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September 1 1th ushered in a period of existential doubt for many
Americans, raising questions about why we are hated, what are our values, and
what, if anything, should change. This paper explores the range of values
implicated by war and compares today's dominant values with those that
prevailed during previous American wars, with a particular emphasis on the
World War Two and early Cold War period.
War is related to values, and as economists like to remind us, what we
value becomes apparent in the movement of people and prices. While it is easy
to talk the talk of promoting democracy and defending freedom, this inquiry is
directed less at the rhetoric of political leadership, and more at the reality of
policy and action. Part I of this Article considers the moral, ethical and
monetary values that prevailed throughout the 1940's and early 1950's. This
historical review suggests that the normative threads that kept the World War
Two effort on track were those of mobilization and shared sacrifice. These
dominant assumptions, which permeated at both strategic and tactical levels of
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politics and planning, represented a distinct "mobilization model" with big
government serving as the central counter-force to private business interests.
The mobilization model empowered the federal government to achieve its
most important public policy objectives while enforcing limits on the self-
interested activities of private actors. Those limits are perhaps best reflected
in the neutralization of monetary policy and the application of administrative
and regulatory authority to maintain price stability while channeling credit to
the public sector. The Congress appropriated and the Executive spent on a
massive scale. Resources-financial, human, technological and industrial-
were mobilized. Production and consumption patterns were redirected, first to
the war effort, and later to reconstruction for a lasting peace in Western Europe
and Japan. Meanwhile on the home front, the wartime mobilization fulfilled the
New Deal promise of full employment, and thereby represented a break with
the avarice of the 1920's and the widespread demoralization of the Great
Depression.
War today reflects far different moral, ethical and monetary values. Today
we see the imagery and rhetoric of war, but rarely do we see the ethic of shared
sacrifice. Government power is routinely constrained by private interests.
There has been no significant mobilization of resources. Instead, there is a high
value placed on a "business as usual" ethic that tolerates gross disparities in the
burdens and benefits of waging war. Meanwhile, without mobilization, the
production and consumption patterns of American society remain largely
unchanged by the war. Strategic objectives are never fulfilled, and the war goes
from bad to worse.
Part II contrasts the World War Two mobilization with the relative
complacency of America's response to September 11 th and the conduct of war
ever since. In the initial shock of September 11 th, Americans pulled together
and seemed ready for service and sacrifice. But the nation's political leadership
instead called for private spending and private consumption as usual and a
continuation of the economic policies of the past two decades that in many
ways resembled the period of financial hedonism that led to the Great
Depression and World War Two.
For all its lofty rhetoric, the Bush administration's ambitious goals of
spreading freedom and democracy are doomed to failure as long as the
dominant value of American society remains business as usual. It is the failure
to mobilize massive resources under conditions of shared sacrifice that has left
the United States weakened at home and therefore with limited capabilities to
exert its will abroad.
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I. SHARED SACRIFICE AND DEMOCRACY MOBILIZED
Prior to World War Two, the U.S. economy languished. The Great
Depression left one in four American workers jobless and swelled the ranks of
the bread line and soup kitchen.' This was a period of weak and ineffective
liberal democracies, social unrest and political extremism. Throughout Europe
and Asia, the rise of Fascism and Communism would usher in one of the
darkest periods in human history.
The early New Deal nurtured a tepid economic recovery through jobs
programs and public works projects. But in 1937 the economic stimulus
suddenly ended. Fiscal policy was tightened with the introduction of the Social
Security tax, and monetary policy was tightened when the Federal Reserve
doubled reserve requirements. The result was the Roosevelt Recession of 1938,
one of the sharpest economic declines on record, which pushed unemployment
back up from fourteen percent to nineteen percent.2 On the eve of Pearl Harbor,
the U.S. unemployment rate was still at double-digits.3
A. Fiscal Mobilization and Home Front Boom
After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. followed the first rule of warfare by
mobilizing its financial, industrial and human resources to the war effort.4 The
most comprehensive mobilization in history helped bring the war to an end in
less than four years. The sacrifice was so widespread and the victory so
complete that the World War Two generation is now routinely referred to as
"the Greatest Generation."5
Federal spending was the driving force behind the mobilization, from
ordering munitions and building new factories to allocating resources and
regulating the economy by command and control. In the first six months of the
war, the government placed over $100 billion in war contracts, thereby ordering
more goods than the economy had ever produced in a single year.6
1. BROADUS MITCHELL, DEPRESSION DECADE: FROM NEW ERATHROUGHNEW DEAL, 1929-1941
271 (1947).
2. LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THINKING AND
POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR 1 3 (1996).
3. HAROLD G. VATTER, THEU.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD WAR II 11 (1985).
4. SUN-TzU, THE ART OF WARFARE 103, 107 (Roger T. Ames trans., 1993) (Sun-Tzu considered
the primacy of resource mobilization to be justified by the magnitude of war, which is "the most vital matter
of state[,]"... "the field on which life or death is determined and the road that leads to either survival or ruin
.Id. at 103.).
5. See, e.g., TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998).
6. NATHAN MILLER, FDR: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 486 (1983); see also JOHN M. BLUM, EDMUND
S. MORGAN, WILLIE LEE ROSE, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., KENNETH M. STAMPP, & C. VANN
WOODwARD, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1965 683 (4th ed.
2006]
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This hyper-active fiscal stimulus required centralized controls and
planning on a level unprecedented in American history. As Eliot Janeway
recognized in his classic economic history of the mobilization model, any
regime based on planning is naturally susceptible to abuse, corruption, incom-
petence and scandal. Without the diversion of the boom and the necessities of
war, controls would die a quick death of a thousand cuts. Private interests
would always organize to resist sacrifice. The politics of interest group plura-
lism would overwhelm bureaucrats and legislators alike. It was only the scale
of the mobilization and the ethic of shared sacrifice that could provide the
political cover required for controls and planning.
Franklin Roosevelt, as epic war president, was too practical to micro-
manage such a vast mobilization. According to Janeway:
So long as the home front was big at the base, Roosevelt was willing
to bet that he could afford to let it be confused at the top... The
participation of the people would push it forward faster than any
leaders could lead it, and the spontaneous dramatics of democracy
would organize it.7
The key to making the home front big at the base was the massive fiscal
expansion, an achievement that was nothing short of a revolution in economics
and public finance. In 1940, total U.S. government spending was $6 billion.
By 1944 it had risen more than fifteen-fold to $95 billion. Total wartime
spending was more than $320 billion, twice as large as all previous federal
spending combined.8
The unprecedented size of federal spending reflected the government's
complete commitment to waging total war by mobilizing the home front as
quickly as possible.9 The explosion in federal spending translated directly into
1977) ("In 1942 the proportion of the economy committed to war production grew from 15 to 33 percent.
By the end of 1943 federal expenditures for goods and services constituted a sum larger than the total output
of the economy when Roosevelt took office a decade earlier. The gross national product grew from $99.7
billion in 1940 to $211.9 billion in 1945...").
7. ELIOT JANEWAY, THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: A CHRONICLE OF ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION
IN WORLD WAR H 12-13, 16 (1951) (Janeway saw compelling similarities between Roosevelt and Lincoln,
another epic war president who recognized that a "victory small enough to be organized is too small to be
decisive." Likewise, throughout the war Roosevelt "looked to democracy and not to leaders, to democracy's
reservoir of mass energy and faith and not to the custodians of specialized wisdom.")
8. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960 556 (1963); see generally BLUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 683-84.
9. The urgency and comprehensive nature of the mobilization reflected the value of shared
sacrifice. As Roosevelt himself said in a fireside chat to the nation little more than two months after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, "Never before have we had so little time in which to do so much." On
Progress of the War (nationwide and worldwide broadcast Feb. 23, 1942), available at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/022342.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
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an enormous economic boom and according to Janeway, the release of
"democracy's reservoir of mass energy and faith."'
By some estimates the country's industrial output tripled during the war."
By any measure, World War Two was the most impressive economic expansion
in American history, with real U.S. economic growth rates exceeding 15 percent
a year during the war's three peak years and averaging double digits throughout
the war.1 2 By way of comparison, in the five years since September 1 lth, the
real U.S. economic growth rate has been less than one-fifth of the peak World
War Two growth rates. 3
The U.S. mobilization of technological, industrial and human resources
exceeded the efforts of all other belligerents combined. The nation's steel mills
operated at 120 percent of their estimated pre-war capacity.'4 Many U.S.
factories operated in triple shifts, twenty-four hours a day. According to
historian William O'Neill, people thought FDR was crazy when he called for
the production of 50,000 aircraft. But by 1945 the U.S. had built 300,000
aircraft, 245,000 for the Army and Navy, the rest for the Allies.15 Likewise
with other areas of American war production. The U.S. tanker fleet grew from
a total capacity of 2.5 million tons in 1941 to 11.4 million tons in 1945, while
the nation's factories produced 8,243 warships, 64,000 landing vessels, and
86,000 tanks. 6 For the first and only time in American history, full employ-
ment was a reality. There was no involuntary joblessness; anyone who wanted
a job could find work quickly.'7 Unemployment vanished. By the end of the
10. JANEWAY, supra note 7, at 13.
11. See generally AMERICA IN WORLD WAR 11, in HOPE AND MEMORY, ADBUSTERS: JOURNAL OF
THE MENTAL ENVIRONMENT, 53 (MAY/JUNE 2004).
12. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 220, 223 (1984) (Table B-1, showing increase in U.S.
gross national product from $100 billion in 1940 to $210 billion in 1944; Table B-2, showing real (inflation-
adjusted) growth rates for those same years of 7.6, 16.3, 15.3, 15.1 and 7.1 percent), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/ERP/issue/1387/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
13. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND RELATED PRICE MEASURES: INDEXES AND PERCENT CHANGES,
ECONOMIC INDICATORS 3 (2006) (monthly compilation prepared for the Joint Economic Committee by the
Council of Economic Advisors reporting real GDP growth rates of 0.8, 1.6, 2.5, 3.9, and 3.2 for the years
2001-2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=economic-indicators
&docid=03jy06.txt.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
14. LYNN TURGEON, THE ADVANCED CAPITALIST SYSTEM: A REVISIONIST VIEW 47 (1980) ("In
1940 steel mills were running at 82 percent of capacity and pouring 67 million tons a year. In 1945 the mills
poured 89 million tons, half the world's total B with the same-size workforce."); WILLIAM O'NEILL, THE
OXFORD ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO WORLD WARn 162 (2002).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. TURGEON, supra note 2, at 5.
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war, the civilian unemployment rate had fallen to 1.2 percent.'8 With such a
boom in the labor market, many citizens who were previously excluded,
particularly many African-Americans and at least 6.5 million American women,
entered the labor force for the first time." As O'Neill noted, by the war's end,
black Americans "held 7.5 percent of all jobs in war industries; ... less than
their share of the overall population but a great improvement over 1940. "2o
B. Military Mobilization: From Wartime Employment to Post-War
Assimilation
Of course, it was not only the civilian side of the economy that boomed.
The military draft was the centerpiece of the mobilization. To be sure, there
were sons of the well-connected who were able to stay out of harm's way, but
there were also many from such families who gave their lives, and their
visibility reinforced the widespread feelings of shared sacrifice.
In September 1939, when World War Two broke out in Europe, the U.S.
had fewer than 190,000 men in its armed forces. There were still only about
270,000 Americans in uniform when France fell to Hitler's armies in 1940.21
But public opinion finally galvanized behind a national military draft, and the
draft changed everything. Some ten million American men were drafted, and
another six million enlisted on their own. Local draft boards preferred to call
up single men younger than forty."2 Unlike much of the Vietnam War, there
were no student deferments.23
As O'Neill concluded, "Selective Service was generally regarded as fair,
in part because conscription was not as rigorously applied in the United States
as in most other belligerent nations." '24 Thirty percent of all draftees-more
18. This 1.2 percent unemployment rate probably represented normal, frictional unemployment,
when people left one job assured there would be a better one already waiting for them to fill. It was far lower
than contemporary estimates of frictional unemployment. Ronald S. Warren, Jr., The Estimation ofFrictional
Unemployment: A Stochastic Frontier Approach, 73:2 REv. ECON. & STATS. 373-77 (199 1) (estimating
frictional unemployment at 3.7 percent).
19. O'NEILL, supra note 14 at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 254.
22. Id. at 162, 323 (16 million American men served in the military during the war, in which 10
million were draftees).
23. Student exemptions, which were part of the original Selective Service Act of 1940, were
dropped in 1941, when the draft was extended by a single vote in the House of Representatives. Id. at 254,
323; see also How the Draft Has Changed Since Vietnam, Selective Service System (2002), available at
http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
24. In response to the military manpower shortage of 1944, the exemption for fatherhood was lifted;
ONEILL, supra note 14, at 323.
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than five million men-were classified as 4-F, rejected for a wide range of
physical conditions and mental ailments.25
The Selective Service system recognized conscientious objectors-those
who objected to combatant and sometimes even noncombatant training and
service on religious grounds.26 About 25,000 conscientious objectors served in
the U.S. military in noncombatant roles during the war, including many
unarmed medics who served in combat. Another 20,000 objectors served on the
home front, building conservation projects in rural areas 27 and taking care of
the mentally ill in hospitals.28 Finally, about 6,000 men who refused to register
for the draft were sent to jail for the war,29 a rather remarkably low figure given
the total size of the U.S. draft population.
There was a certain harshness in the military discipline of conservation
camps for conscientious objectors, but such inequities seemed minor compared
to the horrors of combat. While libertarians may object to the compulsory
nature of the draft, there is no doubt that mobilization was needed to win the
war and that mobilizing on a mass scale meant the war was ended quicker.
Moral and ethical values of shared sacrifice were apparent in the
mobilization. People were willing to sacrifice time, money and even their lives
for the sake of future generations, in part because they felt the sacrifices were
being shared, if not perfectly, at least with a rough justice.
Every sector and group in society was called on to do its part. The wealthy
were taxed, business freedoms were constrained, consumer goods were
rationed, wages and prices were managed, credit was channeled away from
more frivolous investments, and every social class from rich to poor was
conscripted into the war effort.3"
Throughout the war, at a time when the U.S. population was half the size
of today, some sixteen million Americans served in uniform, twelve million at
25. The 4-F Classification for the Draft During World War II, Nebraska Studies, available at
www.nebraskastudies.org/0800/stories/0801_0106.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
26. About the Agency-Classifications, Selective Service System (2002), available at
http://www.sss.gov/classif.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
27. Many conscientious objectors served by fighting forest fires, including the smoke jumpers in
Oregon who parachuted down to fight fires started by the thousands of timed incendiary balloons released
in Japan. "Thus ironically, the only direct attacks on the continental United States during World War Two
were repulsed, in part, by conscientious objectors." Perilous Fight: America 's World Warllin Color, Public
Broadcast System, available at www.pbs.org/perilousfight/social/objectors/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2006).
28. This mobilization ofreligious conscience, even as directed away from war and towards the care
of the mentally ill, was not without its liberating effects as conscientious objectors were first to expose the
systematic terrors and abuses in many of the nation's mental hospitals. Id.
29. These included many Jehovah's Witnesses not granted conscientious objector status on the
grounds that while they opposed World War Two, they did not oppose all wars.
30. See generally VATTER, supra note 3, at 45-65.
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the war's peak. 31 Across the country, Army training centers and universities
were educating Americans by the millions for intelligence and support roles,
including as cryptographers and translators in strategically important languages
such as German, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese.32
In every theater of the war, the outcome turned on Allied capabilities in
cracking enemy codes. Major Allied victories-from the Battle of Midway to
D-Day-were made possible by the intelligence derived from massive armies
of cryptographers monitoring German and Japanese communications.33
War is a race against uncertain probabilities and unknown dangers.
Without the vast Allied intelligence infrastructure, the war would have surely
dragged on much longer. For instance, had the U.S. been blind going into
Midway, our Pacific fleet may have been destroyed and sent into full retreat
back towards the west coast of the continental United States. As with any
number of major engagements, another outcome at Midway-considered "the
most strategically important battle of the Pacific war ' 34-would have meant a
setback in time.
In war, time can be costly. This is perhaps easy to forget in today's war,
where threats are privatized, hidden, and patient. In World War Two, the race
was cruder, but also clearer. Had the U.S. and its allies mobilized more slowly,
and had the Germans mobilized earlier,35 the very outcome of the war could
have been altered by German breakthroughs in missile and jet engine
technology and the introduction of air-to-air and ground-to-air rockets.36
31. By contrast, today, with twice the population, there are less than 140,000 Americans serving
in Iraq, some 1.4 million on active duty in the Armed Forces, and perhaps another million in the Reserves and
National Guard. JoAnne O'Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, US. Forces in Iraq, CRS Report for Congress,
(June 14, 2006); Edward F. Bruner, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?,
CRS Report to Congress, (Jan. 24, 2006).
32. O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 162-66; U.S. Army Center of Military History, available at
http://www.army.mi/cmh-pgfbooks/Lineage/mi/ch5.htm. (last visited Sep. 25, 2006).
33. See generally JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT'S SECRET WAR: FDR AND WORLD WAR H
ESPIONAGE (2001); see also O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 168-71 (Particularly crucial was the MAGIC pro-
gram that broke the Japanese diplomatic, and eventually, military codes; and ULTRA, the program that
cracked the German ENIGMA code "played an important part in the Battle of the Atlantic, enabling the Allies
to divert convoys from areas to which U-boats had been ordered.").
34. Id. at 346.
35. Hitler's delay in ordering total mobilization allowed him to keep his plans to invade Russia
secret. See generally WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH (1990) (on file with
author); O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 136 (Germany did not mobilize fully until after D-Day).
36. JOZEF GARLINSKI, HITLER'S LAST WEAPONS' 112-37 (1978); see also O'NEILL, supra note 14,
at 137, 225-26 (discussing the German Messerschmitt 262 fighter plane, the world's first jet aircraft, and
German rocket technology).
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Mobilization opened a universe of possibilities not just in waging war, but
also in the post-war occupations." In addition to the massive U.S. military
presence providing the necessary security on the ground, there were armies of
U.S. civil administrators, many of whom were also taught German and Japanese
to help ensure highly effective occupations and civil reconstructions in post-war
Germany and Japan.3" While Niall Ferguson suggests that the leaders of the
American occupation "were almost completely ignorant of the language and
culture of their new subjects," it is also true that they governed through a
military and administrative apparatus that was not lacking in numbers or
language abilities, particularly when compared with today's American
occupation projects.39
According to Stanley Katz, at the end of World War Two, there were one
hundred U.S. soldiers in Germany for every thousand Germans, and it took two
years for that number to fall to about ten. In Japan, there were five U.S.
soldiers for every thousand Japanese. "By contrast, in Iraq and Afghanistan,
where the population is anything but compliant, there are fewer than six
soldiers for every thousand Iraqis, and about two-tenths of a soldier for every
thousand Afghans."4
The post-war mobilization also included the Marshall Plan, by which the
U.S. gave more than $13 billion in goods and services to rebuild Western
Europe and Japan. It is hard to imagine the success of the Marshall Plan and
other U.S. foreign assistance in Western Europe and Japan without the
mobilization of U.S. military and industrial resources.
37. SeegenerallyJOHN GIMBEL, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONOF GERMANY 1-25 (1968);seealso
John Gimbel, Governing the American Zone of Germany, in AMERICANS AS PROCONSULS: UNITED STATES
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, 1944-1952 92-102 (Robert Wolfe ed., 1984).
38. Rhonda Evans, A History of the Service of Ethnic Minorities in the U.S. Armed Forces,
eScholarship Repository, University of California, 31 n.73, 33 (2003), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/isber/cssmm/cssmm07 (last visited Sept. 10, 2003) (reporting that several
thousand Japanese American soldiers were assigned to the Military Intelligence Service, where they
"translated documents, interrogated Japanese prisoners, and monitored communications on the Pacific Front,"
perhaps shortening the war by as much as two years).
39. NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 71-72 (2004)
(reporting that the U.S. army that occupied Japan was large, "four hundred thousand strong at first, and
although that number soon halved, it did not fall below one hundred thousand until 1957").
40. STANLEY N. KATZ, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION:
REFLECTIONS ON THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 181-96
(2006). Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argued that withdrawing from Iraq "would be the
modem equivalent of handing post-war Germany back to the Nazis."; David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker,
On Anniversary, Bush and Cheney See Iraq Success, N.Y. TIMES, March 20,2006, at Al, Ai 0. But without
sufficient troop strength in Iraq, the U.S. military was never able to close off Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria
and Saudi Arabia. The historical comparisons in U.S. troop strength suggest that Mr. Rumsfeld's quagmire
in Iraq may be the equivalent of never completely defeating the Nazis prior to occupying Germany.
2006]
10 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
The wartime mobilization also helped to assimilate racial and ethnic
minorities and new immigrant groups into the mainstream of American
society." Americans of German, Italian and Japanese ancestry in particular
proved their loyalty by joining the U.S. war effort. Before the war, Italian and
Sicilian immigrants and their children often suffered discrimination and even
violence.42 Many were the migrant workers and manual laborers of the day,
digging the ditches and building the sewers and subways of cities like New
York.43 Then during World War Two, more than a million Italian-Americans
served in the U.S. armed forces, the largest ethnic group to serve," and suffered
the highest U.S. casualties of any ethnic group.45 The war and its aftermath
catapulted many of them into the mainstream of the American middle class.
Service in the armed forces, the average length of which was thirty-three
months during the war," forced new immigrant groups to mix with English-
speaking populations. Institutions that depended upon foreign languages began
to disappear, and the foreign-language press declined as the descendants of
immigrants were increasingly assimilated through military service and in the
workplace.47 Perhaps assimilation could have been achieved for these
immigrant groups without the decline of their languages of origin. But their
participation in the U.S. war effort helped to free their ancestral homelands
from totalitarian oppression and thereby did much to ensure the future survival
of the democratic tradition in their cultures of origin.
41. PHILIP GLEASON, AMERICANS ALL: WORLD WAR II AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN IDENTITY,
REVIEW OF POLITICS 483-518 (1981).
42. LEONARD DINNERSTEIN AND DAVID M. REIMERS, ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 64 (1975); 3-1 C. WEBB, THE LYNCHING OF SICILIAN AMERICANS IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1886-1910: AMERICAN NINETEENTH CENTURY HISTORY 45-76 (Spring 2002).
43. See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, ITALIAN AMERICAN: THE RACIALIZING OF AN ETHNIC
IDENTITY 5 (1999).
44. An estimated 1.2 million Italian-American men served in the war, making up about 7.5 percent
of the total U.S. armed forces. See generally SALVATORE J. LAGUMINA, ET AL., THE ITALIAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (2000); Italian Culture: Defense of our Country, ORDER SONS OF ITALY
IN AMERICA, Oct. 2005, at 2 (providing estimate that Italian-Americans made up about ten percent of U.S.
armed forces during the war).
45. Prisoners Among Us: Italian-American Identity and World War II, Teacher's Guide, Prisoners
Among Us, at 4, available at http://www.prisonersamongus.com/StudyGuide.pdf(last visited on September
26, 2006) ("Although many Italian Americans were uneasy about going to war against Italy, they supported
the United States once war came. Even those segments of the Italian-American press that had praised
Mussolini and Fascism in Italy proclaimed their loyalty to America and endorsed the American war effort.");
see DINNERSTEIN AND REIMERS, supra note 42, at 142.
46. O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 323.
47. The First World War was particularly unkind to the German-American press. It undermined
the standing of the German language and drove it out of the schools. DINNERSTEIN AND REIMERS, supra note
42, at 143.
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Even for African-American soldiers who were largely relegated to second
class status throughout the war, military service provided a big boost for more
than half a million of them. As O'Neill has pointed out, "[flor whites each year
of military service was worth as much to their earning power as an additional
year of education. But for blacks each year of service was worth up to three
years of education. 48
As the end of World War Two approached, Congress passed the Service-
men's Readjustment Act of 1944, the so-called G.I. Bill of Rights, to assist
veterans in job training and higher education, health care, employment and
business. Some seventeen million veterans received federally-subsidized low-
interest loans for home mortgages,49 and between 1945 and 1952, veterans
received $13.5 billion for education and training alone.50
The G.I. Bill was a massive education and jobs program, a domestic
Marshall Plan that ensured the continuing strength and greatness of the Greatest
Generation. Without the war and its mobilization, for an entire generation of
Americans the benefits of the booming economy and the social tonic of
assimilation would have been delayed at best.5 Assimilation may eventually
have come for America's minorities and newer immigrant groups, but the road
no doubt would have been harder.
Since World War Two, there have been no opportunities comparable in
size and scope to assimilate the nation's minority and newer immigrant groups,
such as Mexican-Americans, Arab-Americans and Islamic-Americans.52 While
there are some educational and economic benefits for those who do enlist in the
all-volunteer military, there is not the same kind of assimilation associated with
a full-employment economy and armed forces drawing from all segments of
society.
Many liberals will be put off by the suggestion that war be used to
assimilate the mosaic of ethnic diversity back into an American melting pot.
Some will argue against the very goal of assimilation and against the idea of
war. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is a broader consensus that military
mobilization may deter conflict while spreading the benefits of Marshall Plan
48. Id. at 3.
49. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 16 (2d ed. 2005) (In passing the G.I. Bill,
Congress was determined not to repeat its past neglect of war veterans. In 1932, after denying relief to World
War One veterans, President Herbert Hoover called in the Army, under the command of General Douglas
MacArthur, to violently evict the so-called "Bonus Army" of thousands of World War One veterans from the
streets of Washington); MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 109-10.
50. BLUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 722.
51. Evans, supra note 38, at 20-22.
52. See DINNERSTEIN AND REIMERS, supra note 42, at 142.
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and G.I. Bill programs to segments of society that have long been marginalized
and excluded from the American Dream.
C. The Mobilization ofAdministration and Finance: From Agency Capture
to Political Accountability
The total cost of the U.S. effort in World War Two was about $320
billion-twice as large as all previous federal spending combined. 3 How did
Uncle Sam raise such vast sums of money to pay for the war? Certainly, higher
taxes paid for a portion of the war costs. The tax structure was broadened and
deepened, and the marginal tax rate was raised to ninety-four percent for the top
tax bracket. But taxes covered only about forty-one percent of the total war
effort. The rest came from government borrowing. 4
In 1944 alone, the federal deficit was $50 billion, twice the size of the
accumulated federal debt in 1941. During the war, the national debt grew six-
fold to $280 billion. To provide some historical comparison, today the federal
deficit is less than three percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). In
World War Two, the deficit was easily ten times larger than today, at more than
thirty percent of GDP. Likewise, today the total federal debt is about sixty-five
percent of GDP. By the end of World War Two, the national debt was nearly
twice as large, more than 120 percent of GDP.55
How did the U.S. meet such enormous borrowing needs? According to
today's conventional wisdom, if the federal government were to once again run
deficits of such magnitude, interest rates would rise to extraordinarily high
levels. The public sector would have to compete with private borrowers for
limited funds, thereby bidding up interest rates. In addition, the higher deficits
would translate into expectations of rising inflation and therefore higher long-
term interest rates in the long-term bond market.56
Not surprisingly, when asked about the level of interest rates during the
World War Two period of massive federal borrowing, most people are likely
to estimate that the federal government must have paid five, ten or even fifteen
percent interest.57 They could not be more wrong.
53. FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 556; BLUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 683-84.
54. O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 112-13.
55. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 304 (Feb. 2005); Timothy A. Canova, The
Transformation ofU.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership,
60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (1995).
56. THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 25 (1994) (discussing the impact of fiscal policy actions on "forward-looking
financial markets" and "the level and structure of interest rates"); id. at 30 (discussing the Federal Reserve's
abdication of long-term interest rates to the inflationary expectations of the long-term bond market).
57. These are the results of informal surveys conducted by the author over the past five years.
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From about 1941 to 1952, interest rates on U.S. government borrowing
were "pegged" at low levels, during the war years at 0.375 percent for short-
term ninety-day Treasury bills and 2.5 percent for long-term (ten-year) Treasury
bonds.58 The Federal Reserve was required to purchase government securities
at any price necessary to keep interest rates at these pegs. The Federal
Reserve's conduct of monetary policy was essentially controlled by the
Treasury Department, a phenomenon quite startling and repugnant to today's
economic orthodoxy that preaches central bank independence.59
Ironically, those with more education in finance and economics have little
knowledge about this period of financial history, and they are more likely to
overestimate the level of U.S. interest rates. The results of such informal
surveys should not be surprising since leading texts in economics and public
finance, and the Federal Reserve's own publications no longer mention this
period of Federal Reserve history.6°
Throughout the 1941 to 1952 "pegged period," the Federal Reserve's
subservient position was enforced not by statute, but by political convention
and necessity. As recounted in Lester Chandler's seminal text, The Economics
of Money and Banking, the Federal Reserve "stood ready to buy without
limitation" the range of government securities to maintain the pegged interest
rates.61 Roosevelt's Treasury Department simply did what today would be the
unthinkable: it forced the Federal Reserve to keep short-term and long-term
interest rates at near zero percent. The real (inflation-adjusted) yield on
government debt was kept in negative territory for a dozen years.62 Finance
capital had to bend to the needs of industrial capital; old wealth had to
accommodate the needs of the present and the hopes for the future.
Fewer than five percent of respondents are able to accurately estimate the level of interest rates for U.S.
borrowing during World War Two.
58. The pegs on short-term rates were relaxed in response to the peak in post-war inflation, with
the peg on Treasury bills rising from 3/8 of I percent to 7/8 of 1 percent in July 1947, and the rate on newly
issued certificates rising from 7/8 to 1.25 percent by late 1948. FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 8,
at 578-79.
59. Likewise, when Lincoln had trouble financing the Civil War, he turned to Congress, which
passed legislation creating the Greenback, a direct issuance of $450 million in currency by the Treasury
Department. WILLIAM F. HIxSON, TRIUMPH OF THE BANKERS: MONEY AND BANKING IN THE EIGHTEENTH
AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 131 (1993); GRETCHEN RITTER, GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE
ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA 29-30 (1997) (the Legal Tender Act
of 1862 and two similar subsequent acts were passed "to save the national economy and provide financing
for the war" by creating the Greenback, a new government-issued currency).
60. THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 105-10 (1947). There is an entire chapter on "War Service of the Federal
Reserve." No such discussion exists in later editions.
61. LESTER V. CHANDLER, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING 482-93 (5th ed. 1969).
62. FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 562-63; CHANDLER, supra note 61, at 482-93.
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The suspension of the Federal Reserve's independence was made possible
because of the politics of shared sacrifice and the practical demands of the
mobilization model. The Fed's 1947 description of its wartime role is telling:
"In time of war the duty of the Federal Reserve, as of everyone, is to support the
country's war effort."63 The amount of government wartime spending was
properly determined by Congress, and it was the Treasury Department's respon-
sibility to determine the character of the government's borrowing obligations,
including the distribution of long-term versus short-term borrowing and "the
rate of interest it will pay to investors."' Only after those policy decisions have
been made by the politically accountable branches of government, "it is the
duty of the Federal Reserve to see to it that the banking system is in a position
to absorb any public debt essential for war expenses that is not purchased by
investors other than banks."65
With the Federal Reserve subservient to Congress and Executive branches,
and with monetary policy neutralized, the mobilization model was able to
quickly emerge as a distinct paradigm. With credit freely available at near-zero
interest rates to the federal government, fiscal policy was not just active-it
became hyperactive. Federal spending did not just double or even triple; it
increased fifteen-fold in only four years.
The mobilization model necessarily raised other important challenges to
administration and control. For central bankers, the "[p]revention of inflation
had to become secondary" to the demands of mobilization, and the Federal
Reserve was forced to "rely in part on selective rather than general methods of
control."66 Without an active monetary policy, other policy tools and other
institutions would have to be found to maintain price stability in such a
dynamic economy.
D. Democratic Accountability and the Pursuit of Price Stability
With the federal government demanding massive resources, spending and
borrowing on a far grander scale in relative terms than today, the Federal
Reserve was forced to channel credit away from consumer borrowing, away
from homebuilding, and away from speculative stock market purchases.67 This
paradigm should be seen as the polar opposite of today's Federal Reserve which
63. THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 105 (1947).
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Id. at 107, ll0.
67. ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, VOL. 1, 1913-1951 602-05 (2003)
(recounting the Federal Reserve's use of selective credit controls); ARTHUR SMITHIES, USES OF SELECTIVE
CREDIT CONTROLS 94-105 (Neil H. Jacoby ed., 1964) (lamenting the surrender of selective credit controls).
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uses only one policy instrument-short-term interest rates-to slow the
economy, without any selective credit controls to prevent speculative bubbles
from developing in the housing and stock markets.
During World War Two, with monetary policy neutralized, the administra-
tion had to find other methods to keep prices stable. Instead of raising interest
rates to stem inflation by slowing the economy, the federal government turned
to wage and price controls, as well as high taxes and massive bond sales to
dampen consumer purchasing power.68
In 1942, Congress created an Office of Price Administration (OPA) under
the direction of a Price Administrator appointed by the President and empower-
ed under the Emergency Price Control Act to set up a comprehensive scheme
for the setting of maximum prices and rents.69 Perhaps no other regulatory
program during the war exacted as much sacrifice from so many Americans.
Throughout the entire mobilization and pegged period, the bankers stood
on the sidelines as inflation and interest rates were controlled by OPA
bureaucrats; and the bureaucrats were elevated on a pedestal of patriotic
support and expectations to provide stability in consumer prices.
The bureaucracy's vast power was tempered by its accountability. Regula-
tory failure was punishable at the polls. Rising consumer prices could cost an
election. Wartime U.S. consumer price inflation (CPI) peaked at 9.2 percent in
1942. Not surprisingly, the 1942 congressional elections left FDR with the
most conservative Congress in decades.7"
As Eliot Janeway recognized, democracy eventually provided its
"spontaneous dramatics." Congress held its hearings and there were purges of
top OPA officials, but in the end Congress kept the OPA strong and funded, and
the Supreme Court upheld the price regulations.7 In Yakus v. United States, the
Supreme Court upheld the federal government's power to impose wage and
price controls." The Court held that the congressional delegation of regulatory
power to the OPA did not violate the non-delegation doctrine since Congress
provided sufficiently definite and precise standards to guide the regulators,
including that prices be set at "fair and equitable" levels and to effectuate
numerous other purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act." While the
delegation was broad and somewhat vague, the Court's ruling implicitly
68. WILLIAM J. BARBER, DESIGNS WITHIN DISORDER: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE ECONOMISTS,
AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1933-1945 142-51 (1996); see generally JANEWAY,
supra note 7.
69. See generally Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
70. BLUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 698.
71. JANEWAY, supra note 7, at 13.
72. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 420.
73. Id
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recognized that the voters would get the last word, and that ineffective OPA
appointees would have a way of killing off incumbents at the polls.74
The Yakus court contrasted the OPA with the industry councils that had set
minimum prices under the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the
centerpiece of the first New Deal which was so concerned with stopping a
deflationary spiral in 1933." 5 But those industry councils were in private hands,
completely unaccountable to voters. For such reasons, a unanimous Supreme
Court in Schecher Poultry v. United States (the "sick chicken case") struck
down the NRA as an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power. In his
concurrence, Justice Cardozo concluded that such a delegation to a private
group was a case of "delegation running riot."76
While the OPA had broad authority, it also had to get the job done.
Annual CPI rates were brought down to 6.3 percent in 1943 and 2.6 percent for
each of the next two years. From Oct. 1942 to Sept. 1945 at the war's end, the
CPI rose only 8.7 percent, less than three percent a year for three years.
Historian has generally concluded that "the OPA was one of the war's brilliant
successes."
77
The World War Two mobilization-and its linchpin, the pegged period of
public finance-lasted for about a dozen years, during which time the U.S. built
postwar prosperity at home and a bulwark of alliances abroad to contain the
expansion of Communism in Europe and Asia. The federal government spent
more than $13 billion (ten percent of the entire federal budget) on the Marshall
Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe, and it spent greater sums under the G.I. Bill
to help assimilate World War Two veterans back into a productive society.
The initial post-war period was less a demobilization than a re-mobiliza-
tion of resources. Throughout the war, the Federal Reserve never attempted to
exert independent authority and did not raise interest rates on federal borrowing
even once.
By the early 1950's, the U.S. was at war in Korea. With the beginning of
the Cold War and the strategy of global containment, U.S. military spending
was increased three-fold, all while allowing for increases in private
consumption at home. But the Federal Reserve showed its first signs of
resistance.78 Then in 1951 with inflation at 7.8 percent, and with the help of
74. Id. at 424.
75. Id.
76. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
77. BLUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 685. FDR bounced back in 1944. He was reelected by a less
comfortable margin, but comfortable nonetheless. The Democrats lost one seat in the Senate but gained
twenty in the House. The Democrats also captured five governorships. Id. at 699.
78. Truman and the Congress fought over the OPA's authority, which was weakened, vetoed,
lapsed, and then renewed. Not surprisingly, inflation returned to over 10 percent in 1946 and Truman took
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some key allies in Congress, the Federal Reserve prevailed in its campaign for
independence. The result was the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March
1951, the Fed's Magna Carta.79 The pegged system of finance soon came to an
end, monetary policy was re-activated, and once again became the primary tool
against inflation. Fiscal policy was pinched and the U.S. promptly went into
a recession, its first of three recessions that would plague the eight years of
Eisenhower's presidency."0
There is arguably no more compelling and important period in U.S.
economic history than the World War Two Era, and yet this so-called "pegged
period" of finance is least remembered and all but airbrushed from our modern
texts. The neutralization of the Federal Reserve and monetary policy provided
vast financial resources to government and industry, creating an economic
boom like none other in history. A great democracy that had stood idle in
depression was suddenly awakened. It sprinted at fifteen percent growth rates,81
and then sustained that blistering pace for three of the bloodiest years in
American history.
While democracies may find it difficult to mobilize and to remain
mobilized for long, there are times when it is an urgent necessity. For a dozen
years, American democracy stayed mobilized. Its discipline and greatness was
reflected in its ability to mobilize its financial, industrial, and human resources
more fully, more quickly, and more effectively than the fascist regimes in
Germany or Japan during World War Two. 2
The period spanning World War Two, the G.I. Bill and the Marshall Plan
was America's finest moment, the mystical moment gone global. The cause of
freedom and equality swept up an entire generation. Whether or not the world
was ultimately savedfor democracy, it was certainly saved by democracy, or
more precisely, by democracy mobilized. The U.S. became the arsenal of
a shellacking in the 1946 congressional elections, with the Republicans carrying both houses ofCongress for
the first time since 1928. BLUM ET AL., supra note 6, at 722.
79. See generally FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 8.
80. TURGEON, supra note 2, at 55, 72, 83.
81. Economists now consider sustained growth rates ofthree to five percent a year as healthy boom
times. During World War Two, the U.S. economy grew nearly five times faster.
82. Neither Germany nor Japan was able to reduce their interest rates for government wartime
borrowing to the low U.S. levels. Both fascist regimes had to contend with private financial interests that
were unrestrained by the countervailing demands of an informed and free public opinion. Germany had
"moderate, but not really low, interest rates," far above the American and British levels. "The lowest average
[interest] rates for Japan reached during World War II were not very low" and never reached the low U.S.
levels. SIDNEY HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 469 476-77, 535 (1963); MICHAEL SCHALLER, THE
AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 5 (1985) (recounting how Japan's traditional conservatives resented
wartime economic controls as threatening the old order).
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democracy and a compelling model of social democracy at a time when
democracy was most in peril.
II. BUSINESS AS USUAL IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
Does the full-employment mobilization model of the Greatest Generation
provide a path for us today? Would conscription help address our most
pressing problems, from security of seaports, borders and the homeland to the
assimilation of minorities and newer immigrant groups? Does the history of
financial mobilization provide a lodestar to imagine alternative futures, to
empower democracy on a global scale?
Perhaps our willingness to consider the World War Two mobilization
model depends in part on how we answer the question in this conference title,
Are We at War? Many Americans believe this is a war. President George W.
Bush and other leading administration officials have repeatedly invoked the
image of the nuclear mushroom cloud." September 11 th, after all, was a failure
of our imagination. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, prior to September
11 th few Americans could imagine enemies hijacking our own airplanes and
crashing them into skyscrappers. Are we now asked to imagine the mushroom
cloud, perhaps multiple mushroom clouds, a nuclear September 11 th with
synchronized suicide bombers?"
Such a dire perspective-that this is a war we could lose-while often
dismissed by academics,85 was apparently the dominant view at the time of the
2004 presidential election. Voters seemed to have no trouble recognizing the
extreme hatred, frustration and resentment that is increasingly directed at
Americans. Perhaps the pressing questions deal less with enemy motivation
than with their technological and logistical capabilities to wage war and engage
in terrorist attacks. And yet these dark concerns have not spurred any serious
mobilization of resources for homeland security and foreign intelligence.
Another perspective, not necessarily incompatible with the first, focuses
on the social and political causes of violent conflict. In his Inaugural Address,
President John F. Kennedy referred to a "long twilight struggle" against the
common enemies of man: "tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."
According to this line of thinking, the war we face is complex and requires a
wide range of economic and political strategies. Although full-employment and
economic opportunity for all would seem necessary to drain the swamp where
83. David E. Sanger, A Doctrine Under Pressure: Pre-Emption is Redefined, N.Y. TlmEs, Oct. 11,
2004, at A10 (quoting President Bush as warning that "we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun
that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.").
84. The FOX-TV show "24" has built a large audience by imaginingjust such nightmare scenarios.
See "24" Season 6:10:00 - 11:00 AM, available at: http://www.fox.com/24/episodes/.
85. See generally Bruce Ackerman, This is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004).
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Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups swim, there is little support among those
on the left for any serious mobilization of resources for Marshall Plans abroad
and G.I. Bills at home.
Barely a week after the September 11 th terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, a Gallup Poll survey showed that nearly eighty
percent of Americans supported a national military draft. 6 This was actually
a higher level of support than existed at the time of the 1940 conscription act.87
But the war in Iraq has dramatically shifted public opinion, and eighty percent
of Americans now oppose any national military draft.8 In the closing days of
the 2004 Presidential election, both parties overwhelmingly rejected a proposal
in the House of Representatives to reinstate mandatory military service by a
vote of 402 to two.8
9
After September ItI' it was common to hear that everything had changed,
that nothing would ever be the same. Yet President Bush made no initial call
for any shared sacrifice, whether in the form of national military service or even
for any significant increase in fuel efficiency standards on vehicles sold in the
U.S. 90 Instead, Americans were told that their patriotic duty was to shop. Five
years later, the same private consumption patterns continue, with the same
dependence on foreign oil imported from the Middle East and the same growing
trade and current account deficits. 9' By September 2003, the Federal Reserve
estimated that forty-six percent of federal debt was held by foreign investors,
including a significant amount by the People's Republic of China.92
Meanwhile, U.S. housing prices reached new heights, while economists have
worried about a possibly unsustainable real estate bubble that is increasingly
financed by unreliable foreign capital flows. 93
This laissez faire, business as usual approach is in sharp contrast to the
Bush Administration's rhetoric about the dangers of mass terrorism. Yet U.S.
borders and ports remain porous, and countless priorities related to national and
86. Jeffrey M. Jones, Support Remains High Even if Military Action is Prolonged, Involves
Casualties, GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 4, 2001, at I (reporting results of Gallup poll survey
conducted Sept. 21-22, 2001).
87. O'NEILL, supra note 14, at 320-25.
88. Darren K. Carlson, Public Support for Military Draft Low, GALLUP POLLNEWS SERVICE, Nov.
18, 2003, at 1.
89. Carl Hulse, Bill to Restore the Draft is Defeated in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,2004, at AS.
90. It took more than three years after September 11 th for President Bush to first call for energy
conservation. David Leonhardt, Jad Mouawad, and David Sanger, To Conserve Gas, President Callsfor Less
Driving, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at AI.
91. FERGUSON, supra note 39, at 268-69, 280-85.
92. Id. at 280.
93. See generally SHILLER, supra note 49.
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homeland security are ignored and neglected.94 In March 2006, undercover
Congressional investigators smuggled into the U.S., across both the Canadian
and Mexican borders, enough radioactive material to make two dirty nuclear
bombs.95 The lack of investment in the levees surrounding New Orleans, and
the painfully slow federal response to Hurricane Katrina highlight the lack of
investment in critical infrastructure and an alarming shortage in first responders
for any natural or man-made disaster.96
Likewise, a number of high level U.S. military officers were apparently
forced into retirement for calling for more "boots on the ground" in Afghanistan
and Iraq.97 Our inability to close off borders and provide sufficient numbers of
ground forces and foreign language translators undermined military objectives
from the outset. In Afghanistan, the result has hardly been satisfying. Osama
Bin Laden remains out of reach, perhaps in the tribal heart of Pakistan, a
country with dozens of nuclear weapons. In Iraq, the shortage of troops and
translators contributed to the breakdown of security, the rise of an insurgency,
the onset of civil war, and a political vacuum that is increasingly filled by
neighboring Iran. 9'
The Bush Administration has tried to keep the National Security Agency's
domestic surveillance program out of the reach of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act courts instead of expending political capital to mobilize the
resources required for effective overseas surveillance of foreign foes. During
94. Damien Cave, Vital MilitaryJobs Go Unfilled, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,2005,atA16;
James Risen, C.LA. Unit on bin Laden Is Understaffed, a Senior Official Tells Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2004, at A 18; Rachel L. Swams, Officers Lack Skills to Vet Saudis Seeking U.S. Visas, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A20; Dan Eggen, FB1Agents Still Lacking Arabic Skills, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
2006, at AOl (reporting that "only 33 FBI agents have even a limited proficiency in Arabic, and none of them
work in the sections of the bureau that coordinate investigations of international terrorism, according to new
FBI statistics.").
95. Eric Lipton, Testers Slip Radioactive Materials Over Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,2006, at
A14.
96. See generally STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE (2004); Edward Alden,
Commission hits at 'shocking'post-9/11 failures, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at 14 (reporting the
September 1 th Commission's follow-up report giving the U.S. failing grades on homeland security and
intelligence reform).
97. Prior to the Iraq War, General Eric Shinseki, then Army chief of staff, told Congress that the
U.S.-led coalition would need "several hundred thousand" troops during any occupation ofIraq. Albert R.
Hunt, What Might Have Been, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2003, at Al 7; A Rand Corporation study estimated that
500,000 American and coalition forces would be needed to secure Iraq. Fred Kaplan, The Army, Faced With
Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at 4.
98. At the time ofthis writing, tens ofthousands ofIraqis are fleeing from mixed Shiite-Sunni areas,
"moving the country toward a de facto partitioning along sectarian and ethnic lines" between Shiites, Sunni
and Kurds. Edward Wong and Kirk Semple, Civilians in Iraq Flee Mixed Areas As Killings Rise, N.Y.
TIMES, April 2, 2006, at 1.
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World War Two, the U.S. monitored a flood of communication traffic within
the Axis block. Today, the administration clearly lacks the resources to
effectively monitor communications even within the Bin Laden family, perhaps
between Saudi Arabia and the far reaches of Pakistan.
In early 2006, President Bush proposed spending $114 million on
educational programs to expand the teaching of Arabic, Chinese, Farsi and
other foreign languages.99 In a country with 300 million citizens, with a gross
domestic product of nearly $13 trillion a year, such a program could easily be
ten or even a hundred times larger.' With fears of mass terrorism and suicide
nuclear bombers, perhaps it should be. But with an independent and
unaccountable Federal Reserve, such a mobilization of resources is simply not
an option.
The first rule of warfare is to mobilize resources, starting first with
financial resources.' 0 ' In contrast to the pegged period of World War Two
finance, today's Federal Reserve remains blissfully independent and aloof from
the cares of war. Over the past five years of war and occupation in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Fed raised short-term interest rates in seventeen consecutive
meetings. 1°2 The key rate on short-term government borrowing is nearly five
percentage points higher (that's more than fourteen times higher) than during
the World War Two pegged period. The higher interest rate has meant
hundreds of billions of dollars in additional federal, local and state expenditures
on interest on newly-issued government debt. 1
03
Throughout World War Two, the Federal Reserve did not dare to raise
interest rates once on federal borrowing. Today, however, its unaccountable
position seems assured. In the 1970's and 1980's, there were a number of
99. Michael Janofsky, Bush Proposes Broader Language Training, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2006, at
AI5.
100. The deficiencies in U.S. foreign language capabilities are jarring. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.1. Said
to Lag on Translations of Terror Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at Al (reporting that more than 120,000
hours of potentially terrorism-related surveillance recordings had not yet been translated by FBI linguists);
Richard B. Schmitt, Translation Capacity Still Spotty After 9/11, L.A. TIMES, May 1,2005, atA24; Douglas
Jehl, C.I.A. Reviews Security Policy for Translators, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at Al; Eric Lichtblau, At
F.B.I., Translation Lags, as Does the System Upgrade, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at A20.
101. Sun-Tzu's first rule is to marshal sufficient gold to pay for the physical mobilization of armies.
SuN Tzu, supra note 4, at 107. Likewise, former U.S. Secretary of State and NATO Commander Alexander
M. Haig, Jr., recently suggested the need for greater mobilization: "Every asset of the nation must be applied
to the conflict to bring about a quick and successful outcome, or don't do it." Scott Allen, Vietnam-Era Aides
Cite the Lessons of a US Defeat, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 2006, at B5.
102. Eduardo Porter, Fed Panel Raises Rate to 4.75 percent, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2006, at C 1.
103. For instance, each $1 billion of newly-issued state bonds costs the California treasury about $65
million a year in principal and interest costs. The state will ultimately repay $2 billion for every $1 billion
borrowed over a 30-year period. Erin Riches and Jean Ross, Bonds or taxes: What is the cost of bonds?,
CALIFORNIA TEACHER, Feb./Mar. 2006, at 4, available at www.cbp.org (last visited Sep. 26, 2006).
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important constitutional challenges to the Federal Reserve's structure. The
members of the Fed's Board of Governors enjoy fourteen-year terms, longer
than any other federal officials, and do not rely on Congress for any budgetary
appropriations.
Most troubling, however, is the structure of the Fed's Open Market
Committee, which includes interested parties, namely the presidents of the
twelve private regional Federal Reserve Banks. This arrangement clearly
violates the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the Schechter Poultry case
against delegations to private groups." 4 It is certainly a case of "delegation
running riot" that would not pass constitutional scrutiny on the substantive
merits. Yet, every legal challenge has been dismissed on procedural grounds.
The courts have either denied standing to private plaintiffs, or when members
of Congress have brought suit, the courts have exercised their "equitable
discretion" to dismiss the case without considering the substantive merits of the
claims. 105
While the reluctance of unelected federal judges to strike down the Federal
Reserve may be understandable, there are significant costs to our system of
constitutional democracy from disposing of these cases on procedural grounds.
Without a full discussion of the substantive constitutional issues, the public
discourse is diminished. The result is a shameful silence in the legal academy
and in our politics about the consequences of the Federal Reserve's departure
from basic norms of democratic accountability.
The Federal Reserve's lack of accountability means a hyper-active role for
central bankers in fighting inflation. It also means that our elected branches of
government are constrained and neutralized in their capabilities, unable to
effectively respond to pressing security concerns, social crises and foreign
policy challenges through expansive fiscal policy and spending programs.
The outcome of neutralized fiscal policy may satisfy the "small govern-
ment" preferences of those on the political right, but it does so by requiring
them to turn a blind eye to national security and foreign policy dangers. The
left seems equally satisfied to avoid talk of mobilizing financial or human
resources. A larger military is something they fear in the hands of an
administration that has been incompetent in its use of U.S. military power in
both Afghanistan and Iraq.
It may be that Americans across the political spectrum will eventually
come to see that mobilization is needed once again. Perhaps there is no more
104. See generally Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495.
105. Melcher v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Comm. for
Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Riegle
v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873,878 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
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effective way to assimilate the nation's neglected populations, from young
black men who are more likely to end up in prison than in the labor market,
0 6
to newer immigrant groups, such as those from Mexico, Latin America and
Arab lands, and those of Islamic faith. Certainly, a G.I. Bill of Rights for such
neglected and alienated populations, along with a Marshall Plan for our
neighbors, starting south of the border with Mexico, would provide this
generation with the skills and meaning that it is sadly lacking.
The war in Iraq, however, continues to undermine public support for any
such mass mobilization of human and financial resources. But rather than wait
either for events to overtake us in Iraq or for another September 11 th, perhaps
on a much larger and more deadly scale, it is imperative that we begin to rebuild
our strength and unity at home and our respect and capabilities abroad. Our
first step on that long road is to recognize how American democracy has
mobilized its reservoir of mass energy and faith in the past.
106. Erik Eckholm, Plight Deepens For Black Men, Studies Warn, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at
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[I]t is an established fact that documents justifying and authorizing
the abusive treatment ofdetainees during interrogation were approved
and distributed .... [T]his policy demonstrates that this war has
tested more than our nation's ability to defend itself. It has tested our
response to our fears and the measure of our courage. It has tested
our commitment to our most fundamental values and our
constitutional principles.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately after the attacks on the United States of September 11,2001,
President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to
undertake electronic surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.2 This was only the first step of an expansive set of claims for
the President to act on his own authority to respond to the "war on terror,"
without regard to whether Congress or the courts would approve or support
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; B.B.A., University of Michigan (1965);
J.D., Detroit College of Law (1968); LL.M. in Public International & Comparative Law, George Washington
University (1969); LL.M. (Environmental Law), Columbia University (1974).
1. Alberto J. Mora, AnAffront to American Values, WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at A25. Mr. Mora
retired as Navy General Counsel in 2005.
2. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000) (electronic surveillance); id. at §§ 1821-29 (physical searches); id. at §§ 1841-46
(pen registers and similar devices); id at §§ 1861-62 (access to business records); id at § 1871 (annual
reports to Congress). For the President's authorization of surveillance, see James Risen &. Eric Lichtblau,
Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at Al. See also James Bamford,
The Nation: Private Lives; The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at sec. 4,
pg. 1; Dan Eggan, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying: Post-9/11 Order Bypassed Special Court, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16,2005, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Domestic Surveillance: SpyAgencyMineda Vast
Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al.
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these decisions. The President claimed, among other powers, the power to
launch preemptive wars on his own authority3 (although in actuality he sought
and obtained authorization to use military force from the Congress'); the power
to disregard the laws of war pertaining to occupied lands;5 and the power to
define the status and treatment of persons detained as "enemy combatants" in
the war on terror.6
These claims were not an accident. Vice-President Cheney stated publicly,
more than once, that these steps were part of a plan to restore the Presidency to
"the proper scope" of its powers even more than a means to defend the nation.'
3. National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15
(Sept. 17,2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited November 1, 2006). See
also George W. Bush, Commencement Speech at the U.S. Military Academy, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Docs. 944, 946 (June 10, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/
200206010-3 (last visited November 1, 2006). For a recent reaffirmation of this policy, see Peter Baker,
Bush to Restate Terror Strategy: 2002 Doctrine of Preemptive War to Be Reaffirmed, WASH. POST, Mar.
16,2006, at Al; David E. Sanger, Report Backs Iraq Strike and Cites Iran Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,2006,
at A6. See also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2002); sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine ofPreemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL.
L. REv. 685 (2005).
4. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(hereinafter"Authorization I"); Authorization of the Use of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243,
116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (hereinafter "Authorization IV').
5. See U.S.-U.K. Letter to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/53 8 (May 8, 2003) (indicating
that the two nations "will strictly abide by their obligations under international law including those relating
to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq"). See David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The
Law of Belligerent Occupation and the US. Invasion of Iraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 121, 189-90 (2005);
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 97,
154-63 (2004).
6. Military Order No. 1: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). See also Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Memorandum to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) ("Bybee Memorandum"),
available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2006); Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and to William J. Haynes,
General Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006); Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum of the Secretary
of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Status of Taliban and al-Qaeda, Jan. 19, 2002, available at
http://lawofwar.org/Rumsfeld%2OTorture%2Omemo 0001 .jpg (last visited Nov. 18, 2006); John Yoo, Deputy
Ass't Att'y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Memorandum to William J. Haynes, II, General
Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.slate.com/features/whatistorture/pdfs/
020109.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
7. Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen Executive
Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Cheney's Power No Longer
Goes Unquestioned, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at 1; Richard W. Stevenson & Adam Liptak, Cheney
Defends Eavesdropping without Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,2005, at A36; Jim VandeHei, Cheney Says
NSA Spying Should Be an Election Issue, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2006, at A7.
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Michael Ramsey has delineated the extent to which the lawyers in the Office
of Legal Counsel of the Department Justice claimed unilateral authority on
behalf of the President when the claims were unnecessary for the specific
policies for which they were invoked 8-a pattern suggestive of a goal of
aggrandizing Presidential authority beyond the defense of the nation. This
pattern disregards the fact that the President's duty is to enforce the law, not to
break it.9
Questions of Presidential authority are important. The framers of the
Constitution expected the separation of powers to be the primary protection for
liberty." They therefore set about to structure each branch's power in ways
that allow each to block the other. The framers expected the three branches to
contend with each other, and in contending to prevent any single branch from
dominating." The framers were prescient-the three branches have contended
with each other in shifting balances throughout our history. Yet the recent
Presidential claims of unilateral authority in effect would smother the other two
branches. 2 Space does not allow a full analysis of the powers of the several
branches. This article considers whether the claims of unilateral Presidential
authority can be sustained in light of constitutional text and tradition.13
II. THE POWERS GRANTED THE PRESIDENT
The grant of powers to the President in Article II of Constitution is short
but impressive. First, Article II vests "the executive Power" in the President.'
4
Article II then provides that the President: serves as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces; 1" supervises the executive branch, with the obligation to see that
the laws are faithfully executed;' 6 has the power to grant pardons for offenses
8. See Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1225-36 (2005).
9. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 5, at 123-24.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 267 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McLellan eds.,
2001). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 249 (James
Madison). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
12. Sanger & Schmitt, supra note 7 (quoting Senator Lindsey Graham, R-SC).
13. Bush 's "Signing'" Bonus: He Issues Himself an Out on Torture, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 2006, at
A32; David Sarasohn, Presidential Powers: Congress Writes a Law, Then President Rereads It, THE
OREGONIAN, Jan. 4, 2006, at B8; Tortured Language: President Bush Signs a Statement that Indicates
Prisoner Abuse Might Well Continue, ALB. TIMES UN., Jan. 16, 2006, at A6. On signing statements
generally, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS,
RECOMMENDATION (2006) available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba-final-signing_
statements_ recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
15. Id. at art. I, § 2 (1).
16. Id. at art. H, §§ 2(I), 3.
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against the United States; 7 has .the power to make treaties; appoints
ambassadors, judges, and officers of the United States; 9 has the power, on
occasion, to control the meeting times of Congress; 0 and is to receive
ambassadors. 21 These powers, if granted fully and exclusively to the President,
would vest in him nearly complete control over the government.
Yet none of the specific powers, except perhaps the power to pardon and
the limited power over the meetings of the Congress, are vested exclusively in
the President. Congress has the power to provide for the common defense, 22 to
declare war,23 and to provide for and regulate the military.24 Congress even was
given the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal 25-which arguably gives
Congress responsibility for undeclared as well as declared wars.26 Moreover,
Congress has the power to make, and the courts to construe, the laws the
President is faithfully to execute.27 Three Presidential powers establish his
authority over the conduct of foreign relations, but two of those (the power to
appoint ambassadors and to make treaties) require the advice and consent of the
Senate (and for treaties, consent must be by a two-thirds majority).28 Thus the
description of the President as the "sole organ" in the conduct of foreign affairs
is something of an exaggeration.29 Presidential authority to make other
appointments also requires the advice and consent of the Senate.3" As for the
powers to pardon and to control emergency meetings of Congress, while not
expressly limited in the text of the Constitution, there is the "necessary and
proper clause": "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
17. Id, at art. l, § 2.
18. Id. at art. I, § 2(2).
19. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2(2), (3).
20. Id. at art. l.
21. Id.
22. Id. at art. I, § 8(1).
23. Id. at art. I, § 8(11).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(11)-(16).
25. Id. at art. I, § 8(11).
26. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800). See Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization andthe War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047,2072-78
(2005).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Id. at art. II, § 2(1).
28. Id. at art. I, § 2(2).
29. U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See H. JEFFERSON POWELL,
THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(2002); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976);
Louis Fisher, A Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1059 (2003).
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2(2).
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and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or officer thereof."'"
Today we are confronted by arguments about a "unitary executive" that,
in its more extreme manifestations, claims that the powers vested in the
President by the Constitution are exclusive and plenary-without limitation by
the other branches of the government, at least during wars or similar crises.32
Such arguments fly in the face the text of the Constitution.3 Some supporters
of the strong executive power argue that the specific grants of powers to the
President are illustrative of an unrestrained grant of "executive Power," rather
than as an exhaustive listing of what the "executive Power" comprises.34 This
argument is not credible. Why would the Framers have bothered to list specific
powers, including "some trifling ones, 35 if the "vesting clause" swept
everything conceivable within its purview? Nor does this theory find support
in the history of the various clauses.36 The Federalist Papers, for example,
viewed the commander-in-chief power as simply the power to command troops
in the field37 and to repel sudden attacks38-not "as the power to do whatever
31. Id. at art. I, § 8(18). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Some refer to the
"necessary and proper" clause as the "Sweeping Clause" because it sweeps a broad and undefined power into
the hands of Congress. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (2003); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
32. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,580-83 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); JOHNYOo,THE
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); Norman C.
Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 U. DENV. L. REV. 335 (2005); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Foreign Affairs andtheJeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1591 (2005). A narrower view
of the theory of a "unitary executive" simply asserts that all executive officers and agencies are answerable
to the President for the discharge of their duties, without regard to the power of the President apart from his
control the executive branch. See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive
for a Unitary Executive, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of
the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001).
33. Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief.- Congress's Authority to
Override Presidential Decisions, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 201-02 (2004).
34. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Siakrishna B. Prakash The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing that the "vesting clause" vests a broad executive power beyond the
specific grants delineated in Article 1I) with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that the "executive Power" must be read as referring
to the specific powers granted in Article II).
35. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. Skibell, supra note 33, at 197-205, 208-18; Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn't True? The
Tenth Amendment and Executive Power, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 135, 153-78 (2001).
37. THE FEDERALIST No.69, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton).
38. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). See
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Note, The Dog of War as a Puppy: The Constitutional Power to Initiate Hostilities as
Answered by the Framing, I GEO. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 361, 368 (2003); Telman, supra note 36, at 149-53.
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it takes to win the war., 39 And consider the federalism concerns if the "inherent
power" of the President derives from sources outside the Constitution.4°
III. THE POWERS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT
Supporters of the "unitary executive" base their claims both on their
perception of the necessities of the modem situation and on an extravagant
reading of the history of the Presidential powers.41 I do not argue whether an
enlarged executive power is necessary as a matter of policy. My concern is
narrower and more technical: Is the President authorized to implement the far-
reaching powers he has decided upon on his own authority, or must he seek
Congressional authorization, except as a temporary reaction to an emergency?
Much of this debate turns upon an examination of the historical practice of the
office of the President as undertaken by successive Presidents and as Congress
and the courts have responded those practices. While persistent institutional
impropriety cannot make an unconstitutional practice constitutional,"
institutional practices can inform us what authoritative interpreters of the
Constitution regarded as its meaning, particularly when closer in time to the
drafting of the language in question.43
Over time there has been an accretion of power in the White House, albeit
with conflicts and setbacks along the way. Struggle over the powers of the
three branches began with the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and has
continued ever since. The problem arises because the framers did not clearly
indicate where Presidential authority stopped and the authority of the other
branches began. Given their theory that the protection of liberty arose from the
clash of the three branches, " the framers apparently created this confusion
39. Oral Argument of Paul D. Clement on Behalf of Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 2004 WL
1066129, at *22 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2004) (comment by Scalia, J.).
40. Would this mean that the Tenth Amendment-with its admonition that powers not delegated
to the federal government in the Constitution are reserved to the states or to the people-is a dead letter?; see
also Telman, supra note 36, at 140-46. Does the Tenth Amendment, in order to protect the prerogatives of
the States and the people, necessarily protect the prerogatives of the Congress and the courts vis-6-vis the
executive branch? Id. at 146-79.
41. See YOO, supra note 32; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of the War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 1639 (2002).
42. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
43. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution,
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss
on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.").
44. Madison, supra note 10. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976).
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deliberately. The first serious controversy over the President's authority to
conduct foreign relations arose with President Washington's Proclamation of
Neutrality5 calling upon Americans to refrain from taking sides in the conflicts
arising from the French Revolution. The proclamation led to an unsuccessful
prosecution of an American merchant seaman for cooperating with a French
privateer" and sparked a debate between Alexander Hamilton (writing as
"Pacificus") and James Madison (writing as "Helvidius") over Presidential
authority.47 Hamilton argued that the Constitution vested in the President an
inherent executive authority that included every aspect of traditional executive
(royal) authority not expressly granted to Congress." Yet if the "vesting
clause" granting the executive power to the President were so broad, the further
listing of specific powers conferred on the President was superfluous. The
argument also ignores the "necessary and proper" clause.49 The debate was too
indecisive to resolve the scope of the President's power.5"
For truly broad assertions of Presidential powers independently of, or even
in defiance of, Congress or the courts, we must turn to the Civil War.5
President Lincoln undertook to exercise the broadest range of "prerogative
power" ever claimed by a President.52 Faced with attacks on federal facilities
45. Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 430-31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
46. J. KENDALL FEW, TRIAL By JURY 289-97 (1993) (recounting the course of the trial and the
jury's refusal to convict despite a charge from the court that virtually directed a verdict of guilty).
47. The "Pacificus/Helividius" essays, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 63-78
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
48. For modem arguments in favor ofthis reading of Article I1, see YoO, supra note 32; John Yoo,
Review Essay: Politics as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty
Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 896-901 (2001). For a careful refutation of Hamilton's claims, see
Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545 (2004).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For an argument against such a broad reading of the necessary
and proper clause, see Saikrishna Prakash, Regulation of Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215,
225-57 (2005). See generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
50. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 48, at 679-87.
51. David Currie has concluded that at least before 1840, every President acted consistently with
the terms of the War Powers Resolution of 1973: "The President may introduce troops into hostilities only
pursuant to a congressional declaration of war or other legislative authorization, or in response to an attack
on the United States." David P. Currie, Rumors of War: Presidential and Congressional War Powers,
1809-1829,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). See also Telman, supra note 36, at 159-65. Washington himself
declined to commit troops against Indian tribes without Congressional authorization. See also SOFAER,
supra note 29, at 120-27.
52. MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 36 (2003). Rozell defines "prerogative power" as an executive power "to act according to
discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it."
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in the South and with the newly elected Congress not yet convened, he
undertook dramatic action to suppress the rebellion,53 calling the militias of the
loyal states into federal service and for 75,000 volunteers, suspending habeas
corpus (first in Maryland and gradually throughout the country), proclaiming
a blockade of the Southern ports, directing the Treasury Department to expend
$2,000,000 raised through New York financiers in support of the war effort,
and ordering civilians to be tried by military commissions for crimes in support
of the Confederacy. None of these actions were authorized by statute, yet it
was in Congress, not the President, that the Constitution vested authority to take
such decisions. 4 If Lincoln had waited for Congress to convene to vote the
necessary measures, however, the war might have been lost before it began."
When Congress finally convened, Lincoln reported his actions to Congress and
asked it to approve his actions. 6 While he argued for the legality of his actions,
he also requested Congress to ratify the decisions, with at least an implicit
admission that the decisions could not stand after Congress was in session
unless Congress did approve them-as Congress eventually did.57
The suspension of habeas corpus was the trickiest problem because Chief
Justice Roger Taney issued two writs directing the release of persons
imprisoned in Fort McHenry in Baltimore on suspicion of sabotaging telegraph
lines and bridges.5 The state courts in Maryland were open and operating but
President Lincoln was unwilling to trust Maryland juries and declined to
comply with Taney's order.59 Lincoln's message to Congress came close to
53. See generallyDANIELFARBER, LINCOLN'SCONSTITUTION 13-17, 115-95 (2003); HAROLD M.
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875
214-15,238-41 (1982); MARK E. NEELY, THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
3-18, 32, 51-53 (1991); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERROR 79-134 (2004).
54. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8(1 1) ("Congress shall have Power... To declare War"); id. at § 8(15)
("Congress shall have Power... To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union.");
Id. at § 9(2) ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."); id. at § 9(7) ("No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by law.").
55. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 15-25 (1998).
56. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Lincoln's Special Message]. See
FARBER, supra note 53, at 132-43.
57. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863); see FARBER, supra note 53, at 138-43.
58. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). See also FARBER, supra note 53, at
188-92; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 239-41; NEELY, supra note 53, at 8-10; Norman Spaulding,
The Discourse of Law in the Time of War: Politics and Professionalism during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2061-67 (2005).
59. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 53, at 241; REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 33-35.
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conceding the illegality of his defiance. 60 Lincoln argued that he had to choose
between his general obligation to see that the laws are faithfully enforced and
the specific obligation to respect habeas corpus. He also argued that because
of the emergency, his claim of authority to act pending the meeting of Congress
was a small implication from the constitutional design. 6' Lincoln argued,
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed
were... failing of execution, in nearly one-third of the states. Must
they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly
clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some
single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty,
that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than the innocent,
should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state the question
more directly: are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
govemment to go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such
a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government
should be overthrown when it was believed that disregarding the
single law would tend to preserve it?62
The problem with arguments based on necessity is that claims of necessity
can mask a host of sins, and what might seem necessary in the heat of the
moment can be embarrassing or worse in hindsight.63 The rule of law is
supposed to prevent such embarrassments. Perhaps this is why Lincoln
followed the argument from necessity with a claim that he was not violating the
law-leaving the Attorney General to fill in the details.' And it is why the
Supreme Court, in calmer times, reminded us that: "[e]mergency does not
create power. Emergency does not increase granted power, or diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted. 65
After Lincoln's defiance of Chief Justice Taney, the courts backed away
from confronting the President.66 Lincoln's most famous action solely on the
basis of his authority as commander-in-chief was the Emancipation
60. Lincoln's Special Message, supra note 56.
61. Id.; see FARBER, supra note 53, at 160-63.
62. Lincoln's Special Message, supra note 56.
63. Consider the later congressional apology for the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified in 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1989 to 1989d). See also Peter Green, The King Is Dead, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 29, 1997, at 36, 39
("What stirs our blood may end up embarrassing our conscience.").
64. Lincoln's Special Message, supra note 56; see 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 87 (1861).
65. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 425 (1934).
66. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863). REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 135-37;
Spaulding, supra note 58, at 2004-11; Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, SuP. CT. REv. 47 (2004).
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Proclamation, an executive order issued on September 22, 1862,67 which was
ratified by an amendment to the Constitution. 68 After the war, the Supreme
Court decided that suspension of habeas corpus when civilian courts are open
and operating is unconstitutional,69 only to see Congress promptly revoke the
Court's authority to hear appeals in habeas corpus cases.70 But the precedent
stands.
Legal conclusions about the inherent powers of the President from
Lincoln's actions are less than clear. Congress, for the most part in fairly short
order, ratified his actions. In the two instances in which the judiciary challeng-
ed the legality of the President's actions, Congress supported the President
against the Supreme Court. Congressional ratification of the President's actions
was enough to end the matter.
Woodrow Wilson was the next President to assert broad powers, parti-
cularly after the United States entered World War I. He relied on a compliant
Congress to authorize the extraordinary actions he considered necessary to the
war effort.7 He declined to issue an executive order authorizing military courts
to try civilians interfering in the war effort.72 Yet he took some actions entirely
on his own authority. Rather dramatically, he issued an executive order seizing
all railroads in the country, ordering them to be operated by a federal
administrator,73 and established the Food Administration, the Grain Corpora-
tion, and the World Trade Board by executive order.74
Franklin Delano Roosevelt made extensive use of executive orders in
fighting the Depression, some of which orders were highly controversial.75 And
67. Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XI1.
69. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124-25 (1866).
70. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
71. See The Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1918) (making it a crime to "willfully
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" about the United States
and excluding from the mails any material advocating "treason, insurrection or resistance to any law of the
U.S."); The Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (punishing criticism of the war or the
government, including any form of language intended to cause contempt or scorn for our form of government,
the Constitution, or the flag). See generally NEELY, supra note 53, at 181; REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at
178-83; STONE, supra note 53, at 135-234.
72. SANFORD J. UNGER, FBI 41-42 (1976). Wilson deferred to the Supreme Court's decision in
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124-25 (holding that military courts could not try civilians when civilian courts
are open and functioning).
73. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919) (upholding the seizure of the
railroads).
74. See John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One), 31 UWLA
L. REv. 99, 103 (2000).
75. See generally Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use andAbuse of Executive Orders in
Modern Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1 (2002).
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during World War II, he issued numerous executive orders. The most notorious
was Executive Order no. 9066,76 authorizing the "exclusion" persons of
Japanese ancestry from the west coast states-meaning their confinement in
concentration camps." Congress shortly thereafter ratified Executive Order no.
9066 by enacting a law making it a misdemeanor to violate the order.7" Because
of this statute, the Supreme Court upheld Executive Order no. 9066 repeated-
ly.79 Forty-six years later, Congress enacted a formal apology to the Japanese
and Japanese-Americans who had been interned and provided a modest
payment ($20,000 per person) as reparations for the wrong done to them. °
President Roosevelt also ordered military commissions to try persons
arrested in the United States "for offenses against the laws of war and the
Articles of War."8' Eight Nazi saboteurs (including one American citizen) were
arrested and brought before a military commission. 2 The Supreme Court
reviewed the lower court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus,3 but concluded
that Congress had authorized trial by military commission for violations of the
(international) laws of war and the Articles of War.84 The Court insisted that
it had no authority to review whether the defendants were guilty or innocent,
but only whether their constitutional rights had been violated;85 thereafter six
of the eight defendants were executed, including the one American citizen. Yet
only four years later, in reviewing a writ of habeas corpus for Japanese General
76. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 9, 1942).
77. See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 55, at 186-91; STONE, supra note 53, at 255-310; ERIC
K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT
(2001).
78. Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
79. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). All three convictions would be vacated some 40 years later
because ofprosecutorial misconduct. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v.
United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984). The Supreme Court also held, on the same day that it decided Korematsu, that detainees who could
establish that they were loyal must be released. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
80. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified in 50 U.S.C. §§
1989 to 1989d).
81. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942).
82. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The would-be saboteurs were already in custody when the
executive orders were issued, having been arrested by the FBI. See LOUIS FISHER, NAZI SABOTEURS ON
TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN LAW 12 (2003). For an argument that these men, or at least
the American among them, should have been tried in civilian courts as traitors, see Carlton F.W. Larson, The
Forgotten Constitutional Law Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863,
894-900 (2006).
83. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25-26.
84. Id. at 25-30.
85. Id. at 25.
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Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was tried before a U.S. military commission in the
Philippines, the Court did in fact examine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.86
During the Korean War, President Truman ordered the seizure of the steel
mills in 1951 to prevent a strike that would have impeded the manufacturing of
military equipment and munitions.8 7 The majority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer88 held that the executive order was not a military act and
therefore not within the President's authority as commander-in-chief;89 nor
could the order be justified under the duty of the President to see that laws are
faithfully executed, for he was not enforcing an act of Congress or a command
of the Constitution but was making his own law.9° The case is better known,
however, for Justice Robert Jackson's concurring opinion-an opinion that has
since been endorsed by a majority of the Court.91 Jackson described an
interpretive continuum according to which a President's actions must be
judged. Jackson's analysis provides a template for analyzing the actions of the
current President:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Pre-
sidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress....
1) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said.., to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it
usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided
whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President
pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
86. See generally In re Yamshita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
87. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (April 10, 1952).
88. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. Id. at 587.
90. Id. at 587-89.
91. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 668, 668-69 (1981).
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interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.
2) When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presiden-
tial responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3) When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such
a case only be disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake
is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.92
Presidential exercises of unilateral authority did not end with Youngstown
Sheet and Tube, but Presidents thereafter tended to involve Congress in their
more controversial actions. In Vietnam, the Presidents did not claim sweeping
authority independently of Congress, although they came to be accused of
abusing the powers conferred by Congress9 3 and of lying to Congress to obtain
authorization for the war.94 Unity between the political branches did not hold.
Congress repealed the authorization in 19719' and took steps to bar continuation
of the War.96 Congress also enacted legislation to limit the exercise of presi-
dential authority as commander-in-chief(the War Powers Resolution of 197397)
and to assure judicial and congressional oversight of intelligence gathering
within and without the United States (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act98). Presidents have never been happy with these restraints, consistently
92. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-40, 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
93. See generally STONE, supra note 53, at 427-526.
94. See Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408,78 Stat. 384 (1964); JOHN HARTELY, WAR
AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 19-20 (1993).
95. Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971).
96. See THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13-33 (1979).
97. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541-1548 (2000).
98. Foreign Intelligence Survelliance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1871 (2000).
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insisting that they are not bound by them," yet Presidents have complied with
them."° President Bush's report to Congress on the actions taken to respond to
the 9/11 attacks exhibits the typical Presidential posture: compliance with the
War Powers Resolution's procedures while insisting that he is not bound by it:
In response to these attacks on our territory, our citizens, and our way
of life, I, ordered the deployment of various combat-equipped and
combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central
and Pacific Command areas of operations .... I have taken these
actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S.
foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chiefand ChiefExecutive. 0 '
IV. PRESIDENT BUSH REACTS TO 9/11
The scale and success of the attacks on September 11, as well as the evi-
dence that it was a part of an ongoing, organized global campaign, perhaps
made it inevitable that the Bush administration would treat the situation as a
war rather than as individual criminal conduct. 10 2 President Bush the younger
declared a "War on Terror"'0 3 and then proceeded in the name of that war to
take a number of unprecedented steps to secure the nation. Congress endorsed
the War by approving resolutions authorizing the use of force against terrorists
and in Iraq,"° by enacting the USA PATRIOT Act,"0 5 and by creating the
99. See STEPHEN DYcUS, ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 302-26 (3d ed. 2002); Louis FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 123-28 (2d ed. 2004). See generally ELY, supra note 94.
100. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION;31297;31297: AFTER THIRTY
YEARS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL 32267, Mar. 11, 2004), available
at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32267.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
101. PRESIDENT's LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS REPORTING ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF
FORCES IN RESPONSE TO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,2 PUB. PAPERS 1157, 1157 (Sept. 24,
2001).
102. See Bay, supra note 32, at 353-71; Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights,
National Security Law andthe Law ofArmed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675,715-25
(2004). See generally Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
103. PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS ON THE UNITED STATES IN
RESPONSETO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1348 (Sept.
20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2006).
104. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Auth-
orization of the Use of Military Force against Iraq, Pub. L. no. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). For analyses of
these authorizations, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26; Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The
War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 2683 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International
Law, US. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2653 (2005).
105. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of
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Department of Homeland Security. 116 Yet, even with these broad powers in
hand, the President claimed powers that no prior President had ever claimed:
to launch preemptive wars; to establish rules contrary to the recognized laws of
war; and to conduct surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. 1
07
The President made these claims on the basis of his alleged authority under
the Constitution, powers that allegedly were beyond the power of Congress to
regulate, restrict, or control. Many of the decisions were taken in secret.'
This may have been because the Bush administration engaged in systematic
violations of the laws of war,'0 9 laws defined in a series of conventions signed
U.S.C.). See generally AMrrAI ETZIONI, How PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT?. (2004); Thomas V. Burch,
"Doublethink"ing Privacy under the Multi-state Antiterrorism Information Exchange, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 147 (2004); Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 175 (2003); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 767 (2002); Steven
A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn't Dead, But No One Will Insure
It, 54 FLA. L. REv. 521 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PA TRIOTAct in
the Context of Coinelpro and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REv. 1051 (2002).
106. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. no. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in various
sections of 6 U.S.C.).
107. See the authorities collected supra at notes 2-6.
108. The Bush administration seemed to be obsessed with secrecy even when not related to the war
on terror. See, e.g., Cheney v. District Ct., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). See also Dan Eggan, White House Trains
Efforts on Media Leaks: Sources, Reporters CouldBe Prosecuted, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,2006, at Al; Walter
Pincus, Press Can Be Prosecuted for Having Secret Files, US. Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at A3;
Andrew C. Revkin, Call for Openness at NASA Adds to Reports of Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2006, at
A20; Scott Shane, Universities Say New Rules Could Hurt U.S. Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at
All; Ellen Smith, Mining for Truth about Sago, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2006, at A23; TORE CLARKE,
LIPSTICK ON A PIG: WINNING IN THE No-SPIN ERA BY SOMEONE WHO KNOWS THE GAME (2006). The
administration's obsession with secrecy reached its apogee with the efforts of several national security
agencies to withdraw and reclassify documents in the National Archives-documents that in many cases had
already been published, and therefore will remain public despite the reclassification project. See Christopher
Lee, Archives Pledges to End Secret Agreements, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at A4; Christopher Lee,
Archives Kept a Secrecy Secret: Agencies Remove Declassified Papers from Public Access, WASH. POST,
Apr. 12, 2006, at A6; Scott Shane, National Archives Pact Let C.IA. Withdraw Public Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18,2006, at A16; Scott Shane, National Archives Says Records Were Wrongly Classified, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at A24.
109. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28
YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges from the "War on Terror ", 27 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFFAIRS 55 (2003); William H. Taft
IV, The Law ofArmed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319 (2003). For less
critical views of the Bush administration's actions, see Brooks, supra note 102; Derek Jinks, The Changing
Laws of War: Do WeNeeda NewLegal Regime after September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1493 (2004);
Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, no. 1, at 2 (Jan.-Feb. 2004).
See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2d ed. 2004); INGRID DETrER,
THE LAW OF WAR (2d ed. 2002); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed.
2000).
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and ratified by the United States."' Traditionally, the United States had taken
the lead in creating and enforcing these laws,"' in our national courts" 2 as well
as through international organizations" 3 and tribunals."l 4 While the United
States is no longer a leader regarding these rules,"15 it did not withdraw its rati-
fications of the basic documents, nor has it altered its statutes pertaining to the
laws of war. On paper, at least, we are still fully committed to the laws of war.
The violations of the laws of war eventually became public-particularly
the abuse of prisoners. Only gradually did it become clear that these practices
extended to the systematic cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of
prisoners, culminating in some instances in outright torture.116 Major General
110. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter "First Geneva Convention");
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter "Second Geneva Convention"); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter "Third Geneva Convention"); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.T.S. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 973 (hereinafter "Fourth Geneva Convention"); Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (hereinafter "Second Hague
Convention"); Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, Consol. T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (hereinafter "Fourth Hague Convention"). The Hague Conventions
continue to apply except were superseded by the Geneva Conventions or other treaties. There are also two
protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977, which the United States has not signed or ratified.
Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3; Additional Protocol 11 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Arguably, the Additional Protocols are customary international law. See Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. No. 130 89, 124; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 610, 617 (Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 119, 127 (Oct. 2, 1995).
111. The U.S. Army issued the first codification of the laws of war to achieve wide international
influence. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General orders no.
100, art. 16 (Apr. 24, 1863). The General Order was drafted by Francis Lieber, and therefore is referred to
as the "Lieber Code." See David Glazier, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and
the U.S. Invasion ofIraq, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 121, 128-48, 151-70 (2005).
112. See, e.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Calley v.
Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976). See also The War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
113. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
142-54 (2004).
114. Id. at 312-16.
115. Id. at 154-63, 317-18.
116. See UN Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights,
Including the Question of Torture and Detention, Commission on Human Rights, 59th Sess., UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/8 (2002) at Prov. Agenda Item 11 (a). See also Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 319-23, 329-35 (2004); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but
Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al; David Johnston, At a Secret Interrogation,
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Geoffrey Miller was brought from Guantinamo to Iraq to instruct the prison
guards in the "best" ways to interrogate prisoners. '17 And eventually, President
Bush acknowledged that these practices-which he termed an "alternative set
of procedures" for interrogation-were and would, if he had his way, remain
government policy."' Yet the Third Geneva Convention expressly prohibits
torture,119 while all four Geneva Conventions, in common article 3, require that
"persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed
forces who have laid down their arms" to be treated "humanely," which is
further defined as excluding "murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliat-
ing and degrading treatment."' 2° Common article 3 applies to conflicts "not of
an international character." The Supreme Court resolved doubts about the
meaning of the phrase in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2' holding that the phrase
encompasses all conflicts other than conflicts between nations.
The United States has also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("Civil Rights Covenant"), which prohibits torture'22 and the
Convention against Torture.'23 The Third Geneva Convention, the Civil Rights
Covenant, and the Convention on Torture all forbid derogation from the
Dispute Flared over Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at Al; Shannon Smiley & Craig Whitlock, Turk
Was Abused at Guantanamo, Lawyers Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at Al I; Craig S. Smith & Souad
Mekhennet, Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at Al.
117. See Josh White, Top Officer Ordered to Testify on Abuse: Use of Dogs to Scare Detainees at
Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2006, at Al4. See also John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK,
May 24, 2004, at 16; Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the
Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (2004); Josh White, Memo Shows Officer's Shift on Use
of Dogs: Abu Ghreib Commander Urged End to Tactic But No Punishment for Guards, WASH. POST, Apr.
15, 2006, at All (describing the testimony of Colonel Thomas Pappas).
118. R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Says Detainees Will Be Tried: He Confirms the Existence of CIA
Prisons, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at Al. For the full text of the Presidents remarks, see President Bush
Delivers Remarks on Terrorism, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/09/06/AR2006090601425.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
119. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at arts. 13, 17, 130.
120. Id. at art. 3. See also First Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at art. 3; Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 110, at art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at art. 3.
121. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794-96 (2006). For the underlying debate, see Derek
Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism ", 46 VA. J. INT'L L.
165 (2005). See discussion infra notes 142-57.
122. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 at art.
7 (hereinafter "Civil Rights Covenant"). Arguably, the Civil Rights Covenant does not apply to actions by
a state outside its territory. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). The
international institution responsible for interpreting the document reached the opposite conclusion. General
Comment no. 31, U.N. Human Rights Commission, Mar. 29, 2004, UN Doc. A/59/40, 1:175, 177.
123. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 65 (hereinafter "Convention against Torture").
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prohibition of torture-unlike other provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
there is no military necessity exception to the ban on torture. 24 The United
States, in ratifying the Civil Rights Covenant, included a reservation that "The
United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the extent that 'cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States.' ' 125 The UN Committee on Human Rights
concluded that the reservation was incompatible with the terms of the Civil
Rights Covenant and therefore is void, although the ratification is valid. 126
Even if that is not correct, can anyone contend that intense and on-going mis-
treatment, even if it does not cause death or severe physical or mental injury,
is not "cruel and unusual punishment" as prohibited by the United States
Constitution? 2
7
The Bybee Memorandum sought to evade these strictures by taking the
position that if interrogation does not involve life-threatening techniques or
serious permanent physical injury ("equivalent to organ failure," or mental
suffering that lasts "months or years"), then there is no torture. This was
translated by U.S. soldiers guarding prisoners into the slogan, "No blood, no
foul.' 129 The practices that resulted from such an attitude range from relatively
mild all the way up to death: deprivation of sleep, food, and water; covering
detainee's heads with hoods; forcing of them to stand in physically stressful
positions; the use of dogs to intimidate and abuse prisoners; "waterboarding";
and the beating or suffocating of prisoners to death. 30
124. Civil Rights Covenant supra note 122, at art. 4(2); Convention against Torture, supra note 123,
at arts. 1(1), 2(2); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 110, at arts. 13, 17, 130.
125. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 29-31 (1990). See also S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 22
(1992) (reservation for the Civil Rights Covenant). See generally Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality
of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1601 (2005).
126. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 6,1 18 (1994), reprinted in U.N. Human Rights Comm.
Report, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1996); U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50, 14 (1995) The problem is considered
at length in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 783-94 (1999).
127. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (the use of excessive
physical force may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if the prisoner does not suffer serious
injury). See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and Screw: Constitutional Restraints on
Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003).
128. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6. See also Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A Torture
Memo and lts Tortuous Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6,2004, at A22; John Yoo, A Critical Look at Torture Law,
L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at B 11. Cf Cathy Young, Torturing Logic: Is Pulling Fingernails Really Just an
Aggressive Manicure?, REASON, Mar. 1, 2006, at 20.
129. Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, Task Force 6-26: Inside Camp Nama; In Secret Unit's
Black Room, a Grim Portrait of US. Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, § 1, at 1.
130. See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE & TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHREIB, AND THE WAR ON
TERROR (2004); Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Impunity for Systematic Abuse (2004), available at
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Apparently realizing that the argument about the meaning of torture was
weak, the authors of the Bybee memorandum also claimed that the President
has the power to authorize torture notwithstanding applicable conventions and
federal statutes: "Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to
detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to
direct troop movements on the battlefield."'' This argument would make the
Uniform Code of Military Justice unconstitutional, despite the Constitution's
vesting in Congress of authority to "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 3' Why the authors of the Bybee
Memorandum chose to do all of this on the authority of the President without
involving Congress and the courts, and over the objections of the lawyers in the
military services and other operational branches of the government, 33 seems all
too clear-these other institutions could not be relied upon to approve the
torture or near torture that the administration wanted to use.
The highly dubious constitutional argument that the President, as chief
executive and commander-in-chief, cannot be restrained in his decisions about
the conduct of military operations has been deployed in defense of indefensible
conduct. As Jeremy Waldron put it, "[t]his is notjust tinkering with the details
of positive law: it amounts to a comprehensive assault on our traditional
understanding of the whole legal regime relating to torture."'3 4 And no legal
legerdemain can explain how the President can order such torture when
Congress has expressly prohibited torture and the nation has ratified treaties
forbidding it. 35 Even if, somehow, one believes these practices are not
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/4.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006); Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of
Interrogation: A Survey of the Landscape ofPersuasion, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2003, at 56; Douglas
Jehl, Questions Left by C.IA. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2005, at A]; Mahvish Khan, My
Guantanamo Diary: Face to Face with the War on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2006, at B 1; Neil A.
Lewis, Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guanidnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A] 1; Miles
Moffeit, Brutal Interrogations in Iraq: Five Detainee's Deaths Probed, DENV. POST, May 19, 2004, at Al;
Schmitt & Marshall, supra note 129; Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee
063, TIME, June 20, 2005, at 26.
131. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 6, at 39.
132. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
133. See Tim Golden, Senior Lawyer at Pentagon Broke Ranks on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2006, at A8; Carol Rosenberg, Miami Lawyer Fought against Detainee Abuse: A Once-Secret Memo Shows
How a Top Navy Lawyer Fought to RescindDefense Department Interrogation Techniques at Guantdnamo,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2006, at A3; Josh White, FBI Interrogators in Cuba Opposed Aggressive Tactics,
WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2006, at Al 6; Josh White, Military Lawyers Say Tactics Broke Rules, WASH. POST,
Mar. 16, 2006, at A13; Josh White, Tough Interrogation Tactics Were Opposed: Pentagon Task Force Was
Told Not to Use Techniques Approved in 2002, Records Show, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at Al 6.
134. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1681, 1709 (2005).
135. Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, andthe D. C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693,
696-704 (2005). See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 5.
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torture,'36 Congress has now enacted the Detainee Treatment Act to ban cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.'37 Since January 1, 2006, there really is no
room for argument that the international standards do not apply in full. Yet
President Bush responded with a "signing statement" in signing the bill in
which he insisted that nothing in this law impaired his powers as commander-
in-chief to do whatever is necessary to protect the country. 
1 38
V. THE DENOUEMENT, PERHAPS
The other branches of government long deferred to the Presidential
assertions of authority, contrary to the expectations of the framers of the
Constitution. 3' But, just as lawyers played key roles in preparing documents
purporting to justify the various policies instituted on the sole authority of the
President, 40 lawyers also challenged the various policies from the beginning-
often acting as pro bono (unpaid) volunteers in defense of the rule of law.
Eventually, several of these cases reached the Supreme Court of the United
States. 4 1 While the Court consistently ruled against the government in these
cases, the Court always ruled on narrow grounds that did not address the
questions of whether the President was exceeding his constitutional powers
until the Court decided the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 42 in 2006.
Hamdan involved the prosecution of a former chauffeur for Osama bin
Laden for various war crimes. The prosecution was to be before a military
commission created by executive order consistent neither with normal civilian
(Article III) courts nor with normal military courts (Courts Martial).'43 The
136. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, With All Necessary Force, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at 13 ("the U.S.
is not required to treat captured terrorists as if they were guests at a hotel or suspects held at an American
police station").
137. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000dd (2006)).
138. Editorial, Bush's "Signing" Bonus: He Issues Himself an Out on Torture, NEWSDAY (Nassau
County, NY), Jan. 8, 2006, at A32; David Sarasohn, Presidential Powers: Congress Writes a Law, Then
President Rereads It, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 4, 2006, at B8; Tortured Language: President Bush Signs a
Statement that Indicates Prisoner Abuse Might Well Continue, ALB. TIMES UN., Jan. 16, 2006, at A6. On
signing statements generally, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS, RECOMMENDATION (2006), available at http://www.abanet.orglop/signingstatements/aba_
final-signing_ statementsrecommendation-report 7-24--06.pdf.
139. See the text accompanied in supra.
140. See the authorities collected supra note 6.
141. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749; Padilla v. Hanfi, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006); Hamdi, 542
U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
142. See generally Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749.
143. Military Order on the Detention, Treatment, and Trail of Certain Non-Citizens in the War on
Terrorrism issued by George W. Bush, Nov. 13,2001,66 FED. REG. 222 (codified at 3 CFR 918 (2002)). See
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Court, by a vote of 5-3 (with the Chief Justice, who had voted in favor of the
government in the case at the Court of Appeals level,'" recusing himself) held
that the President lacks authority to create such a tribunal in the face of valid
statutes limiting the types of courts and procedures to be used in such trials. 45
The Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that mere
emergency ("exigency alone") does notjustify the creation of "penal tribunals"
that are not authorized by Act of Congress or the Constitution itself'46 and went
on to reaffirm the most central holding of Ex parte Milligan: '47 The President's
job is to enforce the law, not to make whatever laws he likes in disregard of
binding Acts of Congress or valid treaties.'48 The Court then carefully
examined the procedures provided for the proposed military commissions and
found that those procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the four Geneva Conventions. 14 Justice Anthony Kennedy declined to join
some other parts of the majority opinion, but concurred in all of the points just
discussed. 50 Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas
dissented on a range of points in opinions written by Scalia and Thomas.
Justice Scalia focused primarily on whether the Court had the authority to
review Hamdan's appeal at all,' 5' while Justice Thomas wrote an impassioned
defense of the President's power to command the military without let or
hindrance from the court. 15
2
Justice Stevens' opinion was long, technical, and narrow, perhaps in order
to avoid the risks of appearing to be too "activist" in a case where the future
safety or even survival of the nation might be at risk. 153 Still Justice Stevens'
opinion made the point that the President could not proceed without
Congressional authorization."' The opinion also confined itself to the question
generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2127-33.
144. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
145. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-75.
146. Id. at 2773.
147. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2(4 Wall. 2), 139-40 (1866).
148. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74.
149. Id. at 2786-96. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 to 946 (2000). The
four Geneva Conventions are collected at supra note 110. The Court focused particularly on 10 U.S.C. §§
821,836.
150. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799-2809.
151. Id. at 2809-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2823-55 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Cf Sunstein, supra note 66 (arguing that the American legal tradition of deciding cases on
non-constitutional grounds when possible allows courts a ready excuse for not confronting the executive
branch in such cases).
154. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-75.
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of the use of the presidentially created military commissions to try persons
accused of crimes, and did not mention, even in passing, the numerous other
Presidential assertions of unilateral authority to defend the nation. While the
implications of the decision for these other assertions of authority seemed clear
enough, the Bush administration insists that the decision applies only to the
military commission question. 155
Has the President learned anything from his errors? It seems not. As of
this writing, the President and a newly aroused Senate are locked in disagree-
ment over whether to enact a statute authorizing the procedures disapproved in
Hamdan'56-secret trials, denying a defendant access to some of the evidence,
with hearsay entered into evidence, and without confrontation of the
witnesses.'57 The President is even more adamant about modifying other
unilateral policies that at the least intrude upon the responsibilities of Congress,
some of which are arguably illegal."5 8
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Disclosure of these practices had disastrous effects for the global image
of the United States. From the near unanimous support for the United States
after the September 1 1th attacks,5 9 the Bush Administration managed in only
155. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justices Tacitly Backed the Use of Guantanamo, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2006, at A14.
156. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785-92.
157. Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senators Defy Bush on Terror Measure: Panel Backs
Rival Bill on Interrogations, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al; Charles Babington & R. Jeffrey Smith,
Bush 's Detainee Plan Is Criticized: Military Laywers and Senators Say Proposed Rules for Evidence Are
Unfair, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A9; David S. Cloud & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, White House Bill Provides
System to Try Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, at Al; David E. Sanger, For Congress, 2 Votes Loom,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at Al; Kate Zemike, Lawyers and G.O.P. Chiefs Resist Proposal on Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al ; Kate Zemike, Rebufffor Bush on Terror Trials in a Senate Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al; Kate Zemike &Neil A. Lewis, Proposal for New Tribunalsfor Terror Suspects
Would Hew to the First Series, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A27.
158. See generally American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d
754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). See also Nina Bernstein, Court Orders US. to Allay 9/11 Spy Fears, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8,2006, at B5; Anna Johnson, Bar Association Attacks Bush over Surveillance, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 14,
2006, at A5; Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Judge Quits Spying Court in Protest over President's Policy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at AI; Eric Lichtblau, Judges on Secretive Panel Speak out on Spy Program,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,2006, at Al 9; Hope Yen, Specter: Spying Program Broke Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb.
6, 2006, at Al. On the present state of proposed legislation, see Sanger, supra note 157.
159. Most famously expressed on the front page of France's most influential newspaper: "Nous
sommes tous americains." LE MONDE, Sept. 12, 2001, at 1. See generally MURPHY, supra note 113, at
167-68; Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense under International
Law, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 669,568-73 (2002); Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, Globalizing Terror, 81
OR. L. REv. 941, 945-50 (2002).
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three years to make the United States an international pariah. 60 The image of
the United States-one of our more important assets during the Cold War-has
only gotten worse since. 16 1 And we pay a predictable price, as when the
Chinese officials dismiss criticism of their violations of human rights with the
response that "they have no lessons to learn from an administration that
produced the abuses at Abu Ghreib prison in Iraq and detainment centers in
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, Afghanistan, and elsewhere."' 162
The domestic consequences these asserted powers are no less momentous.
The various actions constitute a pattern-a plan even 163 -of asserting
Presidential authority to act unilaterally, regardless of the authority or decisions
of the other branches of government. The Pentagon, moreover, has announced
plans for a "long war"--one that would last decades. " The nature of the war
made by terrorists makes it difficult to sort combatants from civilians, to
identify "enemy aliens," to determine whether someone is captured on a
battlefield or elsewhere, or even to determine whether the enemy has been
defeated and the war is at an end. 165 All this makes arguments about the need
to set aside the usual rules for the duration of the emergency even more
alarming. 66
160. See MURPHY, supra note 113, at 169-77; Madeleine K. Albright, Endangered Friendships:
Bush's Policies and Practices Drive a Wedge between the US. and Key Allies in Europe, BALT. SUN, Jan.
4,2004, at 1 C; Ben Barber, May a Good Year Be Sealed, 19 THE WORLD & 1, at 158 (2004); Marcus Noland,
Why Bush Is on Course to Lose Both Koreas, FINANCIAL TIMES (UK), Jan. 23, 2004, at 23; John Vinocur,
Criticism of US. Obscures Growing Disunity on the Continent: What Does Europe Want?/Rhetoric and
Reality, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Jan. 20, 2004, at 2.
161. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner & Donald Greenlees, Australians View US. as Threat to Peace:
America Lags behind Japan and China in Popularity, Poll Finds, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 29, 2005, at
1; Alan Cowell, A New Survey Suggests that Britons Take a Dim View of the US., N.Y. TIMES, July 3,2006,
at A5; Ian Fisher, Pope Condemns Both Terror and Violations of Geneva Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005,
at A8; Warren Hoge, Annan Defends UN. Official Who Chided US., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,2005, at A6; Edith
Lederer, Close Terror Camp: Annan, THE ADVERTISER(Australia.), Feb. 18, 2006, at 73; Colum Lynch, UN.
Official Faults US. Detention: Terrorism Fight Hurts Torture Ban, Human Rights Chief Says, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8, 2005, at A27; Monte Reel & Michael A. Fletcher, Anti-U.S. Protests Flare at Summit: As Bush
Meets Allies in Argentina, Rally Led by Chavez Turns Violent, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at Al; Larry
Rohter & Elisabeth Bumiller, Hemisphere Summit Marredby ViolentAnti-Bush Protests. N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5,2005, at Al.
162. Edward Cody, Chinese Leader Coming to US. Well Prepared: Planning Reflects Priority on
Relations, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2006, at At4.
163. See the authorities collected supra notes 7, 8.
164. Ann Scott Tyson, Ability to Wage "Long War" Is Key to Pentagon Plan: Conventional Tactics
De-Emphasized, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2006, at A 1; Ann Scott Tyson, New Plans Foresee Fighting Terrorism
beyond War Zones: Pentagon to Rely on Special Operations, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2006, at Al. See
generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2123-27; Brooks, supra note 102, at 725-28.
165. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 2048-49.
166. See Lobel, supra note 105.
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This pattern of arrogation of power should alarm any unbiased observer.
As Bill Keller, Executive Editor of the New York Times, stated recently, "I
don't know how far action will follow rhetoric, but some days it sounds like the
administration is declaring war at home on the values it professes to be
promoting abroad."' 67 Justice David Souter, in his concurring opinion in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, expressed what ought to be the national attitude:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a
reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or in war (or
some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive
Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain
security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on
which to rest the Nation's entire reliance on striking the balance
between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory;
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that
security legitimately raises.'68
Justice Souter's analysis might be considered prudential, yet his analysis
points to something more basic, as Justice Robert Jackson pointed out more
than 50 years ago in Youngstown Sheet and Tube:69 The President's power to
act unilaterally is strictly limited by the Constitution and by valid treaties and
acts of Congress. Constraints on the unilateral authority of the President are
among the most central safeguards of our liberties. Have the terrorists
succeeded in making it impossible for us to uphold those limitations? Or are
we just afraid to take reasonable risks in order to uphold our ideals?
167. Dan Eggan, Administration Targets Journalists, Government Sources, WASH. POST, Mar. 4,
2006, at Al. See also Eugene Robinson, "Values " We Have to Hide Abroad, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006,
at A17.
168. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring).
169. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-40, 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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LISTENING TO THE ENEMY: THE PRESIDENT'S
POWER TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF
ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS DURING
TIME OF WAR
By John C. Eastman*
Ever since the New York Times published classified information in
December 2005' about the efforts by the National Security Agency to intercept
enemy communications to or from sources in the United States (as authorized
by the President in his capacity as Commander-In-Chief), there has been a great
hew and cry about the President's "illegal" conduct. Calls of impeachment
have even been heard, both in the media2 and in the halls of Congress.3  The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) weighed in at the request of members
of Congress,4 concluding that "it might be argued" that the President had
* Interim Associate Dean of Administration and Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community
Service, Chapman University School of Law; Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence. The first part of this article, drawn from a letter to Representative James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was presented at a symposium, "Are We at War? Global
Conflict and Security, Post-9/l 1," sponsored by the Center for Global Trade & Development at Chapman
University School of Law, in April 2006. 1 am delighted to thank Chapman Law Professor Tim Canova, who
organized the symposium, and Professors Katherine Darmer, Norman Abrams, and Elizabeth Rapaport who
provided helpful feedback at the "Security and Civil Liberties" panel at which this was discussed. The second
part of the article is drawn from testimony I provided on May 26, 2006, to the U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing Addressing Obligations of the Media With Respect to
Publication of Classified Information.
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2005, at 1. "Months after the Sept. II attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security
Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist
activity without court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying."
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Holtzman, The Impeachment of George W. Bush, THE NATION, Jan. 30,
2006, at 1. "People have begun to speak of impeaching President George W. Bush-not in hushed whispers
but openly, in newspapers, on the Internet, in ordinary conversations and even in Congress."
3. See, e.g., H. Res. 635, 109th Cong. (2005). "The resolution created a select committee to
investigate the Administration's intent to go to war before congressional authorization, manipulation of pre-
war intelligence, encouraging and countenancing torture, retaliating against critics, and to make
recommendations regarding grounds for possible impeachment."
4. Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, CONG. RES. SERVICE, Jan. 5, 2006, at
32 [hereinafter "CRS Report"]. "Where the Congress has exercised its constitutional authority in the areas
of foreign affairs and thereby has withdrawn electronic surveillance, as defined by FISA, from the 'zone of
twilight,' between Executive and Legislative constitutional authorities, it might be argued that the President's
asserted inherent authority to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance was thereby limited."
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violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a statute adopted by
Congress in the late 1970s. In stark contrast, the President, backed by a lengthy
legal analysis by the Department of Justice, defended both the legality and the
necessity of the NSA surveillance program to the overall war against terrorism.
6
The current controversy over the President's surveillance program, like the
controversies over the Boland Amendment in the 1980s, the War Powers Act
in the 1970s, and countless other statutory efforts by Congress to limit the
President's executive powers, force us to give serious consideration to the
Founders' constitutional design. In particular, it is important to assess the
strength of the competing analyses provided by the Congressional Research
Service and the Department of Justice with respect to whether the President's
actions "violated" FISA and, if so, whether the FISA, so interpreted, would be
an unconstitutional intrusion upon powers that the Constitution confers directly
upon the President.
It is perhaps no surprise that the CRS report sided with congressional
power, while the DOJ report sides with the President. CRS rightly touts itself
as the policy arm of the Congress, and it is answerable to Congress for its work.
Similarly, the Department of Justice is an executive Department, answerable to
the President; indeed, Article II of the Constitution specifically authorizes the
President to require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer of each
executive department.7 While both entities have well-deserved reputations for
generally providing unbiased assessments to their superiors, we would be
remiss not to notice where their institutional allegiances lie. As Chief Justice
(and former President) Taft noted eighty years ago in Myers v. United States,8
"[e]ach head of a department is and must be the President's alter ego in the
matters of that department where the president is required by law to exercise
authority." The Supreme Court recently recognized in Bowsher v. Synar, even
more forcefully, that the same is true for agents of the Legislature: "In
constitutional terms, [Congress's] removal powers over the Comptroller
General's office dictate that he will be subservient to Congress."9 What was
true of the Comptroller General in Bowsher is equally true of the Congressional
Research Service, which is statutorily designated as an "agent" of Congress and
5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2006).
6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE AcTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 1 (Jan. 19. 2006) [hereinafter "DOJ Report"].
"The NSA activities are lawful and consistent with civil liberties... [they] are supported by the President's
well-recognized inherent constitutional authority as commander in Chief and sole organ for the Nation in
foreign affairs to conduct warrantless surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect and
disrupt armed attacks on the United States."
7. U.S. CONST. art 11, § 2, cl. 1.
8. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 133 (1926).
9. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986) (emphasis added).
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its committees."° Although the CRS is legally obliged to conduct its work
"without partisan bias,"" there is no similar prohibition on institutional bias,
and CRS is clearly a creature of Congress, "discharging its responsibilities to
Congress," "rendering to Congress the most effective and efficient service," and
"responding most expeditiously, effectively, and efficiently to the special needs
of Congress.' 2 The CRS report itself acknowledges that it was prepared in
response to requests from "more than one congressional client"' 3-and that role
as advocate for its congressional clients is made amply clear throughout the
report-which defends Congress's efforts through FISA to "put to rest the
notion that Congress recognizes an inherent Presidential power to conduct"
foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States. "
However much some members of Congress might prefer the conclusions
reached in the CRS Report to those reached by the DOJ, protecting as they do
congressional prerogatives at the expense of the Executive, the DOJ's
conclusions are much better grounded in constitutional text, precedent, history,
and the political theory espoused by our nation's Founders than those reached
by the authors of the CRS Report.
The argument that existing precedent supports the President's position is
particularly compelling. The two landmark cases that mark the poles of
Supreme Court precedent addressing the interplay between the Executive and
the Congress on matters of foreign policy and war are Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 5 and United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 6 In
Youngstown, the Supreme Court rebuffed President Truman's efforts to seize
the nation's steel mills in order to secure the ready supply of steel for the
military conflict then underway in Korea, and there is language in the case
favorable to proponents of congressional power. '7 In Curtiss- Wright, on the
other hand, the Supreme Court articulated a very broad theory of presidential
power in the foreign-policy arena which remains valid to this day,
acknowledging that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."' 8
Not surprisingly, given its institutional affiliation, the CRS Report begins
its analysis with the Youngstown case (and particularly with Justice Jackson's
10. 2 U.S.C. § 166(d)(1)(C).
11. Id. at § 166(d).
12. Id. at § 166(b)(1)(A-C).
13. CRS Report, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 17 (citing S. REP. No. 95-604(I), at 64 (1972)).
15. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
16. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
17. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 1223.
18. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
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concurring opinion in that case), bolstered by a pro-Congress interpretive gloss
placed on the case by a district court decision in United States v. Andonian.19
Yet the CRS Report fails to give adequate play to what it calls the "nuances"
of Justice Jackson's important concurring opinion in the case,20 treating the case
as much more solicitous of congressional power than it actually is.
Justice Jackson famously described a three-tiered system for assessing the
separation of powers issues that lie at the intersection of presidential and
congressional power.21 Obviously, the President's authority is at its peak when
he acts both pursuant to his own authority under the Constitution and by virtue
of additional statutory authority given to him by Congress-Justice Jackson's
Category one.22 Less strong, but no less certain, is when the President acts by
virtue of his own constitutional powers in the face of congressional silence-
Category two.23 Finally, Justice Jackson even conceded that, at times, the
President could act pursuant to his Article II constitutional powers despite an
explicit act of Congress to the contrary--Category three.24 Congress cannot
pass a law that curtails Presidential powers which come directly from the
Constitution itself 2 The problem for Truman, according to Justice Jackson,
was not that he exceeded statutory authority, but that his constitutional war
powers did not, under the circumstances, permit him to trump the mechanisms
of the relevant congressional statute.26 Congress had not authorized the war,
and the nation's steel mills were too far removed from the "theater of war" to
fall under the President's power as Commander-in-Chief.
27
Contrary to the conclusions drawn by the CRS, a careful review of the
Youngstown holding in general, and of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
particular, yields several important distinctions that vindicate President Bush's
latest actions in the war against terrorism. First, in the Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF) that it adopted a week after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, Congress did authorize the use of force in terms broad
enough to permit the President's actions.28 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,29 the
19. United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd and remanded on other
grounds, 29 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
20. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-39.
21. Id. at 635-37.
22. Id. at 635.
23. Id. at 637.
24. Id. at 637.
25. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II.
26. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-39.
27. Id. at 587.
28. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept.
18, 2001) [hereinafter "AUMF"]. "The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
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Supreme Court held that the AUMF statute was broad enough to give the
President authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants even though
such detentions were not explicitly authorized (and but for the AUMF would
be prohibited by another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)); surely it is therefore
broad enough to serve as authority for the much lesser intrusion on personal
liberty at issue with surveillance of international calls made to or received from
our enemies. As such, the President's actions at issue here fall into Justice
Jackson's first category, in which the President's power is at its zenith; the DOJ
Report's analysis on this point is much more persuasive than the CRS Report's
analysis.
Second, as September 11 made very clear, the United States is a "theater
of war," and the full panoply of presidential powers in time of war comes into
play-his power as Commander-in-Chief, his power as the nation's top
executive; and his inherent power as the organ of U.S. sovereignty on the world
stage. This is more than simply a "point of view" that "might be argued," as the
CRS Report states.3" The agents of our stateless, terrorist enemies are here on
U.S. soil, aiming to strike at our infrastructure, our citizens, and our very way
of life at every possible opportunity. Thus, even if the AUMF was not
sufficient to sustain the President's executive order, and even if FISA is read
as an attempt by Congress to circumscribe the President's own constitutional
powers, Justice Jackson recognized that in such a conflict, Congress could not
by statute restrict powers that the President has directly from Article II of the
Constitution. Congress itself recognized this in the AUMF, when it noted that
"the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and
prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States. . . ."', The
AUMF preamble reflects the view of Congress itself prior to the adoption of
FISA, when it expressly recognized the "constitutional power of the President
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack ... [and] to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States .. ."32
But whether or not the CRS Report misreads Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion from Youngstown, most troubling about the CRS analysis is that it does
not grapple with the Curtiss-Wright case at all, citing it only once, deep in a
footnote, and then only in a parenthetical quotation from a lower court
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons."
29. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
30. CRS Report, supra note 4, at 37.
31. AUMF, Preamble, PL 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (emphasis added).
32. 82 Stat. 214,formerly codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).
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decision.33 Any neutral assessment of the important separation of powers
questions at issue here warranted a thorough consideration of Curtiss- Wright
and the theory of presidential power it recognized (as well as the even more
long-standing precedent on which the decision in Curtiss-Wright relied,
including The Prize Cases34 ), yet none is to be found in the CRS Report.
Instead, every indulgence in favor of congressional authority that can even
weakly be drawn from existing judicial opinions is drawn, and every
recognition by the courts of inherent executive power is downplayed or ignored.
Nowhere is the CRS' slant toward Congress more manifest than in the
Report's discussion of the FISA Court of Review's decision in In re Sealed
Case, which expressly stated: "We take for granted that the President does
have [inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign
intelligence information], and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on
the President's constitutional power."35 Instead of acknowledging the import
of this unbelievably clear statement, the CRS Report begrudgingly finds in it
only "some support" for the President's position, and even then finds the scope
of the support "to be a matter with respect to which there are differing views. ,36
The DOJ Report, in contrast, fully grapples with the competing cases and
provides a well-reasoned analysis for its proposition that the cases clearly
support the inherent constitutional authority of a President to conduct
surveillance of communications from or to enemies of the United States and
their supporters in time of war.37 Almost by default, then, the DOJ Report
makes the stronger case, but even where the CRS Report does take up the
debate by way of its discussion of lower court decisions, the CRS Report's
authors are hard-pressed to find in the existing precedent support for the
proposition that the President does not have inherent authority to conduct the
surveillances at issue here. The best they can muster is that "it might be argued
that the President's asserted inherent authority to engage warrantless electronic
surveillance was ... limited"38 by Congress's adoption of FISA, and that the
reliance by the FISA Court of Review in In re Sealed Case on pre-FISA cases
''as a basis for its assumption of the continued Vitality of the President's
inherent constitutional authority to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance
for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information might be viewed
as somewhat undercutting the persuasive force of the Court of Review's
33. CRS Report, supra note 4, at 31 n. 104 (citing United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d
908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980)).
34. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
35. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (emphasis added).
36. CRS Report, supra note 4, at 33.
37. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 8.
38. CRS Report, supra note 4, at 32 (emphasis added).
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statement."39 This is a classic wiggle by lawyers trying to reach the conclusion
favored by their clients in the face of precedent that is squarely against them.
Curtiss- Wright provides powerful support for the President's position. In
that case, adopting the views expressed by John Marshall while serving in
Congress prior to his appointment as Secretary of State and ultimately as Chief
Justice of the United States, the Supreme Court recognized that "[tihe President
is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."4 As "sole organ" in the foreign affairs
arena, the President has inherent constitutional authority-indeed, the
constitutional duty-to conduct surveillance of communications with enemies
of the United States and people he reasonably believes to be working with
them, in order to prevent attacks against the United States." Were FISA to be
interpreted in such a fashion as to restrict the President's power in this arena,
it may well be unconstitutional-something that the FISA drafters themselves
recognized."2 Congress cannot by mere statute restrict powers that the President
holds directly from the Constitution itself. John Marshall's 1800 statement to
Congress dealt with an attempt by Congress to circumscribe the President's
powers in the negotiation of treaties,"3 much like the interpretation of the FISA
statute being pushed by some in Congress is an attempt to circumscribe the
President's power to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. Yet the
Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright was manifestly clear that Congress had no
authority to intrude upon the President's constitutional powers in the foreign
arena: "Into the field of negotiation [of treaties] the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it."
It should be noted that this Administration is not the first to make such
claims. Indeed, as the DOJ Report correctly notes, similar arguments have been
advanced, successfully, by every administration since electronic surveillance
technology was developed. The notion that Congress cannot by mere statute
truncate powers the President holds directly from the Constitution is a common
feature of executive branch communications with the Congress. Two examples
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
41. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or ofthe Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. at 638.
42. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4064. "The
establishment by this Act of exclusive means by which the President may conduct electronic surveillance does
not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the standard
set forth in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the steel seizure case." (citing 343 U.S. 579).
43. 6 ANNALS CONG. 613 (Mar. 7, 1800).
44. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
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from the DOJ Report are particularly revealing: First, Griffin Bell, President
Jimmy Carter's Attorney General, testified during debate in Congress over the
adoption of FISA that, although FISA did not recognize any inherent power of
the President, it "does not take away the power [of] the President under the
Constitution." '45 Second, President Clinton's Deputy Attorney General, Jamie
Gorelick, made a similar point while testifying before Congress when
amendments to FISA were being considered in 1994: "[T]he Department of
Justice believes, and the case law supports, that the President has inherent
authority to conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes .... "46
Granted, some in Congress may think this analysis affords too much power
to the President, but their beef is with the drafters of our Constitution, not with
the current President who, following the example of a good number of his
predecessors, has determined it necessary to exercise the full extent of his
constitutional powers in order to defend our nation against attack. Our nation's
Founders created a "unitary executive" (that is, an executive branch headed by
a single person rather than a committee, who is responsible for the actions of
the entire executive branch and accountable primarily and directly to the
people, not to Congress), strong enough to protect "the community against
foreign attacks," with "secrecy" and "dispatch" if necessary.47 And it made the
Executive largely independent of the Legislature, particularly in the foreign
policy arena. As the Supreme Court noted in Bowsher, "unlike parliamentary
systems, the President, under Article I, is responsible not to the Congress but
to the people, subject only to impeachment proceedings which are exercised by
the two Houses as representatives of the people." ' Indeed, the Court in
Bowsher correctly recognized that the real concern of the Founders was with
Legislative usurpation of Executive power, not the other way around. "The
dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long
been recognized," it noted, adding that "'[t]he debates of the Constitutional
Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that
the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the
expense of the other two branches.""' 9
45. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 8 (citing Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Act of
1978: Hearings on H.R. 5764, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation
of the House Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (Statement of Attorney General Bell)).
46. DOJ Report, supra note 6, at 8 (citing Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:
Hearings Before the House Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 61 (1994)
(statement of Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick)).
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722.
49. Id. at 727 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976)).
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Thus, while some in Congress may be tempted to follow the conclusions
reached by the CRS Report rather then the much better reasoned and more
thoroughly-documented conclusions drawn by the Department of Justice, they
would do so at the expense of the constitutional design bequeathed to us by our
Founders, a design which has worked magnificently well in protecting both our
nation's security and our individual liberties for over two centuries. Under the
Constitution, confirmed by two centuries of historical practice and ratified by
Supreme Court precedent, the President clearly has the authority to conduct
surveillance of enemy communications in time of war and of the
communications to and from those he reasonably believes are affiliated with our
enemies. Moreover, it should go without saying that such activities are a
fundamental incident of war, particularly in a war such as this where the battle
for intelligence is not only the front line but in many respects the most
significant front in the war. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force,
therefore, must be viewed as lending Congress's own support to the
constitutional powers directly conferred on the President by Article II. Some
may wish to question the wisdom of the President's surveillance activities-I
happen to think the necessity of them will be borne out in the fullness of
time-but we should not confuse such a dispute over tactics and policy with the
present dispute over the constitutional authority of the President to undertake
them.
That conclusion puts the New York Times disclosure of the NSA's
classified surveillance program into stark relief.5" No one contests that
classified information was illegally provided to the Times and then
subsequently published by it. And to my knowledge, no one seriously contends
that the individuals who leaked the information are not subject to prosecution
for violating the Espionage Act5 (or even subject to prosecution for treason if
it could be proved that their intent in leaking the classified information was to
undermine our war effort and thereby give aid and comfort to the enemy).52
Even those who would seek to bestow on the leaker the protected status of
"whistle-blower" surely will acknowledge that the whistle-blower statute
requires that the allegedly illegal activities be reported internally, through a
certain specified administrative route, rather than shouted to the world from the
front pages of our nation's major newspapers.53 Otherwise, the whistle-blower
statute would permit every government employee to be a classified information
50. See generally Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 793 et seq. See also United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D.C. Md.),
appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1985).
52. See generally U.S. Const. Art. III, § 3, cl. 1; Tomoya Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717
(1952); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
53. See Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 50 U.S.C. § 403q (1998).
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law unto himself, determining what should or should not be secret. The
devastating consequences to our national security, and also to individual
privacy, of such a flawed interpretation should be manifest.
But what of the liability of the New York Times itself? Is it equally
subject to the prohibitions of the Espionage Act? In May 2006, Bill Keller,
Executive Editor of the New York Times, published an important letter to the
editors of the Wall Street Journal challenging the notion "that when presidents
declare that secrecy is in the national interest, reporters should take that at face
value."54 Implicit in his rejection of that proposition is the view that reporters
generally, and perhaps the editors of the New York Times in particular, are free
to ignore the laws regarding publication of classified information when, in their
view, the benefit to the public from gaining access to the information would
outweigh any harm that might flow from its disclosure." Keller elaborated:
[P]residents are entitled to a respectful and attentive hearing,
particularly when they make claims based on the safety of the country.
In the case of the eavesdropping story, President Bush and other
figures in his administration were given abundant opportunities to
explain why they felt our information should not be published. We
considered the evidence presented to us, agonized over it, delayed
publication because of it. In the end, their case did not stand up to the
evidence our reporters amassed, and we judged that the responsible
course was to publish what we knew and let readers assess it
themselves.56
This is truly an extraordinary claim, that somehow the New York Times
is entitled to weigh evidence and determine for itself whether to publish
classified information-in other words, that the New York Times is above the
law and can publish whatever classified information it sees fit, with impunity.
Section 798 of the Espionage Act makes no such exception, of course. Its
text is unambiguous: "Whoever knowingly and willfully... publishes.., any
classified information . . . concerning the communication activities of the
United States .... Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both."5 Subsection (b) of the Act defines "communica-
tion intelligence" as "all procedures and methods used in the interception of
communications and the obtaining of information from such communications
54. Bill Keller, Striking a Balance: The New York Times Executive Editor on Leaks and
Partisanship, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 2, 2006, editorial page, at 1.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(3) (2006).
[Vol. 13:1
by other than the intended recipient."58 In the cloak and dagger world of
intelligence gathering, this statutory prohibition is a model of clarity-it is
illegal to publish classified information about our intelligence-gathering efforts
and capabilities.
Keller and other defenders of his claimed exemption from this legal
mandate point to the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United
States,59 as support for the proposition that the media's publication of classified
intelligence communications information is protected by the First Amendment.
There are two fundamental flaws with that contention.6" First, the Pentagon
Papers case dealt only with a request for an injunction, or prior restraint, on
publication-the quintessential restriction on the freedom of the press in mind
of those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights.6 But five Justices in that
case (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Stewart, Harlan, and Blackmun),
recognized what our nation's founders also understood-a prohibition on prior
restraints does not eliminate liability for post-publication prosecution for abuses
of the freedom.62 Justice White, for example, joined by Justice Stewart,
specifically noted in his concurring opinion that "a responsible press may
choose never to publish the more sensitive materials" "because of the hazards
of criminal sanctions."63 Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, would have required full briefing and consideration of
whether an injunction was proper in light of the "doctrine against enjoining
conduct in violation of criminal statutes."" James Wilson made this same point
during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in December 1787:
I presume it was not in the view of the honorable gentleman to say
there is no such thing as a libel, or that the writers of such ought not
to be punished. The idea of the liberty of the press is not carried so
far as this in any country. What is meant by the liberty of the press is,
58. Id.
59. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) [hereinafter "Pentagon Papers Case"].
60. There is also a third, more minor flaw, in reliance on the Pentagon Papers case. The information
that the government sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing was
governed by Section 793(e) of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), not Section 798, which applies to the
intelligence communications information at issue here. As Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion,
Section 793(e) barred only the "communication" of classified information relating to the national defense,
unlike Section 798, which bars both the publication and communication of signals communication
information, demonstrating (at least for Justice Douglas) "that Congress was capable of and did distinguish
between publishing and communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act." Id., at 721 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
61. Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 733.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 755.
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that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every
author is responsible when he attacks the security or welfare of the
government, or the safety, character, and property of the individual.65
The second fundamental flaw in relying on the Pentagon Papers case is
that the Court's per curiam opinion described a prior restraint on speech as
"bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," but it was not
an irrebuttable presumption for a majority of the Court. The classified
information at issue in the case did not involve ongoing tactical intelligence-
gathering operations such as those disclosed by the New York Times, and all
but the most absolutist of First Amendment justices6 6 and scholars have
recognized, quite rightly, that the freedom of the press does not extend to
publication of such things as troop movements. Justice White, for example,
joined by Justice Stewart, expressly noted that he was not contending "that in
no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against
publishing information about government plans or operations," only that the
government had not met "the very heavy burden that it must meet to warrant an
injunction against publication. ' '67 Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissenting
opinion that there are exceptions to the First Amendment, and that
"[c]onceivably such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and would have
been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, free from
unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures."68 Justice Harlan, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, specifically wished to consider whether an
injunction was appropriate in light of the "presumption" and "strong First
Amendment policy" against prior restraints, thereby rejecting the absolutist
view that would make his requested inquiry irrelevant. 69 And Justice Blackmun
noted in his dissenting opinion that "even the newspapers concede that there are
situations where restraint is in order and is constitutional."7 In support of his
position that the government has the right to prevent the publication of some
sensitive information, albeit a "very narrow right," he cited no less a Justice
than Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose own opinions on the First Amendment
chartered the course of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the field for the better
part of the past century.7' "It is a question of proximity and degree," noted
65. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 449 (1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS,
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 99 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
66. 1 refer here in particular to the concurring opinions of Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan
in New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714, 720 & 724.
67. Id. at 731.
68. Id. at 749.
69. ld. at 753.
70. Id. at 761.
71. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714, 720 & 724.
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Holmes in Schenck v. United States.72 "When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.""
In other words, the Pentagon Papers case comes with a very big
caveat--one that is fully in line with prior precedent permitting prior restraints
when the information at issue is highly sensitive classified information of
ongoing military intelligence operations. In Near v. Minnesota, for example,
the Supreme Court noted that "the protection even as to previous restraint is not
unlimited," even though "the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional
cases." 74 Among the litany of exceptional cases mentioned by the Court was
that "a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or
the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops."75  Similarly, in United States v. Reynolds, the Court upheld the
government's claim of privilege that investigation reports of an Air Force
accident involving a plane that was testing classified electronics equipment
need not be produced during discovery.76 Chief Justice Vinson, for the Court,
offered this highly relevant explanation in support of the holding:
In the instant case we cannot escape judicial notice that this is a time
of vigorous preparation for national defense. Experience in the past
was has made it common knowledge that air power is one of the most
potent weapons in our scheme of defense, and that newly developing
electronic devices have greatly enhanced the effective use of air
power. It is equally apparent that these electronic devices must be
kept secret if theirfull military advantage is to be exploited in the
national interests. On the record before the trial court it appeared
that this accident occurred to a military plane which had gone aloft to
test secret electronic equipment. Certainly there was a reasonable
danger that the accident investigation report would contain references
to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary concern of
the mission.77
It seems pretty clear that the disclosure of classified information about our
intelligence-gathering capabilities and tactics fits within the "exceptional case"
72. Schneck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
73. Id.
74. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
75. Id.
76. See generally U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953).
77. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
2006]
62 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
caveat recognized by a majority of the Court in both the Pentagon Papers case"
and in Near,79 and although the Supreme Court has never expressly held that
such a caveat exists, neither has it held that the First Amendment bars the
government from preventing the publication of classified information about
ongoing, highly-sensitive military operations in the same way that it can prevent
the dissemination of classified information by other citizens.
The second extraordinary claim made by Mr. Keller that needs to be
addressed is the notion that the First Amendment's Freedom of the Press Clause
creates a special preserve for the institutionalized press, as opposed to ordinary
citizens. ° Although this is a common understanding among reporters and
newspaper editors, it is wrong. The Freedom of the Press Clause was designed
to protect the published word of all citizens, not just an institutionalized fourth
estate. As one of the anti-federalist opponents of ratification of a constitution
that did not include a bill of rights noted, the liberty of the press insures that
"the people have the right of expressing and publishing their sentiments upon
every public measure."'"
James Madison's initial proposal for the First Amendment clearly
expressed this common understanding, guaranteeing the right of the people "to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments. ' 2 Roger Sherman's own
proposal a month later mirrored Madison's:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them
when they enter into society, Such are the rights ... of Speaking,
writing and publishing their Sentiments with decency and free-
dom .... Of these rights therefore they shall not be deprived by the
government of the United States. 3
These formulations were drawn from the amendments proposed by several of
the state ratifying conventions,"M and lest there be any doubt that "freedom of
78. See Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713.
79. See Near, 283 U.S. 697.
80. See generally Keller, supra note 55.
81. CENTNEL, NO. 2 (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in Cogan, supra note 66, at 103 (emphasis added).
82. ANNALS OF CONG., June 8, 1789, reprinted in PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 128 (1987).
83. Proposal by Sherman to House Committee of Eleven, MADISON PAPERS, DLC (July 21-28,
1789), reprinted in Cogan, supra note 66, at 83.
84. See, e.g., Proposal of the North Carolina ratifying convention, STATE RATIFICATIONS, RG 11,
DNA (Aug. 1, 1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
93-103 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) ("That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and
publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of Liberty, and ought
not to be violated); Proposal of the Rhode Island ratifying convention, STATE RATIFICATIONS, RG 11, DNA
(May 29, 1790) ("That the people have a right to freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their
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the press" was synonymous with the right of the people generally to speak,
write, and publish their sentiments, the Pennsylvania proponents of a Bill of
Rights made that amply clear: "That the people have a right to the freedom of
speech, of writing, and of publishing their sentiments, therefore, the freedom
of the press shall not be restrained by any law of the United States." 5 What is
protected is not just the right to use a printing press or to go into the newspaper
business, but the right of every citizen to publish, to make and distribute copies
of words and/or pictures communicating his or her sentiments to the public.
The founders would never have accepted the view that the freedom of the press
is limited to members of a particular industry called "the press" or "the
media." 6
The consequence of this original understanding, of course, is that the First
Amendment does not afford any greater protection to "the press" than it does
to ordinary citizens, nor exempt "the press" from "the basic and simple duties
of every citizen" to report information regarding discovery or possession of
stolen property or secret government documents-a duty which Chief Justice
Burger correctly noted rests equally "on taxi drivers, Justices, and the New
York Times.87
Indeed, in analogous areas of media law involving matters with much
lower stakes than national security, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the media has no special exemption from generally applicable laws. The
Court's holding in Associated Press v. United States, for example, devastates
any claim that the "press" has "a peculiar constitutional sanctuary" from the
law:8
[W]e are not unmindful of the argument that newspaper publishers
charged with combining cooperatively to violate the Sherman Act are
entitled to have a different and more favorable kind of trial procedure
than all other persons covered by the Act. No language in the
Sherman Act or the summary judgment statute lends support to the
suggestion. There is no single element in our traditional insistence
upon an equally fair trial for every person from which any such
sentiments, that freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated);
Proposal of the Virginia ratifying convention, STATE RATIFICATIONS, RG 11, DNA (June 27, 1788) ("That
the people have a fight to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their Sentiments; that the freedom
of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not to be violated), see Cogan, supra note 66,
at 93.
85. PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in Cogan, supra note 66, at 93 (emphasis
added).
86. See generally Thomas G. West, Free Speech in the American Founding and in Modern
Liberalism, in ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, ET AL, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 310-84 (2004).
87. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 751.
88. Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
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discriminatory trial practice could stem. For equal-not unequal-
justice under law is the goal of our society. Our legal system has not
established different measures of proof for the trial of cases in which
equally intelligent and responsible defendants are charged with
violating the same statutes. Member publishers of AP are engaged in
business for profit exactly as are other business men who sell food,
steel, aluminum, or anything else people need or want.... All are
alike covered by the Sherman Act. The fact that the publisher handles
news while others handle food does not, as we shall later point out,
afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he
can with impunity violate laws regulating his business practices.89
Justice Harlan made the same point for the Court plurality in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts: "The publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws."9 And in the post-Pentagon
Papers case of Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a
reporter/informant privilege that would exempt reporters from the obligation
shared by other citizens to testify before a grand jury, explicitly noting that
"otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be enforced
against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that may be
imposed."'"
So where does that leave us with respect to the New York Times'
contentions? Once it is clear that the "Freedom of the Press" acknowledged in
the First Amendment does not create a special preserve for the institutional
media, the full import of Bill Keller's claims come into view, and it is the old
saw, long since disproved, that democratic governments are not permitted
secrets, even in time of war. Our Constitution expressly recognizes the
common-sense necessity of government secrets, for example, in the Article I
requirement that each House of Congress shall publish a journal of its
proceedings, "excepting such Parts as in their Judgment may require Secrecy."92
The need for secrecy is even more urgent in the executive branch, and as
Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist 71 (discussed above), it is one of the
key reasons the Constitution provides for unity in the executive office,
establishing an "energetic" executive who can operate with "secrecy" and
"despatch" when necessary to protect "the community against foreign
attacks. 93
89. Id. at 6-7.
90. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967). See also Associated Press v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding no press exemption from labor laws).
91. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972).
92. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 48, at 355-56.
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This need for secrecy in the conduct of certain executive functions such
as those under consideration today has repeatedly been recognized and
approved by the courts as well. Writing for the Court in Curtiss-Wright, for
example, Justice Sutherland explained why the President's authority over
foreign affairs was so great, noting that he "has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly
necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results."94
A similar view was expressed by Justice Jackson in Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.: "The President, both as Commander-
in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence
services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world."95
The constitutionality of protecting intelligence gathering and other
operational military secrets in time of war is therefore beyond dispute, and the
institutional press is no more permitted to ignore the legal restrictions imposed
by the Espionage Act on the publication and other dissemination of such
classified information than are ordinary citizens. Neither is it exempt from
prosecution for willful violations of that Act.
Justice Goldberg famously noted inKennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez that our
Constitution "is not a suicide pact,"9 6 and the sentiment is particularly apropos
for the issues we are facing today. The simple fact is that the asymmetric
nature of the current war against international terrorist organizations makes
intelligence gathering the central and most critical front in the war. Not only
must the executive branch aggressively pursue every legal means of gathering
intelligence at its disposal, it must be equally aggressive in protecting the
classified methods that it is using in that effort if it is to succeed in preventing
future attacks on our homeland and fellow citizens such as those we witnessed
on that fateful day in September five years ago. Every citizen, including-
particularly including-those employed with major media organs, have a
responsibility to prevent ongoing operational secrets from falling into the hands
of our enemies by complying with the law regarding classified information. It
is one of those "basic and simple duties" of citizenship that rests equally "on
taxi drivers, Justices, and the New York Times."97 We may never know how
great the damage to our national security the recent disclosures of classified,
highly-sensitive intelligence-gathering information have caused, but with the
seriousness of the threat to our lives and liberty posed by terrorist organizations
94. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
95. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (emphasis
added).
96. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
97. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 751.
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such as Al Qaida, it is certainly the right, and may well be the duty, of the
executive to prosecute those responsible for them.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While they may have been immoral, external military operations of past
empires often proved profitable and, therefore,justifiable on economic grounds.
Military actions abroad usually brought economic benefits not only to the
imperial ruling classes, but also (through "trickle-down" effects) to their
citizens. This was the case with both pre-capitalist empires of distant past and
the capitalist imperial powers of Europe. The United States, too, has often used
military power as a means for economic and territorial gains. These included
not only the expansion of its territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but also
the considerable non-territorial economic gains abroad, especially in the
immediate aftermath of Word War II.
This pattern of economic gains flowing from imperial military operations,
however, seems to have somewhat changed in recent years, especially in the
post-Cold War era. Moralities aside, U.S. military expeditions and operations
of late are not justifiable even on imperialistic economic grounds. Indeed,
* This paper draws heavily on the author's recently published book: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF U.S. MILITARISM (2006). The author is a professor of Economics at Drake University.
I. See generally PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC
CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF
EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC (2004).
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escalating U.S. military expansions and aggressions have become ever more
wasteful and cost-inefficient in the post-Cold War period.
Evidence shows that even the widely-held claim that such expansions and
aggressions are driven largely by concerns for fossil fuels seems increasingly
dubious. Not surprisingly, official justifications for the post-Cold War military
actions have become increasingly fuzzy and shifting: humanitarian concerns,
international drug trafficking, global terrorism, militant Islam and, most
recently, democratic ideals.
The fact that external U.S. military operations of late have become
economically burdensome has also undermined traditional or classical theories
of imperialism, which tend to explain imperial military expeditions and
operations in terms of economic gains and objectives.
So, if it is not economic (or classic) imperialism, how are the escalating
military aggressions of the United States in recent years to be characterized?
What are the driving forces behind these military expansions, expeditions, and
operations?
Official explanations such as weapons of mass destruction, threats to the
national security or interests of the United States, or spreading democracy
worldwide, can now easily be dispensed with as flimsy, harebrained pretexts for
war and militarism.
Critics have offered a number of explanations. One of the most popular
explanations attributes the rise of unilateral U.S. military adventures to the
ascendance to power of the cabal of the so-called neoconservative militarists.
A second widely-shared view, especially outside of the United States, attributes
the recent rise of U.S. militarism, especially the invasion of Iraq, to the
geopolitical imperatives of Israel. The third, and perhaps most widely-held,
view of the surge in U.S. military expansions in the Middle East and central
Asia is that the recently heightened military activities in those regions are
prompted by U.S. designs to gain access to more and cheaper sources of gas and
oil.
Without denying the contributory roles of these factors, this study points
to a more crucial force behind the drive to war and militarism: the powerful
beneficiaries of military industries and war dividends, or, as the late President
Eisenhower put it, the military-industrial complex and related influential
interests that are vested in the business of war and military expansion.'
Drawing on a number of preeminent theories and empirical accounts on
imperialism and militarism3 , this study makes a clear distinction between
2. Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2006).
3. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 1; JOHNSON, supra note 1. See generally SIDNEY LENS, THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1970); ALFRED VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILITARISM: CIVILIAN AND
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"classical" or economic imperialism on the one hand, and militaristic, cost-
inefficient, or parasitic imperialism on the other.
Historically, parasitic military imperialism has almost always evolved out
of a higher stage of economic or classical imperialism-a prolonged reliance
on military power for economic, territorial, or geopolitical gains gradually
creates a dynamic out of which evolves a large standing military apparatus that
tends to perpetuate itself-and develop into a bureaucratic military empire.
Whereas military force in the economic sense of imperialism is usually a means
for economic, territorial, or geopolitical gains, under parasitic military
imperialism, it becomes an end in itself.
Accordingly, as the U.S. military establishment has grown in size, it has
also evolved in quality and character: it is no longer just a means for economic
or geopolitical gains but, perhaps more importantly, an end-nay, an
empire-in itself. Rising militarization of U.S. foreign policy in recent years
is driven not so much by some general or abstract national interests, as it is by
the special interests vested in military industries and related businesses, which
need an atmosphere of war and militarism in order to justify their lion's share
of the public money. This helps explain why since World War H powerful
beneficiaries of war dividends have almost always reacted negatively to
discussions of international cooperation and tension reduction, or ddtente.4
Thus, for example, in the late 1940s and early 195 Os, the Korean War and
the "communist threat" were used as pretexts by the proponents of military
buildup to overrule those who called for limits on military spending following
the end of World War II. Representatives of the military-industrial complex,
disproportionately ensconced in the State Department, succeeded in having
President Truman embark on his famous overhaul of the U.S. foreign policy,
which drastically increased the Pentagon budget and expanded the military-
industrial establishment.
Likewise, in the face of the 1970s tension-reducing negotiations with the
Soviet Union, representatives of the military-industrial complex rallied around
Cold Warrior think tanks, such as the Committee on the Present Danger, and
successfully sabotaged those discussions. Instead, once again, by invoking the
"communist threat," they managed to reinforce the relatively weakened tensions
with the Soviet Union to such new heights that it came to be known as the
MILITARY (Meridian Books, Inc. 1959) (1937); SEYMOUR MELMAN, PROFITS WITHOUT PRODUCTION (1983);
ANDREW BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM (2005).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, HOwMUCH AREYOUMAKING ON THE WAR, DADDY? (2003);
JOHNSON, supra note 1; JAMES MANN, THE RISE OF vULCANS: THE HISTORY OF BUSH'S WAR CABINET
(2004).
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Second Cold War-hence, the early 1980s dramatic "rearming of America," as
President Reagan put it.'
Similarly, when the collapse of the Soviet system and the subsequent
discussions of "peace dividends" in the United States threatened the interests
of the military-industrial conglomerates, their representatives invented "new
external sources of danger to U.S. interests" and successfully substituted them
for the "threat of communism" of the Cold War era. These "new, post-Cold
War sources of threat" are said to stem from the "unpredictable, unreliable
regional powers of the Third World," from the so-called "rogue states," and
more recently from "global terrorism" and Islamic fundamentalism.6
This tendency of the beneficiaries of war dividends to foment international
convulsions in order to justify the continuous hemorrhaging of the Pentagon
budget, also helps explain why the Bush Administration, under the heavy
influence of the Defense Department, viewed the 9/11 tragedy as an opportunity
for further militarization. The monstrous attacks of 9/11 were treated not as
crimes-requiring law enforcement, international police, intelligence gathering,
and public diplomacy efforts and operations-but as war on America. Once it
was thus established that the United States was "at war," military buildup
followed accordingly.
7
Viewed in this light, militaristic tendencies to wars abroad can be seen
largely as reflections of the metaphorical fights over allocation of public
finance at home; of a subtle or insidious strategy to redistribute national
resources in favor of the wealthy; to cut public spending on socio-economic
infrastructure; and to reverse the New Deal reforms by expanding military
spending.
The economic burden of the recent wars of choice go beyond their
opportunity costs in terms of undermining public capital formation (both human
capital such as health and education, and physical capital for infrastructure such
as roads, bridges, mass transit, dams, levees, and the like), which is crucial to
the ideals of long-term economic growth and social prosperity. Equally
burdensome, these wars also cost non-military U.S. transnational capital
external sales markets and investment opportunities as a result of various
blowbacks, especially consumer backlashes, abroad.
5. See, e.g., FRED HALLIDAY, MAKING OF THE SECOND COLD WAR (1983); TRILATERALISM
(1980).
6. Seegenerally SHEILA RYAN, Power Projection in the Middle East, in MOBILIZING DEMOCRACY
41-69 (Greg Bates ed., Common Courage Press 1991) (1990); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1997); MANN, supra note 4.
7. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES
SINCE 9/11 (2006); MANN, supra note 4; THOMAS RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE
IN IRAQ (2006).
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In the first part of this study, I will examine the economic implications and
consequences of the recent external military adventures for U.S. global markets.
After showing that such military adventures cannot be justified on the grounds
of broader national economic interests, I will then examine the powerful special
interests that are dangerously vested in the business of war and are, therefore,
responsible for the tendency to permanent war and militarism.
II. THE IMPACT OF RECENT WARS OF CHOICE ON U.S. GLOBAL MARKETS
Militarism has always tried to disguise its interests as national interests
and justify its parasitic role and existentialist military adventures on grounds
that such military operations will lead to economic gains for the imperium and
the nation as a whole. This despite the fact that military adventures by
beneficiaries of the business of war are often costly economic burdens that tend
to be at odds, not only with the interests of the masses of the poor and working
people, but also with those of non-military transnational capitalists who pay
taxes to finance such adventures while losing sales and investment
opportunities in foreign markets to international competition, and lose political
and economic stability in global markets.
A. War and the Non-Military U.S. Transnational Capital
Recent U.S. military build-up, and its unilateral aggressions abroad, have
increasingly become economic burdens, not only because they devour a
disproportionately large share of national resources, but also because such
adventurous operations tend to create instability in international markets,
subvert long-term global investment, and increase energy or fuel costs.
Furthermore, the resentment and hostilities that unprovoked aggressions
generate in foreign lands, are bound to create backlash at the consumer level.
For example, the Iranian-made beverage Zam Zam Cola has in recent years
made significant inroads into the traditional markets of the U.S. brands Coca-
Cola and Pepsi, not only in the Middle East, but also in Europe and elsewhere.8
A Business Week report pointed out in the immediate aftermath of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq that the Muslim world, Europe, and elsewhere "there have been
calls for boycotts of American brands as well as demonstrations at symbols of
U.S. business, such as McDonald's corporation."9 A leading Middle East
business journal, AME Info, reported in its April 8, 2004 issue:
8. Coke and Pepsi Battle it Out, AME INFO., Apr. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/37492.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2006) [hereinafter AME INFO.].
9. Michael J. Mandel, et al., How War Will Shape the Economy, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 14,2003,
at 29-32.
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[i]n 2002, a cluster of Arab organizations asked Muslims to shun
goods from America, seen as an enemy of Islam and a supporter of
Israel. In Bahrain, the AI-Montazah supermarket chain, for example,
boosted sales by pulling about 1,000 US products off its shelves, and
other grocers followed suit. Coca-Cola and Pepsi, sometimes
considered unflattering shorthand for the United States, took the brunt
of the blow. Coca-Cola admitted that the boycott trimmed some $40
million off profits in the Gulf in 2002.'0
The report further pointed out that in recent years, a number of "Muslim
colas" have appeared in the Middle Eastern/Muslim markets. "Don't Drink
Stupid, Drink Committed, read the labels of Mecca Cola, from France....
Iran's Zam Zam Cola, originally concocted for Arab markets, has spread to
countries including France and the United States."' "I The report also indicated
that "US exports to the Middle East dropped $31 billion from 1998-2002.
Branded, value-added goods-all the stuff easily recognized as
American-were hit the hardest."' 2 Quoting Grant Smith, director of IRmep, a
leading Washington-based think tank on Middle Eastern affairs, the report
concluded: "Our piece of the pie is shrinking, and it's because of our degraded
image."13
Evidence shows that foreign policy-induced losses of the U.S. market
share in global markets goes beyond the Middle East and/or the Muslim
world."4 According to a December 2004 survey of 8,000 international
consumers carried out by Global Market Insite (GMI) Inc., one-third of all
consumers in Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United
Kingdom said that "U.S. foreign policy, particularly the 'war on terror' and the
occupation of Iraq, constituted their strongest impression of the United
States."' 5 In addition, "[b]rands closely identified with the U.S., such as
Marlboro cigarettes, America Online (AOL), McDonald's, American Airlines,
and Exxon-Mobil, are particularly at risk."' 6
Furthermore, "[t]wenty percent of respondents in Europe and Canada said
they consciously avoided buying U.S. products as a protest against those
10. AME INFO., supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Jim Lobe, Poll: War Bad for Business, ANTIWAR.COM, Dec. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=4235 (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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policies."' 7 Commenting on the results of the survey, Dr. Mitchell Eggers,
GMI's Chief Operating Officer and chiefpollster, pointed out, "[u]nfortunately,
current American foreign policy is viewed by international consumers as a
significant negative, when it used to be a positive."' 8
Kevin Roberts, chief executive of advertising giant Saatchi & Saatchi,
likewise expressed concern about global consumer backlash against militaristic
U.S. foreign policy when he told the Financial Times that he "believed
consumers in Europe and Asia are becoming increasingly resistant to having
'brand America rammed down their throats. ""' Similarly, Simon Anholt, author
of Brand America, told the British trade magazine Marketing Week that "four
more years of Bush's foreign policy could have grave consequences for U.S.
companies' international market share."20
Despite these damages and threats to global U.S. market share,
beneficiaries of war dividends claim that their military operations abroad would
yield economic benefits for the nation as a whole because, they claim, such
military actions would help spread unhindered market mechanism, remove
obstacles to transnational corporations and keep foreign markets and resources
open to their business operations. Recently, such assertions are frequently
interspersed with claims of "spreading democracy worldwide." In this fashion,
beneficiaries of war and militarism try to disguise the colossal military buildup,
which has become an end-indeed, an empire-in itself, as a means for
spreading democracy and achieving international economic advantage.
Such claims are made both directly through Pentagon policy documents
and indirectly through militaristic surrogate think tanks such as the Project for
New American Century (PNAC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).
In recent years, such allegations are also made through a number of policy
papers written by the Bush administration.2
Evidence, as well as logic and common sense, suggest, however, that not
only is the assertion that continued military buildup would help spread political
and economic freedom is hollow and disingenuous, but that war and militarism,
as strategies to achieve these lofty ideals, are counterproductive, especially in
the era of integrated and interdependent global markets. Not only is militarism
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Lobe, supra note 14.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last
visited Sept. 9, 2006); THOMAS DONNELLY, PROJECT FOR NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, REBUILDING
AMERICA'S DEFENSES: STRATEGY, FORCES, AND RESOURCES FOR A NEW CENTURY (2000), available at
http://www.newamericancentury.orgfRebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
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inherently at odds with freedom, but it is also burdensome economically-
except, of course, for the beneficiaries of the business of war.
Economic liberalism, which has in the last few decades been called
neoliberalism, is in fact antithetical to militarism. It shuns militarism not only
because militarism is costly and wasteful, but also because it is disruptive to
international economics and would therefore undermine global capitalist
profitability-except for military industries and war-related businesses.
Accordingly, economic liberalism/neoliberalism tends to rely on market, not
military, force to maintain international economic superiority.
As this strategy of relying on market efficiency, instead of military power,
in pursuit of international economic advantage tends to expose a large military
establishment as parasitic and redundant, it also helps explain the inherent
conflict between militarism and liberalism/neoliberalism. The strategy further
helps explain why beneficiaries of war and militarism, the military
establishment and the neoconservative militarists in and around the Bush
administration, were so hostile to Bill Clinton and his neoliberal economic
policies. In addition, the conflicting interests of militarism and neoliberalism
help explain why these beneficiaries stifled the widespread calls for "peace
dividends" and military downsizing in the immediate aftermath of the collapse
of the Berlin Wall.22
Perhaps more importantly, the conflicting interests of militarism and those
of non-military transnational capital help explicate why representatives of the
latter interests have not encouraged or embraced the Bush administration's
policy of unilateral militarism. Although non-military transnational interests
have not expressed a strong opposition to the administration's drive to war, they
have nonetheless shown some tepid wariness toward it. As shown later in this
study, even big oil, the major but largely incidental beneficiaries of war, did not
support the war on Iraq.
This is not to say that the American oil companies, and other non-military
transnational corporations, would not welcome the spoils of war in the form of
oil price hikes, or in the form of acquisition of asset ownership that would result
from privatization of previously-public industries and enterprises that might
ensue from the policy of "regime change" in a country like Iraq. Indeed, there
is evidence that, as soon as Iraq came under U.S. occupation, many such
corporations from agribusiness, transportation, telecommunications, financial
services, and power, rushed their representatives to Baghdad to participate in
the contracting and privatization bonanza that followed the occupation.23
22. See, e.g., James Mann, The True Rationale? It's a Decade Old, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar.
7, 2004, at B02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35472-
2004Mar6?language=printer (last visited Sept. 9, 2006); RYAN, supra note 6.
23. See, e.g., Naomi Prins, MakingaKilling in lraq, LEFT BuSiNESS OBSERVER, Aug. 2003, at 2-3.
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Nonetheless, there is no evidence that major oil and other non-military
transnational corporations, instigated or encouraged the invasion because non-
military transnational corporations including big oil, prefers stability and
predictability in global markets to short-term spoils of war.
Ordinarily, representatives of non-military, transnational capital prefer
multilateral economic policies ofneoliberalism to unilateral actions of the Bush
administration because they are afraid that war and militarism might subvert
international economics and undermine long-term U.S. competitiveness.
Expressing such concerns ofneoliberalism, Business Week carried an article on
the eve of the invasion of Iraq that read:
Washington's unilateral tendencies have also created nervousness in
global financial markets on which the U.S. has become dependent. It
has made the multilateral trade negotiations-in which so many
American companies have a huge stake-a secondary priority....
Financing foreign wars and boosting homeland security is bound to
erode U.S. economic vitality.24
Three weeks later, in another article titled "How War Will Shape the
Economy" the magazine wrote: ".... the real threat [of the war] is to the rapid
productivity growth of the 1990s, which may be tough to sustain in an unsettled
and hostile world. New Economy growth depends on globalization and
innovation, both of which could be dampened by war and a potentially difficult
aftermath."25 Any slowdown in the free flow of trade, people, and technologies
could significantly dampen innovation and growth in the U.S. and abroad. As
stated in Business Week, "[w]hat we do know is that the market-driven growth
the U.S. enjoyed in the 1990s thrived on an atmosphere of global peace. The
war in Iraq, the tough rebuilding task ahead, and the rise in global tension all
signal to an end to that fertile era."26
Writing in the October 27, 2003 issue of the Star Tribune, Ron Bosrock
of the Global Institute of St. John's University likewise expressed anxiety over
negative economic consequences that might follow from the Bush
administration's policies of unilateral military operations and economic
sanctions:
In the meantime, the U.S. economy, in order to grow, will have to
continue to expand into the global markets while dealing with this
ever-increasing competition [from EU, China, India] .... If this new
24. Geoffrey E. Garten, Bush 's Guns-and-Butter Dilemma, BUSiNESS WEEK, Mar. 17, 2003, at
66-76.
25. Mandel, supra note 9.
26. Id.
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U.S. foreign policy [of militarism] leads to decades of upheaval, how
will U.S. businesses convince their future global partners that they
should look to them for stable business opportunities-as opposed to
all those new competitors waiting in the wings?27
Concerns of this nature have prompted a broad spectrum of non-military
business interests to form coalitions of trade associations that are designed to
lobby foreign policy makers against unilateral U. S. military aggressions abroad.
One such anti-militarist alliance of American businesses is USA*ENGAGE. It
is a coalition of nearly 700 small and large businesses, agriculture groups and
trade associations working to seek alternatives to the proliferation of unilateral
U.S. foreign policy actions and to promote the benefits of U.S. engagement
abroad. The coalition's statement of principles points out:
American values are best advanced by engagement of American
business and agriculture in the world, not by ceding markets to
foreign competition. Helping train workers, building roads, telephone
systems, and power plants in poorer nations, promoting free
enterprise-these activities improve the lives of people worldwide
and support American values. Unfortunately the real difference made
by American companies and workers through such day-to-day activity
is lost in the emotion of political debates, where there is pressure to
make a symbolic gesture [a unilateral foreign policy action], even if
it won't work.2
Non-military business interests' anxiety over the Bush administration's
unilateral foreign policy measures is, of course, rooted in their negatively-
affected financial balance sheets by those actions: "Hundreds of companies
blame the Iraq war for poor financial results in 2003, many warning that
continued U.S. military involvement there could harm this year's performance,"
pointed out James Cox of USA Today.29 In a relatively comprehensive survey
of the economic impact of the war, published in the July 14, 2004 issue of the
paper, Cox further wrote: "In recent regulatory filings at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, airlines, home builders, broadcasters, mortgage
27. Ron Bosrock, The Project for the New American Century: Why American Business Should
Care, STAR TRIBUNE, OCT. 27, 2003, available at http://www.oldamericancentury.org/pipermail/
poacnewsletter-oldamericancentury.org/2003-October/000059.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
28. USA Engage, available at http://www.usaengage.org/about_us/index.html (last visited Sept.
11,2006).
29. James Cox, Financially Ailing Companies Point to Iraq War, USA TODAY, July 14, 2001,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2004-06-14-iraqx.htm?POE=click-refer (last
visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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providers, mutual funds and others say the war was directly to blame for lower
revenue and profits last year., 30 Many businesses blamed the war and
international political turbulence as a 'risk factor' that threatened their sales:
"The war led to sharp decreases in business and leisure travel, say air carriers,
travel services, casino operators, restaurant chains and hotel owners."'"
The survey covered a number of airlines including Delta Airlines, JetBlue,
Northwest Airlines and Alaska Airlines, all of which blamed the war for a drop
in air travel. Related industries such as travel agencies, hotels, restaurants, and
resort and casino operations all suffered losses accordingly.32
The mutual funds managers who were interviewed in the USA Today
survey included David J. Galvan of Wayne Hummer Income Fund who wrote
(in a letter to shareholders), "The war in Iraq created a quagmire for
corporations." Vintage Mutual Funds likewise concluded that "the price of
these commitments [in Iraq and Afghanistan] may be more than the American
public had expected or is willing to tolerate."33 In a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filing, Domenic Colasacco, manager of the Boston
Balanced Fund, characterized the ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq as "sad and
increasingly risky."34 Even technology giants such as Cisco, PeopleSoft and
Hewlett-Packard that tend to benefit from military spending expressed concerns
that "hostilities in Iraq hurt results or could harm performance."35
For example, managers at Hewlett-Packard complained that:
potential for future attacks, the national and international responses
to attacks or perceived threats to national security, and other actual or
potential conflicts or wars, including the ongoing military operations
in Iraq, have created many economic and political uncertainties that
could adversely affect our business, results of operations and stock
price in ways that we cannot presently predict.36
Other companies that were specifically mentioned in the survey as having
complained about the "whiplash from the Iraq conflict" included home builders
Hovnanian and Cavalier homes, casino company Mandalay Resort Group,
retailer Restoration Hardware, cosmetics giant Est6e Lauder, eyewear retailer
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cox, supra note 29.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Cole, Longs Drug Stores, golf club maker Callaway, and H&Q Life Sciences
Investors.37
B. War and Military-Based Industries and Businesses
While thousands of non-military businesses have suffered from losses and
stagnation due to war and militarism, war-based industries and related business
have been reaping the benefits of a war-time bonanza thanks to drastic increases
in military spending under President Bush-officially a forty-five percent
increase in real terms over what he inherited in 2001. For example, the above-
cited USA Today survey revealed that, as expected,
Several companies have reported a boost from sales to the military or
contracts stemming from the Iraqi reconstruction effort. The war has
lifted sales of: gas masks from Mine Safety Appliances; bio-weapons
detection kits and training from Response Biomedical; air cargo from
Atlas Air; port dredging by JDC Soil Management; packaging by
TriMas; body armor and vehicle protection kits from Armor Holding;
telecom services and communications gear from Globalnet, CopyTele
and I-Sector.38
Escalating Pentagon appropriations and the war-time "unity" on Capitol
Hill have created an environment in which war industries can have their cake
and eat it too: continuing to make money on the weapons systems of the Cold
War era while reaping the benefits of a war time bonanza of new defense
contracts. The surge in the Pentagon budget, and the need to replace weapons
used in Afghanistan and Iraq, has prompted weapons manufacturers to
drastically accelerate production. For example,
Boeing added a second shift of workers to boost production of its
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs)-the most widely used smart
bomb in the Afghan war. Raytheon, best known for its Tomahawk
missile, added a third shift and announced that production for its
laser-guided bomb has been accelerated by five months.39
While the giant manufacturers of warfare products are the obvious
beneficiaries of the heightened war and militarism, there is also a whole host
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Michelle Ciarocca, Post-9/1 1 Economic Windfalls for Arms Manufacturers, FOREIGN POLICY
IN Focus, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.91 ldigitalarchive.org/objects/50.pdf (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
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of war-related smaller businesses that have recently spun around the Pentagon
and the Homeland Security apparatus in order to cash in on the Pentagon's
spending bonanza. For example, "Air Structures is introducing fortified vinyl
domes for quarantining infected communities in the aftermath of a potential
bioterror attack, Visionics is looking into designing facial recognition
technology, and PointSource Technologies is developing a sensor to detect
biological agents in the air or water. '
There are also many less visible Pentagon contractors that are just as
handsomely benefiting from military expansion. These are the somewhat
surreptitious, private contractors that operate on the periphery of U.S. foreign
policy by training foreign "security forces," or by "fighting terrorism." Often
these private military firms are formed by retired Special Forces personnel
seeking to market their military expertise to the Pentagon, the State Department,
the CIA, or foreign governments.
For example, MPRI, one of the largest and most active of these firms,
which "has trained militaries throughout the world under contract to the
Pentagon,"' was founded by the former Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono and
seven other retired generals. The fortunes of these military training contractors,
or "modern-day mercenary companies," like those of the manufacturers of
military hardware, have skyrocketed by virtue of heightened war and militarism
under President Bush. For instance, "the per share price of stocks in L-3
Communications, which owns MPRI, has more than doubled" in recent years. 42
Referring to the fierce competition among these private military training
companies to win Pentagon contracts, Pete Singer, an Olin Fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington,
points out, "[t]his is big business among these companies. They are furiously
bidding on involvement in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. The minute
the Pentagon started to use the phrase 'a program to train and equip the Afghan
army,' buzzers went off." 43 The Bush Administration's open-ended "war on
terrorism" promises to be a boon for these companies.
The fact that the United States' war industry flourishes on war and
international political tensions has also been reflected in the stock prices of the
military-based industries in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The attacks led to
the collapse and temporary shut down of the Wall Street stock market. When
it reopened several days later, the few companies showing increased value were
40. Id.
41. Esther Schrader, Companies Capitalize on War on Terror, LOS ANGELESTIMES, APR. 14,2002,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-041402trainers.story (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
42. Id.
43. Id
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the giant military contractors: Alliant Tech Systems, Northrop Grumman,
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. As the U.S. military's biggest supplier,
Lockheed Martin's share value rose by a staggering 30 percent. Other top
gainers for the week of September 17-21, 2001, included military and space
contractors like Raytheon (+37%), L-3 Communications (+35.8%), Alliant
Techsystems (+23.5%), and Northrop Grumman (+21.2%)."
III. BEHIND THE DRIVE TO WAR AND MILITARISM
The sample evidence provided in the preceding pages shows that while
military industries and war-related businesses have benefited substantially from
the heightened pace of war and militarism, many more non-military
transnational corporations are losing sales and investment opportunities in
global markets due to an anti-American consumer backlash and the war
atmosphere of uncertainty and instability. Not surprisingly, powerful
beneficiaries of war dividends, the military-industrial conglomerates, have
served as the major (but largely subtle or submerged) driving forces behind the
heightened militarism of recent years and the concomitant rise in unilateral
wars of aggression.
What makes this tendency of the military-industrial complex to war and
militarism especially dangerous is that it is driven by existential, intrinsic, or
systemic imperatives: the powerful interests that are vested in the complex get
economic and political nourishment from war and international political
convulsions. It is due to this inherently ominous threat to world peace and
instability-as well as to the principles of republicanism and ideals of civil
liberties at home-that the late President Eisenhower's prescient warning that
"we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence.., by the
military-industrial complex" ' is even more relevant today than when it was
issued nearly half a century ago.
Despite the crucial role of the beneficiaries of war dividends in the rising
militarization of U.S. foreign policy, most critics of the Bush administration's
policies of war and militarism seem to be oblivious to this perilous role.
Instead, they tend to place the blame largely on: the oil and/or energy interests,
the cabal of neoconservative forces, and the hard-line Zionist forces that lobby
for the geopolitical interests of the state of Israel. In the following pages I shall
challenge all these three widely-held views of the forces behind war and
militarism, and argue, instead, that the roaring U.S. war machine is powered
primarily by the military industry conglomerates.
44. Ciarrocca, supra note 39.
45. Eisenhower, supra note 2.
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A. The Role of Big Oil
A most widely-cited factor behind the Bush administration's drive to war
is said to be oil. "No Blood for Oil" has been a rallying cry for most of the
opponents of the war. Yet, such claims cannot be supported by facts. Major oil
companies have come (in recent years and decades) to prefer peace, stability,
and predictability in global markets to war and instability. It is true that big oil,
like the arms industry, has handsomely benefited form the heightened tempo of
war and militarism. There is no hard evidence, however, that major oil interests
encouraged or embraced the Bush administrations drive to war and militarism.
On the contrary, evidence shows that for the last quarter century or so oil
interests have not favored war and turbulence in the Middle East, including the
current invasion of Iraq. Major oil companies, along with many other non-
military transnational corporations, have lobbied both the Clinton and Bush
administrations in support of changing the aggressive, militaristic U.S. policy
toward countries like Iran, Iraq and Libya in favor of establishing normal, non-
confrontational business and diplomatic relations.46
The claim that attributes the Bush administration's drive to war to the
influence of major oil companies tends to rest more on precedent and
perception than reality. Part of the perception is due to the exaggerated notion
that both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were "oil men" before
coming to the White House. However, George W. Bush was never more than
an unsuccessful petty oil prospector and Dick Cheney headed a company, the
notorious Halliburton, that sold (and still sells) services to oil companies and
the Pentagon.
The larger part of the perception, however, stems from the fact that oil
companies do benefit from oil price hikes that result from war and political
turbulence in the Middle East. Such benefits are, however, largely incidental.
Surely, American oil companies would welcome the spoils of the war (in the
form of oil price hikes) in Iraq or anywhere else in the world. From the largely
incidental oil price hikes that follow war and political convulsion, some
observers automatically conclude that big oil must have been behind the war.47
Yet, there is no evidence that, at least in the case of the current invasion of Iraq,
oil companies pushed for or supported the war.
46. See, e.g., Cyrus Bina, The American Tragedy: The Quagmire of War, Rhetoric of Oil, and the
Conundrum of Hegemony, JOURNAL OF IRANIAN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.urpe.org/bina-oil_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2006); Melinda K. Ruby, Is Oil the Driving Force
to War? (Spring 2004) (unpublished senior thesis, Department of Economics and Finance, Drake University)
(on file with author).
47. See generally JOHNATHAN NITZAN & SHIMSHON BICHLER, THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF ISRAEL (2002).
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On the contrary, there is strong evidence that, in fact, oil companies did
not welcome the war because they prefer stability and predictability to periodic
oil spikes that follow war and political convulsion: "[1]ooking back over the
last 20 years, there is plenty of evidence showing the industry's push for
stability and cooperation with Middle Eastern countries and leaders, and the
U.S. government's drive for hegemony works against the oil industry." '48 As
Thierry Desmarest, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of France's giant oil
company, TotalFinaElf, put it, "[a] few months of cash generation is not a big
deal. Stable, not volatile, prices and a $25 price (per barrel) would be
convenient for everyone. 49
It is true that for a long time, from the beginning of Middle Eastern oil
exploration and discovery in the early twentieth century until the mid-1970s,
colonial and/or imperial powers controlled oil either directly, or through control
of oil producing countries-at times, even by military force. But that pattern of
imperialist exploitation of global markets and resources has changed now. Most
of the current theories of imperialism and hegemony that continue invoking that
old pattern of big oil behavior, tend to suffer from an ahistorical perspective.
Today, even physically occupying and controlling another country's oil
fields will not necessarily be beneficial to oil interests. Not only will military
adventures place the operations of current energy projects at jeopardy, but they
will also make the future plans precarious and unpredictable. Big oil interests
know this, and that is why they did not countenance the war on Iraq:
"The big oil companies were not enthusiastic about the Iraqi war,"
says Fareed Mohamedi of PFC Energy, an energy consultancy firm
based in Washington, D.C., that advises petroleum firms.
"Corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco want stability,
and this is not what Bush is providing in Iraq and the Gulf region,"
adds Mohamedi.
During the past few decades, major oil companies have consistently
opposed U.S. policies and military threats against countries like Iran, Iraq, and
Libya. They have, time and again, lobbied U.S. foreign policy makers for the
establishment of peaceful relations and diplomatic rapprochement with those
countries. The Iran-Libya Sanction Act of 1996 (ILSA) is a strong testament to
the fact that oil companies nowadays view wars, economic sanctions, and
48. Ruby, supra note 46, at 10.
49. Id. at 13.
50. See Roger Burbach, Bush Ideologues vs. Big Oil: The Iraq Game Gets Even Stranger,
available at http://www.counterpunch.orgburbach10032003.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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international political tensions as harmful to their long-term business interests
and, accordingly, strive for peace, not war, in international relations.5'
In May of 1997, for example, major U.S. oil companies such as Conoco,
Exxon, Atlantic Richfield, and Occidental Petroleum joined other non-military
U.S. transnational corporations to create an anti-sanction coalition. 2 Earlier that
same year Conoco's Chief Executive Archie Dunham publicly took a stance
against unilateral U.S. sanctions by stating that "U.S. companies, not rogue
regimes, are the ones that suffer when the United States imposes economic
sanctions."53 Texaco officials have also argued that the U.S. can be more
effective in bringing about change in other countries by allowing U.S.
companies to do business with those countries instead of imposing economic
sanctions that tend to be counterproductive.54
B. "Coalition of the Willing" to Pursue War and Militarism: The Military-
Industrial-Zionist-Neoconservative Alliance
A widely-shared view attributes the Bush administration's militaristic
foreign policy to the influence ofneoconservative forces and the power of their
ideology: the small but influential cabal of starry-eyed ideologues, bent on
spreading the U.S. economic and political system, along with American power
and influence, managed to single-handedly drive the country to war through lies
and false pretexts. Some of these critics compare the "ideologically-driven"
neoconservative militarists to the idealistic Jacobinic forces of more than two
centuries ago in Europe, the eighteenth century French revolutionaries whose
intention to remake Europe in revolutionary France's image launched the
Napoleonic Wars. Proponents of this thesis further argue that the neocon-
servatives' domination of the Bush administration's foreign policy amounted
to a political coup d'etat.55
While this argument may not be altogether false, it is woefully deficient.
By placing an inordinately high emphasis on pure or abstract ideology and on
political personas or the role of individuals, the argument tends to lose sight of
the bigger, but largely submerged, picture: the powerful military-industrial-
Likud interests-the real architects of war and militarism--that lie behind the
51. Ruby, supra note 46, at 14-18.
52. David Ivanovich, Conoco 's Chief Blasts Sanctions, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 12, 1997, at
Cl.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, Neo-Jacobins Push for World War IV, available at
http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts8.html (last visited Sept. 11,2006); Gordon Prather, Neo-Crazy
Coup d'Etat, available at http://www.antiwar.com/orig/prather.php?articleid=2343 (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
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faqade ofneoconservative figures in and around the Bush administration. There
is clear evidence that the leading neoconservative figures have been long-time
political activists who have worked through think tanks set up to serve either
as the armaments lobby, or the Likud (militant Zionist partisans) lobby, or
both-going back to the 1990s, 1980s and, in some cases, 1970s. These
corporate-backed militaristic think tanks include the American Enterprise
Institute, Project for the New American Century, Center for Security Policy,
Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, Middle East Forum, National Institute for Public Policy, and Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs. There is also evidence that the major
components of the Bush administration's foreign policy, including the war on
Iraq, were designed long before George W. Bush arrived in the White House-
largely at the drawing boards of these think thanks, often in collaboration
directly, or indirectly, with the Pentagon and the arms lobby. Even a cursory
look at the records of these militaristic think tanks-their membership, their
financial sources, their institutional structures, and the like-shows that they
are set up to essentially serve as institutional fronts to camouflage the
incestuous relationship between the Pentagon, its major contractors, and the
Israeli lobby on the one hand, and militaristic neoconservative politicians, on
the other.56
Take the Center for Security Policy (CSP), for example: "[a] sixth of the
Center's revenue comes directly from defense corporations... CSP boasts that
[there are] no fewer than twenty-two former advisory board members or close
associates in the Bush administration."57 The Center's alumni in key posts in
the Bush administration include its former chair of the board, Douglas Feith,
who served as Undersecretary of Defense for policy, Pentagon Comptroller Dov
Zakheim, former Defense Policy Board Chair Richard Perle, and longtime
friend and financial supporter former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.58 In
its 1998 annual report, the center listed virtually every weapons-maker that had
supported it from its founding, from Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Northrop,
Grumman, and Boeing, to the later 'merged' incarnations of same-Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman, and so forth.59
56. See generally HARTUNG, supra note 4; William D. Hartung & Michelle Ciarrocca, The
Military-Industrial-Think Tank Complex, 24 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Jan./Feb. 2003), available at
http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2003/03jan-feb/jan-febO3corp2.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); MANN,
supra note 4; DiLip HIRO, SECRETS AND LIES: OPERATION IRAQUI FREEDOM AND AFTER (Nation Books
2004) (2003).
57. See generally Hartung & Ciarrocca, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. See generally Hartung & Ciarrocca, supra note 56; MANN, supra note 4.
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Likewise, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), an influential
Washington think tank and a major lobbying force for the military-industrial-
Zionist alliance, can boast of being the metaphorical alma mater of a number
of powerful members of the Bush administration. For example, Vice President
Dick Cheney and his wife Lynne Cheney, State Department arms control
official John Bolton (former U.S. ambassador to the UN), and former chair of
the Defense Policy Board, Richard Perle, have all had long-standing ties with
the Institute.6" The Institute played a key role in promoting Ahmed Chalabi's
group of Iraqi exiles, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as a major Iraqi
opposition force that the Iraqi people would welcome as an alternative to the
Saddam Hussein regime once the Untied States had overthrown that regime.6'
"From 1998 on, when there was U.S. government money openly available to
support the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein due to the AEI-backed Iraqi
Liberation Act, Chalabi's INC grabbed the bulk of the funding., 62 In return, the
INC, working closely with the AEI, played an important role in the justification
of the invasion of Iraq. It served, for example, as a major source of (largely
fabricated) intelligence for the civilian militarists of the Pentagon whenever
they found the intelligence gathered by the CIA and the State Department at
odds with their plans of invading Iraq.63
Another example of the interlocking network of neoconservative forces in
the Bush administration and the militaristic think tanks that are dedicated to the
advancement of the military-industrial-Zionist agenda is reflected in the
affiliation of a number of influential members of the administration with the
Jewish Institute for the National Security Affairs (JINSA). JINSA is on record
in its support of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and against the Oslo
Accord.6' "In its fervent support for the hard-line, pro-settlement, anti-
Palestinian Likud-style policies in Israel, JINSA has essentially recommended
that 'regime change' in Iraq should be just the beginning of a cascade of
toppling dominoes in the Middle East.,
65
JINSA has influential friends either as liaisons with or members of the
Bush administration.66 For example, Douglas Feith, Assistant Secretary of
Defense during the first term of the Bush administration, is a former JINSA
advisor. 67 General Jay Garner, the initial head of the U.S. occupation authority
60. HARTUNG, supra note 4, at 103.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 104.
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 111.
65. Id. at.109.
66. HARTUNG, supra note 4, at 110.
67. Id.
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in Iraq, is also a former JINSA advisory board member.68 JINSA advisor
Michael Ladeen, who also unofficially advises the Bush administration on
Middle Eastern issues, has occasionally talked about the coming era of "total
war, '69 indicating that the Bush administration should expand its policy of
"regime change" in Iraq to other countries in the region such as Iran, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia.
In keeping with its role as a cheerleader for U.S. intervention in the Middle
East, JINSA chose to honor Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz...
to receive the 2002 edition of its Henry M. 'Scoop' Jackson public service
award. The corporate sponsor of the affair was Northrop Grumman, a company
that Wolfowitz worked for as a paid consultant prior to joining Rumsfeld's
Pentagon.7"
The fact that neoconservative militarists of the Bush administration are
organically rooted in the military-industrial complex and/or the militant Zionist
supporters of "greater Israel" is even more clearly reflected in their incestuous
relationship with the jingoistic lobbying think tank Project for the New
American Century (PNAC). Like most of its counterpart institutes within the
extensive network of neoconservative think tanks, PNAC was founded by a
circle of powerful political figures a number of whom, including Dick Cheney,
later ascended to key positions in the Bush administration.7 As William
Hartung describes,
In many ways, the founding of PNAC in 1997 marked the opening
salvo in the formation of the Bush policy of aggressive unilateralism.
The signatories of PNAC's founding statement of principles are a
rogue's gallery of intransigent hardliners, ranging from Iran-Contra
re-treat Eliot Cohen, to ex-Pentagon hawks I. Lewis Libby, Paul
Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld, to neo-con standbys Frank
Gaffney, former Reagan drug czar William Bennett, and Norman
Podhoretz, to the President's brother and partner in electoral crime,
Jeb Bush.72
A closer look at the professional records of the neoconservative players in
the Bush administration indicates that "32 major administration appointees...
are former executives with, consultants for, or significant shareholders of top
68. Id.
69. Id. at 109.
70. Id. at 110-11.
71. See id. at 113.
72. HARTUNG, supra note 4, at 113.
[Vol. 13:1
Hossein-Zadeh
defense contractors."73 For example, James Roche, former air force secretary
who took over the army, is a former president of Northrop Grumman; his
assistant secretary Nelson Gibbs is another Northrop alumni. An under
secretary at the air force, Peter Teets, was chief operating officer at Lockheed
while Michael Wynne, a Defense Department under secretary, was a former
senior vice-president at General Dynamics.74 Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld himself is an ex-director of a General Dynamics subsidiary, and his
deputy during the first term of the Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz (now
the head of the World Bank), acted as a paid consultant to Northrop
Grumman.75 Today, point out Hartung and Ciarrocca, the armaments lobby "is
exerting more influence over policymaking than at any time since President
Dwight D. Eisenhower first warned of the dangers of the military-industrial
complex over 40 years ago."76
This sample evidence indicates that the view that the neoconservative
militarists' tendency to war and aggression is inspired by an ideological passion
to spread American ideals of democracy is clearly unwarranted. Their success
in orchestrating the unprovoked war against Iraq stemmed largely from the fact
they were working essentially on behalf of two immensely powerful special
interests, the military-industrial complex and the influential Zionist lobby in the
United States. Neoconservative architects of war and militarism derive their
political clout and policy effectiveness largely from the political machine and
institutional infrastructure of these two powerful interest groups. Thus, to the
extent that the neoconservatives' ascendance to the commanding heights ofU.S.
foreign policy is comparable to a "political coup d'etat," as some observers
have suggested, it is more a coup d'etat that is engineered by some highly
influential special interests than one prompted simply by a handful of starry-
eyed ideologues working out of a commitment to some abstract ideals of
democracy.77
It is also necessary to note at this point that, despite its immense political
influence, the Zionist lobby in the United States is ultimately a junior, not
equal, partner of the military-industrial complex in the military-industrial-
Zionist alliance. Without discounting the extremely important role of the
Zionist lobby in the configuration of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East,
73. See generally Hartung & Ciarocca, supra note 56; see also MANN, supra note 4; HIRO, supra
note 56.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Hartung & Ciarocca, supra note 56.
77. See generally Pat McDonnell Twair, Carl Boggs, Chalmers Johnson Discuss Neocon Ideology
and American Empire, WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, June 2004, available at
http://www.wrmea.com/archives/June_2004/0406018.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
2006]
88 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
I would caution against simplifications and exaggerations of its power and
influence over the U.S. policy in the region.
It is true that most of the neo-conservative militarists who have been
behind the recent U.S. military expansion and aggression, and who played an
instrumental role in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, have long been active
supporters of Israel's right-wing politicians and/or leaders. It is also no secret
that there is a close collaboration over issues of war and militarism between
militant Zionism, neoconservative forces in and around the Bush
administration, and jingoistic think tanks such as the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI), Project for the New American Century (PNAC), Middle East
Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Middle East Forum, National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Jewish Institute
for National Security Affairs (JINSA), and Center for Security Policy (CSP).8
It does not follow, however, that, as some critics argue, the U.S.-Israeli
relationship represents a case of "tail wagging the dog;" that is, the U.S. foreign
policy in the Middle East is shaped by the Israeli/Zionist leaders. While, no
doubt, the powerful Zionist lobby exerts considerable influence over U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East, the efficacy and the extent of that influence
depend, ultimately, on the real economic and geopolitical interests of U.S.
foreign policy makers. In other words, U.S. policy makers in the Middle East
would go along with the desires and demands of the radical Zionist lobby only
if such demands also tend to serve the special interests that those policy makers
represent or serve-if there is a convergence of interests over those demands.
Aggressive existential tendencies of the U.S. military-industrial empire to
war and militarism are shaped by its own internal or intrinsic dynamics:
continued need for arms production as a lucrative business whose fortunes
depend on permanent war. Conjunctural or reinforcing factors, such as the
horrors of 9/11, the Zionist lobby, the party in power, or the resident of the
White House will, no doubt, exert significant influences. However, such
supporting influences remain essentially contributory, not defining or
determining. The decisive or central role is virtually played by the military-
industrial complex.
C. The Military-Industrial Complex: the Major Force behind the War
Juggernaut
So long as you have a military class, it does not make any difference what
your form of government is; if you are determined to be armed to the teeth, you
78. See generally Hartung & Ciarocca, supra note 56.
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must obey the only men who can control the great machinery of war. Elections
are of minor importance.
- Woodrow Wilson79
The military-industrial-complex [would] cause military spending to be
driven not by national security needs but by a network of weapons makers,
lobbyists and elected officials
- Dwight D. Eisenhower"
Despite their expansionist tendencies, the Founding Fathers of the United
States opposed the idea of maintaining large standing armies on grounds that,
as George Washington put it, a large peacetime military establishment "hath
ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a country."'" With varying
degrees, this anti-militarist tradition was maintained until the second half of the
twentieth century.
Thus, despite the fact that during that period of over 150 years the United
States engaged in many wars, and the military force was expanded during each
war, demobilization at the end of each conflict reduced the armed forces to their
pre-war size. In keeping with this tradition, the United States embarked on a
major demobilization of the wartime military structure when World War II
hostilities ended in 1944.
But the demobilization did not last long. With the onset of the Cold War
and the U.S. plunge into the Korean War in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
remilitarization began in earnest and on a permanent basis-thereby reversing
that long tradition of more than 150 years of anti-militarism. In constant (2002)
dollars, military spending rose from $150 billion in 1950 (the last year of the
ephemeral postwar demobilization) to $500 billion in 1953.82
The ensuing expansion of the military-industrial complex signified more
than a quantitative growth. Perhaps more importantly, it also resulted, over
time, in a qualitative change: change in the attitude, the sense of mission, and
the historical outlook of the military establishment. As civilian policy makers
relied on military power as the ultimate guarantor of their designs for the post-
war world, the military establishment developed a heightened sense of
identity-an added sense of autonomy, or existential mission, that went beyond
the traditional responsibility for "national security" or for economic and
geopolitical gains abroad. The military establishment gradually began to not
only implement but also increasingly influence policy-to view itself not just
79. SIDNEY LENS, THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 69 (1970).
80. CHARLES BELL, ET AL., THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY: REAL SECURITY OR FALSE PROMISE?,
NATIONAL JOBS FOR ALL COALITION, SPECIAL REPORT 4 (JAN. 2004), available at
http://www.njfac.org/sr4.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
81. See LENS, supra note 79, at 13 quoting Congress of the United States of America (June 1784).
82. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 57.
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as a means but also as an end in itself. In other words, protracted reliance on
and steady expansion of the armed forces that started with the onset of the
bipolar world of the Cold War era gradually gave birth to what is historically
called militarism, or parasitic imperialism.83
As was pointed out earlier, there is a historical pattern to this evolution of
militarism out of an over-extended superpower and its over-reliance on the
armed forces for economic and geopolitical gains. Despite the importance of
this distinction between imperialism in the usual sense, that is, economic and/or
geopolitical imperialism, and parasitic/military imperialism, such a distinction
is absent from most of the theories of imperialism in the context of the Bush
administration's aggressive foreign policy, especially its invasion of Iraq.
Whereas imperialism in the usual sense views military force as a means for
economic, territorial, or geopolitical gains, under parasitic imperialism,
instigation of international conflicts and military adventures abroad are often
prompted not so much by a desire to expand the empire's wealth beyond the
existing levels, but by a desire to appropriate the lion's share of the existing
wealth and treasure for the military establishment. It is at such stages that
military operations abroad, as well as gigantic military apparatuses at home,
tend not to be cost effective even from the standpoint of the empire itself.
Today U.S. imperialism seems to have degenerated to this status or stage of
parasitic imperialism.'
The first open challenge to civilian authority by the military-industrial
complex came in the mid-1970s. As the long economic contraction of that
decade and the resulting budgetary constraints forced spending cuts on the
government, policy makers seriously considered curtailment of the Pentagon
budget. A faction of the ruling elite headed by the so-called Trilateralists argued
that, in the face of financial challenges, coupled with the tension-reducing
(ddtente) agreements with the Soviet Union, military spending could be
significantly cut without compromising "national security or global
obligations."85
Faced with the prospects of downsizing, the military-industrial complex
reacted swiftly. The powerful beneficiaries of the Pentagon budget rallied
around Cold Warrior think tanks such as the Committee on the Present Danger
and successfully quashed discussions of military curtailment. Instead, once
again, by hyping up the "threat of communism," they managed to effectively
sabotage the short-lived detente of the first half of the 1970s with the Soviet
Union and replace it with such heightened tensions between the two
superpowers that came to be known as the Second Cold War in the late 1970s
83. For an interesting and informative discussion of the rise ofU.S. militarism, see generally LENS,
supra note 3; JOHNSON, supra note 1; BACEVICH, supra note 3.
84. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 1.
85. See generally SKLAR, supra note 5.
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and early 1980s. It was this successful political maneuvering of the champions
of militarism that paved the way for the early 1980's dramatic "rearming of
America," as President Reagan put it.
86
Since the rationale for the large and growing military apparatus during the
Cold War years was the "threat of communism," U.S. citizens celebrated the
collapse of the Berlin Wall as the end of militarism and the dawn of "peace
dividends"-a reference to the benefits that, it was hoped, many would enjoy
in the United States as a result of a reorientation of part of the Pentagon's
budget toward non-military social needs. Such hopes, however, were quickly
shattered. Instead of declaring the end of the Cold war a victory and
demobilizing the military structure that had been premised upon it, partisans of
war and militarism used it for propaganda purposes and U.S. triumphalism in
order to usher in a new, aggressive and imperial role for the United States.
To stifle the voices that demanded peace dividends, champions of
militarism resorted, once again, to the oldest trick in the books of militarism:
the tried and true pretext of "external threats to our national security/interests."
Instead of the Soviet Union, the "menace of China, rogue states, global
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the axis of evil and militant Islam"
would have to do as new enemies-thereby justifying appropriation of bigger
and bigger shares of national resources for military spending. Having thus
successfully substituted "new sources of threat" for the "communist threat" of
the Cold War era, powerful beneficiaries of military spending managed not only
to maintain but, in fact, expand the Pentagon budget beyond the Cold War
years.8 7
The Bush administration's invasion of Iraq can be better understood
against this backdrop: the unilateral militarists' post-Cold War strategies to
fend off demands for "peace dividends" following the collapse of the Berlin
Wall. 8 Most of such strategies were drafted by Pentagon officials soon after the
demise of the Soviet Union. In his relatively thorough study of the Pentagon's
post-Cold War plans to prevent military/Pentagon downsizing, James Mann of
the Center for Strategic & International Studies points out,
The Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, effectively ending
the Cold War and prompting the Pentagon to undertake a search for
a new set of principles, in part to prevent Congress, then controlled
by the Democrats, from slashing the defense budget. The key
participants were Cheney, Wolfowitz and Colin L. Powell, then
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff... the three men worked closely
together on forestalling cutbacks. The Soviet Union's collapse added
86. See generally id.; see also HALLIDAY, supra note 5.
87. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1; BACEVICH, supra note 3; MANN, supra note 4.
88. See generally Mann, supra note 22.
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new urgency to their task. "What we were afraid of was people who
would say, 'Let's bring all of the troops home, and lets abandon our
position in Europe,"' recalled Wolfowitz in an interview.89
Mann further points out:
Some of the most important and bitterly debated aspects of the war in
Iraq-including the administration's willingness to engage in
preemptive military action--can be traced to discussions and
documents from the early 1990s, when Pentagon officials, under then-
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and then-Undersecretary of Defense
Paul D. Wolfowitz, led the way in forging a new, post-Cold War
military strategy for the United States."
Most of what the Pentagon team crafted in the early 1990s as the post-Cold
War military strategy is unclassified and well documented. The end product of
those early drafts, which were originally written by Zalmay Khalilzad, then a
Wolfowitz aide and now U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and by I. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby, then principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy and until
recently Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, eventually appeared in 1992
as the now well-known Pentagon document titled Defense Planning Guidance
(DPG).9' In January 1993, as the Bush Sr. team left the White House and
Cheney's tenure as Defense Secretary came to an end, the document was
published as a government document under Cheney's name as America's
"Defense Strategy for the 1990s. '"92
Most of the Bush administration's military strategies-unilateralism, pre-
emption, and regime change--can be clearly traced back to Cheney's "Defense
Strategy for the 1990s" of a decade earlier.93 For example, Cheney's document
projected that the United States would build up its military capabilities to such
an extent that there could never be a rival.94 America would develop such
enormous superiority in military power and technology that other countries
would realize it would be self-defeating to try to compete.95 Although the
document gave lip service to collective responses to global conflicts, it also
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Mann, supra note 22.
94. See generally id.
95. Id.
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pointed out that collective action would "not always be timely."96 Therefore, the
document concluded, the United States had to be ready to protect its critical
interests abroad "with only limited additional help, or even alone, if
necessary."97 And while the document did not mention preemption specifically,
it noted that sometimes a measured military action can contain or preclude a
crisis."
The Pentagon's "Defense Strategy for the 1990s" also spoke about
maintaining and expanding America's "strategic depth"-a term coined by the
then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.99 "Strategic depth" had a geopolitical
connotation, meaning that, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
the United States must extend its global presence-in terms of military bases,
listening and/or intelligence stations, and military technology-to areas
previously neutral or under the influence of the Warsaw Pact.' 0
The Clinton administration basically ignored Cheney's "Defense Strategy
for the 1990s" without actually or officially disclaiming it.'0 ' During the 1992
presidential election, Clinton's deputy campaign manager, George
Stephanapoulos, aptly characterized the document as an effort by the Pentagon
to "find an excuse for big budgets instead of downsizing. ' 02
Clinton pursued a policy akin to multilateralism and economic liberalism,
also called (in recent years/decades) neo-liberalism.' 3 He sought to advance
global U.S. interests through further integration of world markets, additional
expansion of multilateral institutions (led by the United States), greater
international free trade, and increased development of international alliances,
including U.S.-led collective military actions."' While representatives of
civilian or non-military transnational capital celebrated Clinton's policies of
neo-liberalism, those of the arms industry and related business spurned those
policies because they were not "sufficiently" lucrative for the beneficiaries of
war dividends.
Clinton's modest increases of the Pentagon budget and his multilateralist
foreign policies fell short of the militarists' expectations, despite the fact he too
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Mann, supra note 22; David Armstrong, Dick Cheney's Song of America,
Montanapeaceseeker.org, available at http://www.montanapeaceseekers.org/common/documents/20021010/
song.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2006).
99. See generally Mann, supra note 22.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Armstrong, supra note 98.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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had his own share of military operations abroad-in Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, and
various provinces of the former Yugoslavia, for example. 5 Not surprisingly,
the Pentagon authors of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (Cheney,
Wolfowitz, Lewis "Scooter" Libby and their collaborators) vehemently
criticized his "defense" policies as inept and passive.'0 6 They called on the
Clinton administration to "finish thej ob [of overthrowing Saddam Hussein after
his military forces were driven out of Kuwait] by arming Iraqi opposition forces
and sending U.S. ground troops to defend a base of operation for them in the
southern region of the country."' 0' 7 In a 1996 editorial, Paul Wolfowitz, one of
the authors of the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance," raised the prospect of
launching a preemptive attack against Iraq: "' [s]hould we sit idly by,' he wrote,
'with our passive containment policy and our inept covert operations, and wait
until a tyrant possessing large quantities of weapons of mass destruction and
sophisticated delivery systems strikes out at us?"" 08
As expected, the Pentagon critics of President Clinton's military and
foreign policies celebrated his departure from the White House, and the
ascension of George W. Bush to the presidency, as the opportunity they were
seeking to implement their long-shelved Defense Planning Guidance, including
the plan to "finish the job" of ousting Saddam Hussein, was presented to
them.'0 9 Even as the vote count was still being disputed in Florida, and the
Supreme Court was deliberating George W. Bush's dubious claim to victory,
Dick Cheney moved from Texas to Washington, D.C, with a huge entourage
and fanfare, camped out next to the White House, and stacked the would-be
Bush administration with other Pentagon hawks, including all of his co-authors
of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance."0
While Cheney's and his hand-picked civilian militarists' de facto
occupation of the White House may not have played as an important role in
George W. Bush's rise to the White House as the Supreme Court decision, it
nonetheless played a key role in influencing the outcome of that controversial
election-a role that largely skipped the attention it deserved.
Thus, with the accession of George W. Bush to the presidency, all the
Pentagon contributors to the early 1990s Defense Planning Guidance also
returned to positions of power in the government. 1' Cheney of course became
Vice President, Powell became Secretary of State, Wolfowitz moved into the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Armstrong, supra note 98.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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number two position at the Pentagon, as Donald Rumsfeld's deputy, and Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, who served as Wolfowitz's Deputy during Bush Sr.'s
administration, became the Vice President's Chief of Staff and National
Security Adviser.'
1 2
Although George W. Bush's administration thus arrived in the White
House with plans of "regime change" in the Middle East, it could not carry out
those plans without a pretext. Before 9/11, the militarists in and around the
administration were without tools and excuses to drum up public and political
support for the war on Iraq. The 9/11 attacks provided the needed pretext. The
administration wasted no time manipulating the public's fear of further terrorist
attacks to rally support for the invasion of Iraq, which had nothing to do with
the attacks. It heightened people's fear by constant terror warnings, while
marketing the "war on terrorism" as an epic battle between "good and evil."
Soon after the heinous attacks of 9/11, the Pentagon dusted off the 1992
Defense Planning Guidance, replaced Cheney's name with Rumsfeld's, and
promoted it as the Defense Planning Guidance for the "new, post-9/11
circumstance." James Mann, author of The Rise of Vulcans: the History of
Bush's War Cabinet, describes:
The Clinton administration set aside Cheney's vision without actually
repudiating it. A decade later, as the second Bush administration
moved toward war with Iraq, the ideas in the 1992 document took on
heightened significance. What the Pentagon officials had succeeded in
doing, within months of the Soviet collapse, was to lay out the
intellectual blueprint for a new world dominated-then, now and in the
future-by U.S. military power." 3
The Pentagon's post-9/11 version of Defense Planning Guidance retains-
indeed, strengthens-all the major elements of the 1992 version, although at
times it uses slightly modified terminology." 14 The preemptive attacks projected
in the original document are now called "unwarned attacks." ' 5 The old Powell-
Cheney doctrine of military "forward presence," put forth in the early 1990s in
response to the demise of the Soviet Union, is now called "forwarded
deterrence."" 6 And the use of overwhelming force to defeat an enemy called for
in that old doctrine is now branded as "effects based" vision." 7 But the new
112. Armstrong, supra note 98.
113. See generally Mann, supra note 22; see also MANN, supra note 4; Armstrong, supra note 98.
114. Armstrong, supra note 98.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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version also adds a few new ideas, including the incredibly dangerous concept
of "preemptive strikes" with nuclear weapons: "[t]hese would be earth-
penetrating nuclear weapons used for attacking 'hardened and deeply buried
targets' such as command-and-control bunkers, missile silos, and heavily
fortified underground facilities used to build and store weapons of mass
destruction." '" The new version also directs the military to develop cyber-,
laser-, and electronic-warfare capabilities to enhance global capabilities of the
U.S. military might.' 19
As the administration was preparing for the invasion of Iraq in early 2003,
it also revealed the refurbished Defense Planning Guidance as the "Bush
Doctrine" for the new, post-9/11 world. 20 After Rumsfeld's signing of the
document in May 2002, the Pentagon leaked it to The Los Angeles Times in July
and the administration officially endorsed it on the occasion of President Bush's
2002 West Point speech. It is worth noting that what was once called the
"Wolfowitz Doctrine" by Pentagon insiders came to be re-labeled as the "Bush
Doctrine."'' As David Armstrong points out,
Commentators parrot the administration's line, portraying the concept
of preemptory strikes as a 'new' strategy aimed at combating
terrorism... [yet] Preemption, of course, is just part of the Plan, and
the Plan is hardly new. It is a warmed-over version of the strategy
Cheney and his coauthors rolled out in 1992 as the answer to the end
of the Cold War.'22
That the U.S. military response to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989
and its response to the collapse of the World Trade Towers in 2001 were
basically the same should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the
dynamics or market imperatives of the business of war: continued increase of
the Pentagon budget and/or continued expansion of sales markets for the war
industry and related businesses.'23 This also confirms the overriding argument
of this study: that the pretexts or tactics for pursuing higher profits for the
business of war may change (from the "threat of communism" to the "threat of
rogue states, of global terrorism, of axis of evil, of militant Islam,.. .") but the
118. Id.
119. Armstrong, supra note 98.
120. Id.
121. See id
122. Id.
123. See generally id
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objective or strategy remains the same-war and militarism and, consequently,
further escalation of the Pentagon budget and war dividends.'24
This brief review of the events that led to the invasion of Iraq in early 2003
clearly reveals that the plans for the invasion were drawn up nearly a dozen
years earlier. As William Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca of the World Policy
Institute write:
Each major element of the Bush administration's national security...
was developed and refined before the Bush administration took
office, at corporate-backed conservative think tanks like the Center
for Security Policy, the National Institute for Public Policy and the
Project for a New American Century .... Unilateralist ideologues
formerly affiliated with these think tanks, along with the 32 major
administration appointees who are former executives with, consultants
for, or significant shareholders of top defense contractors, are driving
U.S. foreign and military policy.'25
This is a clear indication of the fact that the cabal of neoconservative
militarists is more akin to the executive arm of some real, powerful special
interests than a group of starry-eyed ideologues committed to the goal of
spreading democracy worldwide.
IV. IN SUMMARY
By focusing primarily on the systemic or internal dynamics of the military-
industrial complex as an existentially-driven juggernaut to war and militarism,
this study provides a welcome challenge to most of the prevailing critiques that
attribute the rising militarization of U.S. foreign policy to big oil, to the
ideological power of the neoconservatives, to George W. Bush's unseasoned
and near-missionary approach to Presidency, or to America's idealism to spread
democracy.
124. Armstrong, supra note 98.
125. Hartung & Ciarrocca, supra note 56.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "war" has undergone extensive usage in U.S. foreign
policy since the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001. Not allowing itself to
be confined by formal declarations, finite military objectives, and other
characteristics of traditional warfare, the U.S. government has adopted a broad
usage of the word "war" to define its counterterrorism measures. Indeed, the
"war on terrorism" has revived attempts to redefine "war" along with the legal
implications that are associated with various forms of armed conflict.'
The politically fluid understanding of "war" has practical concerns for
international legal norms, not least because of the high stature counterterrorism
has been placed in U.S. foreign policy concerns.2 Not only can the legal
ambiguity of "war on terrorism" be expected to continue to influence the
American approach to armed conflicts in the form of non-normative policies,3
but economic measures may also take hitherto unconventional forms to
counteract terrorist funding.4 Because restrictive trade regulations, particularly
sanctions, are a common method of employing economic measures against
perceived antagonistic foreign interests, it may be of practical value to examine
the legality and feasibility of alternative possibilities to traditional trade
sanctions for national security objectives.
Before speculating on the possible merits and shortcomings of a new
approach to national security trade sanctions, however, it is necessary to
analyze the legal background and practice of conventional sanctions. Thus, the
first section of this Paper seeks to explore the effect of trade sanctions in
1. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction
of War, 43 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7 (2004). To highlight the legal implications of approaching
counterterrorism as a "war," the French government, in contrast, has adopted a criminal law approach, see
Michael Steinberger, The War on Terror's Legal Challenges, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Jan. 8-9, 2005, at
Weekend 3. It should be noted, however, that the "war on terrorism" has also been dismissed as mere rhetoric
rather than an actual paradigm shift in law, see Yoram Dinstein, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations: Comment on War, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877 (2004); Moreover, the formal
concept of"war" itself has undergone change since the end of World War II; see BRIAN HALLETT, THE LOST
ART OF DECLARING WAR (1998).
2. Counterterrorism, including a "war" against terrorists, has taken a primary place in U.S. foreign
policy; see THE WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter NSS], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
3. The U.S. use ofpreemptive self-defense as justification for the invasion oflraq in 2003 has been
criticized as a violation of international norms. E.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United
Nations after Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 610-14 (2003); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729,
797 (2004); contra William H. Taft IV &Todd F. Buchwald, Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict:
Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003).
4. The NSS presents the importance of disruption of terrorist funding as a critical step in
counterterrorism measures. NSS, supra note 2.
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today's fight against modem international terrorism, and specifically to explore
the structural inadequacies of utilizing conventional trade sanctions as weapons
against the evolving forms of terrorism. Due to the breadth of the subject,
though, this Paper limits itself to national security sanctions as specifically
permitted by Article XXI in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).' Article XXI provides that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
a. to require any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security
interests; or
b. to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests
i. relating to fissionable materials or the chemicals from
which they are derived;
ii. relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as
is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supplying a military establishment;
iii. taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations; or
c. to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and security.6
Currently, Article XXI sanctions are placed on national political units, but
with terrorists increasingly shedding national identities, the traditional rationale
of using sanctions, either to punish nation states for supporting terrorism or to
coerce nation states into relinquishing ties to international terrorism, has
become outdated. This Paper will examine the history of GATT Article XXI,
starting with the drafting history of the Article as well as early usage of the
security exception. A historical look at Article XXI and at the GATT ought to
provide valuable clues as to the original intent of the security exception as well
as the formative practices of the exception, which can be compared and
contrasted with later trade rules.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1l , 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATI] (incorporating into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex IA of the
WTO Agreement at 1 (a)).
6. GATT, supra note 5 at art. 2 1.
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The Paper will then turn to the intention behind the creation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO),7 the historic revolution in international trade
disputes. The application of Article XXI, naturally, changed in light of the new
system. Since the WTO is the present framework from which to understand
security-related trade sanctions, an examination of WTO disputes reveals the
possible legal limits of Article XXI. Furthermore, this Paper will look at how
sanctions are applied today. Today's sanctions against nation states continue
the traditional view of state-to-state foreign engagement, which can in part be
explained by diplomatic symbolism and institutional inertia bound up in the
history of GATT and the WTO. In spite of the history, tradition, and institu-
tional structures, the present day practice of whole-state sanctions may need to
be reexamined in light of the growing terrorism from non-state actors.
Terrorism has changed in character and its sources of funding have altered, too.
Such realities may encourage the possibility of finding new uses and limits to
Article XXI.
In the second section of this Paper an alternative method of applying
sanctions is offered, a method that attempts to address the shortcomings of
present sanctions while retaining the forcefulness that makes sanctions a
practical weapon in international disputes. Regional sanctions that pay little
heed to national borders, but rather focus on specific areas or regions are
offered as a practical alternative solution. Possible objections to regional
sanctions are presented, as well, at the end of the Paper.
H. SANCTIONS PAST AND PRESENT
A. Background to GATTArticle XXI
1. Drafting of Article XXI
The Allied powers at the end of the Second World War viewed growth in
international commerce and economic prosperity as vehicles for a lasting peace.
So when Allied victory in World War II seemed imminent, the Allies convened
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire and laid out the three pivotal institutions of
modem trade liberalization designed to ensure world peace: the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the GATT.8 The GATT became the
7. World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
April 15, 1994 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
8. Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization as a Second Chance at "Peace for Our Time ", 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 217, 226 (2000).
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primary global framework for which to assess trade liberalization, and thus the
provisions of GATT took on a significance of their own.9
Article XXI is an original provision of the 1947 GATT that was drafted
with much debate and conflicting ideas.'0 The drafters struggled with finding
a balance between two important interests: the right of states to freely protect
themselves from security threats and the need to limit the use of a security
exception to only in times of genuine security threats, which one drafter to the
original GATT noted, "[w]e cannot make it too light, because we cannot
prohibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On the other
hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of security, countries
will put on measures which really have a commercial purpose.""
The security exception had to be addressed far more carefully than other
issues for trade exceptions, such as protection of public morals, protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health, and preservation of national treasures,12
because "[n]ational security issues are obviously very sensitive and intimately
connected with the safety, sovereignty and existence of States." 3 The fact that
the GATT drafters understood this is illustrated by their revision of Article XXI
from the original intention of using the more restrictive chapeau of Article XX 4
for both Article XX and Article XXI. 5 Thus, the drafting history indicates that
the application of the Article XXI security exception was not meant to be
judged with the same level of scrutiny as other exceptions in the GATT
framework, but at the very strictest, a scrutiny that gives more deference to the
states applying the security exception than would normally be given for other
GATT exceptions.
9. For a history on the GATT, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (MIT Press,
1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
10. See Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO
Security Exception: Reducing the Role of the Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance
Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 421-22 (2001).
11. Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, July 24, 1947,
Verbatim Report, at 20-21, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (1947).
12. This is a partial list of "General Exceptions" found in GAIT. GAIT, supra note 5, at art. 20.
13. Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, InternationalAdjudication on National Security Issues: What
Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 372 (2003).
14. The chapeau of Article XX states: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
.Cf. GAIT, supra note 5, at art. 21 (qualifying terms such as "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable
discrimination" are not explicitly mentioned in Article XXI).
15. Cann, supra note 10, at 422.
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2. Past Usage of Article XXI
Usage of Article XXI under the pre-WTO GATT framework gave rise to
the unresolved question of whether or not GATT Contracting Parties had a right
to invoke Article XXI without subject to any review by some sort of judicial
panel.' 6 This was complicated by the language of Article XXI, which seems to
give more deference to invoking States than other GATT exceptions. This
deferential feature of the Article's wording coupled with the fact that before the
establishment of the WTO, GATT existed as an ad hoc unofficial "institution"
composed of agreements with no permanent or central organization,
7
significantly reduced the odds of probability that usage of Article XXI would
ever be subject to outside review.
The first attempted usage of Article XXI as a justification for a sanction
was by the United States against Czechoslovakia. 8 Czechoslovakia brought
attention to the U.S. sanction in 1949, claiming that the United States invoked
Article XXI in an overly broad way, "because the narrow reference in the text
to war materials had been construed by the United States Government to cover
a wide range of goods which could never be so regarded."' 9 Paving the way for
outside review on the Article XXI application, the U.S. conceded that "if at any
time it were thought that a decision had been based on false premises, the
interested party could have recourse to the appeal board which was instituted
for that purpose."" Upon review, the Contracting Parties rejected
Czechoslovakia's claim on substantive grounds, but, significantly, the Con-
tracting Parties did not decline jurisdiction over the case.2'
After the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute, various nations invoked Article
XXI as a defense for sanctions six more times prior to the establishment of the
16. Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GA 7TArticle XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1310-11 (2003).
17. GATT became the defacto unofficial organization responsible for overseeing GATT compliance
when the U.S. failed to ratify the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) as the official organization
empowered to manage trade liberalization. Consequently, GATT operated more on consensus between
Contracting Parties and less on centralized decision-making made by a legally empowered organization. See
JOHN H. JACKSON et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293-301 (3d ed. 1995).
18. Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, GATIr/CP.3/SR22, B.I.S.D. 128 (June 8,
1949).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, Constitutionalization andDispute Settlement in the
WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 432 (1999). For background
facts on the U.S.-Czechoslovakia dispute, see Antonio F. Perez, WTO and UN. Law: Institutional Comity
in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 333 (1998).
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WTO.2 2 Of these cases, three set important principles in place for under-
standing the scope of Article XXI. In the 1961 dispute between Ghana and
Portugal, where Ghana defended its sanctions, Ghana expanded the usage of the
national security application by using it to cover potential as well as actual
danger.23  A little over two decades later a dispute erupted between the
European Community (EC) and Argentina, from which the Contracting Parties
adopted the decision that a nation invoking Article XXI had to notify other
Contracting Parties "to the fullest extent possible. 24 In 1985, the United States
invoked Article XXI tojustify its sanctions against Nicaragua at the time.25 The
U.S. did not permit the Contracting Parties to make a substantive review of its
actions, asserting that Article XXI was self-defining for individual States.26
3. Creation of WTO and Its Usage
The WTO was proposed to at least in part help clarify some of the
ambiguity of the former GATT framework. The WTO accomplishes this by
requiring Member Nations to implicitly surrender some sovereignty in order to
join the WTO and take advantage of its benefits.27 Another feature of WTO
that makes it much stronger than its forebear is the mandatory and independent
dispute resolution system.2' The WTO dispute settlement system was actually
urged by the United States, more than any other Uruguay Round participant, so
that a prospective defendant would not experience the same level of frustration
as defendants did under the old GATT system.29
The formation of the WTO has been called a watershed moment in modem
politics and economics in that it has constitutionalized customs of international
trade law and consequently strengthened the role free trade has in international
22. Note, Be Careful What You Wish for: U.S. Politics and the Future of the National Security
Exception to the GA TT, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 97, 101 (1997).
23. See GATT Council, Summary Record of the Twelfth Session, GATr/SR.19/12 [hereinafter
Summary Record] (Dec. 12, 1961).
24. Report ofthe Panel, Decisions Concerning ArticleXXl ofthe General Agreement, l (Nov. 30,
1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (20th Supp.), at 23 (1983).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1986), reprinted in United States-TRADE MEASURES
AFFECTING NACUARAGUA: COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES, GATr/L/5803, at 2 (May 29,
1985).
26. See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held July 17-19,1985, GATT/C/M/191, at 41 (Sept.
11, 1985).
27. Lindsay, supra note 16, at 1298.
28. Id. at 1303.
29. John H. Jackson, Helm-Burton, the U.S., andthe WTO, ASIL INSIGHTS, March 1997, available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/insight7/htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2006).
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relations.30 Indeed, in just a few years after the establishment of the WTO,
international trade law rapidly has evolved into a stable, mature, and almost
predictable niche within the discipline of law itself. This is largely due to the
massive volume of cases that the WTO dispute settlement system has handled
since 1995; processing over 11,000 pages of reports total.3' It is no wonder
then that the WTO dispute settlement system has become known as "the busiest
international system for resolving international disputes in the history of the
world."32 Even so, an Article XXI case has not been brought to the WTO panel
and decided on yet.
Two significant Article XXI sanctions have been challenged, though, since
the birth of the WTO framework. In the controversy over the Helms-Burton
Act,33 the U.S. went beyond mere trade sanctions against Cuba, but also opened
up American courts to civil lawsuits against any companies from third-party
countries for "trafficking" in Cuban property once owned by Americans.
American plaintiffs can sue for up to three times the value of the property.
Moreover, the Helms-Burton Act prohibits the officers, controlling share-
holders, and even the families of such who were found "trafficking" in formerly
American-owned property from visiting the United States.34 The E.U., Canada,
and Mexico threatened to challenge Helms-Burton in a WTO panel; and the
U.S. defended the legislation on Article XXI grounds, even suggesting that a
WTO panel's jurisdiction would not be recognized.35 In the end, a political
solution was worked out between the United States and the E.U. in order to
avoid a WTO panel ruling.36 Thus, the Helms-Burton controversy may not be
very useful in shedding light on how to interpret Article XXI, but it does
illustrate the reluctance of nations to actually go through with a WTO panel
decision on Article XXI issues. This may largely stem from a desire of States
30. John H. Jackson, Introduction: Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L.
L. 17, 23 (1996).
31. James Bacchus, Groping Toward Grotius: The WTO and the International Rule of Law, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 533, 540 (2003). A more recent count records that there have been a total of 345 disputes
brought before the WTO. WTO, Chronological List of Disputes Cases, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/dispustatus-e.htm#2005 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); and of
those, 73 Appellate Body Reports from 1996 to 2005. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Statistics, available at
http'J/www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/stats-e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
32. Bacchus, supra note 31, at 540.
33. See generally The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91. (1996).
34. Id.
35. Lindsay, supra note 16, at 1305-06.
36. Id. at 1307.
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to maintain control over their own security-influenced trade policy rather than
leaving such decisions up to an international third party.a7
The second significant Article XXI dispute thus far in the WTO era is a
trade conflict between Nicaragua and Colombia.3" Nicaragua imposed
sanctions on Colombia and defended the sanctions by invoking Article XXI and
arguing that a WTO panel does not have jurisdiction over Article XXI
sanctions. The E.U., mindful of Helms-Burton, supported Colombia's right to
appeal to the WTO for a panel review. Eventually, a deal was worked out in
which the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO agreed to set up a panel,
but the Chairman of the DSB consulted with Nicaragua and Colombia, thereby
avoiding the establishment of a panel.39 This dispute also shows reluctance for
rushing an Article XXI dispute to a panel. Consequently, no Article XXI
dispute has been resolved by a WTO panel. This means that the hypothetical
question of whether the panel will adopt absolute deference to the states or
varying degrees short of this continues to divide scholars.40 In a larger sense,
no boundaries yet have been put on Article XXI limiting its usage in any way.
This may be both a curse and a blessing in that states have neither a model nor
guideline to follow when issuing sanctions; yet precisely because of this lack
of clarity, states are free to do as they wish. The current lack of consensus of
Article XXI makes for interesting analysis in light of evolving and growing
national security concerns that haunt the modern geopolitical landscape.
37. Lindsay speculates that States have an incentive of maintaining a blurry concept of Article XXI
so that they may use the provision whenever they feel they need it. For this reason, WTO members are not
"rushing to embrace the new legalism for issues of national-security." Id. at 1308.
38. See WTO, Nicaragua-MeasuresAffectinglmportsfrom Honduras and Colombia, WT/DS 188/2
(Mar. 28, 2000).
39. Akande & Williams, supra note 13, at 377.
40. For a sampling of scholarly opinion, see Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post
Cold War Transformations in National Security and Separation of Powers-Beating Nuclear Swords into
Plowshares in an Imperfectly Competitive World, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331,408-10 (1997)
(presenting the view that because the WTO dispute settlement process intended to be more adjudicative than
the pre-WTO GATT, the WTO ought to have more authority over substantive trade questions, including the
security exception); Rene E. Browne, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdependent World: The
GATT Article X1I Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405, 432 (1997), (asserting that national
sovereignty is becoming an outdated concept facing competing values, which means national security
concerns must be subjected to a WTO panel that balances such concerns against the value placed in
interdependent trade); David A. Baldwin, Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free
Trade: Prolegomena to Thinking about Economic Sanctions and Free Trade, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 271,280-81
(2003) (giving the perspective that nations ought to have authority to impose security-related trade sanctions
because issues other than trade are involved and the global political stability from sanctions eventually leads
to more free trade); see Lindsay, supra note 16, at 1310 (offers a compromise solution of deliberately leaving
the question of deference unanswered so as to allow and encourage disputing parties to politically negotiate
through the sensitive terrain of national security issues).
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B. Present Sanctions in the War on Terrorism
1. Recent Counterterrorism Actions
One of the most visible national security concerns in recent years is
terrorism. Although difficult to track statistically, not least of all because of a
difficulty in defining the criteria, terrorism arguably reached relative highs in
terms of total number of international terrorist attacks between the years 1999
and 2001.41 Undoubtedly, such numbers have fueled the increased concern
expressed by governments, the media, and the public over terrorism.
The magnitude of the threat from terrorism, indeed, can be anecdotally
measured by the increasing number of counter-terrorism commissions and
official measures being created by primarily economic multi-national
organizations throughout various parts of the world. The Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), for example, established its Counter Terrorism
Task Force (CTTF) in February 2003, which, among other programs, oversees
the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) program. 2 The European Union
adopted the Treaty on European Union in 2002, which includes in the
Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters an article
that specifically identifies terrorism as a matter that needs policing.43 In the
aftermath of the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the E.U. set up a
pan-European anti-terrorism campaign that created uniform arrest warrants and
database entries to track and mitigate potential terrorist threats." In Southeast
Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in November 2001.4
The swelling concern of terrorism by multi-national organizations more
experienced in trade and economic issues is consistent with the increasing
attention that political institutions have given to terrorism issues in recent years.
41. U.S. Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, Appendix G (released June 22, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003 (follow "Report (pdf format)" hyperlink; follow "Appendix
G" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
42. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Counter Terrorism (2006), available at
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec__groups/somspecial-task_.groups/counter-terrorism.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2006).
43. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 29 OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITIES
(2002).
44. Thomas Fuller, European Union Agrees on Plan to Coordinate Anti-terror Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2004 at A9. For a slightly skeptical perspective, however, on the efficacy of E.U. law enforcement
integration, see Eric J. Lobsinger, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Window on EU Integration, I
HANSE L. REv. 127, 236-41 (2005), available at http://www.hanselawreview.org (follow "Vol.1 No.2"
hyperlink; then follow "Article" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
45. Ass'n of Southeast AsianNations [ASEAN],ASEANEfforts to Counter Terrorism (Nov. 2001),
available at http://www.aseansec.org/l4396.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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For instance, the member nations of the regionally based Organization of
American States (OAS) signed the Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism in June 2002.46 In the weeks following September 11, 2001, the
Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1373 to condemn
the September 11 th attacks and to establish the Counter Terrorism Committee,
which comprises of all fifteen Security Council members.47 In the U.S.,
President George W. Bush issued sweeping economic sanctions as U.S. policy
in the immediate aftermath of the September 1lth attacks.48  Moreover,
government leaders from diverse nations have convened to discuss how
ideological terrorism threatens to completely replace current notions of
government with systematic governance that imposes the ideology of terrorist
organizations.49 Aside from political reasons, an economic rationale as to why
governments have taken a proactive interest in blotting out terrorism is that
terrorism is seen as a threat to trade liberalization-safe trade is an important
precondition of free trade.5"
The dual phenomena of terrorism and expanding globalized markets have
become linked as a way for the world powers to define global political and
economic policy. The United States has taken up a foreign policy of expanding
free markets and free trade as a tool to counteract the appeal of terrorism in
impoverished parts of the world.5 This policy of using trade as a counter-
terrorism measure under the faith that doing so will reduce poor economic
conditions in developing countries favorable to terrorism has been championed
by a wide range of commentators.52
A counter-terrorism strategy that strikes at the financial funding of
terrorism, however, has gained more traction recently as an immediate response
46. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, June 3, 2002, Clementine Olivier, Human
Rights Law and the International Fight Against Terrorism: How do Security Council Resolutions Impact on
States' Obligations Under International Human Rights Law? USAG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-0/02) (June 3,2002).
47. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
48. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
49. Militant Islamists, for example, have openly advocated the creation of a pan-Islamic state across
South and Southeast Asia. In multinational response to this, see Shawn Donnan, Bali Hosts Terrorism Debate
while Indonesia Shies Away from Confronting Suspects, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Feb. 4, 2004 at 2.
50. Michel Henri Bouchet, The Impact of Geopolitical Turmoil on Country Risk and Global
Investment Strategy, in TERRORISM AND THE INT'L BUS. ENv.: THE SEC.-Bus. NEXUS, 92-94 (GabrielleG.S.
Suder, ed., 2004).
51. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
52. Compare John Norton Moore, Solving the WarPuzzle, 97 AM.J. INT'LL. 282,288 (2003), with
Christopher Preble, Free Trade: a Potent Weapon Against Terror, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 20, 2003 (giving a
libertarian perspective) and Daniel T. Griswold, Free Trade Tills the Soil ofDemocracy, DETROIT NEWS, July
30, 2003, and Jeffery D. Sachs, Democrats ShouldBack Free Trade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001 (giving a
neoconservative perspective).
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to terrorism. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental
body that attempts to police against money laundering and terrorist financing,
has advocated methods to improve information exchange between countries on
terrorist funding.53 The U.S. has also more aggressively taken official action
to pursue the financing of terrorism.54 However, the desire to locate and disrupt
sources of ,financing for terrorists, although -attracting more salience and
attention today, has been a counter-terrorism strategy for at least several
decades now." Indeed, countries have, since decades ago, engaged in trade and
economic sanctions against nations which have had governments suspected of
sponsoring terrorism.
2. Traditional Whole-Nation Sanctions
At least until very recently, financial disruption of terrorism networks has
almost exclusively meant penalizing government sponsors of terrorism, usually
by targeting whole nations with trade or foreign investment restrictions.
Famous examples of sanctions levied against an entire nation for suspected
terrorism links by the government are the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA)" and the Export Administration Act (EAA)." Both U.S.
statutes give the President broad powers to impose trade sanctions against
hostile nations. The IEEA has been used against South Africa in the 1980s,
Iraq in the 1990s, Haiti, Burma, Sudan, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.5" The U.S. also leveled sanctions against Iran during
the hostage crisis, the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, and
Poland after martial law was declared there for a time.59 It can be said that
some of the aforementioned sanctions were motivated more by human rights
concerns rather than terrorism or national security concerns, while other
sanctions were probably motivated by a mixture of both. The relatively
53. E.g., Fin. Action Task Force, Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering, (June 20, 2003),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow the "40 Recs" hyperlink) [hereinafter FATF]. See also FATF,
Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, (Oct. 22, 2004) available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org
(follow "9 Special Recs" hyperlink). Andrew Parker, Move to Boost Crackdown on Terrorist Finance, FIN.
TIMES (Asia ed.), Feb. 28/29, 2004, at 5 (providing an account of the geopolitical climate surrounding
FATF's actions).
54. See supra note 48.
55. LORET'A NAPOLEONI, MODERN JIHAD: TRACING THE DOLLARS BEHIND THE TERROR
NETWORKS, 22 (2003) (describing the economic trade policies the United States pursued during the Cold
War, particularly in response to Marxist guerilla fighters/terrorists in El Salvador).
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2004).
57. 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2004).
58. Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of
Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 133, 143-44 (2002).
59. Id.
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recently passed Clean Diamond Trade Act,"° which initially faced opposition
from President George W. Bush on the grounds that the Act allegedly violates
GATT, mixes a concern for human rights conditions in Africa with a desire
to end militarization in certain African countries like Sierra Leone and
Liberia.62 It has been suggested that many of the diamonds affected by the
Clean Diamond Trade Act are used to funnel funds to the terrorist organization
al-Qaeda.63
Regardless of whether sanctions are imposed largely because of explicit
national security concerns, human rights concerns, or a blurring of both-which
may increasingly be the case as gross violations of human rights are becoming
understood as threats to international peace and securityT -the traditional
model of imposing sanctions, as illustrated by the examples above, is to use
sanctions to penalize an entire nation for the alleged crimes or abuse of its
government. Almost all international disputes between national governments
follow this traditional approach of using whole-nation sanctions. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine another common approach to resolve international disputes,
other than the resort to military action. Illustrative of the prevalent usage of
sanctions, it is impossible to even conceive of United States foreign policy
without the existence of whole-nation sanctions.65
3. Diplomacy, Politics, and Institutions
A political justification of why whole-nation sanctions are conventional
and normative is that most global agreements concerning trade, security, and
human rights have government signatories, not private entities or individuals
as signatories. Thus, governments are parties in disputes in all but a handful of
cases where private individuals are directly allowed to bring their complaints.66
60. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3901 (2004).
61. Cleveland, supra note 58, at 134.
62. Questions surrounding the legality of the Act under the GAT framework were waived by the
WTO. See WTO General Council, ProposedAgenda, Item 6, WT/GC/W498 (May 13, 2003).
63. See Timothy W. Docking, Terrorism's Africa Link, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 14,
2001 at 9. See U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Address on the Senate Floor (Apr. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/200304/ 040903e.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
64. Hoe Lim, Trade and Human Rights: What's at Issue?, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 275, 286-87
(2001). The conceptual blurring of national security and human rights has strongly influenced the foreign
policy of President Bush's administration, see Guy Dinmore, 'Fear Societies' the Target of New
Administration, FIN. TIMES. (Asia ed.), Jan. 21, 2005, at 2.
65. Raj Bhala, MRS. WA TU: Seven Steps to Trade Sanctions Analysis, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565,
566-67 (1999).
66. Private individuals may bring a cause of action under the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement. Private investors may bring complaints against foreign
governments through the International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID) depending on
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The GATT is no exception to this general rule. The GATT exclusively treats
member states as parties to the GATT framework, which means only member
states may participate in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings. This
feature has opened the WTO GATT dispute settlement process to criticism
from those who feel that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ought to play
a larger role in dispute settlement by being able to file amicus briefs in panel
and Appellate Body hearings.67 The WTO was formed exclusively by states,
however, and it is precisely from the formal entry into the WTO by 149 states6"
that gives the WTO a certain image of legitimacy. Moreover, if states enter the
WTO, naturally states have an interest in maintaining control over hearings.
Furthermore, it may be difficult to overstate the simple institutional inertia that
exists in the WTO dispute settlement structure, which would make the
introduction of non-state parties in the process rather unlikely for the near
future.69
Another reason why the WTO remains exclusively a dispute settlement
body between member states is that this makes communication and settlement
easier for nations. Member states are more likely to be aware of one another's
needs or areas of compromise, whereas private parties may be quite unpredict-
able as to what they are expecting or would accept for compensation. Predict-
ability is arguably a rather significant benefit for national security related trade
sanctions, which often touch on sensitive topics such as political fear,
nationalism, and genuine concerns over safety. Undoubtedly, with the high
political stakes involved in an Article XXI sanction, predictability is a very
valuable asset for a diplomatic solution. Should private parties be able to bring
complaints challenging the legitimacy of an Article XXI sanction, however, the
private parties stand a greater chance to act incalculably.
It also bears noting that national security related sanctions are not
infrequently coordinated or planned with other nations. As in the African
conflict diamond regulation and the sanctions in Iraq through the 1990s, many
parts of the world join in sanctions where there exists a shared threat or a
shared symbol of a threat. The U.N. can at times serve as a guide to encourage
the relationship with the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States. See WTO, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex C
(Apr. 15, 1994).
67. See Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 173 (2000); Daniel D. Bradlow, The Issues in the New Millennium: "Times are a-Changin "': Some
Preliminary Thoughts on Developing Countries, NGOs, and the Reform of the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REv. 503 (2001).
68. WTO, Homepage, What is the WTO? available at http://www.wto.org (follow "The WTO"
hyperlink; then follow "What is the WTO?" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
69. Joseph Weiler, WTO Panel Member, Remarks at Kyushu University, Graduate School of Law
(Mar. 22, 2004).
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nations to share in the fight against terrorism by suggesting multilateral action.70
These sort of shared sanctions operate best amongst parties that know one
another. Additionally, since the goal of such sanctions is usually to pressure the
sanctioned nation to abandon dangerous weapons programs, stop human rights
abuses, or to crack down on militants and/or terrorists within national borders,
it does seem most effective to place liability, by way of sanctions, against
governments.
C. Problems with the Present Model
1. Humanitarian Concerns
Despite the long practice of nation states placing trade sanctions on one
another, there exist several shortcomings of whole-nation sanctions in the
current fight against terrorism. One objection to conventional sanctions, which
may be applicable to all whole-nation sanctions and not just Article XXI
measures, is that traditional sanctions tend to place hardship on those who are
powerless instead of putting pressure on the intended targets.7 This can lead
to severe humanitarian crises, a significant concern in its own right, but also a
contributing problem in the spread of terrorist ideology. Whole-nation
sanctions have the powerful ability to disrupt the economic development of the
target country, thereby crippling a number of economic opportunities for people
in the target country. This in turn may breed an environment of dissatisfaction
and hostility, fodder for ideological extremism and terrorism.72 Thus, the long-
term harmful effects on innocent populations-a virtual inevitability from
whole-nation sanctions-need to be seriously weighed in order to avoid
disastrous unintended consequences of not only the humanitarian kind but of
the national security kind as well.
2. Internationalization and Global Regionalism of Terrorism
There are other significant shortcomings in continuing to understand
GATT Article XXI within a nation-to-nation paradigm. The changing nature
of terrorism may be antiquating the current dispute settlement process. State-
sponsored terrorism has been steadily declining since the early 1990s. It has
70. E.g., 2002/35 Human Rights and Terrorism, The Commission on Human Rights, April 22,
2002.
71. Don Henshaw, Sanctions: Another Weapon of War, CAMBRIDGE REP., Apr. 25, 2003, at A6
(illustrating that sanctions against Iraq did little to destabilize the regime of Saddam Hussein, but reportedly
led to severe starvation and malnourishment of hundreds of thousands of people in Iraq).
72. Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror Without the
War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587, 602-03 (2004).
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been replaced with terrorism conducted by independent groups, usually very
ideologically driven by violent religious extremism or nationalism. 3 Indeed,
in the U.S. State Department's current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, a list of thirty-seven organizations, and Other Terrorist Groups,
a list of an additional forty groups, there is not a single organization that is
directly or officially state-sponsored." Although the list does include several
groups that have varying degrees of informal support from government leaders,
e.g., Hezbollah has received funding and aid from Iran,75 the majority of the
listed organizations operate more or less independently from any government
73. WALTER LAQUEUR, THENEWTERRORISM: FANATICISM AND THE ARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
178-83 (1999).
74. The Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations are: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Abu
SayyafGroup (ASG), AI-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Ansar al-Islam (AI), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Asbat al-
Ansar, Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA), AI-Gama'a al-slamiyya (Islamic Group, IG), HAMAS (Islamic
Resistance Movement), Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Hizballah (Party of God), Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Jemaah Islamiya (Jl), AI-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, ELI),
Kahane Chai (Kach), Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK), Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba (LT), Lashkar i Jhangivi (LJ), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Mujahedin-e Khalq
Organization (MEK or MOK), National Liberation Army (ELN - Colombia), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PU),
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian Front
for the Liberation Front of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), A-Qaida, Real IRA (RIRA),
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Revolutionary Nuclei, Revolutionary Organization 17
November, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 135, Salafi st Group for Call and
Combat (GSPC), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), and United Self-Defense Forces/Group of
Colombia (AUC). 2003 DEP'T ST. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM REP. app. B (released April 29, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31711 .htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). The Other
Terrorist Groups are: AI-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badhr), Al-Ittihad al-Islami (A1AI), Alex Boncayao Brigade
(ABB), Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA), Cambodian
Freedom Fighters (CFF), Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/United People's Front, Continuity Irish
Republican Army (CIRA), Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), First of October Antifascist
Resistance Group (GRAPO), Great East Islamic Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), Harakat ul-Jihad-l-Islami (HUJ1),
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Hizb-I Islami Guldbuddin (HIG), Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM),
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Irish Republican Army (IRA), Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), Islamic
International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM), Japanese Red Army (JRA),
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA), Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI), Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group (GICM), New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC), People Against
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), Peoples War, Red Hand Defenders (RHD), Revolutionary Proletarian
Initiative Nuclei (NIPR), Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
(RSRSBCM), Sipah-I-SahabaiPakistan (SSP), Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR), The Tunisian
Combatant Group (TCG), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Turkish Hizballah, Ulster
Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (USA/UFF), and Ulster Defense Force (UVP). 2003 DEP'T ST.
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM REP. app. C (released April 29, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/31759.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
75. PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM app. B, supra note 74.
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authority or agenda, except where a terrorist organization's agenda and a
government's agenda happen to be congruent. Even amongst the organizations
that may have originated with formal state sponsorship, such as the PFLP in
1967 from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), these organizations
are notorious for splitting in factions, as the PFLP-GC did in 1968 from the
PFLP,76 and thus tend to be unreliable to the formal state organs for carrying
out state political goals under the leadership of state strategy. The extent of
autonomy of non-state terrorist organizations is reflected in their ability to
engage in state-like "plausible deniability" as well as hold diplomatic relations
with formal states.77
The weakening of state-sponsored terrorism is illustrated by the lack of
terrorist activity of once highly involved countries such as Cuba, which at one
point supported nearly all Latin American extremist movements and left-wing
terrorism, and North Korea, responsible for a number of massive bombings
against South Koreans in the 1980s. 78 Libya also has recently shown uneasi-
ness in sponsoring terrorism. In the 1970s and 1980s one of the foremost
sponsors of international terrorism--Colonel Khadafi even promoted his little
"Green Book" as inspirational literature for terrorism-today Libya has
jettisoned its pro-terrorism rhetoric and has even begun to cooperate with the
West in revealing valuable information about its weapons programs.79
What has replaced the state-sponsored terrorism, however, is far more
dangerous, at least within the security and sanction framework that exists today.
Names of organizations like al-Qaeda have now entered the common Western
vocabulary, and Osama bin-Laden is possibly the world's most infamous
person. Neither al-Qaeda nor bin-Laden, though, are really associated with any
particular nation state; both are perceived by the West as nationally amorphous,
which makes it all the more difficult for observers to fully grasp what kind of
terrorist force threatens the world today.
One of the most difficult characteristics about non-state terrorism is the
evasiveness of the perpetrators. Unlike nation states, international terrorist
organizations typically do not control quantifiable territory complete with a
capital city. Rather, the terrorists, even the leaders of terrorist organizations,
move stealthily, always on the run. It is a bit like guerilla warfare, just more
transnational. This kind of mystery fighting, where not even the identity of the
76. Id.
77. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL'S 2020 PROJECT 94-5 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s4.html#trans (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
78. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 180-81.
79. Rob Watson, U.S. Displays 'Libyan Nuclear Secrets', BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3514818.stm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
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terrorist leaders are known with certainty, disappointed Pakistani forces who
thought they were on to one of al-Qaeda's top officers near the border of
Afghanistan in March 2004, but ended up finding tunnels instead which were
probably used for al-Qaeda's escape."0 Among the al-Qaeda fighters left
behind, a mix of nationalities was discovered, including Uzbeks, Chechens,
Afghans, Arabs, and western Chinese Uighurs.8 The multi-national and multi-
ethnic dimension of non-state terrorism, as a result of either an ideological
appeal that spans across national borders, like pan-Arabism, or a universal
appeal, such as an absolutist faith in a militant and expansionist Islam, can be
much more dangerous than state-sponsored terrorism due to the vaster reach of
territory with a terrorist presence and the deeper pool of potential recruits.8 2
The Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, recruited "j ihadists" from all over the
world. 3 In Indonesia today there exists terrorist training camps operated by
local Islamic militants that serve the wider al-Qaeda network that attract
hundreds of foreigners from Europe, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle
East. 4 Monitoring non-state terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda's
expansive network, is rather difficult because of the lack of fixed capitals and
fixed borders.
Pakistan has already been mentioned, but one may note that countries as
far apart and different as Indonesia, Yemen, and possibly Thailand have
experienced difficulties with al-Qaeda activities within their borders.8 5 This
true internationalization of terrorism has become an undeniably characteristic
feature of the modern world. Indeed, current trends suggest that non-state
actors, including terrorist organizations, will continue to assume a more
prominent role in global affairs.8 6 It is for this reason that the traditional
approach of comprehending the world exclusively in terms of nation states is
outdated, and perhaps dangerously so. Consequently, employing trade sanctions
to fit within neat political boundaries in order to pressure parts of the world to
comply with the international community may be irreconcilable with reality.
80. David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, Tunnels Found in Pakistan Tied to Foreign Militants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004.
81. David Rohde & Carlotta Gall, Seeking Top Qaeda Figure, Pakistanis Battle Militants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004.
82. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 238.
83. Id. at 239.
84. Donald Pearson, Radical Islam in Indonesia and lts Potential Impact on International Islamic
Terrorism, 8, no.2 J. COUNTERTERRORISM & SEC. INT'L 16, 17 (2002).
85. See Jemaah Islamiyah Document Reveals Planned Bombings in Indonesia, STRAITS TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2005; Mark Huband, Yemeni Police Arrest Second Top al-Qaeda Terror Suspect, FIN. TIMES (Asia
ed.), Mar. 5, 2004, at 7; Amy Kazrnin, Muslim Militants Blamedfor Thai Blasts, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Feb.
11, 2005, at 9.
86. Nat'l Intelligence Council, supra note 77.
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The very manner in which terrorist groups operate today-spread thin over vast
territory, located in numerous countries-makes whole-nation sanctions an
inadequate weapon; akin to "trying to kill a mosquito with a wrecking ball."87
Indeed, there exists evidence that al-Qaeda deliberately accelerated the
decentralization of its organization to counteract and stay ahead of U.N.
sanctions placed on it and Afghanistan, thus allowing al-Qaeda to stay
financially able of carrying out its objectives.88
Imposing whole-nation sanctions on states that sponsor terrorism may be
justified because sanctioned governments might actually be significantly
weakened if the national economies falter from a sharp reduction in trade. The
rationale for whole-state sanctions against governments that sponsor terrorism
cannot be used, however, for non-governmental terrorist organizations. A
faltering domestic economy most likely does not affect independent terrorist
organizations in the same way sudden economic collapse can undermine the
legitimacy of a government.89 Moreover, the vast majority of the terrorist
organizations on the U.S. State Department's list receive independent sources
of funding separate from where the majority of their activities take place; this
is particularly true for the terrorist groups that focus their terrorist activities in
and near Israel, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PFLP-GC.9° Naturally, a
very spread-out organization that truly is multi-national and has an independent-
ly wealthy leader, such as al-Qaeda, is not nearly as vulnerable to sanctions
imposed on individual nations as the targeted nations themselves. Consequent-
ly, there appears to be a strong correlation between self-reliance of a terrorist
group and the level of impact whole-nation sanctions will have on the group.9
3. Financing of Terrorism
Whole-nation sanctions are perhaps their weakest in addressing the
financing of non-state terrorism. Unlike state-sponsored terrorism which for its
funding relies heavily on domestic tax revenue, which in turn is dependent on
the state of the economy, non-state terrorism tends to operate financially in the
margins of economic activity, or perhaps even completely outside the
87. Alan Einisman, Ineffective at Its Best: Fighting Terrorism with Economic Sanctions, 9 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 299, 320 (2000).
88. Stephen Fidler, AI-Qaeda Outsmarts Sanctions, Says UN: Decentralisation and Smaller
Operations with Less Need for Funds Frustrate Counter-Measures, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Aug. 28, 2004,
at 1.
89. Einisman, supra note 87, at 300.
90. PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM app. B, supra note 74.
91. Einisman, supra note 87, at 309.
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mainstream economy.9 2 Consequently, the financial support of non-state
terrorism is affected far less by whole-state sanctions than on state-sponsored
terrorism.
Increasing evidence shows the extent to which terrorist organizations,
particularly non-state organizations, receive funding through the illicit drug
trade. In January 2002, the U.S. government for the first time collected proof
that Hezbollah and terrorist groups in Yemen and Lebanon were directly
receiving proceeds from the sale of methamphetamine in Chicago, Detroit, and
other U.S. cities.93 Of course, the linkage between the illicit drug trade and
terrorist groups in Latin America has been well understood for some time by
intelligence experts and scholars. It has been known since the 1980s, for
instance, that the terrorist-sponsoring states of Cuba and Nicaragua have
supported terrorist groups with illicit drug trafficking. 94 The non-state terrorist
groups in Colombia, especially the FARC, may be considered the quintessential
narco-terrorists, it being one of the first and largest narco-terrorist organiza-
tions.95 FARC's status as a narco-terrorist organization is reflected in the lack
of division between its revolutionary interests against Colombia's government,
which it supports by terrorism, and its profiteering interests, which it supports
from the cocaine trade, assuming there exists a division. Perhaps one of
FARC's slogans is very telling: "Coca and Liberty... Long Live the Revolu-
tionary Struggle." 96
Within militant Islamic terrorism, perhaps no organization contributed to
the illicit drug trade more than the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although the
Taliban long officially forbade the consumption of opium and similar drugs for
religious reasons, and punished severely those who used drugs, the production
of opium in Afghanistan was actually encouraged. As a result, before the fall
of the Taliban, Afghanistan was one of the world's main centers of opium
production.97 Indeed, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has suggested
that it is highly likely that Osama bin-Laden personally facilitated the heroin
trade from Afghanistan to finance terrorist activities.9"
The illicit drug trade may not appear to have much relevance for WTO
governance (after all, drug trafficking does not enjoy GATT concessions), but
92. M. CherifBassiouni, Legal Control oflnternational Terrorism: A Policy-OrientedAssessment,
43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 88 (2002).
93. Don Bamard, Narco-Terrorism Realities: The Connection Between Drugs and Terror, 9, no.
I J. COUNTERTERRORISM & SEC. INT'L 31 (2003).
94. Id. at 32.
95. NAPOLEONI, supra note 55, at 39-40.
96. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 189.
97. Id. at 211-12.
98. Bamard, supra note 93, at 32.
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the illicit drug trade does not exist in a vacuum; it exists amongst legal trade.
The overwhelming majority of illicit drugs that are shipped to the U.S. are
co-mingled with legally imported goods.99 The innocuous kitchen ingredient
honey, for example, is a favorite export/import good as a conduit for the illegal
trafficking of drugs, arms, electronic items, etc.' 00 Due to terrorist connections
to certain sectors of the honey trade, such as Osama bin-Laden's control of
Yemeni honey companies and Islamic Jihad's use of honey shops to raise funds,
terrorist organizations receive revenue from a legal source as well as a cover for
smuggling.' ' Thus, it can be said that terrorists are using the legitimate free
market, largely governed by the WTO, to engage in the illicit drug trade in
order to fund terrorism.
Whole-nation sanctions, however, cannot address this problem very
effectively because such sanctions are too indiscriminate, affecting the vast
majority of trade in goods that are not co-mingled with illicit drugs. Not only
do such broad sanctions deter trade liberalization in legitimate goods, and thus
run counter to the objective of GATT and the WTO, but overly broad sanctions
fail to isolate and identify the precise nature and export and import routes of
illicit goods. From a law enforcement and investigative perspective, the whole-
state sanction approach should raise some questions on how effectively the
sanctions aid counter-terrorism agencies in tracing the financial sources of
terrorism. Rather than using sanction tactics that were developed to fight the
kind of terrorism that was prevalent two decades ago, counter-terrorism efforts
today must adapt to the advantages that globalization has given to the financing
of non-state terrorism.1
0 2
One of the ways in which globalization has helped the financing of
terrorism is by providing a globally expansive reach for businesses and NGOs
or non-profit groups that serve as fronts for terrorist organizations. In the
United States, for example, President George W. Bush soon after September
11 th announced the closure of three entities in the U.S. that had ties with
Hamas: the Holy Land Foundation, Beit-al Mal Bank, and Al Aqsa Islamic
Bank. 03 The Holy Land Foundation, purportedly a charity, raised $13 million
99. Id. at 33.
100. NAPOLEONI, supra note 55, at 158-59.
101. Id.
102. Willy Deridder, Executive Director of Interpol, Remarks at the 16th Annual Interpol Symposium
on Terrorism (Oct. 22-23, 2001) (transc ript available at
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/20011022b.asp) (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
103. Press Release, United States Department of Treasury, Remarks by John B. Taylor, Under
Secretary of the Treasury on the Financial Fight Against Terror (Dec. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po840.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
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for Hamas in one year. 1" Beit el-Mal Bank and Al Aqsa Islamic Bank engaged
in directing business and in investing $25 million for Hamas.' 5 Indeed, the
United States' post-September 11 th actions to more closely monitor financial
information for terrorism links highlights the potential significant role that faux
businesses and NGOs play in funding terrorism.'0 6 Stricter scrutiny on charit-
able funding since the September 11 th attacks resulted in U.S. officials freezing
over $130 million in terrorist assets, with approximately $75 million of the total
suspected of having belonged to al-Qaeda or the Taliban in 2003.'07 In Canada,
the government's anti-money laundering efforts have uncovered $35 million in
suspected terrorist financing; $22 million was uncovered in the 2002-2003
fiscal year.0 8 The periodic freezing of assets of individual groups worth
millions of dollars, however, does not even begin to address the overall global
network of terrorist financing, which has been estimated to be worth $1.5
trillion.'0 9
The free market financial characteristic of non-state terrorism is a natural
by-product of market globalization." 0 NGOs like the Holy Land Foundation
possibly benefit the most from globalization because NGOs, as a result of
globalization, have risen in prominence and numbers in recent years, demand-
ing for a greater role in the development of international norms and law."'
Within this growth, terrorist organizations have planted NGOs for the purposes
of spreading propaganda for terrorist objectives, receiving official recognition
from governments and international organizations, like the United Nations, for
their humanitarian efforts, recruiting activists for terrorism, and collecting
donations." 2 Globalization has particularly increased the exploitive advantages
that charities and faux charities can receive from official recognition from the
United Nations, which provides an aura of legitimacy, thereby making it easier
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
107. Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda 's Finances Ample, Say Probers; Worldwide Failure to Enforce
Sanctions Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al.
108. Jim Bronskill, $35MFunneledto Terror Groups; Amount exceeds 2002-03 Agency 29 cases
probed thisfiscal year, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 29, 2004, at A 16.
109. Napoleoni compares this figure as being twice the GNP of the United Kingdom and three times
the size of the United States money supply; thus appropriately terming terrorist financing as the New
Economy of Terror. NAPOLEONI supra note 55, at 198.
110. Id.
111. Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalization as a Challenge to International Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV.
655, 659-60 (2002).
112. Donald Pearson, Tracking Terrorists Through Open Sources, 6, no. 1, J. COUNTERTERRORISM
& SEC. INT'L 58 (1999).
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for these organizations to solicit funds from international donors." 3 Interna-
tional donors may play a critical role because the organizations themselves are
typically located in areas of an impoverished population. The growing threat
of terrorist front organizations passing off as legitimate NGOs is indeed listed
as one of the nine modem terrorism-related dangers issued by the international
FATF.' 1
4
The recent seizures of terrorist funding reflect a concerted and more
cooperative effort between governments and international agencies in pursuing
terrorist financing.' 15 Nonetheless, the practice of freezing assets suspected of
funding terrorism and relying on governments from varying economic and
social conditions to police and make bank records transparent is a daunting task
that may not be sufficient in blocking the financing of terrorism." 6 Indeed, the
FATF has identified sanctions as a critical step in reducing terrorist funding
and, consequently, the threat ofterrorism. 7 Therefore, it may behoove nations
to increase the usage of trade sanctions in their arsenal of methods to combat
terrorist financing, but by employing trade sanctions designed to adapt to the
non-state nature of terrorist organizations today. Sanctions ought to mitigate
as much as possible the negative economic consequences inflicted on innocent
populations. This caution should be taken for humanitarian reasons as well as
to avoid causing social conditions friendly to terrorist ideology.
The traditional model of whole-state sanctions is inadequate to handle the
modem threat to international stability from non-state terrorism. Although
possibly effective for state-sponsored terrorism, whole-state sanctions address
neither the transnational character of modem terrorism, nor of terrorism's
increasing integration in the globalized economy from which it finds interna-
tional financing. Since many terrorist organizations today are not conveniently
113. Id.
114. See Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, supra note 53, at no. 8.
115. U.N. SC Res. 1373 (2001) and the FATF's Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
are the main sources of law and guidelines for international cooperation in combating terrorist financing.
SUPPRESSING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (Paul Gleason &
Glenn Gottselig eds., 2003). To help coordinate international efforts to combat terrorist financing, the Egmont
Group brings together financial intelligence units from 101 countries to share information. To facilitate U.S.
efforts, the U.S. Treasury Department recently created an office designated specifically to coordinate the
investigation ofterrorist financing with other financial crimes. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofthe Treasury, U.S.
Treasury Department Announces New Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (Mar.
3, 2003).
116. See Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism andthe Fight Against
Its Financing, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 365 (2003).
117. The FATF has given increased importance to the policing of economic activity for money that
may fund terrorism. See Cherry Reynard, FATF Expands Its Role on with New Standards, INT'L MONEY
MARKETING, Nov. 6, 2001, at 1.
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located or funded within neat political borders, but rather exist as shadowy
entities spanning across nations and even continents, it must logically follow
that trade sanctions imposed on nations put very little pressure on these non-
state terrorist organizations. Indeed, one may even conclude that the disruption
in trade liberalization from whole-state sanctions is no longer a proportional
sacrifice for what little, if any, security returns such whole-state sanctions
produce in the attempt to combat non-state terrorism. Consequently, GATT
Article XXI must not be read in a manner that limits the security exception to
only whole-state sanctions. Regardless of what may have been the original
intent and early practice of Article XXI, to continue to read it in the traditional
light endangers the world from the threat of international non-state terrorism,
a realistic and material threat to the modern, globalized world.
I. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO APPLYING TRADE SANCTIONS
A. Regional Trade Sanctions in Response to Non-State Terrorism
1. The Application of Regional Sanctions
An alternative means of imposing trade sanctions without the
disadvantages of whole-nation sanctions is to make sanctions more precise and
better focused. Region-specific sanctions to counter terrorism would cease to
define sanctions in the terms of nation states, but would rather conceptualize
sanctions as a means to punish and control the wealth of particular terrorist
organizations without regard to national boundaries.
Trade sanctions of this sort would not necessarily be bound on an entire
nation, but could be imposed just on a particular region within a nation-
perhaps imposed on a sub-national level of government-that is suspected of
harboring terrorists or exporting goods to fund terrorism. Such a sanction
would leave the rest of the nation unaffected in international trade. Using
Thailand as an example, certain provinces suspected of harboring terrorist
activities"' could have sanctions imposed, but the rest of Thailand would be
free to trade. Although sub-national, region-specific sanctions could easily be
transnational if the sanctioned areas cross national borders. A place where this
may be desirable in order to counteract porous borders, a well organized
terrorist network, and a related drug trade operating freely across national
borders is the area where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina all intersect." 9
Imposing trade sanctions just on the region where the three countries' borders
118. Kazmin, supra note 85.
119. Timothy L. O'Brien, South American Area is Cited as Haven of Terrorist Training, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at A28.
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touch in order to put pressure on the movement of trade goods in the area would
allow the remaining areas of the three countries free to engage in normal trade
relations.
Regional sanctions, at least in effect, already have been utilized by the
E.U. against the U.S. In the E.U.'s threatened countermeasures against U.S.
steel import limits, the E.U. threatened to place sanctions on very particular
types of goods, which all seemed to be important exports for certain U.S.
states. 2 ' Curiously, these U.S. states were important "swing states" for the
2004 U.S. general election. Of course there are differences between E.U.
countermeasures against targeted goods and regional sanctions used to mitigate
terrorism. Whereas E.U. countermeasures may be designed to affect certain
influential localities in order to place pressure on the national government,
regional sanctions would primarily exist to directly challenge terrorist
strongholds without any intention of undermining the national government.
Far from attempting to undermine or place pressure on a national govern-
ment, regional sanctions could essentially ignore national governments and
apply pressure directly to terrorist-dominated regions (assuming the national
government is distinct from the terrorist organizations). Unlike conventional
sanctions, regional sanctions could bypass the national government of a nation
altogether; enabling the imposition of sanctions, an inherently international
measure, but lacking the government-to-government interaction, a traditional
facet of international actions. Perhaps this bypassing of national governments
coincides with the growing clout of international non-governmental entities,
such as NGOs, multilateral companies, international agencies, and even
independent, transnational terrorist groups, all at the expense of the power of
national governments.1 2' The implication behind avoiding national govern-
ments in imposing sanctions is not that it is a call for a change in how to shape
foreign policy, but rather an acknowledgment of how globalization has shifted
the focus away from states to non-state actors.
120. Adrian Cox & Emily Schwartz, EU Tariff Revenge Could Get Personal; Would Target Goods
from States Crucial Politically to Bush, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at 58.
121. Maryann Cusimano Love, Globalization, Ethics, and the War on Terrorism, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 65, 66-67 (2002). The author makes this observation on globalization and the
diminishing importance of nation states, especially concerning terrorism: "On September 11th, nonstate
actors used non-military means to attack primarily noncombatant and non-government targets. The al Qaeda
terrorist network, the presumed perpetrators, operate across sovereign borders with cells in an estimated fifly
states. The suicide bombers, nineteen hijackers representing no state, were Saudis and Egyptians living in
the United States, trained in Afghanistan, organized and financed in Germany, England, and Spain, with
information and money sent internationally to them from companies, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and individuals. Al Qaeda's financial network drew from diamond trade in Sierra Leone and the
Afghan heroin trade, linking the terrorist network with global crimes and drug trafficking networks."
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Key characteristics of regional sanctions are that they could narrowly limit
the areas under sanction as much as possible and geographically pinpoint a
terrorist region with the hope of restricting the movement of trade goods in that
area. Regional sanctions would radically change the perception of how anti-
terrorism sanctions ought to be conceptualized in an age where national borders
are losing their significance not just with terrorism but with all matters of global
economic and political issues. From a legally formalistic point of view, the
suggestion of ignoring national boundaries in imposing trade sanctions may
seem rather bold. After all, the very foundation of the WTO presumes states
to be actors in nearly all decisions'2 2 and for the rules of trade to be in accor-
dance with GATT. Indeed, recourse against sanctions perceived in violation of
GATT is only given to member states of the WTO, thus providing states
exclusively the right to challenge trade sanctions.'23
2. Flexibility of Article XXI
The most relevant provision in GATT for trade sanctions imposed to
combat terrorism is the national security exception, Article XXI. Regional
trade sanctions as suggested in this Paper have not yet been enacted under the
provisions of Article XXI. Article XXI has only been invoked so far when
targets of the sanctions have been nation states, which is not surprising given
the presumptions of the GATT/WTO framework. The plain language of Article
XXI, however, does not seem to preclude member states from imposing
sanctions on specified regions within the borders of other member states.
Article XXI uses rather broad and permissive language, in contrast with the
more restrictive chapeau of Article XX. 24 The history of the usage of Article
XXI does not shed much light as to whether a new, targeted approach to
sanctions would be permissible, except that Article XXI sanctions may be
justified for potential as well as actual dangers. 125 Moreover, ambiguity on
what Article XXI permits partly stems from the fact that a WTO panel has not
yet had the opportunity to review an Article XXI case. The broad language of
Article XXI and the lack of definitive decisions concerning the Article have led
122. For exceptions, see supra note 66.
123. Only WTO member states may petition for a WTO panel to review another member state's
sanctions to decide the validity of the sanctions under GATT. Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2006) [hereinafter DSU].
124. See GAT art. 21, supra text accompanying note 14.
125. See Summary Record, supra note 23.
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scholars to disagree about some arguably more fundamental questions on the
proper scope of the Article. 26
Considering the room for varying opinions on the usage of Article XXI
sanctions, it may be reasonable to conclude that in the interests of fighting
terrorism, regional trade sanctions imposed on the sub-national level against a
WTO member state are well within the real possibilities for employing Article
XXI. Of course, this line of analysis maintains its relevance only if the WTO
has a right to review and make decisions on Article XXI sanctions. 27 For
purposes of examining more clearly the legal flexibility of Article XXI,
naturally it must be assumed that the WTO does possess the authority to review
Article XXI sanctions. 28
3. Sanctions and the Diamond Trade
In 2003, the WTO granted sanctions that in some respects appear targeted
at the sub-national level by authorizing trade restrictions imposed on WTO
members not participating in the Kimberley Certification Scheme, a procedure
that attempts to deter the sale of "conflict diamonds.' ' 129 By issuing certifica-
tion for diamonds that are mined with certain minimum standards, Kimberly
Certification essentially enforces a source of origin scheme in which the
particular mine the diamond is from is the relevant factor, with the objective of
preventing as much as possible the sale of diamonds that fund militias and even
terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. 13  The WTO-authorized waiver for
accommodation of the Kimberley Certification Scheme is not, strictly speaking,
however, a kind of regional sanction that is suggested by this Paper, since the
WTO waiver authorizes sanctions on diamonds by Kimberley participants (that
are member states) imposed on states that are not Kimberley participants. The
WTO waiver, nonetheless, requires that trade in diamonds between Kimberley
participants must be limited to non-conflict diamonds; this in effect threatens
126. See generally supra note 40.
127. The academic debate on whether an Article XXI sanction is reviewable by a WTO panel has
produced a number of differing views. Id.
128. Should the WTO at some point actually decide that it has no authority to review Article XXI
sanctions, naturally any further speculation on the legal limits of Article XXI, including this Paper's
examination of targeted sanctions, would be moot, since Article XXI would then essentially serve as a
limitless exception for VTO member states--giving member states essentially the position of Rex nonpotest
peccare as long as Article XXI were invoked. See generally GATT, supra note 5, at art. 21
129. See WTO General Council, Proposed Agenda, Item VI WT/GC/W/498 (May 13, 2003); WTO
Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough
Diamonds: Communication, G/C/W/432/Rev.I (Feb. 24, 2003); WTO Council for Trade in Goods,
Kimberley Process Certification Schemefor Rough Diamonds- Requestfor a Waiver, G/C/W/431 (Nov. 12,
2002) (including a reprint of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme).
130. See Docking and U.S. Sen. Leahy, supra note 63.
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sanctions if a Kimberley participant imports diamonds from particular diamond
mines rather than particular diamond producing countries. In this sense, the
WTO waiver for the Kimberley Certification Scheme polices trade between a
nation and a sub-national level of another nation, i.e. particular diamonds
mines.
Even though the WTO has opted to respect the Kimberley Certification
Scheme by creating a special waiver, it is not altogether clear that a special
waiver was necessary. Sanctions to conform to Kimberley could have been
justified under Article XXI.'3 1 Article XXI(c) would have excused sanctions
because the United Nations initiated Kimberley and the U.N. General Assembly
as well as the U.N. Security Council have supported the scheme.'32 Sanctions
would also have fallen within Article XXI(b)(ii) and Article XXI(b)(iii)
because the conflict diamonds relate directly to the traffic in weapons and the
funding ties to al-Qaeda are of profound concern for national security interests
of many WTO member states.'33
This applicability of Article XXI for sanctions under the Kimberley
Scheme illustrates an example in which sanctions may be utilized to address
national security concerns that primarily exist at the sub-national level of other
countries. The WTO waiver system for Kimberley does not impose sanctions
directly on sub-national regions, but it does impose diamond sanctions on
countries that trade with uncertified mines. This is just one step removed from
direct sanctions on such mines. Thus, it is not entirely without related prece-
dent to suggest that Article XXI sanctions could be imposed on sub-national
regions.
B. Advantages of Regional Sanctions
1. Effective Against Non-State Terrorism
By identifying a precise area for sanctions, regional sanctions can more
effectively isolate and publicly identify a base of terrorist operations and
financing than conventional sanctions that restrict trade for an entire nation.
Prohibitions on the trade of goods from a particular area within a country may
help prevent terrorists from co-mingling their exports with legitimate exports
in that country in the attempt to hide the exports used to finance terrorism. The
co-mingling of terrorism financing exports-often narcotics-with legitimate
131. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO
Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds ", 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177 (2003).
132. Id. at 1185.
133. Id. at 1185-86.
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goods is the means in which a majority of narcotics are shipped to the U.S. 34
Indeed, the illegal drug trade is a major source of terrorism funding, used for
funding by a wide array of terrorist organizations, including the IRA, the
Kurdistan Workers Party or PPK, Kosovo Liberation Army, Hezbollah, Hamas,
Abu Sayef, al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, the United Wa Army, ETA, FARC, ELN,
and Shining Path. 35 As previously mentioned, although the trade in narcotics
is not a WTO issue per se since the GATT does not provide trade protection for
narcotics, the fact that illegal drugs are often trafficked by being co-mingled
with legitimate goods does make the shipment of narcotics an issue that touches
upon the security of legitimate, WTO-protected trade.
Terrorist organizations also engage in what on the surface appears to be
legitimate businesses. Not only does al-Qaeda, for example, use honey and
baked goods businesses as fronts for fundraising,'36 Osama bin-Laden himself
has been tied to various construction companies, currency trading firms, and
export-import businesses. 37 Indeed, the business network of terrorist organiza-
tions is truly multinational. 38 Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups are
suspected of receiving funding from Al Taqwa, a group of companies in
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, and Italy, with shares of business
throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Al Taqwa has cement plants,
drydocks, textile and brick factories, a division that trades factories, and a
division that trades steel, wheat, oil, and other commodities.'39 The business
networks that fund al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups certainly rely on
globalized trade facilitated by the WTO. Thus, the sanctions available in the
WTO regime, amongst them notably Article XXI, have the ability to minimize
the terrorist funding.
Effective Article XXI sanctions, however, ought to target only the areas
with terrorist ties and not entire nations, because targeted sanctions have the
potential to isolate terrorist havens from not only the rest of the world, but also
from within the countries the terrorist havens are located. Particularly in
geographically larger WTO member states, such as the E.U., China, and India,
where terrorist financial activity might occur in a small area of the member's
borders, regional sanctions imposed over only the relevant region might isolate
134. See Barnard, supra note 93, at 33.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter- Terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering Regimes,
34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 45,52 (2002) (naming AI-Hamati Sweets Bakeries, AI-Nur Honey Press Shops,
and AI-Shifa Honey Press as three businesses tied to aI-Qaeda funding); Napoleoni, supra note 55, at 158-59.
137. Zagaris, supra note 136.
138. Id. at 70.
139. Id.
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terrorists more completely by deterring those outside of the sanctioned area
from co-mingling their exports with goods originating in the sanctioned region.
The U.S. imposed regional sanctions within Afghanistan in 1999 by
enacting a comprehensive embargo on "goods, software, technology (including
technical data), or services" to the Taliban and "to the territory of Afghanistan
controlled by the Taliban."' 4 ° In practice, this meant that the majority of
Afghanistan was under sanction that prohibited trade and financial exchange
between Americans and Afghans since the Taliban controlled a majority of
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the trade sanction against Taliban controlled
territory may serve as a model as to how regional sanctions can disassociate
sub-national regions from national political boundaries, and thus focus more of
the world's attention on the terrorists themselves. Indeed, shortly after the U.S.
imposed sanctions on the Taliban, the U.N. Security Council adopted sanctions
against the Taliban and even demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin-
Laden. 14' Future use of regional sanctions could likewise bring public attention
to terrorist organizations and perhaps help mobilize multilateral efforts to
isolate terrorist havens from funding.
Regional sanctions could be particularly useful in preventing money
transfers in the form of illegal hawala banking, a form of banking and money
transfers prevalent in Southeast Asia and many Muslim nations and known for
its paperless trail and informal arrangements. 42  Hawala operates by the
transferor of money asking a hawaladar to transfer a specified sum to the
transferee, who may be in another country.'43 The hawaladar gets in touch with
his contact, another hawaladar, near the transferee.' 44 The hawaladar near the
transferee gives the specified sum to the transferee. At some later point, the
hawaladars exchange goods to balance the account.'45 This is a method in
which money can be transferred without currency ever having to cross national
borders. The system also lacks written records since personal contacts are
relied on and hawaladars operate trusting one another. Because of the lack of
140. Himamauli Das, The United States Sanctions Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001:
A Synopsis of Remarks at the NESL Rogue Regimes Conference, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 943,950 (2002). The
sanction against the Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan was Executive Order 13129, Exec. Order No.
13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (July 7, 1999).
141. Das, supra note 140, at 951-52. The U.N. Security Council actions against the Taliban are:
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19,
2000).
142. Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas,
15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3, 13-15 (2002).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (Baldwin adds that the hawala system is like a "Western Union without the high tech gear
and exorbitant transfer fees").
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records in hawala and its reliance on personal knowledge and trust, it is an
incredibly difficult system for investigators to crack, even when investigators
know where it exists, such as in the "hawala triangle" of Dubai, Pakistan, and
India. 4 6
Regional trade sanctions could disrupt areas known to engage in terrorist-
related, cross-border hawala money transfers by simply prohibiting the trade
in goods from those areas, thus removing a means of transferring money
between hawaladars.'47 Regional sanctions definitely would not eliminate
altogether the transfer of funds to terrorists by hawala, but regional sanctions
may make using trade in goods a difficult substitute for the transfer of more
easily traceable cash.'48 Moreover, imposing regional sanctions in order to
combat unsavory uses of hawala would bring greater public awareness of this
still relatively unknown practice, which could place more scrutiny on suspected
terrorism-related hawala dealings.'49
2. Effective for International Relations
Regional trade sanctions may perhaps be most beneficial in how they
could improve trade relations between countries and provide more courses of
action for times when sanctions are desirable. The decision to impose trade
sanctions is usually controversial with many points of view, not least because
conventional trade sanctions-sanctions imposed on an entire country-
adversely affect various third parties, 5 ' although sanctions are viewed as the
more humane and less politically controversial alternative to the heavy
bluntness of armed military conflict for resolving international disputes.' 5 ' If
sanctions are levied against an entire developing country, however, the impact
on the people in the country who do not have any role in why the sanctions
146. Id., at 15-17.
147. Baldwin, supra note 142.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. For the controversy over the Helms-Burton Act on third parties see, e.g., Schloemann and
Ohlhoff, supra note 2 1; for the effect sanctions against Iraq had on that country's civilian population, see
Henshaw, supra note 71.
151. See JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (Westview Press, Inc.
& Mansell Publishing Ltd 1989); Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 303 (1987). It has been suggested that economic and trade sanctions may
address the root causes of terrorism far more effectively than military intervention. See, e.g., Sean D.
Murphy, International Law, the United States, and the Non-Military 'War' Against Terrorism, 14 Eur. J.
INT'L L. 347 (2003). The United Nations Security Council has long used sanctions instead of military
intervention in response to terrorism. See, e.g., sanctions imposed on Libya for failing to surrender two
Libyan nationals suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 104, S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31,
1992) and S.C. Res. 883, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (Nov. 11. 1993).
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were imposed in the first place may disproportionately suffer, such as how the
sanctions against Haiti actually enriched the Haitian government because the
government profited off of the contraband economy at the expense of the mass
populace."' Sanctions resulting in mass poverty lead to humanitarian crises
and possible fertile breeding ground for ideological and religious extremist
terrorism, whereas economic growth and a rise in population-wide prosperity
are powerful factors that diminish the appeal of ideological terrorism.
5 3
Indeed, an expansion of free trade-the very opposite of trade sanctions-in
order to encourage economic growth in developing countries is a policy advo-
cated to counteract the conditions that foster terrorism.'54
Regional sanctions provide a way to hinder the economic activity of
terrorist organizations while also mitigating as much as possible the unintended
consequences of impoverishing a large portion of a nation's population. By
confining the area imposed with sanctions, regional sanctions are ethically more
justifiable for not causing nation-wide humanitarian crises. Regional sanctions
are also strategically smarter by not contributing to conditions friendly to the
breeding of terrorist ideology.
Regional sanctions, unfortunately, still may impose harsh economic condi-
tions on innocent populations who live near terrorist base camps. Considering
the close proximity such populations are to terrorist ideology and propaganda,
it is not unreasonable to conclude that, suffering from sanctions, such people
may be more disposed to assist terrorist organizations, thus aggrandizing the
problem of terrorism. Regional sanctions, however, at least limit imposed
economic hardship as much as possible, and consequently limit the pool of
potential people who may feel more inclined to ally with terrorists in response
to the effects of sanctions. Additionally, sanctions may not influence the
allegiance of those who happen to live near a terrorist base of operations and
who consequently feel oppressed by the local terrorist group. For example, the
terrorist organizations in Colombia, FARC, AUC, and ELN, are known for
brutally terrorizing those who live under their rule.'55 Also, the Shining Path
of Peru is known for its inhumane actions against locals.'56 Regional sanctions
152. Cann, supra note 10, at 466.
153. Fandl, supra note 72, at 609 (emphasizing that "Eradicating poverty is the single most potent
solution to the problem of terrorism.").
154. See Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror With Trade, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35;
Brink Lindsey, The Trade Front: Combating Terrorism with Open Markets, TRADE POLY'S ANALYSIS no.
24 (Aug. 5, 2003).
155. See, e.g., Julia E. Sweig, What Kind of War for Colombia?, FOREIGN AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2002, at
122.
156. See Ravi Nair, Confronting the Violence Committed by Armed Opposition Groups, 1 YALE
HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 1 (1998) (assessing the difficulties in countering human rights violations committed
by non-governmental armed groups against the populations that the groups are based in).
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have the possibility of breaking local population dependencies on the "terror
economy," which may be beneficial for such local populations in the long term
as such populations reintegrate with the mainstream economy, even if short
term consequences might be economically painful.157
By only focusing on regions hiding terrorist organizations and attempting
not to impose harsh economic conditions on populations in other areas, regional
sanctions may appear less hostile on the whole than an entire nation being
sanctioned. Additionally, regional sanctions might dispel many of the
suspicions that governments often possess when sanctions are imposed on them
in the name of national security, especially since national security has not been
a well-defined concept, and arguably an elastic concept. Indeed, developing
nations tend to view Article XXI sanctions as nothing more than political acts
expressive of a wealthier country's foreign policy and economic interests, with
little regard for real national security concerns.' Regional sanctions would
encourage a greater degree of transparency because regional sanctions are by
their nature more geographically precise, consequently leaving less room for
speculation as to ulterior motives for the imposition of sanctions. Reducing
cynicism for Article XXI sanctions ought to be a high priority for Western
nations since trust between the West and the developing world is critical in the
fight against terrorism, which is evident by the increased multilateral efforts to
confront terrorism, as represented by recent counter-terrorism activities by such
diverse regional organizations as the ASEAN, 5 9 the OAS, 60 the APEC,' 6' and
the E.U.
162
Unfortunately, the developing world has observed in the past what has
appeared to be hypocrisy in the application of purported national security trade
sanctions. For instance, the U.S. imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan after
both countries detonated nuclear tests, but agriculture and food were exempted
from the sanctions in order to satisfy important constituencies in the U.S.1
63
Also, the U.S. has given inconsistent treatment between China, which was
given Normal Trade Relations status,"6 and Cuba, which has been subjected to
157. Napoleoni, supra note 55, at 109-10 (presenting the harsh suffering of local populations that
become dependent on a "terror economy" imposed by locally dominant non-state terrorist organizations).
158. Cann, supra note 10, at 419-20.
159. ASEAN, supra note 45.
160. See supra note 46.
161. See supra note 42.
162. Fuller, supra note 44.
163. Cann, supra note 10, at 451.
164. Normal Trade Relations for the People's Republic of China, Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114 Stat.
880 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. & 22 U.S.C.) (authorizing the President of the
United States to approve China's entry into the WTO).
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harsh trade and investment sanctions under the rationale that Cuba is a security
threat and human rights violator.'65 Cuba may very well be a gross violator of
human rights, and the Caribbean communist country certainly has contributed
to state-sponsored terrorism in the past,'6 6 but there does appear to be double
standards in treating China vastly differently from Cuba considering China's
less-than-reputable human rights record and past support of secretive North
Korea. Because of such inconsistencies in employing national security sanc-
tions, developing countries tend to be wary of Article XXI sanctions.
167
To overcome this cynicism and win back the confidence and trust of
developing countries, it is imperative for the West to utilize Article XXI
sanctions honestly and with a clear purpose. Regional sanctions have the
advantage of conveying more clearly the rationale for the sanction. Covering
a more geographically limited area than conventional sanctions, regional
sanctions would not shut out as much trade as conventional sanctions, thus
offering fewer opportunities for a target nation to speculate that protectionism
may have been an ulterior motive in imposing sanctions.
Not only could regional sanctions reduce skepticism from developing
countries of Article XXI sanctions, but in some cases governments may
willingly cooperate with the prospect of having sanctions imposed on a region
of the country that is under the influence of terrorist organizations. Currently,
the government of Colombia cooperates with the U.S. government in fighting
against the left-wing narco-terrorist and rebel group FARC that operates in
Colombia and in fact controls significant territory within Colombia's borders.'68
Likewise, the U.S. has worked with the government of Pakistan in order to
search for al-Qaeda and Taliban encampments in the remote provinces of
Pakistan. 169 The Pakistani government, indeed, imposed economic sanctions on
its own north-west region in order to counteract non-state terrorism. 170 It is not
too inconceivable to think that governments like Colombia and Pakistan, which
suffer from certain areas being controlled by terrorist organizations, might
cooperate rather willingly to cut off trade to and from the terrorist controlled
areas. With the assistance of major trading partners imposing sanctions on the
165. For a summary of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 imposed against Cuba, see Schloemann and
Olhoff, supra note 21, at 427-30.
166. LAQUEUR, supra note 73, at 180-81.
167. Cann, supra note 10, at 450-51.
168. Andy Webb-Vidal, FARCPoisedfor New Battle in Long War, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Apr. 11,
2005, at 2; Marika Lynch, Rebels Say They 're HoldingAmericans; Colombia 's FARCAssails U.S., Demands
Prisoner Exchange, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 2003, at A3.
169. David Johnston, Raid on Feb. 13 Smoothed Way in al-Qaeda Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,2003,
at Al.
170. Farhan Bokhari, Pakistan Lifts North-West Region Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Asia ed.), Sept. 27,
2004, at 2.
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terrorist-controlled areas, it might make the attempt to financially isolate a sub-
national region far more successful than if a weak central government tried to
on its own control the trade of a province ruled by terrorists. Consequently,
regional sanctions may actually be seen by some governments that have
difficulty maintaining authority over terrorist controlled regions as a welcome
tool.
C. Possible Criticisms of Targeted Sanctions
1. Lack of Relevance and Effectiveness
In spite of the advantages that regional sanctions may offer, there exist a
number of possible objections to such a sanction scheme. One criticism might
be concerning the relevance of analyzing Article XXI. Because of the present
ambiguity of Article XXI,'71 the notion of justifying regional sanctions based
on Article XXI may be irrelevant, since many WTO member states might be
hesitant to justify trade sanctions on the wording of an unpredictable Article
XXI, especially for unorthodox regional sanctions.' 72 Unwillingness on the part
of nations to refer to Article XXI for sanctions would render the issue moot.
Nonetheless, the strength of the WTO lies in its relatively formalized structure,
at least in comparison to its far more informal predecessor GATT, which
suggests that respect for its rules-based procedure is a large part of the WTO's
appeal, as evident in its significant case load.'7 3 Thus, it is important for the
sake of formalized rules to explore the possible interpretations and applications
of GATT articles, including Article XXI.
A perceived lack of effectiveness in curbing terrorist financing may also
raise questions of relevance in analyzing regional sanctions. The Kimberley
Certification Scheme, for example, has come under criticism from some NGOs
for the Scheme's absence of "regular independent monitoring."' 74 Naturally,
regional sanctions might also be subjected to similar criticism, being measures
imposed by nation states without necessarily any input or monitoring from
independent sources. Although criticism of the Kimberley Certification
Scheme may be relevant to regional sanctions because of their similarity,
criticism on the grounds of lack of independent oversight can be applied to any
171. See generally supra note 40.
172. "Even developed countries, often on the receiving end of expansive U.S. "national security"
measures, are likely to resist contorting the language of article XXI toj ustify even "smart" sanctions measures
for fear that damaging precedent will be established." Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible
Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 YALE HMN. RTS. DEV. L.J. 1, 48 (2002).
173. See Bacchus, supra note 31.
174. Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature ofLaw,
24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 835, 866 (2003).
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form of government imposed sanctions, including conventional state-to-state
sanctions. Indeed, the absence of NGOs in measuring the effectiveness of
sanctions is a fault that would be hardly unique to regional sanctions.
2. The Problem of Standing
A possible procedural issue that regional sanctions raise is the difficulty
in understanding the applicability of standing. The first question is whether a
terrorism-related sanction imposed on a sub-national area of another WTO
member state would even qualify as a proper Article XXI sanction. Article
XXI was drafted explicitly to protect the security and sovereignty of states.175
Of course it is reasonable to speculate that the drafters foresaw national security
threats from non-state origins, but it may be too much to think that anything
other than member states would be targets under Article XXI. After all, GATT
only treats member states as parties to the GATT framework, which means only
member states may participate in WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings.
This might seem to suggest that only sanctions against another member state are
relevant for GATT exceptions, including the national security exception of
Article XXI. A regional sanctions scheme as suggested by this Paper, however,
conceptually fits into the mold of conventional sanctions against states, with
only the geographical scope of the sanction being the difference from
conventional sanctions.
From a practical point of view, it is difficult to imagine that the WTO
would refuse to hear a complaint from a member state about how it alleges it
is an unjust victim of an Article XXI sanction solely because the sanction does
not cover 100 percent of the member state's territory.176 If the WTO were to
refuse to hear a complaint based on such rationale, then a risk-averse nation
wanting to impose sanctions without having to defend the sanctions would
simply always leave a small percentage of the target nation's territory sanction-
free. This would be an absurd loophole to avoid WTO panel reviews. There-
fore, member states likely would have standing to challenge a sanction that does
not completely cover the member state's territory.
Additionally, parallels may be drawn between targeted sanctions and
limited wars or otherwise known as imperfect wars-wars conducted between
two countries but with restraint and typically with limited political goals, such
as the U.S.'s involvement in Kosovo and Serbia.177 This is not to suggest that
175. See Akande & Williams, supra note 13.
176. For the moment, please set aside other possible reasons a WTO panel may not review the
complaint, including deference to a nation imposing Article XXI. For a summary of varying opinions on this
issue, see supra note 40.
177. Michael Hahn, The Conflict in Kosovo: A Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351, 2361-62
(2001).
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trade sanctions are anything like war, but only that both may be utilized in a
geographically limited fashion. Since imperfect or limited restrictions are
recognized in the conduct of warfare, certainly the more benign retaliation of
sanctions can be used in a limited or imperfect way, especially if very specific
political goals are the object, such as financially crippling terrorist organiza-
tions.
A far more difficult potential problem of regional sanctions is to determine
who has standing to bring a complaint to the WTO if a member state actually
welcomes sanctions on a certain region within its borders. Do private
individuals from the region suffering targeted sanctions have standing to bring
a complaint to the WTO if the national government supports the sanctions? For
example, assuming the Colombian government would welcome regional trade
sanctions against FARC-held territory, would private individuals in FARC-held
territories be permitted to challenge the sanctions to the WTO panel? The
WTO dispute settlement process has been criticized from those who feel that
NGOs ought to play a larger role in dispute settlement by being able to file
amicus briefs in panel and Appellate Body hearings. I"' Many member states,
however, adamantly expressed concern when the Appellate Body in the
EC-Asbestos case adopted an ad hoc procedure for the filing of amicus curiae
briefs from non-state interests, since WTO dispute resolution procedures do not
explicitly provide for the possibility for unsolicited amicus curiae briefs.179 As
a result, the Appellate Body was informed to exercise extreme caution for using
amicus curiae briefs in the future. 18 ° Institutional inertia also tends to keep out
new plans for representation of non-members at WTO panels.'
8
'
Nonetheless, the trend in the world seems to be moving towards more
individualized remedies in intergovernmental actions. Intellectual property
rights are already recognized by the WTO as a private right.8 2 Human rights
as called for in the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights grant private rights.i"3 In a very limited
fashion, the U.N. Security Council permits individuals in exceptional cases to
178. See Charnovitz and Bradlow, supra note 67.
179. Complaint against EC, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Prohibition ofAsbestos
andAsbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135 (May 28, 1998); Peter Van den Bossche, The WTO Dispute
Settlement System andArab andlslamic Countries, in STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH ARAB AND ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES THROUGH INT'L L. 192-93 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Weiler, supra note 69.
182. Thomas Cottier, Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.
111, 120 (2002).
183. Id.
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appeal U.N. sanctions.'84 Along with this trend, one could reasonably assert
that individuals who reside in an area affected by regional sanctions and whose
national government approves of such sanctions ought to be recognized as
having standing in the WTO as a matter of equity. Otherwise, individuals in the
affected areas would have no effective remedy. Admittedly, however, this in
itself is not sufficient reason to grant such affected individuals standing-
individuals today are affected by other countries' trade regulations, but only
member states may bring complaints forward to the WTO, which essentially
leaves private individuals today at the discretion of their government. Perhaps
this question of standing is not so difficult after all, especially if it is compared
to a conventional trade regulations, e.g. anti-dumping rules, in which an
industry requests the government to reply to an alleged violation, requiring the
government to determine what course of action, if any, to take."8 5
3. National Treatment
Regional sanctions would certainly bring about a difference in treatment
within the same country between those goods that are under sanction and those
that are not. If a national government is perceived as complicit with this kind
of outside difference in treatment, it may raise questions of legality under the
GATT. Namely, would individuals residing in an area affected by regional
sanctions be able to bring a complaint alleging violation of national treatment
if the national government seems supportive of the targeted sanctions? The
underlying notion of national treatment is that foreign and domestic products
are treated equally; a fundamental principle of the GATT/WTO regime.'86
With regional sanctions, though, the difference in treatment would not be
between imported products and domestic products, but rather between domestic
products from different regions of the same home country. Moreover, national
treatment requires a member state not to treat like products-between imported
and domestic products--differently in its own territory. With regional sanc-
tions, however, the sanctioning government-the foreign government-would
be the one treating sub-national regions abroad differently. Even if the
184. See S.C. Res. 1521, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (Dec. 22, 2003). The Committee established
pursuant to Res. 1521 permits individuals in exceptional cases to appeal travel sanctions as authorized by
Res. 1521. Procedures for Maintaining and Updating the List of Persons Subject to Travel Restrictions
Pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003), Mar. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.un.orgDocs/sc/committees/Liberia3/152 Itbl.proc.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
185. It cannot be overstated, however, that governments sometimes willingly serve as mere nominal
parties to WTO disputes, with non-state actors, i.e. affected domestic industries, being the real interested
parties. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Post-Doha Trade Agenda: Questions about Constituents, Competence, and
Coherence, in THE WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE 79 (2003).
186. GATT, supra note 5, art. 3.
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subjected area's national government were to consent to regional sanctions, this
could only be regarded as a passive form of acceptance rather than official
measures of enactment, such as regulations, laws, or taxes that intend to treat
like products differently.
An analysis of possible objections to regional sanctions suggest that there
may be little problem in employing regional sanctions. Questions like standing
for non-member states are controversial, however, and will have to evolve
between those who wish to keep the WTO dispute resolution process in the
hands of states and those who wish to expand it. This Paper will not come to
a conclusion on that question, which is a very large topic in and of itself.
Regardless of the position one adopts, though, regional sanctions might still be
permitted because even in conventional sanctions governments have the right
to choose whether or not to challenge the sanctions, and choose not to do so
over the requests of private entities within the government's territory.
Likewise, national treatment probably ought not to be an issue in deciding
the legality of regional sanctions. Because imported products and domestic like
products would not be treated differently by the nation receiving sanctions, it
would not be a case of national treatment as understood in the traditional sense.
Consequently, after assessing possible criticisms of regional sanctions using the
same lines of analysis for judging the legitimacy of conventional sanctions,
regional sanctions still appear to be a plausible option within the GATT/WTO
framework.
IV. CONCLUSION
Questions about regional sanctions are not mere academic inquiries into
the theoretical limits of Article XXI, but rather reflect an acknowledgment that
trade sanctions may increasingly need alternative models in order to adapt to
a new age of international, non-state sponsored terrorism. Terrorist organiza-
tions, like many other organizations, have become globalized, shedding their
nation-state identities. The conventional method of imposing sanctions on an
entire nation, consequently, may be ineffective in counteracting non-state
threats. Sanctions, if they are to be used-arguably instrumental in disrupting
funds for terrorism and more benign than military intervention--ought to reflect
the changing nature of terrorism. Just as terrorist organizations have increasing-
ly not allowed formal national boundaries to define their scope of activities,
neither should sanctions.
Furthermore, an inquiry into the possible forms of Article XXI sanctions
ought to be raised in order to ensure compliance with the WTO framework. It
may be tempting for a nation that does impose regional sanctions on another
WTO member state to deny the applicability of Article XXI, should the target
nation question the legitimacy of the sanction to the WTO. This Paper, though,
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attempts to present the view that regional sanctions are indeed covered under
Article XXI and are permitted under Article XXI. Thus, assuming the WTO
panel has the authority to review Article XXI sanctions, regional sanctions in
the name of national security ought to be reviewable by the WTO.
The applicability of the GATT articles is a critical issue for examining
possible criticisms of regional sanctions, such as perceived problems with
standing and perceived problems of national treatment. Regional sanctions
most likely can survive such critiques, however. Overall, regional sanctions
should not have any more difficulties in overcoming these questions than
conventional sanctions.
Regional sanctions offer a pragmatic and possibly more humanitarian
method of imposing trade sanctions. Also, regional sanctions attempt to find
the balance between expanding free trade for increased prosperity, a tool for
fighting off the influences of terrorist ideology, and placing pressure on the
financial resources of terrorist organizations. For these extraordinarily
important policy reasons, regional sanctions ought to be seriously considered
as a legitimate alternative within the WTO/GATT framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the immediate aftermath of 9-11 illustrated, war-and the threat of
war-brings people in a society closer together as they look for security. But
war also produces an underlying and deeply disturbing sense of insecurity.
Hence, one of the most important ideas to be defined for the twenty-first
century is the notion of "war." For too ready an application of the term "war"
to conflicts can bring unwanted adverse effects, whereas the reluctance to call
conflicts "wars" undermines the unity of purpose which the perspective of
warfare brings to a threatened society.
Any viable definition of warfare today must address the exigencies of the
fight against international terrorism. Now, one military response to terrorism
can be humanitarian intervention. And one military means of supporting
humanitarian intervention can be the employment of private military companies
(PMCs). Another suggested method for combating radical terrorism during
warfare is the use of torture. So how are these kinds of issues which are
prominent in the legal and public policy debates--combating terrorism, torture,
humanitarian intervention and PMCs-relevant to how we define war in the
twenty-first century?
* Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Chapman University and Life Member, Clare
Hall, Cambridge University. I am grateful to Christa Lorenz and Nancy Gregory for their invaluable help in
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H. CATEGORIZING TYPES OF WAR
The great British war historian John Keegan identifies war as "collective
killing for some collective purpose."' The collective nature of the killing points
to the difference between police actions and military actions, and the collective
nature of the purpose points to the difference between the skirmishes of
adventurism and the organized violence of military operations. However, the
state of war may not involve the active implementation of killing. This is why
the long stand off between the United States and the Soviet Union (and the
allies of each) was reasonably termed the "Cold War." Moreover, there are
many different types of wars. There are state-to-state conflicts-or collections
of states versus collections of states-which are the focus of Sun Tzu's The Art
of War, Clausewitz's On War, and Western Just War Theory.2 But, for
example, there are also civil wars, such as the Russian or Chinese revolutions;
colonial wars against indigenous peoples, such as the so-called "American
Indian wars" or the British Zulu wars in South Africa3 ; and wars between states
and non-state actors, such as the Boer War. As we begin the twenty-first
century, one relatively new form of warfare not easily assimilated to the old
categories is military humanitarian intervention. And importantly for the
present discussion, there is the "war on international terrorism," a putative form
of warfare which involves non-state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, that transcend
state boundaries. This last form of warfare has elements of guerilla warfare but
is actually very different from inner state guerilla warfare like that during the
Boer War or the Philippine-American War in the early part of the twentieth
century.
Compounding the fundamental complexity of the term "war," we currently
face a bewildering proliferation of the use of "war" to describe a wide range of
struggles: e.g. the current "War in Iraq," "guerilla war," "religious war," the
"War on Terrorism," the "War on Cancer," the "War on Drugs," and the "War
on Poverty." A quick Google search reveals some of the current darlings of
political groups: e.g. the "Taliban War on Women," "Rupert Murdoch's War
on Journalism," the "Republican War on Science," and the "War on
Christmas." My own personal favorites are the fight for gun rights, ironically
named the "War on Guns," and best of all, the self-reflective "War on Hype."
As the last named "War on Hype" illustrates, there clearly are overblown
and misleading contemporary uses of the term "war." So it is important to keep
1. JOHN KEEGAN, WAR AND OUR WORLD 72 (Vintage Books 2001) (1998).
2. See SUNTzu, THEARTOF WAR (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1963); CARL VON CLAUSEWTTZ, ON
WAR (Col. J.J. Graham trans., 1976).
3. However it is not clear, for example, that the genocide conducted by Australian European
settlers against the aboriginal peoples of Australia and Tasmania was a warper se.
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in mind at least five different, though not mutually exclusive, ways to use this
potent term, listed here in descending order of strength:
1) The act of waging military conflict against a clearly designated
enemy. Here, we would place the American Civil War, the
Philippine-American War, the two World Wars, and the Korean War.
2) The legal state produced by a declaration of war against a
designated enemy. While WWI and WWII fit this category, the
Korean War, which was designated a "police action," and the so-
called 1899 "insurrection" in the Philippines do not.
3) The profession of warmaking. Prolonged warfare or the
prospect of war leads organized states and movements to institute
military training and develop a professional military class. Here we
might ask whether the training given to members of private military
companies rises to the level of the military professionalism of
warmaking.
4) A campaign to terminate a destructive condition in society.
Struggles which fit this category are the "War on Terror," the "War
on Drugs," and the "War on Poverty."
5) strenuous struggle between competing groups. Here we have
"price wars," "culture wars," and the ineptly named "Republican War
on Science."
Category I-the act of waging military conflict-is the foundational
category from which the other uses of "war" are derivative. So while category
I is a primary use of "war," categories II and III-i.e., the legal status of war
and the profession of warmaking-derive their meaning from the more
fundamental state of actual military conflict. Category IV---campaigns to end
destructive conditions in society-is a secondary or parasitic sense of "war,"
which is not primarily military. Category V is also secondary and is the most
parasitic of the usages. Thus, when we ask the question "Are we at war?" vis-
6-vis the struggle against international terrorism, while this struggle clearly
rises above category V and at least fits category IV, the question is whether it
fits categories I and II. A fundamental problem with the public discussion of
the fight against international terrorism is the tendency to confuse the
attenuated senses of "war" in category IV and even V, with the robust and
fundamental sense of war in categories I and II.
II. THE POTENCY OF THE TERM "WAR"
"War" is a steamer trunk of a term, laden with complex conceptual
baggage and enormous emotional impact. Few terms rise to this emotive level:
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perhaps "death," "murder," and "evil" do so. For some, such as Helmuth von
Moltke, category I war is positive: "[e]verlasting peace is a dream, and not
even a pleasant one; and war is a necessary part of God's arrangement of the
world ... [w]ithout war, the world would deteriorate into materialism."4
More typically, military professionals have a negative view of category I
war. As Robert E. Lee said after the Battle of Fredericksburg, "It is well that
war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."5 And speaking from the
northern side of the horrific American conflict, William Tecumseh Sherman
said in a post-war speech in 1880, "There is many a boy here today who looks
on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all hell."6
The very use of the term "war" to describe a struggle marshals deep
passions and potentially strong commitments. These deep passions tend to
exaggerate and prolong category I war and, as Sun Tzu observes in his Art of
War, "there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited
... War is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are themselves
consumed by them."7 Thus it is crucial to carefully distinguish category I war
from the derivative senses of "war," so that the terrible things which are
inevitably done to human beings during warfare are not in part induced by a
tragically misleading use of this powerfulterm.
General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote a small
volume Warfighting: The U.S. Marine Corps Book of Strategy, which became
official doctrine for the Corps in 1989.8 He opens with this definition of war:
War is a state of hostilities that exists between or among nations,
characterized by the use of military force. The essence of war is a
violent clash between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable
wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.., the object of war is
to impose our will on our enemy. The means to that end is the
organized application or threat of violence by military force.9
This identifies many wars in the sense of category I, though I think this
pre-9/11 description needs to be expanded to include military hostilities
between or among both state and non-state actors. The object of war is to
4. Letter from Helmuth von Moltke to Dr. J.K. Bluntshli (Dec. 11, 1880), in DANIEL HUGHES,
MOLTKE ON THE ART OF WAR: SELECTED WRITINGS 22 (1993).
5. Roy BLOUNT, JR., ROBERT E. LEE 1 (2003).
6. William Sherman, Speech at Columbus, Ohio (Aug. 11, 1880), in LLOYD LEWIS, SHERMAN:
FIGHTING PROPHET 636 (1932).
7. SUN Tzu, supra note 2, at 73.
8. See generally A.M. GRAY, WARFIGHTING; THE U.S. MARINE CORPS BOOK OF STRATEGY
(1994).
9. Id. at 3.
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impose one's will; the further object of just war is imposing one's will for
peace. (As Aristotle said in an early intimation of Just War Theory, "[w]e
make war that we may live in peace.")'0
Now, General Gray goes on to point out that "disorder is an integral
characteristic of war [itself]; we can never eliminate it."" He concludes that
War is among the greatest horrors known to mankind; it should never
be romanticized ... violence is an essential element of war, and its
immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and suffering. 2
Thus, the most extreme social means of settling disputes-warfare-has
the curious property of at least suspending if not destroying the very state of
security and peace which is war's raison d'etre. It is especially important to
note in the current world situation that insecurity results from war notjust in the
land where active combat occurs, but even in the non-war-zone homeland of
distant combatants. As U.S. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has said,
"without question, the government's authority to engage in conduct that
infringes civil liberty is greatest in the time of declared war,"' 3 and this is true
whether the "declared war" is declared in the legal sense of category II or in a
more generalized declaration like the "War on Terror."
IV. WAR VERSUS PEACE
We see, then, that "war" is a contrast term, only fully explicable in the
context of the character of the intended peace. Analyzing this further, consider
the restrictive view of peace which Oliver O'Donovan presents in The Just War
Revisited.'4 He says that "the peace which any conflict aims at is still
indeterminate, known only negatively as the correction of the grave injustice
that afforded the cause."15 But surely O'Donovan is mistaken. Achieving the
absence of war-negative peace--often simply perpetuates the unjust structures
of the society which caused war in the first place. The goal of war must be
positive peace--or what Immanuel Kant called "perpetual peace"--i.e.,
establishing the conditions for a just society. 6 In Iraq the United States does
not want to simply reproduce the relatively stable prewar Iraqi society sans
10. RICHARD McKEON, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1105 (1941).
11. GRAY, supra note 8, at 10-11.
12. Id. at 14.
13. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAws BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 218(1998).
14. OLIVER O'DoNovAN. THE JUST WAR REVISrrED 59 (2003).
15. Id.
16. BASIC WRITINGS OF KANT 384 (Allen W. Wood ed., 2001).
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Saddam Hussein, but rather correctly sees peace as the establishment of a new
and just social order, even if it is not entirely to the current Administration's
liking.
Consider now a too liberal construal of "war." In Leviathan, Hobbes
postulates a sort of generalized "warfare" of the human condition: "during the
time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called war; and such a war is of every man against every
man.""7 This is not particularly helpful for identifying the primary sense of the
term "war," for it does not distinguish war from other forms of human conflict.
A somewhat better understanding of war can be found in Evolution of War,
Maurice Davie's classic study after the First World War:
The struggle for existence is a process in which a group and nature
are parties . . . each group, besides struggling with nature for its
existence, has to compete with every other group with which it comes
into contact; rivalry and collision of interests appear, and when these
issue in a contest by force, we call it war. 8
That is, in order to have distinctive content, the term "war" should be used to
demarcate a state of society or a type of conflict which is markedly different
than other portions of human existence.
However, one should not think of the "state of war" as an exactly
separable unit of time from two contrasting "states of peace." For two nations
could be in a state of war without actually engaging in warfare, and warfare
might cease between two nations even when there is no legally determined
armistice, so that technically and legally the two nations are still in a state of
war, though they have ceased all warfighting. Hobbes suggests that:
As the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but
in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war
consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 9
While Hobbes' views are infelicitous for identifying war itself, he does
identify the disruptive psychological state which results from war in the sense
of category I, which is quite distinct from the legal sense of war identified in
category II.
17. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1996).
18. MAURICE R. DAVIE, THE EVOLUTION OF WAR: A STUDY OF ITS ROLE IN EARLY SOCIETIES 12
(Dover Publications 2003) (1929).
19. HOBBES, supra note 17, at 85.
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V. WAR AS A FAMILY RESEMBLANCE
Once we have narrowed our primary use of "war" to categories 1-111, all
of which emphasize the essential military nature of war, we still confront a
wide range of types of war. Wars may or may not involve professional armies,
may or may not involve mercenaries or PMCs, may or may not stretch over long
periods with few actual battles (such as the Punic Wars or the 100 Years War),
may or may not be recognized by international law, may or may not be
recognized by national law, may or may not be declared, may involve little
actual combat (such as the Cold War), and might not come to a clear end (such
as the Congolese Wars of the last twenty years). The cessation of war may or
may not be a goal (if not, the war is not just), war may or may not be fought as
a defensive action, war may or may not be fought to take back something stolen
(such as land), war may or may not be fought on religious grounds (such as the
First but not Fourth Crusades), and war may be limited or total. To take only
the latter dichotomy, limited wars push the boundaries of the use of the term
"war." While the U.S. is not currently at war with Iraq, is the U.S. currently "at
war" in Iraq (there was, after all, a presidential declaration that the war is over)?
Or is Japan, with its security deployment in Iraq, "at war" in Iraq? In general,
is humanitarian military action a war?
No one comprehensive set of features is definitive of all warfare in the
category I sense. However, it does not follow that there are no necessary
conditions for "war" or that there are no sufficient conditions which identify
"war." For instance, prolonged military conflict involving collective killing for
a collective purpose is a sufficient condition for "war." On the other hand, it
would seem that there are some necessary conditions for war in the primary
sense of "war." First, military force (and this may include PMCs) must be
involved either by threat or actual use. Second, soldiers must be involved, and
hence war in the sense of category III is involved. Third, the aim of the military
action must be to force a perceived enemy to conform to one's will. And
fourth, the aim must be to defeat the perceived enemy. This last condition is
important, because as soon as a conflict is designated a "war," then it becomes
possible to lose by not defeating the "enemy."
Now, given the fact that there is no definitive set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for "war," this term undoubtedly functions as a "family
resemblance." As Ludwig Wittgenstein famously explains in the Philosophical
Investigations, certain terms function as collectives, as for example, does the
term "game."2 ° There is no one definitive set of features which identifies all
20. LUDWIG WflrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1968).
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games.2 Rather, games share "family resemblances," for just as members of
the same human family do not have the same features, two members of the
family might share one set of features while two other members share another
set of features, even as one member of each of those two pairs form another
pair, sharing other features, creating overlapping sets of shared features.22 So
too, games can have one, two, or many players, games can be physical or
mental, games can have time limits or not, and so on.23 Thus, solitaire, chess,
basketball, and cricket have a family resemblance, as species of games.24 In the
same way, civil wars and colonial wars and world wars share a family
resemblance of the species "war."
VI. PARAMETERS FOR EMPLOYING "WAR"
There are at least four salient parameters for identifying "war" in a clear,
accurate and substantive primary usage. First, this term must be used in a
balanced way which avoids two extremes. On the one hand, if the term is
restricted to a narrow usage applying only to professional armies and nation-
state conflicts, many contemporary conflicts, which are arguably the most
dangerous for our world, would not be treated as wars. On the other hand, if
this term is used in a virtually unrestricted sense to apply e.g., to confrontations
not primarily involving military force, then the dilution of the term will make
it impossible to construct a viable Just War Theory and impossible to articulate
viable international law to condemn, restrict and punish the unjust use of
military force.
Second, it is best to err on the side of caution in applying the term "war"
to a conflict or potential conflict since this emotionally charged term can
unleash forces of fanaticism and disregard for law. As Cicero famously
observed more than two millennia ago: laws are silent in times of war.25 Third,
another reason for caution in labeling any conflict a "war" is that once declared
wars are either won or lost. The attempt to avoid "losing a war" at all cost can
be extraordinarily destructive to a society.
Fourth, once a war is declared, far reaching governmental war powers go
into effect both explicitly and implicitly, subverting the normal mechanisms of
civilized society. As Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke argue in America
Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order:
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. CICERO, PRO MILONE Chapter 11 (1992).
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Neo-conservatives argued-and continue to argue-that military
force is the preferred option responding to foreign challenges. The
neo-conservatives for have actively encouraged the interpretation of
counterterrorism as a war, which mobilizes all national resources and
legitimizes all available means.26
In times of war, the populous rightly places immediate self-preservation
over more nuanced approaches to security. Procedures like torture, which
would normally not be contemplated, are seriously contemplated in public.
People are incarcerated without trial; businesses are forced to change their
trading partners; their merchandising, and even their products; mothers and
fathers willingly give up their sons and daughters to the machinery of death
and; most crucially, others who were once perceived as fellow human beings
often become denigrated as sub-human, through the process I call
"verminification," which has extraordinarily adverse affects on any eventual
peace. Since "war" is importantly defined in terms of the intended peace, the
effect on peace of the methods of warfare should be calculated into what one
is willing to designate a "war."
VII. THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Turning now to the "War on Terror," this is clearly a war in sense IV,
though it is sometimes erroneously characterized as a "clash of cultures" and
thus further categorized as a "war" in sense V. The putative "War on Terror"
is not like typical wars in category I because Western societies are not in fact
generally mobilized against the enemy and the "war" does not require an
acknowledged general sacrifice from society. The question of whether the
"War on Terror" fits category II is a question about the legal status of this
"war." And the extent to which it fits category IH, the science of warmaking,
is in part determined by the degree of military professionalism of the large
numbers of PMC personnel which are engaged.
There are many threats against any modern society-threats to economic
well-being, threats to cultural well-being, threats to security-but only the
gravest and most specific threats to peace itself justifiably call forth the
collective killing for collective purpose which is the horror of war. Generalized
threats of competition, of cultural erosion, or erosion of security, do not merit
the grave social burden of war. General calls to "fight against terrorism" are
not legitimate calls to war, though the struggle against a specific terrorist
system or network which can be identified, and against which there is some
reasonable hope of success, may merit a war response. The general so-called
26. STEFAN HAPLER & JONATHAN CLARKE, AMERICA ALONE: THENEO-CONSERVATIVES AND THE
GLOBAL ORDER 281 (2005).
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"War on Terror" is a counter-terrorism struggle. Like the "War on Drugs," it
is a struggle against a heartless, murderous enemy. International drug lords and
their weapons of cocaine, heroin, etc., have much the same deleterious effects
on society as terrorists with their bombs and guns. The struggle against these
two enemies is not a war in the primary sense of category I, for neither is
principally military.
One way to see this distinction is to step outside the super-heated
American context and look at the struggles of another country. Israel is
constantly struggling with terrorism. Israel has also fought several distinct and
notable wars. It is valuable both conceptually and practically for Israel to be
able to distinguish between the two forms of conflict. Israel's overall counter-
terrorism struggle is not a war in the category I sense.27 The distinguishable Six
Days' War, the Yom Kippur War, and the recent incursion into southern
Lebanon are category I wars. Similarly, the initial 2003 second war with Iraq
was a category I war, while the overall counter-terrorism struggle against Al-
Qaeda is a war in the derivative sense of category IV.
In political society, the quest for truth is always too easily set aside in the
quest for rhetorical effect, and whenever this happens, it can be a dangerous
time for a nation. In our country, every time the current Administration
declares that the nation is at war, and every time the media blithely puts the
words "War on Terror" on the nation's television screens, the deep fears,
animosities and even hatred which this term can illicit are tapped. Importantly,
this also posits a war which can be won or lost, rather than a struggle with
degrees of success. It is worth keeping in mind Sun Tzu's admonition some
2500 years ago: "War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark
upon it without due reflection. ,28
27. I should note that my friend the esteemed Israeli ethicist Asa Kasher does not agree with me
about this.
28. SUN TZU, supra note 2, at 63.
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1. ABSTRACT
This article deals with the "new" terrorism, responses to it by the Bush
administration, the impact of those policies on domestic and global security,
and concludes with some brief recommendations for alternative approaches to
national and global security.
The concept of "timing" plays an important role here as one objective of
the article, as the 2006 midterm and 2008 presidential elections approach, is to
stimulate reflection and debate among Americans with regard to post-9/11
security and, in the process, reinforce a "tipping point" trajectory away from
public support for President Bush's policies toward more constructive
alternatives.
* Dennis J.D. Sandole is Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at the
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University. A founder-member of
ICAR, he received his Ph.D. from the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland (1979) and worked with
conflict resolution pioneer Professor John W. Burton at University College, University of London before both
moved on to ICAR during the early 1980s. His most recent publication is CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITY OF
CONFLICT: DEALING WITH VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICTS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (1999) and his new
book, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD: THE OSCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION, will be
published in early 2007.
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II. INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL AND GLOBAL SETTING
Significant change has occurred in global affairs over the past fifteen
years. The Cold War between the democratic West and communist East, with
its specter of thermonuclear annihilation, came to an end (at least in public
consciousness and fears);' the Soviet Union collapsed into fifteen successor
republics, three of which (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) have entered both the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU); the
Warsaw Pact receded into history; communist regimes in Eastern and Central
Europe have been transformed into democratizing states, most of which (the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) have achieved
NATO and EU membership. Indeed, somewhat presciently, the current U.S.
president's father George H.W. Bush had earlier declared that, with the end of
the Cold War, we had entered into a "New World Order."2
So it seemed until the most recent Balkan wars began with the implosion
of former Yugoslavia in late June 1991, consuming most of the 1990s and tens
of thousands of human lives, with the return of genocide to Europe for the first
time since the end of World War II. But the return of genocide to Europe-
catastrophic and shocking though it was-could not compare to what occurred
in the "Switzerland of Africa"--Rwanda--during the last three weeks of April
1994, when 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered at the low
technology level of the panga knife.3 In Bosnia, Rwanda was followed a year
later by Srebrenica, whose killing fields are still, 11 years later, yielding the
bodies of the nearly 10,000 Muslim boys and men slaughtered there by Serb
forces in July 1995. 4
1. Stephen F. Cohen, The New American Cold War, THE NATION, July 10, 2006, available at
www.thenation.com/doc/200607 10/cohen (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
2. George H.W. Bush, Former President of the U.S., Address to Joint Session of Congress and the
Nation: Toward a New World Order (Sept. 11, 1990), available at www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/
bushsr.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
3. See Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan
Tragedy Happen, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept., 2001 at 84; Samantha Power, A Hero of Our Time, THE
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 18, 2004 at 8. See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM
HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002); ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL:
THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004).
4. See JAN WILLEM HONIG AND NORBERT BOTH, SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR CRIME 4
(1996). See generally D. ROHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S WORST
MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR 11 (1997).
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Ill. ADVENT OF THE "NEW" TERRORISM
Developments in the Balkans between 1992 and 2001, with their "clash-of-
civilizations" overtones, helped set the stage for what was still to come.' While
the world was preoccupied with violent conflict in Bosnia and elsewhere,
elements of the "new" terrorism were being manifested in the Middle East and,
most importantly, in the United States and Europe as well. The World Trade
Center in New York City was first bombed in 1993; U.S. military personnel
were killed at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996; a mujahedeen supported
by the U.S. during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Osama
bin Laden-a wealthy Saudi and founder ofAl Qaeda-issued the first of his
fatwa against the U.S. and Americans in general in 1996, in part because the
West had allowed Serbs to slaughter Bosnian Muslims with impunity for three
years; the U.S. embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)
were blown up in 1998; and in 2000, the USS Cole was attacked in Aden
(Yemen).
And then, on September 11,2001, one month following a peace agreement
negotiated by the EU and NATO between ethnic Albanians and the
Government of Macedonia in former Yugoslavia (the "Orhrid Agreement"),
nineteen young Arab men-fifteen of whom were Saudis and all of whom were
Wahhabist (Salaf) Muslims-hijacked with boxcutters four American
passenger-filled airliners in the U.S., turning them into cruise missiles with
devastating effect against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the
process, they killed themselves and some 3000 people, plus ushered in the
"new" terrorism and forever changed the world into something closely
resembling a Hobbesian "state of nature."6
The question arises: what is new about the "new" terrorism? Although
terrorism is as old as humankind itself,7 the attacks of 9/11 and others cited
above are "new" for the following reasons:'
5. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 22.
See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996).
6. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.M. Dent 1950) (1651).
7. See Adina Friedman, Terrorism in Context, in TERRORISM: CONCEPTS, CAUSES, AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution ed., 2002); Everett L. Wheeler, Terrorism and
Military Theory: A Historical Perspective, in TERRORISM RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY (Clark McCauley
ed., 1991).
8. Dennis J.D. Sandole, The 'New' Terrorism: Causes, Conditions and Conflict Resolution,
VIENNA JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 2004, at 1.
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1) They tend to be "catastrophic," 9 "causing the deaths of hundreds
or thousands of innocent victims."'" For example, five years
after 9/11 (and one year after the London Transport bombings),
Paul Stephenson, London Metropolitan Police Deputy
Commissioner, characterized a foiled attempt to blow up ten
U.S.-bound airlines during the height of the summer season as,
"an extraordinarily serious plot and... attempt to commit mass
murder on an unimaginable scale;""
2) They are launched from within the territory and/or against the
civilian populations and symbols of former or current
imperialist ("Crusader') countries; 2
3) "They tend to be carried out by young Muslims, usually males,
prepared to give up their lives in the execution of their acts of
violence." 3
Clearly, there is a need to study the "new" terrorism because it must be
stopped, but "How?" remains the enduring question.'4 The historically
dominant paradigm in International Relations, Realpolitik (or Machtpolitik)
would suggest that we stop the new terrorism by pursuing, capturing and/or
killing its perpetrators: this is what the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been
doing in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. 5 A major alternative paradigm,
Idealpolitik, suggests that in order to stop the new terrorism, we must also know
what makes it "tick": this very few state actors attempt to do.16
Observing U.S. President Bush during his first term, there seems to have
been a tendency for him to reflect the first option, with the Europeans reflecting
the second. In his second term, President Bush and the Europeans may have
been moving toward a "paradigmatic convergence" of sorts, facilitated by
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. However, as recently evident at the G-8
9. DAVID A. HAMBURG, No MORE KILLING FIELDS: PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT 252 (2002).
10. Sandole, supra note 8, at 1.
11. Danica Kirka, British Police Thwart Aircraft Bomb Plot, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10,
2006, available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/printer_081006J.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2006);
Jennifer Quinn, British: Thwarted Plot Involved 10 Jets, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 10,2006, available
at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/15238686.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
12. Sandole, supra note 8, at 2.
13. Id. See generally The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
14. Sandole, supra note 8, at 2.
15. Dennis J.D. Sandole, Conflict and Education: Some Personal Reflections, 21 CONFLICT
RESOLUTION QUARTERLY 513-23 (2004).
16. Id. at 513.
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meeting in St. Petersburg (Russia), Bush still seems to be from "Mars" while
the Europeans appear to be from "Venus."' 7
IV. PRESIDENT BUSH'S RESPONSE TO THE "NEW" TERRORISM:
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR (GWOT)
A dominant feature of Bush administration policies in pursuing the GWOT
has been the "rhetoric-reality disconnect" where, for example, Bush's policies
have made Americans and the world in general less, rather than more safe,
despite official declarations to the contrary.
To illustrate, although conducting military operations against the Taliban
and al Qaeda in Afghanistan made sense to many Americans and members of
the international community immediately following 9/11,8 going to war against
Saddam Hussein on the basis of dubious premises, and in the process, allowing
Afghanistan to slip back into the hands of the Taliban and al Qaeda, did not.' 9
This is not simply a case of "left-wing," antiwar people clashing with
"right-wing," pro-Bush people. For instance, Paul O'Neill, Secretary of the
Treasury during President Bush's first term, has indicated that from Bush's first
days in office-nine months before September I 1-the President wanted to
attack Iraq.2° Similarly, when those attacks occurred, Bush instructed his
counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke to look for an "Iraq connection," while
Clarke repeatedly insisted that 9/11 was the work of al Qaeda, and not Saddam
Hussein.2
No matter what the "facts" were, including the various intelligence
failures; 22 that no weapons of mass destruction were ever found;23 and the
apparent fact that Bush wanted to go to war against Saddam "no matter what,
24
Bush was able to convince a majority of Americans to stick with him and his
mission in Iraq. This, despite the fact that the U.S.-led invasion and occupation
have resulted in a major insurgency against the Americans, brutal acts of
17. Agence France-Presse, Allies Split with U.S. Stance on Offensive, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, July 14,2006, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/printipub.php?file=/articles/2006/07/14/news/
React.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
18. Sarah Baxter, He Predicted the Clash ofCivilizations, SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 23, 2004,
at 8.
19. Tyler Hicks, A Drive to Root Out the Resurgent Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at 6.
20. RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY: GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE
EDUCATION OF PAUL O'NEILL 72-7 5 (2004).
21. RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 32 (2004).
22. See generally The 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 13.
23. John Barry & Richard Hosenball, Nukes: Is the Intel on North Korea as Bad as It was on
Iraq?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 10.
24. See generally HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ (2004).
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terrorism against civilian Iraqi and foreign personnel and, as of this writing, the
deaths of more than 2500 U.S. military personnel and countless thousands of
Iraqis. Indeed, in the week after "a new cabinet was formed [in Iraq in late
April/early May 2005] . . . more than 290 people-mostly Iraqis-[were]
slaughtered in car bombings and other bloody attacks."25 More recently, "the
U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq said that 14,338 Iraqi civilians died violent
deaths during the first six months of 2006. [For June 2006] alone, 3,149
civilians died that way-an average of more than a 100 a day., 26 During July
2006, in Baghdad alone, 1850 bodies wound up in the morgue, with as many as
ninety percent estimated to have died violent deaths."
The "rhetoric-reality disconnect" is revealed not only by the U.S. going to
war on the basis of dubious premises and "cherry-picked" intelligence to justify
the war,28 but that the subsequent occupation has not been facilitating the
successful democracy-building that has been claimed to be occurring by the
Bush administration.29 Indeed, as will be demonstrated later, the war and
occupation have had the effect of exacerbating, rather than lessening the factors
making for the "new" terrorism.
V. SUPPORT OUR TROOPS
Another example of the "rhetoric-reality disconnect" is that, on the one
hand, the Bush administration lauds and demands public support for the brave
U.S. military men and women fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, reinforced
regularly by the President making patriotic speeches at U.S. military
installations on American holidays. On the other hand, the administration
underfunds the equipment (e.g., armor) that keeps American troops alive on the
battlefield:
A recent military study of a random sample of scores of Marine
deaths from torso wounds between the start of the Iraq war in March
25. Hiwa Osman, What Do the Insurgents Want? Different Visions, Same Bloody Tactics, WASH.
POST, May 8, 2005, at B 1.
26. Andy Mosher & Saad Sarhan, Blast Kills 53 in Iraqi Holy City: Growing Violence Claimed
3,000 Civilians Last Month, UN. Says, WASH. POST, July 19, 2006, at A13.
27. Andy Mosher, Baghdad Morgue Tallies 1,850 Bodies in July: As Violence Spikes, U.S. Puts
Onus on Iraqis in Second Phase of Crackdown, WASH. POST, Aug 10, 2006, at A20.
28. See Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April
2006, availableat http//www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301 faessay85202/paul-r-pillar/intelligene-policy-and-
the-war-in-iraq.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
29. See generally GEORGE PACKER, THE ASSASSINS' GATE: AMERICA IN IRAQ (2005); PETER W.
GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: How AMERICAN INCOMPETENCE CREATED A WAR WITHOUT END (2006);
James Glanz, Iraq Rebuilding Badly Hobbled, US. Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006; THOMAS E.
RICKS, FLASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ (2006).
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2003 and mid-2005 found that more protection on the chest, back,
sides and shoulder areas could have prevented up to 80percent of the
fatalities (emphasis added).3"
Almost from the beginning, some soldiers asked for additional
protection to stop bullets from slicing through their sides. In the fall
of 2003, when troops began hanging their crotch protectors under
their arms, the Army's Rapid Equipping Force shipped several
hundred plates to protect their sides and shoulders. Individual
soldiers and units continued to buy their own sets (emphasis added).
The Marine Corps said it had opted to take [an] older version of
[protective] ceramic to speed delivery. As of early [December 2005],
officials said marines in Iraq had received 2,200 of the more than
28,000 sets of plates that are being bought at a cost of about $260
each.
The findings and other research by military psychologists suggest that
an analysis of all combat deaths in Iraq, including those of Army
troops, would show that 300 or more lives might have been
saved(emphasis added).... Military officials and contractors said the
Pentagon's procurement troubles had stemmed in part from
miscalculations that underestimated the strength of the insurgency,
and from years of cost-cutting that left some armoring companies on
the brink of collapse as they waited for new orders (emphasis
added).3
As a New York Times editorial put it:
The Pentagon buys some truly wondrous space-age weaponry with its
half-trillion-dollar annual budgets. If the cold war ever resumes, the
American military will certainly be prepared. Meantime, surely
enough spare change can be found in that vast budget to accelerate
deliveries of lifesaving armor to the marines and soldiers coming
under fire today, and everyday, in Iraq.32
There is also a perception that the U.S. Government is underfunding
treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suffered by America's
combat veterans and in the process, reducing Veterans Administration (VA)
30. Ann Scott Tyson, Body-Armor Gaps Are Shown to Endanger Troops: Pentagon Studies Call
Deaths Preventable, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at A5.
31. Michael Moss, Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at
1.
32. Marines Without Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 13. See also Soldiers Versus Defense
Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at 34.
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medical benefits supposedly available to them after they have been wounded
in combat and discharged from active military service:
The spiraling cost of post-traumatic stress disorder among war
veterans has triggered a politically charged debate and ignited fears
that the government is trying to limit expensive benefits for emotion-
ally scarred troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan .... Larry
Scott, who runs the clearinghouse www.vawatchdog.org said conser-
vative groups are trying to cut VA disability programs by unfairly
comparing them to welfare.33
Further, the more than halfa million U.S. National Guardsmen/women and
Reservists who have been called up in record numbers since 2001, to serve in
combat in Afghanistan and Iraq or to assume other duties associated with
Homeland Security, are being discriminated against in their access to GI Bill
educational benefits in comparison with their active-duty counterparts.34 More
significantly:
[President] Bush has passed legislation that denies the National Guard
and Reservists the same medical insurance that the regular military
gets and increases the costs of veterans' health care ... Bush also
signed the bankruptcy law... that does not exempt Guard members
and Reservists who have been forced to seek relief while serving
extended tours in Iraq and have been unable to cover their expenses
and mortgage payments.35
VI. SUPPORT OUR ALLIES
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who effectively validated George W.
Bush's claim of a "coalition" in support of the war in Iraq by providing
thousands of troops for the invasion, with many still in Basra and elsewhere in
southern Iraq as occupation forces, has yet to receive reciprocity from Mr.
Bush. In July 2005, PM Blair hosted the annual Group of Eight Industrialized
Nations (G-8) meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, still trying to convince Mr.
Bush of the need to do something about Africa and global warming. Mr. Bush
had earlier critiqued Mr. Blair's Africa initiative as good for Britain but bad for
the United States, and doubted that human activities cause global warming,
33. Shankar Vedantam, A Political Debate On Stress Disorder: As Claims Rise, VA Takes Stock,
WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2005, at Al, A8-A9.
34. Ron Martz, War Veterans Denied GI Bill Benefits, Cox NEWS SERVICE, July 10, 2006,
available at www.truthout.org/docs 2006/printer_071106Z.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
35. Nick Reina, Bush Hypocritical on Veterans, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, June 8, 2006, at A6.
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despite a plethora of scientific evidence to the contrary (including a then recent
report by the National Academy of Sciences).36 In this regard:
It's no secret that the Bush administration has been almost
psychotically hostile to the "fact-based community," including, and
perhaps especially, the scientific community. The debate, as it were,
about whether human action has contributed to global warming is
only the most prominent example of this administration's war on
science, because in point of fact there's no "debate" about global
warming at all, at least not among climate scientists (emphasis
added).37
After the Gleneagles and subsequent Montreal meetings, the U.S. still
remains the only one of the G-8 countries that has not signed on to the Kyoto
Protocol on Global Warming, despite mounting evidence of the human role in
global warming and the likely deleterious impact of it on the sustainability of
life on the planet.38 That the July 7, 2005 London bombings occurred during
the Gleneagles G-8 meeting without President Bush tilting toward support for
PM Blair's Africa and environmental initiatives underscores the intensity of
this particular example of the "rhetoric-reality gap."
One year later, in July 2006, during the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg
(Russia), Bush and Blair were initially still poles apart, on how best to respond
to the escalating Middle East crisis as Israel continued to bomb Lebanon in
response to rocket attacks by Hezbollah.39 A few days later, however, Blair
joined Bush in not calling "on Israel to halt its onslaught on Lebanon before
Hezbollah released two kidnapped Israeli soldiers and ended its rocket attacks
[thereby making the] British position.., at odds with that of other European
countries, including France, Germany and Italy, which have called for an
immediate cease-fire." (emphasis added)40
36. National Academies, UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: HIGHLIGHTS
OF NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORTS (2005), http://dels.nas.edu/basc/Climate-HIGH.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2006).
37. Jennifer Moses, Katrina Compounded, WASH. POST, July 17, 2006, at A15.
38. Bill McKibben, Too Hot to Handle: Recent Efforts to Censor Jim Hansen, NASA's Top
Climate Scientist, Are Only the Latest. As His Message Grows More Urgent, We Ignore Him at Our Peril,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb 5, 2006, at El.
39. Jim Rutenberg & John O'Neil, Annan and Blair Press for New Peacekeeping Force,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 17, 2006, available at www.iht.com/bin/print-ipub.php?file=/
articles/2006/07/17/america/web.0717bush.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
40. Jad Mouawad & Steven Erlanger, As Toll Mounts, Beirut Calls for Truce, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, July 20, 2006, available at www.iht.com/bin/print-ipub.php?file=/articles/2006/
07/19/news/mideast.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
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VII. THE FOG OF WAR
Why the American public has not been overwhelmingly critical of these
and other inconsistencies and even called for, among other things, Mr. Bush's
impeachment, may be one of the great mysteries of our time, especially after the
(continuing) woefully inadequate U.S. governmental response to Hurricane
Katrina, especially after revelations that the Bush administration knew more
about the likely failure of the levees in New Orleans earlier than the President
and others had claimed;4 and nonimplementation of recommendations made by
the 9/11 Commission which, according to its (Republican) Chairman Thomas
Kean, could have saved lives during Katrina's assault on New Orleans and
other parts of the U.S. Gulf Coast and could still save lives in the event of
another terrorist attack in the U.S. In general, the former 9/11 Commission
issued a "report card for" the federal government "that included 5 F's, 12 D's
and two incompletes in categories including airline passenger screening and
improving first responders' communication system. ,42
"Former Chairman Kean decried these 'scandalous' failures and the lack
of urgency in addressing [them]. '43  He continued: "We believe that the
terrorists will strike again. If they do, and these reforms that might have
prevented such an attack have not been implemented, what will our excuses
be?
, 44
Another concern of homeland security where the U.S. Government has
done nothing of significance is transport of lethal chemicals. According to a
recent airing of PBS's Now, which dealt with "Toxic Transport":
Thousands oftons ofhazardous chemicals are transported throughout
the United States each day by trucks, trains and barges, often through
heavily populated areas. Despite the danger they pose, national
security experts say these transports are largely unguarded and very
vulnerable to a terrorist attack. And the terrorists know it. American
intelligence agencies have been aware for several years that AI-Qaeda
is interested in targeting U.S. railroads. In 2002 the F.B.I found
photographs of U.S. railroad engines, cars and crossings in Al
Qaeda's possession (emphasis added). "I'm sorry to say [that] since
41. CHRISTOPHER COOPER & ROBERT BLOCK, DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE FAILURE
OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2006); Spencer S. Hsu & Linton Weeks, Video Shows Bush Being Warned on
Katrina: Officials Detailed a Dire Threat to New Orleans, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al, A 11; Matt
Fellowes et al., The State of New Orleans: An Update, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2006, at 17.
42. Dan Eggen, U.S. Is Given Failing Grades By 9/11 Panel: Bipartisan Group Faults
Counterterrorism Progress, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at Al.
43. Dana Milbank, Washington Sketch: With Abysmal GPA, Government Fails to Make Kean 's
List, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at A4.
44. Eggen, supra note 44, at Al.
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9/11 we have essentially done nothing in this area," Richard
Falkenrath, formerly one of President Bush's top advisors on home-
land security, said in Senate testimony last year. Falkenrath is one of
several in Washington alleging the federal government is failing to
protect the nation from the threat of an attack on toxic chemicals. He
says that if terrorists were to attack our chemical sector, the casualties
could be on the scale or in excess of lives lost and affected on
9/11 ... One of the military's top scientists, Jay Boris of the U.S.
Naval Research Laboratory [said that] "When the wind is in the right
direction, a hundred thousand people could easily die" (emphasis
added).45
In addition, there have been revelations by former Secretary of State Colin
Powell's Chief of Staff, retired U.S. Army Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, that
a Cheney-Rumsfeld "cabal" deceptively took the U.S. to war in Iraq;46 and an
indictment and guilty verdict of Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff Lewis
Libby for playing a role in that venture by "outing" a covert CIA operative, Ms.
Valerie Plame, to the media in order to "punish" her husband, former U.S.
Ambassador Joseph Wilson, for revealing contradictions in the Bush
administration's case for going to war in Iraq.47
Each of these potential "smoking guns" is a part of the "fog of war"
phenomenon, a term first used by one of history's great strategic thinkers,
General Carl von Clausewitz, to refer to the chaos, confusion, and non-rational
responses to threats that often accompany the experience of warfare.48
Progressive recognition of the "fog" in this case49further enhances prospects for
reaching a "tipping point" in public support for Mr. Bush, with even
Republicans (including California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger) calling
for action on global warming and the war in Iraq.5" This dynamic includes,
according to polls following the Dubai Ports World debacle, record decreases
in support for the Iraq war and the President's policies in general (even among
45. Now: Toxic Transport (PBS television broadcast June 30, 2006) (transcript available at
www.pbs.org/now/shows/226/index.html) (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
46. Bob Herbert, How Scary Is This?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at 21.
47. Elisabeth Bumiller& Eric Schmitt, In Indictment's Wake, a Focus on Cheney's Powerful Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 1; Frank Rich, It's Bush-Cheney, Not Rove-Libby, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,2005,
at 12.
48. See generally CARL PHILIPP GOnIFRIED VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Anatol Rapoport ed.,
Penguin Books 1968) (1832).
49. Eric Lipton, Hurricane Investigators See 'Fog of War' at the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2006, at 10.
50. Karen Breslau, The Mean Green Machine, NEWSWEEK, June 19, 2006, at 40-41.
2006]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
Republicans).5 This process has undoubtedly been reinforced by the looming
enhanced civil war in Iraq between minority Sunni and majority Shiite Muslims
following the destruction, on February 22, 2006, of the Golden Mosque, a
maj or Shiite shrine in the largely Sunni city of Samarra. Full-scale civil war in
Iraq, a catastrophic possibility which goes against the grain of official Bush
policy and claims of "progress" in Iraq, has even been advocated by some U.S.
military officers as likely to ensure that Iraq has "a true and sustainable
future."
52
Encouraging a "tipping point" in public support for President Bush's
policies is a goal that has less to do with ideology than a deep sense of
continuing national and global danger should Mr. Bush continue with his
policies for the next two years-an issue which transcends claims that Mr. Bush
is "merely" incompetent.13 As Lieutenant General William Odom, former
President Ronald Reagan's National Security Agency director, has said: the
Iraq war is "the greatest strategic disaster in United States history."54 For
Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief
of staff, this state of affairs could "get even more dangerous than it already
is." 55
This concept of "danger" calls forth an article I wrote on the eve of the
Iraq war, appropriately entitled "The Fog of War," in which I concluded that,
for various reasons, including those cited in this article, "President Bush may
have become one of the world's most dangerous men" (emphasis added).56
Among the dangers implicit in a continuation of Mr. Bush's policies is the Iraq
war's further radicalization of Arabs and Muslims worldwide, including in
Europe and Asia. This could have the effect of motivating European, Asian,
and other Muslims to join the growing Jihad against the "Crusader" in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Israel, Chechnya and elsewhere. Many of those "foreign fighters"
could then return home as trained, experienced members of local terrorist cells
available to launch attacks such as those carried out in Bali (October 12, 2002),
Madrid (March 11, 2004), London (July 7 and 21, 2005) and in the process,
further the self-fulfilling dynamic of the "clash of civilizations."
51. Will Lester, Lawmakers Deride Assurances on Arab Port Firm, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2006,
at A7; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republican Speaks Up, Leading Others to Challenge Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2006, at p. 1; Polling Report.com, Iraq, www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
52. Thomas E. Ricks, Merits of Partitioning Iraq or Allowing Civil War Weighed, WASH. POST,
Apr. 30, 2006, at A18.
53. See generally supra note 29; Harold Meyerson, Bush the Incompetent, WASH. POST, Jan. 25,
2006, at A19.
54. Rich, supra note 47.
55. Herbert, supra note 46.
56. Dennis J.D. Sandole, The Fog of War, ICAR NEWS, Spring 2004, at 8-10.
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VIII. FUELING THE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS"
Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington caused quite a stir in academic,
policy, and popular circles more than a decade ago with the publication of his
controversial thesis that wars of the future would be fought between
"civilizations" instead of states and that, therefore, a new "civilizational
paradigm" was required to supplant the traditional state-centric one (without
necessarily jettisoning Realpolitik/Machtpolitik).57
Huntington's thesis is that, in former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union
and elsewhere in thepostmodern world, intervention on behalf of ethnic kin can
and has played a major role in conflict escalation through what Huntington-
borrowing from H.D.S. Greenway-calls the kin-country syndrome, or
"civilizational rallying" 8 :
In the post-Cold War world, multiple communal conflicts have
superseded the single superpower conflict. When these communal
conflicts involve groups from different civilizations, they tend to
expand and to escalate. As the conflict becomes more intense, each
side attempts to rally support from countries and groups belonging to
its civilization. Support in one form or another, official or unofficial,
overt or covert, material, human, diplomatic, financial, symbolic, or
military, is always forthcoming from one or more kin countries or
groups. The longer a fault line conflict continues the more kin
countries are likely to become involved in supporting, constraining,
and mediating roles. As a result ofthis "kin-country syndrome,"fault
line conflicts have a much higher potential for escalation than do
intracivilizational conflicts and usually require intercivilizational
cooperation to contain and end them. In contrast to the Cold War,
conflict does not flow down from above, it bubbles up from below
(emphasis added).59
Since 9/11, Huntington's thesis has appeared more credible to many
people on both sides of the Judaic/Christian-Islamic civilizational divide, with,
regrettably, a self-fulfilling dynamic helping to bring reality more in line with
it: for some, including Huntington himself," the ultimate trap. In other words,
while the "clash of civilizations" may not have been a causal factor in the
57. See Huntington, supra note 5.
58. Id.
59. Id at 272.
60. Baxter, supra note 18.
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etiology of 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror,6 it has certainly
become a result.62
IX. THE EXPANDING JIHAD
One troubling result of the U.S.-led war and occupation of Iraq is that,
according to the authoritative The Military Balance 2003-2004 issued by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London,63 the war "in Iraq
has swollen the ranks of al Qaeda and galvanized the Islamic militant group's
will."' Such observations even predate the revelations of U.S. prisoner abuse
at Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba,65 plus the Bush policy of "extraordinary rendition": sending suspected
terrorists to other countries where torture is more a routine part of the
interrogation "subculture."66
According to David B. Low, national intelligence officer for transnational
threats of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the "CIA director's
thinktank":
Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the training ground for the next
generation of"professionalized" terrorists... Iraq provides terrorists
with "a training ground, a recruitment ground, the opportunity for
enhancing technical skills... There is even, under the best scenario,
over time, the likelihood that some of the Jihadists who are not killed
there will, in a sense, go home, wherever home is, and will therefore
disperse to various other countries."67
Jihadists reside in Western Europe as well as the Middle East and
elsewhere. According to a PBS Frontline program on "Al Qaeda's New Front":
Home to an estimated 18 million Muslims, Western Europe has
become the new and deadly battleground in the war on terror. That's
61. Seegenerally MAHMOODMAMDANI, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA, THE COLD WAR,
AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR (2004).
62. Dennis J.D. Sandole, The Western-Islamic 'Clash of Civilizations': The Inadvertent
Contribution of the Bush Presidency, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, Fall 2005, at 54-68.
63. THE MILITARY BALANCE 2003-2004 (Christopher Langton ed., 2003).
64. See Peter Graff, Iraq War Swells Al Qaeda 's Ranks, Report Says, REUTERS, Oct. 15,2003. See
generally FRANCIS FuKUYAMA, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND THE
NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY (2006).
65. Neal Katyal, Tortured Logic, WASH. POST BOOK WORLD, Feb. 20, 2005, at 10.
66. Self-Inflicted Wounds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at 18.
67. Dana Priest, Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground: War Created Haven, CIA Advisors Report,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at Al.
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because disenfranchised Muslims, inspired by local radical imams and
jihadist websites are taking up the causes ofjihad. And al Qaeda,
once just a loose organization on the continent, has morphed into a
powerful ideological movement. . . "The threat is before us, not
behind us," France's top antiterror judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, tells
FRONTLINE. "And we are quite concerned... I think that the
terrorist threat today is more globalized, more scattered, and more
powerful... than it was before September I L." What's driving the
terrorism threat? Many experts in counterterrorism say it's the belief
that violence is justified in order to free the Muslim world from
corrupt governments and the influence of the United States and
Europe. And because it is difficult forjihadists to launch an attack on
U.S. cities and institutions, their focus has turned to local targets in
Western Europe.68
Hence, the attacks on four trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004, killing
nearly 200 and injuring more than 1400 early morning commuters; plus, a little
more than a year later, on July 7, 2005, the attacks on London Transport, also
during morning rush hour, killing more than fifty (including the four attackers)
and wounding some 700 passengers; and a year later, on August 10, 2006, the
foiled plans of the "Heathrow-24" to destroy up to ten passenger-filled airliners
en route from London to major American cities: 69
The key reality faced on the other side of the Atlantic is the 18 million
Muslims whose ranks are expected to swell to 20 percent of Europe's
population in the next 15 years. This community of immigrants who
share religious and ethnic bonds has largely failed to integrate into
European societies. Many are poor and subject to bigotry; they have
lived in Europe for years and many were born there, yet often feel that
they are not full members of society. This sense of alienation is
deepened by the ubiquity of television with its non-stop images of
their suffering brethren in Palestine, Iraq, and Chechnya. Inspired by
local radical imams andjihadist Web sites, disenfranchised European
Muslims are taking up the cause of jihad. With full-scale war
between the U.S. military and Islamic insurgents in Iraq-which is
just a two-and-a-half day drive from Berlin-the reality of a war
between Islam and the West is a domestic problem for Europe
(emphasis added).7"
68. Frontline: "Al Qaeda's New Front" (PBS television broadcast Jan. 25, 2005) (transcript
available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/etc/profile.html) (last visited Oct. 7, 2006)(on
file with author).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Accordingly, Arabs' and Muslims' perceived sense of violated needs for
identity, recognition, and security, exacerbated by "historical memory" and
calls to action by religious leaders and TV images of the oppression of their
fellow "Wretched of the Earth" in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and
elsewhere have likely played a role in the etiology of global terrorism and the
accompanying "clash of civilizations." 7' Further, the violent conflict-generating
potential of these factors has probably been reinforced by lingering experiences
of structural and cultural violence: the experience by members of certain
ethnic, religious, racial, and other minority groups that they have been-and
continue to be--denied access to the political, social, economic, and other
resources typically enjoyed and presided over by mainstream groups in
society."
The National Intelligence Council's (NIC) "new report on global trends
[Mapping the Global Future, which] took a year to produce and includes the
analysis of 1,000 U.S. and foreign experts":
73
is an evaluation of Iraq's new role as a breeding ground for Islamic
terrorists.... President Bush has frequently described the Iraq war
as an integral part of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. But the...
report suggests that conflict has also helped terrorists by creating a
haven for them in the chaos of war .... "At the moment," NIC
Chairman Robert L. Hutchings said, Iraq "is a magnet for
international terrorist activity."
Iraq has joined the list of conflicts- including the Israeli-Palestinian
stalemate, and independence movements in Chechnya, Kashmir,
Mindanao in the Philippines, and southern Thailand-that have
deepened among Muslims and helped spread radical Islamic ideology.
... At the same time, the report says that by 2020, al Qaeda "will be
superseded" by other Islamic extremist groups that will merge with
local separatist movements. Most terrorism experts say this is already
well underway. The NIC says this kind of ever-morphing
decentralized movement is much more difficult to uncover and defeat.
71. See generally JOHN W. BURTON, VIOLENCE ExPLAINED (1997); FRANTz FANON, THE
WRETCHEDOF THE EARTH (Constance Farrington trans., 1968); Dennis J.D. Sandole, Virulent Ethnocentrism:
A Major Challengefor Transformational Conflict Resolution andPeacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era,
THE GLOBAL REVIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICS, June 2002, at 4-27.
72. Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace and Peace Research, 6 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, at
167-91. See generally JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT,
DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION (1996); Paradise Now (Warner Independent Pictures 2005).
73. Dana Priest, Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground; War Created Haven, CIA Advisors Report,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at Al.
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NIC officials said their greatest concern remains the possibility that
terrorists may acquire biological weapons and, although less likely,
a nuclear device (emphasis added).74
Approximately one month after the release of the NIC report, top U.S.
national security officials, including former CIA director Porter Goss, told
Congress that the Insurgency in Iraq continues to baffle the U.S. military and
intelligence communities, and the U.S. occupation has become a potent
recruiting tool for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups (emphasis added):7 5
"Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new
anti-U.S. jihadists," CIA Director Porter J. Goss told the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence [on 16 February] .... "These
j ihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts
of urban terrorism," he said. "They represent a potential pool of
contacts to build transnational cells, groups and networks in Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and other countries." . . . [such] statements
underscored the unintended consequences of the war in Iraq.
"Our policies in the Middle East fuel Islamic resentment," Vice Adm.
Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told
the Senate panel. "Overwhelming majorities in Morocco, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia believe the U.S. has a negative policy toward the Arab
world."
"It may be only a matter of time before al Qaeda or another group
attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
weapons," Goss said (emphasis added).76
Concerning the possibility of further attacks in the U.S., FBI Director
Robert S. Mueller III said "transportation systems and nuclear power plants
remain key al Qaeda targets,"77 while James Loy, acting deputy secretary of
homeland security, said: "any attack of any kind could occur at any time. 78
In his recently published book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of
Suicide Terrorism, Robert Pape argues convincingly, based upon perhaps the
74. Id.
75. Dana Priest, War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told: Intelligence Officials Talk of Growing
Insurgency, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at Al.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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most comprehensive empirical dataset on the subject, that suicide terrorism is
a response to foreign occupation of the terrorists' homeland.79 If that is indeed
the case, then the long-term presence of U.S. and other military forces in
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim worlds does not augur
well for a less dangerous, more stable world where Americans, Israelis,
Russians and others are safe.
Given that Osama bin Laden has apparently received approval from a
Saudi cleric to use a nuclear device against the United States, 0 Pape's
demonstrated empirical connection between U.S. occupation abroad and suicide
attacks against Americans may include the nuclear option as a viable "next
step."'" We have, therefore, with the "new" terrorism, clearly returned to
"thinking about the unthinkable."
The possible terrorist use of nuclear weapons against American targets is
the ultimate danger implicit in Mr. Bush's policies-a danger which, as of this
writing, has undoubtedly been enhanced by Arab and Muslim perceptions
worldwide that the Bush administration supports, and therefore is complicit in,
Israel's destruction of neighboring Lebanon:8 2
European allies are particularly alarmed about the disproportionately
high civilian death toll in Lebanon. They are also concerned that the
U.S. position will increase tensions between the Islamic world and
the West by fueling militants, playing into the rhetoric of Osama bin
Laden and adding to the problems of the U.S.-led coalition force in
Iraq (emphasis added).8 3
X. AN ALTERNATIVE VISION OF U.S. POLICY
The "new" terrorism is not just a law-and-order "security problem" to be
resolved by force, which is how it tends to be "fought"; hence, the "Global War
79. See generally ROBERTA. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
(2005).
80. Dafna Linzer, The World After 9/11. The Nuclear Threat: Nuclear Capabilities May Elude
Terrorists, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,2004, at Al, A6. See generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN
SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT
(2005).
81. See generally Pape, supra note 79.
82. Brian Knowlton, From U.S., A Green Light for Offensive, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 17,2006, available at www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/17/news/policy.php (last visited Oct. 6,2006); Jim
VandeHei, Congress Is Giving Israel Vote of Confidence: Both Parties Back Ally, Court Jewish Support,
WASH. POST, July 19, 2006, at A5; Robin Wright & Thomas E. Ricks, Bush Supports Israel's Move Against
Hezbollah, WASH. POST, July 19, 2006, at A10.
83. Robin Wright & Colum Lynch, US. at Odds with Allies on Mideast Conflict: Citing Civilian
Casualties, European Nations and UN. Eager for Cease-Fire, WASH. POST, July 20, 2006, at A17.
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on Terror" (GWOT). The "new" terrorism is a complex phenomenon that must
be addressed by multiple actors performing different roles over time in a
coordinated fashion if the "war on terror" is ever to come close to being "won."
What this means is that, in addition to addressing the violent symptoms of
relationships that have gone wrong (which is clearly important), analysts and
policymakers must address those relationships and the underlying causes and
conditions of why they have deteriorated.84
Referring again to Pape's seminal study, as long as forced military
occupations endure, the more likely it is that the occupied and oppressed will
conduct terrorist attacks-including suicide or martyrdom missions-against
the occupier and oppressor.85 The "lessons" here for the U.S., Israel, Russia,
Thailand, and the Philippines, among others, should be clear. If all we do is
"fight fire with fire" (symptoms), then we are likely to have a greater, more
enduring fire. If, on the other hand, we address the fire's underlying causes and
conditions, denying the fire further oxygen and other combustible sources, then
we are more likely to "resolve" and not merely "manage" or "settle" it! As
former USMC General (and USCENTCOM Commander) Anthony Zinni said
with regard to the "causal linkage" between the Middle East and other
conflicts: "You solve the Middle East [conflict and] you'd be surprised what
kinds of other things work out." 6
XI. CONCLUSION
We end with a sobering hypothesis: The more dangerous the world
becomes, in part, because of Mr. Bush's counterproductive policies, the better
it is for the President (at least in the short term) to rally the country behind him
on otherwise contentious issues (e.g., torture, wire-tapping, the Patriot Act). In
other words, the U.S. military presence in Iraq has been "good" for Mr. Bush,
at least up until now, not because it has made the world safer-which this
article has argued is patently not the case-but because it has provided the
President with a continuing "psycho-emotional cover" initially provided by the
9/11 attacks, for an ideologically-framed political agenda that might otherwise
meet with more resistance, debate, and revision.
87
84. See generally Dennis J.D. Sandole, The Causes of Terrorism, in TERRORISM: CONCEPTS,
CAUSES, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution ed., 2002); Dennis J.D.
Sandole, The 'New' Terrorism: Causes, Conditions and Conflict Resolution, VIENNA JOURNAL OF PEACE
RESEARCH, Dec. 2004 at 1; Dennis J.D. Sandole, Complexity and Conflict Resolution, in COMPLEXITY IN
WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF ANEW PARADIGM (2006).
85. Pape, supra note 79.
86. GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI, REMARKS AT CDI BOARD OF DIRECTORS (May 12, 2004).
87. See generally LEWIS A. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIALCONFLICT (1956); GEORGE SIMMEL,
CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP-AFFILIATIONS (Kurt H. Wolff& Reinhard Bendix trans., 1955); VAMIK
VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM (1997).
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As I said earlier: "President Bush may have become one of the world's
most dangerous men" (emphasis added).88 This proposition has been
demonstrably reinforced by his steadfast refusal to support international calls
for an "immediate ceasefire" in response to the escalating Middle East conflict
and destruction of Lebanon during and after the July 2006 G-8 meeting in St.
Petersburg, with the argument that, until Israel had destroyed Hezbollah's
capacity to make war against it, a ceasefire would be "premature" (emphasis
added). Given the television coverage of death and destruction in Lebanon,
such a position has likely had significant implications for the "new" terrorism
and further attacks on the U.S. and Americans in general-the foiled plans to
blow up ten passenger-filled aircraft flying from London to major American
cities being but a recent example.89
It is clear from all indications that the world is currently beset with
multiple complex crises, where U.S. military forces are stretched to the point
that they cannot even participate in galvanizing international action to stop the
acknowledged genocide taking place in Darfur, western Sudan.9" Just imagine
if, at this time of interconnected global crises, North Korea were to do
something more drastic than fire off some missiles that fall harmlessly into the
Pacific Ocean. Or if, in response to the calls of his irate neo-conservative
critics to be "more aggressive," President Bush were to attack nuclear facilities
and other sites in Iran, in effect, do to Iran what Israel has been doing to
Lebanon.9' According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, former President Jimmy
Carter's National Security Advisor:
I think of war with Iran as the ending of America's present role in the
world . . . Iraq may have been a preview of that, but it's still
redeemable if we get out fast. In a war with Iran, we 'll get dragged
down for 20 or 30 years. The world will condemn us. We will lose
our position in the world (emphasis added).92
88. Dennis J.D. Sandole, The Fog of War, ICAR NEWS, Spring 2004, at 8-10.
89. Kevin Sullivan & Joshua Partlow, Young Muslim Rage Takes Root in Britain: Unemployment,
Foreign Policy Fuel Extremism, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2006, at Al.
90. See Michael Abramowitz & Robin Wright, A Driven President Faces a World of Crises, WASH.
POST, July 6, 2006, at Al; David Broder, For Bush, A World of Worry: Abundant Trouble, But Few
Solutions, WASH. POST, July 13, 2006, at A23; Robin Wright, Options for U.S. LimitedAs Mideast Crises
Spread, WASH. POST, July 13, 2006, at 19; Robert Bums, Study: Army Stretched to Breaking Point, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/012506A.shtml (last
visited at Oct. 6, 2006); It's Just a Genocide, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B6; Sudan s Long Slide: A
Peace Agreement's Unmet Promises Need a US. Response, WASH. POST, July 22, 2006, at AI 6.
91. Michael Abramowitz, Conservative Anger Grows Over Bush 's Foreign Policy, WASH. POST,
July 19, 2006, atAl.
92. Christopher De Bellaigue, Under the Olive Trees: Waiting for the War in Iran, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, July 2006, at 59-60.
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Apropos the extent of President Bush's responsibility for negative
relations with Iran, de Bellaigue explains that:
The U.S. president did not cause Iran's reform movement to fail. It
was flawed by the timidity of its leaders and their followers. But it is
no coincidence that the movement went into terminal decline
immediately after Bush included Iran [along with Iraq and North
Korea] in his 2002 "axis of evil." That speech, and the subsequent
invasion of Iraq, convinced Iran's clerical leaders that Bush was
determined to try and topple the Islamic Republic. One of the ways
they reacted was by intensifying their assault on liberalizing, reformist
Iranians. The hard-line establishment depicted all democracy seekers
as traitors; they were discredited, tortured, orjailed. Iran's pro-demo-
cracy movement could not survive in the atmosphere of protracted
crisis that Bush helped create. If there are attacks and a national
emergency, things will get worse. Pro-democracy newspaper colum-
nists, striking bus drivers, dissenting students-all will be smashed
with an iron fist. Military action will herald a crisis of the kind that,
during the Iran-Iraq War [1980-1988], Khomeini's followers used in
order to limit democracy and eliminate their opponents. The Islamic
Republic will become more fanatical, and anti-American feeling,
strikingly absent in many Iranians, will grow (emphasis added).93
In the event of U.S. military action against Iran, perhaps with nuclear
weapons to eliminate hard-to-access underground uranium-enrichment facilities
at Natanz, as President Bush and Vice President Cheney initially insisted, the
results could be catastrophic.94 This, not just because of how such an event
would play out on the Arab and Muslim "streets" via Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya
and other TV outlets, but also given Iran's influence on the price of oil
worldwide and its linkage with the dominant Shiite population, leadership and
militias in Iraq and with Hezbollah in Lebanon, with profound implications for
American and Israeli security in the region and elsewhere.95 If Iran were
sufficiently enraged by an American attack, it might decide, among other
things, to open a second front in Hezbollah's missile war against Israel. And
then nuclear-armed Israel, with a very low threshold for insecurity, could do
to Iran what it has been doing to Lebanon, and more. And then... ?
According to Hobbes, the "state of nature" is where there is war "of every
man against every man," and where "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short" (emphasis added).96
93. Id. at 63.
94. Seymour M. Hersh, Last Stand, NEW YORKER, July 10, 2006, at 42.
95. Id.
96. Hobbes, supra note 6, at xxiii.
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With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the world has, indeed,
changed. Regrettably, despite his administration's declarations to the contrary,
President George W. Bush has done nothing but continue or facilitate the
negative trajectory of events. It almost seems that, with events spinning out of
control in the Middle East, we are on the verge of a global conflagration. In-
deed, Muslims in Britain, one of the world's great centers of cultural tolerance,
believe that Bush's and Blair's policies in Iraq and Afghanistan and Israel's
policies in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank, constitute a "war against
Islam."97
Accordingly, one acute challenge now is for more Americans to think
about this state of affairs and to explore more constructive, security [survival]
-- enhancing alternatives to the Hobbesian state-especially before Osama bin
Laden gets his hands on that nuclear device-and then to take appropriate
action at the polls in November 2008, as they did in 2006.
The outcome of Ned Lamont's recent antiwar challenge to Democratic
(pro-war) Senator Joe Lieberman in Connecticut is one indication of what is
possible in this regard:
Ned Lamont's victory ... in Connecticut's U.S. Senate primary is
great news for Democrats. And it's a watershed moment for the
growing majority of Americans, in red states and blue, who want
change. For months, polls have warned that across the political spe-
ctrum people arefed up-with the no-end-in-sight occupation oflraq;
with an energy policy that caters to oil giants while gasoline prices
soar; with a health--care system that leaves more behind with every
passing day. Lamont's victory is evidence that a long-awaited wave
of voter sentiment on those issues has materialized (emphasis
added).9"
In the meantime, American politicians, lawyers, journalists, analysts,
consultants, political science students, and others should do some soul-
searching and brainstorm policy alternatives for American voters to choose
from, lest voter alienation and frustration with the political process (two
possible indicators of the "tipping point") reach new heights.99
97. Sullivan and Partlow, supra note 909, at Al.
98. Eli Pariser, The Death of Triangulation, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2006, at A23; Dan Balz and
Shailagh Murray, Lieberman Defeated in Democratic Primary: Senator Vows Independent Run As Antiwar
Challenger Prevails, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al.
99. Jonathan Alter, The Political Power of Truth, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 41.
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Abstract
Contemporary global security threats pose a serious challenge to the
existing international legal regime on the use of force. Preventing the
potentially devastating consequences of an unconventional armed attack
launched by terrorist groups or hostile governments might require an earlier
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action. Yet, international law seriously restricts the ability of States to respond
to such risks using military force in the absence of an actual or imminent armed
attack, or Security Council authorization. The U.S. National Security Strategy
of 2002 seeks to modify the current regime by expanding the narrow standard
of imminence that traditionally defines the scope ofjustifiable unilateral action
against threatened attacks. More ambitiously, it pushes aside the normative
restraints to the launch of preventive military strikes by declaring the willing-
ness of the U.S. administration to act alone against more remote threats before
they have fully materialized. This paper addresses the tension between the
existing legal rules governing the unilateral use of force and the assertions that
these rules should be expansively interpreted, or even modified, to properly
reflect the compelling needs of the new security environment. It seeks to
evaluate, in abstract terms, the ramifications of such proposals and lays out the
dimensions of the possible normative change.
I. INTRODUCTION
To put it simply, and, I fear, through a banality it may not
deserve, the message is that there must be limits to the exercise of
power.. . and that when professional men and women engage in an
argument about what is lawful and what is not, they are engaged in a
politics that imagines the possibility of a community. . . allowing a
meaningful distinction between lawful constraint and the application
of naked power.1
Drafted at the conclusion of the most destructive war in history, the United
Nations (UN) Charter sought to prevent aggressive war by eliminating virtually
all uses of force between States, save in cases of individual or collective self-
defence against an armed attack or under authorization of the Security Council.
Six decades later, however, inter-state wars are no longer the main threat to the
stability of the international system. Rather, the threat of asymmetric warfare,
launched by international terrorist organizations and hostile governments
holding weapons of mass destruction,2 forced the international community to
reconsider the Cold-War State-centred paradigm of armed conflict, which had
framed the structure of international law on the use of force for the past half a
century.
1. MARTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 1870-1960 503 (2002).
2. The phrase "hostile governments" refers in this paper to governments with weapons of mass
destruction that manifest certain hostile intent and/or support the activities of terrorist groups residing within
their territories.
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This mismatch between the contemporary threat environment and
international legal rules on the use of force generated a degree of scepticism
among statesmen and scholars as to whether the existing international rules are
still applicable to the rapidly changing security context. Claims have been
made that the existing legal framework no longer enables states to efficiently
respond to the changing security needs. In its 2002 National Security Strategy
(NSS), the U.S. administration called for a more permissive approach to the use
of force in self-defence.' They did so in two decisively different ways. The
NSS first proposes a more expansive reading of the traditional standard of
imminence, which arguably defines the scope of a legally valid unilateral action
against an enemy that is just about to attack.4 More ambitiously, the NSS drops
this narrow standard of imminence altogether by declaring the willingness of
the US administration to act alone against purely hypothetical threats even
before they have fully emerged.'
At the outset, the semantics at play must be clarified. The terms "anticipa-
tory," "pre-emptive" or "preventive" self-defence are often used interchange-
ably, but should not be regarded as synonyms since many practical conse-
quences result from their use or misuse. For the purpose of this paper, the term
"anticipatory" denotes military actions against imminent threats of an armed
attack, while the term "preventive" designates the use of military force against
developments or behaviour that may mature into threats of an armed attack at
some unspecified time in the future. In the context of this essay, the term "pre-
emptive" refers to the doctrine of anticipatory, not preventive, self-defence,
unless used differently in the context of quoted statements.
The following analysis is both descriptive, drawing upon the current
international regulation of the use of force (de lege lata), and prescriptive,
reading the validity of anticipatory and preventive military actions from the
perspective of the future of international law (de legeferenda). The first part
of the paper examines whether the existing rules permit unilateral military
action against threatened attacks and suggests that States may use force in
anticipation of an imminent armed attack under certain stringent conditions.
The second part proceeds to examine the claims that international legal rules on
the use of force need to be relaxed or even changed to accommodate new
realities. While granting that defensive military actions may be justified, in
extreme cases, even when the threat is overwhelming but not temporally
imminent, the present writer concludes that accepting the logic of unilateral
3. See generally White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(Sept. 17, 2002) [hereinafter National Security Strategy].
4. Id. at 15.
5. Id.
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preventive military action against the threats-to-be remains abhorrent to the
global order governed by the rule of law.
Two methodological notes must be made at the beginning to delimit the
subject and evade confusion. First, although the U.S. National Security
Strategy has stimulated the present discussion, it is referred to primarily for
illustrative reasons. It exemplifies an actual policy debate, by bringing specific
contemporary threats into focus and proposing specific means of dealing with
them, including unilateral military action in extreme cases. However, the aim
of this paper is not to evaluate the legality of any particular governmental policy
or action. Rather, it addresses the questions of anticipatory and preventive
actions in general and abstract terms. Second, although the relevance of both
strategic considerations and moral dilemmas of this thorny issue cannot be
denied, these aspects are beyond the scope of this paper, which centres upon the
legal arguments on legitimate responses to contemporary security needs.
HI. CURRENT SCENARIOS: NORMATIVE RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE
A. Point of Departure: Prohibition of the Use of Force
The starting point is uncontroversial: The Charter of the United Nations
emphasizes that peace is the fundamental aim of the newly established inter-
national organization, and is to be preserved if at all possible.6 The preamble
expresses a determination of the United Nations "to save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war," "to practice tolerance and live together in peace
with one another as good neighbours," "to unite our strength to maintain
international peace and security," and to ensure "that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest."7 Article 1(1) sets forth as the primary
purpose of the United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace.'
The Charter then goes on to set out two fundamental principles of the
United Nations. First, Article 2(3) asks States to settle their international
6. See generally U.N. Charter at Preamble.
7. Id. at Preamble.
8. Id. at art. 1, para. 1.
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disputes by peaceful means.9 Second, Article 2(4) articulates the general
prohibition of the use of force:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.'"
Unquestionably, the prohibition of the use or threat of force contained in
Article 2(4) forms not only a part of the conventional" but also of general
customary international law. The International Court of Justice has described
this provision as a rule ofjus cogens, binding upon all States, not only members
of the United Nations. 12 The travauxprdparatoires of the UN Charter reveal
that Article 2(4) was intended to operate as an "absolute all-inclusive
prohibition; the phrase 'or in any other manner' was designed to ensure that
there should be no loopholes."' 3 This view is supported by the majority of
scholarship, including commentators like Charney,"4 Dinstein, I5 Gray, 16 and
Randelzhofer.17 States are prohibited from using force in international relations
and from threatening others with the use of force in all but narrowly defined
circumstances. In other words, the effect of Article 2(4) is that any specific use
of force is lawful only if it is based on a legal exception to this prohibition.
The Charter explicitly envisaged only two exceptional situations: 1)
collective military enforcement action taken or authorized by the UN Security
Council in accordance with Chapter VII (and by extension for regional
organizations under Chapter VIII); and 2) the exercise of individual or
collective self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the Charter.'" The legality
9. Id. at art. 2, para 3.
10. Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
11. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1998). Not
only the U.N. Charter but also, inter alia, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
(1933), the Charter of the Organization of American States (1948), the Helsinki Final Act (1975).
12. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (June 27).
13. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, U.S., June
4, 1945, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee 1/1, 334-35.
14. Jonathan I. Charney et al., Editorial Comments: NA TO's Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 824, 835 (1999).
15. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 82 (Cambridge University Press
2001) (1988).
16. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 24-26 (2nd ed. 2004).
17. ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 106, 112-13 (Brunno Simma ed., 2002).
18. U.N. Charter, supra note 6, at chapters 7-8.
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of any military action will, therefore, depend on the applicability of either of
these exceptions, which are examined below.
B. Military Actions Authorized by the Security Council
The UN Charter does in fact envision the possibility of addressing an
emerging threat with military force if necessary. Under Chapter VII, the
Security Council may authorize military action not only in response to an act
of aggression or a breach of the peace, but even against threats to the peace with
a view to preserve international peace and security. 9 Should a State pose a
threat to another, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council as "the
international community's collective security voice ' to provide a response
beginning with non-violent sanctions leading up to use of military force,
including preventive force, to preserve international peace and security.2
This position was re-stated recently by the UN High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change and subsequently by the Secretary-General
Kofi Annan in his report In larger freedom.22 In its report of December 2004,
the Panel concluded that the Security Council mandate under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter is broad enough to include approval of coercive action even where
the threat is not imminent and even if it involves non-State actors. 23 In fact,
when all other preventive efforts have failed, collective military action is seen
by the panel as a cornerstone of effective collective security system.
24
Given the broad political discretion the Council enjoys in acting under
Chapter VII, the question emerges of how its power should be exercised "when
the Charter offers no specific criteria, when States see their interests so
differently and when some States exercise so much more influence than
others. 2 ' Taking these concerns into consideration, the High-level Panel
proposed the following criteria to guide the Council's decision on recourse to
armed force: seriousness of threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional
means; and balance of consequences.26
19. Id. at chapter 7.
20. The High-Level Panel, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,
194, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the High-level Panel].
21. U.N. Charter, supra note 6, at art. 39-42.
22. See generally The Secretary-General, In LargerFreedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
23. Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 20, at 193.
24. Id. at R 190-91.
25. Gareth Evans, When is it Right to Fight? Legality, Legitimacy and the Use of Military Force,
Lecture at Oxford University (May 10, 2004), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.
cfm?id=2747&l=l (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
26. Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 20, at 207.
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Thus, as a safeguard against future violent actions between States, the
Charter introduced a system of collective security to replace the previously
almost unfettered recourse to unilateral military actions. Should a State pose
a threat to another, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council as
"the international community's collective security voice ' ,27 to provide a
response beginning with non-violent sanctions leading up to use of military
force, including preventive force, to preserve international peace and security.
After all, as Christopher Greenwood observed, "the Charter is about keeping
the peace, not about pacifism., 21
C. Unilateral Actions: Self-Defence and Its Limits
1. Self-Defence against Threats of Attacks under the UN Charter
Without a Security Council authorization, States may only use force in
individual or collective self-defence to repel an armed attack.29 The provision
of Article 51 of the Charter provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security.3"
The language of Article 51 clearly stipulates that self-defence is lawful
only where there is an armed attack, clearly a narrower notion than the use (or
threat) of force prohibited by Article 2(4). Not every use of force necessarily
amounts to an armed attack and consequently States are not entitled to defend
themselves against every use of force.31 The interpretation of the phrase "armed
attack" is a matter of significant disagreement and the Charter itself offers no
27. Id. at 194.
28. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan,
AI-Qaida, andIraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 10 (2003).
29. The term "self-defence" is hereinafter used to denote both the individual and collective modes
of self-defence.
30. UN Charter, supra note 6, at art. 5 1.
31. This is in perfect accord with the architecture of the Charter regulation of the use of force
significantly limiting the unilateral force of States in favour of the multilateral response through collective
security mechanisms.
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guidance on this issue.32 Nevertheless, it is widely accepted today that the
notion of armed attack includes the indirect attacks in which a State does not
use military force against another State directly, but through the use of non-
State actors (such as insurgents), as well as acts by non-State actors, when they
are equivalent, by its "scale and effects," to an armed attack by a State.
33
Moreover, the Charter itself gives no clear answer as to whether unilateral
military action against a threat of an armed attack may ever be justified. The
language of Article 51 makes it clear that self-defence is lawful only when an
armed attack occurs and not as a first strike option. However, the Charter does
not define at which point in time an "armed attack" begins and nothing in this
provision itself implies the legality or illegality of the use of force in cases
when an armed attack is about to occur.
Since the Charter is silent about whether "self-defence" includes the
anticipatory use of force, other general sources of international law must be
used, including state practice and the works of learned writers on international
law.34
2. Anticipatory Self-Defence in Customary International Law
Before the Second World War, international customary law traditionally
endorsed the idea that a State can respond to an impending attack. The doctrine
of anticipatory self-defence appears in the early writings of legal philosophers
such as. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel, although with no common under-
standing of its scope.35 For instance, Grotius wrote that the danger "must be
immediate and imminent in point of time... but those who accept fear of any
sort as justifying anticipatory slaying are themselves greatly deceived and
deceive others."36 In turn, Vattel opined that a nation has "the right to prevent
an injury where it sees itself threatened with one."37
32. Two main contemporary approaches exist to the reading of the doctrine of self-defence and the
meaning of 'armed attack' in its temporal sense: that which is narrowly construed as to allow self-defence
only in response to an actual armed attack and the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence justifying military
action also against imminent armed attacks.
33. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, M 194-95 (June 27). State
practice, at least in the aftermath of the 9/1i, supports such interpretation of Article 51.
34. Following the conception formulated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
35. For a detailed comment on their writings see Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of
Preemption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 216 (2003).
36. HUGO GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LtBRI TRES 173 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925),
quoted in Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Pre-emptive Self-Defence, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599
(2003).
37. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 243 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916).
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Based on the Webster formula, articulated in 1837 in the context of the
U.K.-U.S. Caroline dispute, military action in self-defence was deemed
legitimate only if the "necessity of self-defence [was] instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation .... In line
with the general traditional criteria, self-defence in anticipation of an armed
attack is justified only when it is necessary and proportional to the threat at
hand, in other words, self-defence must not be retributive or punitive.
The applicability of this customary law doctrine after the entry into force
of the UN Charter and its general ban on the unilateral force remains somewhat
debatable. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the disagree-
ment between States on this issue: "They have disagreed about whether [s]tates
have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against
imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend
themselves against latent or non-imminent threats ... In practice, states
have mostly refrained from invoking the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence
to justify their military actions after 1945 even when the facts of the case would
allow it.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is often mentioned as an example of
anticipatory self-defence. However, the Soviet-Cuban maritime quarantine
imposed unilaterally by the United States to intercept the missiles, travelling on
the high seas to be installed by the Soviets in Cuba, was never justified by the
United States in this way. Instead, the U.S. administration claimed to have
taken a regional enforcement action previously authorized by the Organization
of American States.4°
In one particularly relevant example, Israel argued that its attack against
Egypt beginning the Six Days War in 1967 was a lawful exercise of self-
defence. The incident, which prima facie appeared to be a case of anticipatory
self-defence, was not explicitly condemned by the Security Council despite the
proposal put forward by the Soviet Union.4 ' However, a closer look at the
Israeli claims in the course of events reveals that Israel based its justification
38. Letter from Daniel Webster, US Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister in
Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS: REPORTS AND PAPERS
FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIDENTIAL PRINT, part I, series C, vol. 1 153, 159 (Kenneth Bourne ed.,
1986).
39. In Larger Freedom, supra note 22, at 122.
40. LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 218, 228 (2nd ed. 1979).
In this context, it is worth noting that to consider state practice alone as constitutive of customary law would
be to deny the normative nature of international law. It is the second requirement, the expression of a feeling
of legal obligation (opiniojuris), that demarks the transposition of state practice onto customary law. In its
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court
of Justice stated that the substance of customary international law must be found primarily in the actual
practice and feeling of obligation of States, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 253 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion].
41. See Greenwood, supra note 28, at 14.
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on a broad construction of an armed attack, rather than on the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defence-it maintained that its action was an act of self-
defence under Article 51 of the Charter after Egyptian forces had attacked Israel
first.42
In one contrasting example, Israel did try to justify its 1981 attack on the
Osirak nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq on the basis of anticipatory
self-defence. The Israeli government attempted to describe their action as a
response to Iraqi threats to develop nuclear weapons to be used against Israel
in the near future.43 But the international response was sharply critical: the
Security Council roundly rejected Israeli arguments in its resolution 487."
Most members of the Security Council expressed their disagreement with the
Israeli view, by unreservedly voting in favour of the operative paragraph one
of the resolution, whereby the Council strongly condemned "the military attack
by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms
of international conduct."'45 For instance, Egypt and Mexico explicitly rejected
the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. The United Kingdom likewise
condemned the Israeli attack "without equivocation." The then Prime Minister,
Margaret Thatcher, was characteristically blunt: "Armed attack in such circum-
stances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach of international law." '46
These are not all instances of state practice where preventive or
anticipatory self-defence was a relevant issue, but they do reveal that state
practice is too scarce and inconsistent to allow any clear conclusion about the
legality and scope of anticipatory self-defence after 1945. But it needs to be
pointed out that at least on the policy level (opiniojuris) some of the key actors,
such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Australia, have
explicitly accepted its validity in certain pressing circumstances.
A prevailing view in legal scholarship seems to likewise accept that
anticipatory self-defence is permitted in the post-Charter international law, but
has traditionally required the existence of an imminent threat.47 A significant
42. Summary Records of the 19th Meeting, [1967] Y.B. of U.N. 196, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I.1.
43. See, e.g., Sean D. Magenis, NaturalLaw as the Customary International Law of Self-Defence,
20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 413, 427(2002).
44. S.C. Res. 487, 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
45. Id.
46. Michael Byers, A New Type of War, 26 LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS (online edition) (2004),
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n09/byer01.html (last visited Sept. 15,2006) (quotingPrime Minister
Margaret Thatcher).
47. Many prominent commentators including Dinstein, Greenwood, and Schachter have asserted
that the Caroline criteria survived the entry into force of the UN Charter. In their view, they remain at the
very least a valuable tool for interpretation of the right of self-defence, helpful also in determining whether
and when that right may be invoked to deal with the modem threats.
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number of eminent scholars, including Bowett, 8 Franck,49 Greenwood,5"
Higgins,51 and Sands,52 have argued that a threat may be so direct and overw-
helming to allow for self-defence also in case of an impending attack under
certain strict conditions. Recently, the UN High-level Panel, while acknowl-
edging the restrictive language of Article 5 1, held in its report that "a threatened
State, according to long established international law, can take military action
as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it
and the action is proportionate."53 However, when the attack is not imminent,
authorization from the Security Council for the use of military force should be
secured.54
3. The Limits of Anticipatory Self-Defence: The Caroline Criteria
Jennings and Watts argued that anticipatory action in self-defence can be
justified under international law when an attack is imminent, creating an urgent
necessity for defensive action, leaving no practicable alternative, in particular,
when another State or other authority which has the legal powers to stop or
prevent the infringement is not able or willing to do so." Due to the obvious
risk of abuse of a more permissive conception of self-defence, the general
requirements of necessity and proportionality would have to be applied a
fortiori to any invocation of anticipatory self-defence.56
Necessity demands, essentially, that all non-military alternatives of redress
have been exhausted and the use of force remains the only viable option to
prevent the attack in the particular circumstances.57 Cassese has emphasized
that there must be "solid and consistent evidence" that another State is about to
engage in "a large-scale armed attack jeopardizing the very life" of a target
48. DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-192 (1958).
49. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002).
50. See Greenwood, supra note 28.
51. Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of Force,
in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986).
52. Philippe Sands, International Law and the Use of Force, United Kingdom Parliament, 15 (July
30, 2005), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/441/
4060805.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
53. Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 20, at 188.
54. See, e.g., In Larger Freedom, supra note 22, at 124-25.
55. See generally PEACE, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 1991).
56. Id. at 41-42.
57. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 513, 530, 535-36 (2003).
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State having no peaceful means of resolving the dispute at hand due to the
imminence of the attack and the futility of the measures.58
It is not always entirely clear what the condition of proportionality
requires. Dinstein proposed that this quintessential principle of self-defence,
in its basic terms, be understood as "a standard of reasonableness in the
response to force by counter-force. '59 There must be a symmetry or at least an
approximation between the action and it defensive purpose, namely that of
preventing the attack from occurring.6" Already in 1963, McDougal and
Feliciano argued that the principle of proportionality must be applied with some
flexibility, according to the specifics of a particular context.61 The scope of the
defensive action may under certain circumstances need to exceed the scale and
scope of the first attack or the threatened attack.62
As the third general limit on self-defence, the immediacy condition means
that there must be no "undue time-lag between the armed attack and the
exercise of self-defence. 6 3 This requirement has already been more broadly
construed in state practice in the age of terrorism and attacks without warning.
It has been interpreted as enabling a reasonably delayed response "where there
is a need to gather evidence of the attacker's identity and/or collect the
intelligence and [organize the] military force in order to strike back in a
targeted manner. '
Undoubtedly, the concept of imminence is the most problematic variable
of anticipatory self-defence and one that has no precise definition in
international law. It is currently rather unclear when an attack is sufficiently
"imminent" to justify military action in self-defence and it may indeed be very
difficult to ever express the imminence of a particular threat "in a legally robust
fashion."65
The Caroline requirement seems to have centred on the temporal
dimension of the notion and it is very stringent. It considers the threat to be
imminent when the attack is just about to occur or, in other words, when "[a]n
58. Higgins, supra note 51, at 233.
59. Dinstein, supra note 15, at 184.
60. See also Leo Van Den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 69, 103 (2003).
61. MYERS S. McDOUGAL AND FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 217 (1961).
62. Id.
63. Dinstein, supra note 15, at 184.
64. ANGUS MARTYN, THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RESPONSE
TO THE TERRORIST ATrACKS OF I I SEPTEMBER, LAW AND BILLS DIGEST GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF THE
PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY 10 (2002).
65. New Warfare and the Allies, Select Committee on Defence Sixth Report, United Kingdom
Parliament, 139 (May 2003), available at http://www/publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/
cmdfence/93/9311 .htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
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attack is in evidence. '66 Unilateral defensive force could accordingly be used
only in situations where weapons have been visibly launched but have not yet
reached their targets, or when forces have at least been mobilized with
apparently aggressive intent.
Such a restrictive requirement could hardly ever be satisfied in the context
of asymmetric warfare launched by terrorists or hostile governments. Applying
the narrow standard of temporal imminence in an age in which technology
allows great devastation to be wrought in a very short period of time would
disable a State from effectively repelling the attack and protecting its popula-
tion from potentially great harm. The purpose of the following section is to
evaluate the need and potentials for adapting the traditional doctrines to the
changing realities.
III. REGULATION OF FORCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A TIME FOR CHANGE?
A. Redefining Imminence: Need for Clear(er) Standards
If the ultimate goal of international law is to preserve State's right to
effective self-defence, the standard of imminence may need to be read more
broadly. In that sense, the U.S. administration does not seek to overturn the
rule but seeks to explore how the rule and its underlying purpose could be
applied in particular situations that did not exist in the past.
Christopher Greenwood exposed two new factors not incorporated in the
Caroline test which should be relevant in determining whether an attack is
imminent: the gravity of the threat and the method of delivery of the threat.68
The potentially cataclysmic dimensions of an attack with nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons make this threat so disproportionate to the conventional
threats that existed in the times of the Caroline case that it would be suicidal to
wait until the attack is visibly underway. 69 At the same time, the development
of advanced missile technology has improved the capability for stealth, leaving
literally no time for defence once an attack is launched and before it hits its
targets. 70  This is especially true with respect to contemporary terrorism
66. ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW TASK
FORCE ON TERRORISM 9 (August 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf (last visited
Nov. 18, 2006).
67. See Allen Buchanan and Robert 0. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1 (2004).
68. See Greenwood, supra note 28, at 16.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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characterized by clandestine preparations and surprise attacks: the evidence of
a specific attack coming will usually be only the attack itself.7
Therefore, the particularly grave threats which could materialize in attack
without a reasonable degree of warning and time for defence may be regarded
imminent even when the attack is not menacingly near. To quote Phillipe
Sands, the concept of imminence must be flexibly interpreted "in an age in
which technology allows great devastation to be wrought in a very short period
of time."72 Applying the narrow temporal standard of imminence in such
contemporary reality might deprive a State from an opportunity to effectively
repel the attack and protect its population from unimaginable harm. It would
go counter to the object and purpose of the right of self-defence which provides
States with a self-help mechanism to protect them from an attack when peaceful
alternatives would prove inadequate and the multilateral response too tardy.
Clearly, international law does not and should not give States a carte
blanche for aggression under the flag of anticipatory self-defence. Strict and
objective criteria should be agreed upon before any such reinterpretation could
be made. Some possibilities will now be examined.
If an attack is not temporally imminent, self-defence may be triggered only
when the threat of attack can be clearly identified on the basis of credible
intelligence. The threat must be very serious and its realization in case of
inaction certain or highly probable. Otherwise, the relaxed standard would
enable speculative defensive attacks clearly contrary to the restricting purpose
of the international regulation of force. The existence of such threat has to be
determined by reference to the capabilities of the alleged aggressor and their
specific intent to attack. Indeed, the capabilities of today's adversaries are
easier to conceal and the intent much more difficult to gauge. Nonetheless,
mere unfocused malevolence cannot be sufficient to justify unilateral recourse
to force.73
Once the threat has been appropriately identified, the defending State must
be reasonably convinced that no other viable alternative for counter-action but
military force remains. Clearly, the threshold for reaching such a conclusion
will be much higher when the condition of temporal imminence is less strictly
applied. Furthermore, in line with the traditional requirements for lawful self-
defence, the nature of the actual response must be reasonably proportional and
necessary to repel the threatened attack.
71. Id.
72. Sands, supra note 52, at 15.
73. See generally Rabinder Singh and Alison Macdonald, Legality of Use of Force Against Iraq,
Matrix Chambers, London (Sept. 10, 2002), available at http'J/www.lcnp.org/globallraqOpinion I 0.9.02.pdf
(last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
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Sofaer summarized these requirements by proposing a set of factors and
circumstances that need to be considered when deciding whether the use of
force in anticipatory force is really necessary:
1) The nature and magnitude of the threat involved;
2) The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless pre-emptive
action is taken;
3) The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force;
and
4) Whether using pre-emptive force is consistent with the terms
and purposes of the UN Charter and other applicable inter-
national agreements.74
Clearly, this new attitude is not problem-free. As shown above, the
concept of imminence is not free from ambiguities even when applied in its
traditional temporal sense, where it was required for the attack to be evident,
(at least possibly) visible to the potential victim and wider audience. More
uncertainties will inevitably arise once the temporal threshold is lowered to
accommodate contemporary security claims. The possible repercussions of this
shift could be counter-productive, which is why the credibility of evidence will
be one of the crucial conditions to satisfy in any given case. Admittedly, firm
intelligence that a devastating blow may be coming will be much more difficult
to attain than in the case where an attack is already underway; yet any error in
threat assessment could create or exacerbate the conflict rather than forestall its
violent manifestations.
In any case, an expansion of the circumstances validating self-defence will
have to place a higher burden of proof on a State to justify the steps it took to
avert an absolutely imminent attack. Unfortunately, this does not entirely
prevent the risks of error and abuse since the current international legal order
inherently lacks an effective system of accountability. That is why a serious
attempt to develop more effective procedures and mechanisms of accountability
must accompany any attempts to reinterpret the rules governing the unilateral
use of force.
Without a common understanding of what constitutes an "imminent" threat
in the context of contemporary security reality, broad agreement on a lawful
military response will be hard to achieve. The standard of imminence should
remain an important part of the analysis, although new dimensions, such as the
gravity of the threat and the methods of delivery, need to be included into the
concept alongside the traditional considerations of temporal imminence.
74. Soafer, supra note 35, at 220.
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Certain standards must hence be agreed to guide the decision-makers through
their considerations of unilateral military options in any given situation.
Building on the various approaches as outlined above, a framework governing
defensive actions against the non-conventional threats, could be developed
along the following elements:
1) The specific character of the threat, including: the magnitude
of potential harm; the nature of strategies, tactics, and methods
of warfare (clandestine operations, surprise attacks, sophisti-
cated technology, non-conventional weapons);
2) The capacities of the alleged adversary;
3) The manifestation of specific hostile intent of the alleged
adversary;
4) The proximity of the threat and time available for defence;
5) The likelihood of the threat being realized;
6) Credible intelligence: availability of clear and convincing
evidence;
7) The exhaustion of all viable non-military alternatives to reduce
or eliminate the threat;
8) Compatibility of the military action with other principles of the
UN Charter and customary international law (necessity and
proportionality, duty to report to the Security Council,
termination of unilateral action after the Council has undertaken
the necessary steps).
B. Self-Defence beyond Imminence: Normative Perils of Preventive Actions
It seems possible to reconceptualize the Webster-formulated notion of
anticipatory self-defence this way in order to respond to the technological and
strategic developments that have made attacks stealthier, quicker, and more
devastating. If all of the narrowly defined conditions are satisfied, such grave
threats may justify an earlier use of unilateral defensive force that would be
unacceptable in case of a less serious threat. A State need not wait until an
attack is just about to occur, when waiting for that moment may deprive it of an
opportunity to effectively defend itself and its people against a serious threat
with potentially catastrophic consequences.
But the second dimension of the U.S. National Security Strategy statement
on self-defence goes beyond the above stated or, in fact, any legal limits. The
Bush administration made their case for military strikes against the non-
[Vol. 13:1
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conventional threats even where "uncertainty remains as to the time and place
of the enemy's attack."75
The main difficulty of such a stance is that when no credible reason exists
to believe that a threat is temporally imminent or highly probable, the recourse
to force against some unspecified hypothetical threats that might occur at some
time in the future would not be anticipatory but preventive. Unlike anticipatory
action, preventive war is not about pre-empting an immediate and credible
security threat, but about foiling the unspecified threats that might have
occurred at some uncertain time in the future. It is an offensive strategic
response to a long-term threat, not a defensive tactical response to an impending
attack, which is the underlying rationale of the anticipatory action.76
These pronouncements assert that the rules on self-defense need to be
modified so as to allow States to prevent a future attack, even when there is no
concrete evidence that an attack has been planned. On its face the proposed
doctrine is radically different from the existing regulation of the use of force.77
Contrary to the above discussion on adapting the existing legal standard of
imminence to make it more responsive to the present-day circumstances, this
second proposal is not a matter of degree, but a step into a different kind of
legal order. In my opinion, the logic of unilateral preventive strikes against the
threats-to-be, should also in the future be rejected in the global order governed
by the rule of law due to many concerns of both legal policy and principle,
some of which are contemplated below.78
1. Risks of Abuse and Instability of the Global Order
The essential problem of the U.S.-proposed doctrine is that it lacks any
conceptual clarity as to the actual scope and objective criteria for its
implementation. Such an excessively vague and politically attentive reading of
self-defence would enable the powerful actors to freely determine when and
how the rule applies and would increase the danger of abuse in pursuit of some
narrow national interest. Miriam Sapiro has described the willingness to
unilaterally use force against emerging threats before they are fully formed as
75. National Security Strategy, supra note 3, at 15.
76. The distinction is partly borrowed from Jack S. Levy, Declining power and the Preventive
Motive for War, 40 WORLD POL. 82, 91 (1987).
77. States themselves are reluctant to endorse these developments. Apart from US, Russia, Israel
and Australia, most other key actors have expressed both political and normative resentment to the idea of
preventive strikes.
78. The conclusion of the UN High-level Panel was similarly straight-forward: "[l]n a world full
of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it
continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from
collectively endorsed action, to be accepted." Report of the High-level Pane, supra note 20, at 191.
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taking "the already controversial doctrine of anticipatory self-defence a step
further into the realm of subjectivity and potential danger."79
Indeed, power politics will always play an important role in international
system and the legal constraints on that power will probably never be
completely free from uncertainties. But opening the way to military actions
subject only to the more or less reliable threat assessment by single States and
incapable of formal legal scrutiny, could lead to an unrestricted exercise of
power against some perceived threats. Sofaer has zealously underlined this
risk: "[a]ny such doctrine would purport to allow States to attempt to ensure
their individual security, but by creating massive insecurity for others and
ultimately for themselves."8
The conclusion of the UN High-level Panel was similarly straight-forward:
[I]n a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global
order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be
based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive
action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.81
2. The Boomerang Effect: Return to Violence
Universal acceptance of the preventive strikes doctrine would create
greater potential for violence, the effect of which on reducing the contemporary
risks is highly questionable or even counter-productive. For example,
highlighting the preventive option would likely encourage the allegedly hostile
governments to accelerate development of precarious "launch-on-warning"
weapons systems and increase their military preparedness. The conflict with
North Korea and the recent escalation of the Iranian nuclear question expose
exactly these concerns. On the other hand, others may arm offensively to
"prevent the preventor" from eventually transferring them to the list of targets.82
Accepting this doctrine as a part of international law would in principle
enable that these two states to assert the right to attack the United States in
order to prevent the preventor from striking first. Subsequently, this could
fatally erode the already fragile norms and institutions designed to prevent
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
There is indeed no a priori satisfactory answer to these difficult questions
of risk management. But in a world that has become increasingly aware of the
advantages of using cooperative or "soft" power, tackling problems through
79. Sapiro, supra note 36, at 599.
80. Abraham D. Sofaer, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (March 31, 2003).
81. Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 20, at 191.
82. Although this is only speculation, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could qualify as examples.
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persuasion rather than coercion, through economic and social influence rather
than military coercion, a shift in favour of the "hard power" would be a step in
reverse. This trend would undermine the rule of law in international relations,
promote the solving of problems through force rather than law, and deride the
efforts of preventive diplomacy and other peaceful preventive tools. As Arthur
Schlessinger Jr. eloquently observed, the new US strategy leads to replacement
of "a policy that aimed at peace through the prevention of war by a policy
aimed at peace through preventive war."83
3. Endangering Sovereign Equality of States
In addition to the general implications already discussed, the doctrine of
preventive self-defence as uttered by the U.S. administration, threatens one of
the fundamental principles of international law, the principle of sovereign
equality of States. Obviously, the United States does not want to make
prevention a widely accepted doctrine; the idea was, so it seems, to develop a
new concept that would, however, not be universally applicable. What would
they say in the entirely hypothetical event that China wanted to take preventive
action against Taiwan, saying that Taiwan was a threat to it? Or what if India
decided to attack Pakistan on that ground, or vice versa?
The U.S. administration is well aware that a formal legal reformulation
tailored exclusively to further US security interests would never gain the
widespread acceptance necessary to change the Charter or even customary
international law. But as Michael Byers observed, a de facto exceptionalism
might be accomplished indirectly, for instance "by introducing increased
ambiguity and thus providing more scope for power and influence in the
application of the rules to specific circumstances." 4
However, granting one or few great powers a privileged authority (either
formally or informally) over assessment and thwarting of aggressive threats can
hardly be reconciled with the principles of the international order, especially in
the area as sensitive as the international peace and security.
4. Weakening of International Norms and Institutions
There are additional problems with the argument that radical times require
radical means, reaching beyond the risk of the open-ended and ultimately
anarchic resorts to force. They entail also broader doctrinal difficulties.
Introducing into international law a rule incapable of defining workable legal
83. Arthur Schlessinger Jr., Eyeless in Iraq, 50 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 24 (Oct. 23, 2003).
84. Michael Byers, Pre-emptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal
Change, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 171, 184 (2003).
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limits on the defensive use of force, would mean, as Bothe pointed out, "that
the validity of the prohibition of the use of force itself will be in jeopardy." 5
There must remain at least some objective, non-political, standard by
which the military actions of States can be evaluated and either supported or
condemned as illegitimate. Eliminating even the minimum legal standards
(albeit partly unclear and controversial) and replacing them with purely
subjective judgments would mean to deprive international law on the use of
force of its normative character. In words of Thomas Franck: "a general
relaxation of Article 51s prohibitions on unilateral war-making to permit
unilateral recourse to force whenever a State feels potentially threatened could
lead to a reductio ad absurdum" and would "negate any role for law."86
IV. CONCLUSION
It is safe to say that the basic underlying assumptions of the doctrine of
self-defence no longer accurately reflect the geo-strategic realities characterized
by unconventional, asymmetric warfare, launched by trans-national terrorist
groups or other ostensibly undeterrable international actors. Law should of
course be sensitive to the new realities if it is to retain its normative power, but
cautiousness is needed as to the degree of modification. Its potential adaptation
seems to be more a matter of a careful re-interpretation of the existing rules
rather then dropping them altogether.
The challenges attending a more permissive approach to the unilateral use
of force require that any agenda relaxing the legal constraints on the unilateral
resort to force should be based on at least three main objectives. First,
prevention of the global security risks should remain a matter of collective
response. The Security Council is fully empowered to deal with every kind of
threat that States may confront, even with military force.87 This mechanism of
collective action has been created exactly with the purpose to replace the lack
of an objectively definable threshold of probability with regard to unspecified
and hypothetical future threats. Therefore, eventualpreventive military action
should be taken only with the prior Security Council authorization.
Second, in the context of modem warfare and shifts in strategic threats,
States may well need to use force without a prior Security Council authoriza-
tion, even when an armed attack is not temporally imminent, but the threat of
it is overwhelming. However, clear and objectively verifiable criteria for
85. Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR.J. INT'LL. 227, 237
(2003).
86. Franck, supra note 49, at 98.
87. Recently, the Council has also quite properly shown increasing willingness to characterize more
general security concerns including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as threats
to international peace and security.
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evaluation of the threat must first be developed to improve the unilateral
decision-making and to reduce the risk of error. An anticipatory action outside
the Security Council framework should be acceptable only after compelling
evidence is provided that there is a clear and present danger and that there are
no practical alternatives to a military strike
Finally, effective procedures and mechanisms of international review must
be established to screen every unilateral use of force and to ensure account-
ability in cases of abuse. Admittedly, this goal will be most difficult to achieve.
But until more effective procedures and mechanisms of accountability are
established, those powerful and creative governments that are prepared to use
force in bad faith will be able to overstretch any limits on the use of force to
provide a rationale for nearly any aggressive action not authorized by the
Security Council.
In conclusion, let me point out once more that taken as a whole, the
collective security system combined with a carefully re-interpreted doctrine of
self-defence would enable States to respond fully reactively, anticipatorily, or
preventively, to the necessities of the modern security environment. It is both
needless, as a matter of law, and too perilous for the stability of international
order, to eradicate the normative restraints on the unilateral preventive military
action. Such reality would only foster paranoiac aggression, not peace.
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THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO 9/11
Philip Towle*
It was politically and strategically unwise for the Bush administration to
use the term "war on terror" after 9/11. It should rather have considered itself,
and told the public, that the West was henceforward involved in a struggle
against Islamic radicals, such as al Qaeda. By calling the struggle a war, the
administration encouraged the pressure to increase the defense budget by forty-
five percent or by twenty-two percent when inflation is taken into account. Yet,
this is irrelevant or even counter-productive as far as the present struggle is
concerned.' Above all, the administration shifted attention away from the
essential battle for men's hearts and minds, and particularly for the support of
the Moslem world.
The United States administration built up the Islamists' cause when it
proclaimed a war on terror. Ironically, Bonnie Cordes of the Rand Corporation
had used exactly these words in 1987 to illustrate what Western governments
should not do when faced with terrorism, warning that "a war against
international terrorism" would be welcomed by terrorists because it confirmed
their fantasies that they were "at war" against the state, united the core terrorist
group, and strengthened their prestige in the community from which they
sprang.2 Just as the Carter administration made the fatal mistake of focusing on
the hostages held in Iran in the late 1970s and thereby built up the standing of
the Iranian government, so has the Bush administration staked everything on the
war on terror.3
What was novel about the tragedy on 9/11 was that terrorists were carrying
their struggle into the Western heartland. In retrospect, what is surprising is that
* Philip Towle is Reader in International Relations at the Centre of International Studies in
Cambridge where he has taught for the last 25 years. He was employed previously by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office for whom he attended negotiations on arms control in Geneva and New York. After
leaving the FCO he became a Senior Research fellow at the Australian National University where he wrote
on the naval balance in the Indian Ocean. The most recent of his nine books are "From Ally to Enemy:
Anglo-Japanese Military Relations. 1900-45" (Global Oriental, 2006) and, with Robert Jackson,
"Temptations of Power: The United States in Global Politics after 9/11" (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006).
1. CHRISTOPHER LANGTON, MILITARY BALANCE 2005-2006 15, 37 (2005).
2. BONNIE CORDES, Euroterrorists Talk About Themselves, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN
TERRORISM 326 (Paul Wilkinson et al. eds., 1987).
3. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER 516 (1983).
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past guerrilla wars were almost entirely confined to the Third World;4 the Viet
Minh did not attack metropolitan France directly and the Viet Cong did not
attack the United States. Now, that has changed partly because Palestinians set
the example at the Munich Olympics and beyond of conducting their struggle
against the Israelis in Europe, and partly because so many Moslems live in the
West and form a sea in which the Islamist fish can swim. This makes the
conflict very different from the historic insurgencies after the Second World
War, when the discomforted Western armed forces could withdraw from the
battlefield as the French did in 1954 and the Americans in 1973.
The insurgents have chosen the field of the current struggle; and the
United States efforts to shift this to the level where they have overwhelming
advantage-the conventional level-have been only ambiguously successful so
far in Afghanistan and an unmitigated calamity in Iraq. Yet, the increase in
defense expenditure since 9/11 encourages the tendency to take this type of
action. Given the overwhelming conventional superiority, which it already had
over any other state, the US can easily attack small states-as in the case of the
raid on Tripoli-or overthrow their governments as in Grenada in October 1983
and in Panama in December 1989. To undertake the much more ambitious
project of both removing a government and subsequently constructing another
may be possible when the will of the people has been broken in a prolonged and
bloody campaign, when the previous government has been totally discredited,
and when there is a large body of people waiting to take over the reins of power
who are sympathetic to the invaders. Most of these circumstances prevailed in
Germany, Italy, and Japan at the end of the Second World War. The allies sent
tens of thousands of troops into Japan and Germany expecting that resistance
might continue, but there was none whatsoever. Such conditions did not prevail
in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the consequence of Western intervention is to
expose weakness in the face of insurgency. The conventional wars had been
very short, the will of the Iraqi and Afghan people had not been broken, and in
the eyes of substantial minorities, previous regimes were not discredited.
Prospects for successful reconstruction were, therefore, grim.
Given terrorism's intrinsic link to mass politics, which have been
intensifying and spreading ever since 1789, destroying it, as the Bush admini-
stration has claimed to be doing, is no more realistic than the equally chiliastic
notion of abolishing conventional warfare has been for the League of Nations
and the UN. Unconventional warfare could only disappear if all great political
issues had been settled. But, if the ideological divisions of the twentieth
century have largely disappeared, other "causes" have appeared or reappeared
4. There were exceptions: Udham Singh assassinated Sir Michael O'Dwyer at a public meeting
in March 1940 in revenge for the Amritsar massacre two decades earlier. See ALFRED DRAPER, THE
AMRITSAR MASSACRE: TWILIGHT OF THE RAi (Buchan & Enright 1985) (1981).
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on the political screen. In Britain, animal rights groups have threatened to kill
to achieve their ends, and in the United States anti-abortionists have done the
same. Above all, religion, which was written out of politics at the start of the
twentieth century, has become an ever greater cause of dissension and violence.
Until the collapse of Yugoslavia, Western publics were religion-blind, they
cannot be so today.
We can then dismiss the notion of a war on terror, while admitting that the
United States and its allies are involved in what promises to be a very long
struggle against al Qaeda and its affiliates involving spasmodic violence and
continuous propaganda, while each side tries to break or bend the will of the
other. We can also see that al Qaeda's center of gravity is the will of its leaders,
and much more importantly in the long run, the sympathy that their aims evoke
in a wide constituency within the Moslem world. The assumption must be that
even if all current al Qaeda members were converted, captured, or killed, their
places could be taken by others. Ominously, sixty percent of Jordanians and
fifty-one percent of Pakistanis expressed "a lot" or "some" confidence in
Osama bin Laden in Pew's July 2005 poll.5
Mass sympathy for terrorism and guerrilla warfare makes it far more
difficult to compel such enemies to "do our will," using Clausewitzean
terminology, because we are no longer just dealing with governments or armed
forces, which might be said to have some collective will that can be coerced,
but a plethora of individual wills. Historians have suggested that it was, for
example, Eric Ludendorff's will which broke after the failure of the German
offensive in the spring of 1918.6 Once his will had given way, the Kaiser's
government made terms with the allies; it was, similarly, the Japanese
Emperor's immediate entourage who decided that their country had to accept
allied terms after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.7
In contrast, even when terrorist or guerrilla leaders negotiate terms, as the IRA
or the Palestinian Liberation Organization may be said to have done in recent
years, splinter groups of more extreme factions may continue the struggle and
undermine the old leadership. This is most likely when the insurgents have the
backing, tacit, or explicit, of large sections of the surrounding population. Thus,
even when such a struggle ends or tails off for a period, after a compromise has
been reached between the government and the insurgents, it is quite likely to
break out again at a later stage, as indeed the IRA struggle has from time to time
against the British and opposition by Hamas to the Israelis. This demonstrates
5. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western
Publics (July 14, 2005), available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportlD=248.htmt (last
visited Sept. 26, 2006).
6. DAVID STEVENSON, 1914-1918: THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 468 (2004).
7. ROBERT C. BUTOW, JAPAN'S DECISION TO SURRENDER (1954).
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only too clearly that the battle for hearts and minds of the wider public is the
heart of the struggle. Unless the vast majority can be convinced that the
compromise is fair, no peace will last.
While the fragmentation of willpower is in many ways an advantage to the
guerrillas, it is a disadvantage to democracies. Democratic people usually rally
around their government when a war or covert struggle begins, though there
will always be hesitations, particularly amongst the older sections of the
population, who have experience of previous conflicts, and the less educated,
who prefer their government to concentrate its attention on home affairs.' But,
as the struggle continues, it becomes steadily more difficult to maintain any sort
of democratic consensus because economic and human costs increase and
propaganda battles confuse opinion.
While apocalyptic visions of a clash between multiple civilizations may
seem to many people to be far-fetched, it is incontrovertible that the relation-
ship between the West and the Islamic world is steadily deteriorating and that
religion is becoming an ever more divisive issue.9 According to Pew, only
twenty-one per cent of Turks and twenty-two per cent of Pakistanis have a
favorable view of Christians, and no Lebanese or Jordanians were willing to
express sympathetic views of the Jews.'° Moreover, because of the asymmetry
between the conventional strength of the West and of the Islamic states, and
because this is a conflict between peoples--or by some Moslems against the
West, though not yet, vice versa-rather than countries, it manifests itself in
guerrilla warfare and terrorism waged by the Islamists. In these respects, the
new struggle contrasts with the Cold War, which was not a conflict between
peoples; there was no personal antagonism between the mass of Russians and
Americans, Britons and Poles. The confrontation in the northern hemisphere at
least was between two societies, each trying to prove that it was superior both
at producing weapons and at providing its people with the better standard of
living. The Soviet challenge disintegrated when its people gradually realized
how far their conditions had lagged behind the West. At the same time, Mikhail
Gorbachev and his colleagues appreciated that the Soviet armed forces could
no longer continue to compete with those fielded by the United States.
A closer parallel with the present confrontation between the West and the
Islamists was that between the Western countries and the Japanese in the 1930s
and 1940s. In that case too, a non-Western people were encouraged by their
leaders to become incensed by their victimization and humiliation at Western
8. JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1973). See generally Robert W.
Oldendick & Barbara Ann Bardes, Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions, 46-3 THE PUBLIC OPINION
QUARTERLY 368 (Autumn 1982).
9. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLDORDER
(Touchstone ed., 1997).
10. See Pew Global Attitudes Project, supra note 5.
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hands. They had been forced by the United States to open their ports to Western
trade and influence in the mid-nineteenth century; Western people had pushed
their way into Japan but insisted on not being subject to Japanese courts;
Japanese hopes of having a clause espousing racial equality in the League
Covenant had been rejected by the Western countries led by Australia; the
export of Japanese goods had been, to some extent, restricted in the 1930s by
Western tariffs despite the fact that Japan could not live from its own resources
because its expanding population depended upon trade to survive. All these
grievances coalesced with general resentment about discrimination against
Japan not to produce insurgency because the Japanese hoped to win in battle,
but a conventional war to the death between Western soldiers and Japanese."
The Emperor's troops did not surrender, they fought indomitably and died
where they stood in Burma, the Philippines, and Manchuria; and they tortured
or killed many of the Western soldiers, who surrendered, and Chinese,
Indonesians, and other Asian civilians whom they suspected of sympathizing
with the enemy. The Japanese completely rejected the League of Nations as a
Western construct designed to preserve the status quo to their disadvantage.
The present British Secretary of State for Defense, John Reid claimed in
a speech on February 20, 2006 that the West confronts "an unprecedented
enemy" today. We face, he said:
[A]n adversary which revels in mass murder; which sets out to cause
the greatest pain it can to innocent people; which is entirely
unconstrained by any law; which sees all civilians, including women
and children not as non-combatants but as easy targets; which sees
terror as a key part of its arsenal, and which both glorifies and
operates suicide bombers. It is an enemy, unfettered by any sense of
morality-indeed it is spurred on by a perverse perception ofmorality
to achieve ever-greater extent of civilian carnage. 12
In fact, every one of these characteristics applied to the Axis in the Second
World War and particularly to the Japanese, though also (apart from suicide
bombers) to Nazi Germany in its genocidal drive against the Jews, and East
European peoples whom it planned to exterminate or enslave.
11. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOTA ISHIMARU, JAPAN MUST FIGHT BRITAIN (Capt. G.V. Rayment
trans., 1936); HOSOYA CHIHIO, Britain and the US in Japan's view of the international system: 1919-1937,
in ANGLO-JAPANESE ALIENATION 1919-1952: PAPERS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE ON THE
HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 2 (Ian Nish ed., 1982).
12. Speech by John Reid MP, Secretary of State for Defense, to Kings College, London (Feb. 20,
2006), available at http://www.mod.uk/Defencelnternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/SpeechBy
JohnReidMpSecretaryOfStateForDefenceToKingsCollegeLondonOn2OFebruary2006.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2006).
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The Islamists and their supporters today, and the German and Japanese
Armies in the past, were fully aware of Western moral and judicial codes and
did not argue against them; rather they bypassed them. The Nazis never
admitted to murdering Jews and East Europeans, and the Japanese never
admitted to torturing and killing prisoners. In fact, the Japanese government
claimed to be operating in accord with international law. But, Tokyo in the
1930s and 1940s and the Islamists today have an interpretation of history,
which to their way of thinking overrides the dictates of morality. The Islamist
believes that the Umma has been persecuted for centuries by the West; that the
attack on the Turkish Empire in the First World War, the colonization of the
Middle East afterwards, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the recent
wars in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are all the continuation of a premeditated
and historic Western "Crusade" against Islam. Furthermore, the Moslems
cannot fight back in a conventional fashion; their armies were defeated by
Israel, Britain, and France in 1956, by Israel in 1967 and 1973, and by the
United States, Britain, and their allies in 1991 and 2003. Therefore, they have
to fight as guerrillas or terrorists against Israel in particular and the West in
general; and this gives them the right to dismiss the principles of the Just War
and the rules of international law.
Just as the Japanese militarists in the 1930s had both wide-ranging com-
plaints against Western behavior over the previous eighty years, and the
specific demand to set up a unipolar Asian international system centered on
Tokyo, without Western interference, so the Islamists have both specific and
general demands. Their general complaints are often against Western secular-
ism and Christianity, hedonism and commercialism, and the spread of these
values to their own societies through the media, commerce, and travel-the
processes of globalization, which also first opened Japan to Western influence.
As the Saudi Imam, Dr Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis preached in July 2005:
The most dangerous weapon which the enemy has raised against us-
with which he tore to pieces our order, and with which he soiled our
spiritual and social purity, is the terrible deluge of all manner of vice,
which is considered a form of moral terrorism against the values,
ideals, and virtues of the Islamic nation. [This war is waged] by
means of licentious satellite channels and the vile spider webs of the
Internet, whose gloom fills the sky with darkness and spreads its
stench in all directions. 3
13. Dr. Abd AI-Rahman AI-Sudayyis, Friday Sermon on air Saudi Arabia's Channel 1 (July 15,
2005), available at http://memri.orgfbin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&lD-SP93905 (last visited
Oct. 4, 2006).
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Such attacks are often accompanied by paranoia about Western institutions
and plans. The previous month, the Egyptian historian, Abd Al-Aziz claimed
on Saudi television that the Second Vatican Council had decided in 1965 to
impose Christianity on the whole world and that the World Council of Churches
had followed this up by delegating the mission to the United States in January
2001.14 In response, the administration had itself carried out the attacks on 9/11
and pinned responsibility upon Moslems.15 But, if Islamists argue that the West
is engaged in a general attack on Moslem values, Osama bin Laden and others
have had specific demands, including justice for the Palestinians and the
removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia, and now from other Islamic states
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, concern about Western intervention
in Moslem states has resonance amongst other Moslems; fifty-three percent of
British Moslems said the July 2005 bombings on the London underground were
connected with the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq. 6
The war in Iraq was a major distraction for the United States administra-
tion from the covert struggle against al Qaeda. Worse still, the Iraq War
solidified the support amongst Moslems for the idea that the West was bent on
humiliating the Umma. Infractions of the law of war further increased the
general anger after publicity about the mistreatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib
and Camp Breadbasket, and British soldiers' beating of rioters in Basra. There
were even more serious examples of torture, and even killing. Thus, Iraqi
General Abed Hamed Mowhoush was savagely beaten by Chief Warrant
Officer Lewis Welshofer and a number of assistants, probably from the CIA.
Subsequently, he was asphyxiated in a sleeping bag. Welshofer and the defense
witnesses claimed at his trial that he had been encouraged to torture prisoners
by senior officers including General Robert Mixon. 7 Whether this is true or
not, such incidents expose the hypocrisy of Western claims to have outlawed
torture and create the climate of opinion in Moslem countries which has, for
example, led to the anti-US film, "Valley of the Wolves-Iraq" breaking box
office records in Turkish cinemas within days of its release.'" Given that
moderate Moslem opinion is the center of gravity in this struggle, this outcome
is equivalent to a major defeat in a conventional war.
14. Professor Zaynab Abd AI-Aziz, Interview of Egyptian Historian on Saudi Iqra TV (May 26,
2005), available athttp:/memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area-sd&ID=SP92005 (last visited Oct.
4, 2006).
15. See generally id.
16. Ipsos MORI, Attitudes of British Muslims, July 23, 2005, available at http://www.ipsos-
mori.com/polls/2005/s050722.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
17. Marc Kusntez, Diary, The London Review of Books (Feb. 23, 2006).
18. Suna Erdem, Turks swap sides as warfilm turns US intofoe, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 17,
2006, at 43.
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Anglo-American actions since 9/11 have thus been largely counter-
productive to the struggle against al Qaeda. The most significant writer on
counter-insurgency to date is Sir Robert Thompson, who participated in the
successful British struggle against communist insurgents in Malaya during the
1950s. Thompson formulated a number of principles which any government
engaged in such a struggle should uphold. His first principle was that the
government should have a clear political aim. The United States and Britain
have confused their aims by invading Iraq and formulating Quixotic schemes
for "democratizing the Middle East." Thompson's second principle was that the
government should function in accordance with the law as "a government
which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a
government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law." Abu Ghraib,
Camp Breadbasket, the death of General Mowhoush, and others, the conditions
in Guantanamo speak for themselves. Thirdly, Thompson argued, the govern-
ment must have an overall plan covering "all political, social, economic,
administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the
insurgency." Only thus would overlapping be avoided. Fourthly, "the govern-
ment must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas." In
other words, in this case, it is far more important to erode sympathy for al
Qaeda in the wider Moslem community than to hunt down Osama bin Laden;
and this is linked to Thompson's fifth point that a government must secure its
base area, in this case, the United States homeland before worrying about
operations overseas. Thompson was writing about insurgency in the Third
World but it is clear that the British and American governments have failed to
heed his advice about how to wage a war against unconventional forces of any
type. The penalties will be severe.' 9
The West has not effectively undermined the historical argument which
underlies the Islamist case. It has failed to point out that it has often protected
Moslems and Moslem societies. Britain spent most of the nineteenth century
trying to protect the Turkish Empire, it was only when London discovered its
isolation during the Boer war and its inability to protect Constantinople, that
British policy changed.2° This left Turkey free to join the German side in the
First World War. If Western countries took over much of the Middle East after
the First World War, they had to find some way of ruling this region following
the collapse of the Turkish Empire. Nor did Britain plan the emergence of a
Jewish state, what it promised was a Jewish "homeland" within Palestine. In
1991, the United States, Britain, and France fought to expel Iraq from the
Moslem state of Kuwait; the United States forced the Serbs to compromise with
19. SIR ROBERT THOMPSON, 4 DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY: EXPERIENCES FROM MALAYA
AND VIETNAM (1966).
20. ZARA S. STEINER, BRITAIN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 23 (1977).
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the Moslem Bosniaks at Dayton in November 1995; and NATO expelled the
Serb army from the predominantly Moslem province of Kosovo by attacking
Serbia itself from March to June 1999. Until about this point the West was
religion-blind. It is only gradually that attitudes have changed, but, even now,
Westerners do not usually express hostility towards Moslems. Immediately
after the Islamist bombings on the London Underground in July 2005, fifty-five
percent of Americans expressed a favorable view of American Moslems and a
majority denied that Islam encouraged violence. 21 Sixty percent dismissed the
claim that there was a clash of civilizations as opposed to a clash with a small
22Islamist group.
All this is particularly important because the struggle against al-Qaeda can
only be won if Moslem groups in the West do not feel alienated and isolated.
There is a consensus that good intelligence is the key to defeating terrorist
groups. Such intelligence can come from electronic intercepts, from the wider
Moslem community, or from terrorists who have been won over. Politicians
often claim to want terrorists destroyed, but dead terrorists take their secrets to
the grave, one who has been "turned" is invaluable to the government. This is
unlikely to happen when captured terrorists are congregated together and
physically mistreated. Weak, former drifters are much more likely to be
affected by probing into their past, trying to make them feel there are others
who sympathize with their former loneliness beyond the Islamist group, playing
on their psychological weaknesses. Tough-minded terrorist leaders need to be
challenged on their own theological ground by Moslems, who dispute the
historical and theological justifications they have been using to defend random
violence in the same way that communist interrogators turned the old
Bolsheviks' faith in communism against themselves during the Moscow show
trials in the 1930s. 3
Attempts to bend captured terrorists to the will of Western governments
must be attuned to their psychology. Jerrold Post, Professor of Psychiatry at
George Washington University discerned, in terrorists in general, a
[T]endency to externalize, to seek outside sources to blame for
personal inadequacies. Other prominent traits were a defensive
grandiosity, an exaggerated self-absorption with little regard for the
feelings of others . . . they had split off the devalued parts of
themselves and projected them on to the establishment which then
became the target of their violent aggression ... troubled family
21. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Views ofMuslim-Americans holdsteady
afterLondon bombings, July 26,2005, available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageJD-982
(last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
22. Id.
23. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (Daphne Hardy trans., Penguin Books 1964) (1940).
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backgrounds [mean] many terrorists have an incomplete psychosocial
identity and an exaggerated need to belong. 4
Post said the West German police had found that twenty-five percent of
terrorists had lost one or both parents by age fourteen and a third had convic-
tions before juvenile courts.2 5 Many had failed in their jobs or schools; they
were isolated failures who made the terrorist group the family they had never
enjoyed.
This aptly describes many of the individuals who have become prominent
amongst Islamist terrorists and particularly those living in the West; Osama bin
Laden himself had a marginalized childhood in his wealthy family because of
his mother's nationality and position as a concubine;26 Asif Iqbal and Ruhal
Ahmed, two of those Britons held by United States forces had been convicted
earlier of attacking someone with a hammer; Moazzam Begg, another of the
Guantanamo Britons had been educated in a Jewish school in the British
Midlands, lost his mother when he was young and dropped out of university
before joining a radical Moslem group;27 Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber" led
the life of a drifter and petty criminal in south London before being converted
to Islam in Brixton jail; Abu Hamza, who preached murder for years at the
Finsbury Mosque and is accused of helping to kidnap Westerners in Aden, was
a nightclub bouncer, and as so often with Moslem extremists, a womanizer
before he became an Islamist and went to Afghanistan where he lost his hands
and one eye;2" Omar Khayam, who pretended to be a suicide bomber at the
protests in London in February 2006 against the publication of cartoons about
Mohammed, was a convicted drug dealer on probation.29 And so the litany
continues.
But how do Western governments bend the will of those who have failed
within their societies and want to kill or maim as many Western people as
possible? Post argued that where possible, benign neglect was the best policy
because; if a powerful Western government focused attention on the terrorists,
it would inflate their prestige and encourage others toj oin the cause. Deterrence
would not work because terrorists were not afraid of death and threats would
confirm their paranoia and their belief that they were righteous warriors
24. J.M. POST, Group and Organizational Dynamics of Political terrorism: Implications for
Counterterrorist policy, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM 307 (Paul Wilkinson et al. eds.,
1987).
25. Id.
26. Ben Macintyre, The real Osama, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 19, 2001, at 2.
27. Richard Wolffe, What went wrong with my schoolfriend?, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 6,2003.
28. Rajeev Syal, Hooked on Hamza, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 2006, at 4.
29. Richard Ford & Daniel McGrory, Drug dealing 'suicide bomber' is jailed again for breach of
parole, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 8, 2006 at 27.
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engaged in a full-scale war against a hostile state. He believed that governments
should concentrate on trying to dissuade new recruits fromj oining the terrorists
not least by an extensive information policy, and that takes us back to the
historical arguments outlined above.
In the case of the Islamists, benign neglect has failed; Abu Hamza and
others like him were able for years to promote and plan murder. Discouraging
recruits from joining the terrorists is crucial but there will always be some who
fail and some Moslems who feel disorientated in the West. On the other hand,
governments have made little effort to use this in the propaganda battle. There
has been an utter failure to point out that the terrorists are united by their guilt
about their youthful activities-bin Laden's period in the Beirut discotheques
is archetypal. What the Islamists are doing is expiating their own feelings of
guilt by threatening or killing Western people. Nor have Western governments
pointed out that they are dealing with an abject bunch of social failures, petty
drug smugglers, violent semi-deranged individuals who are no advertisement
for the Moslem cause. Attacking them, as John Reid did, for not abiding by the
values accepted by most of the international community is a waste of time
because emotionally, they need to belong to the Islamist family, while on the
rational level they argue that their history and situation gives them the right to
override or reject these values.
The conclusion is obvious. The West's primary defenses are the police and
the intelligence services which have the task of tracking down terrorists before
they can attack and persuading them to divulge their secrets. The West's
offensive capacity is not primarily made up of its armed forces, which are a
weapon of last resort, but its "soft power," its ability to win over the mass of
Moslem people. The West has become flabby during the years when the BBC,
CNN, Hollywood, Reuters, and Associated Press dominated the media. That
age has gone with the development of the internet and satellite television
stations in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Saudi Imam quoted above shows
that these developments have caused concern in the Moslem world as well as
the West and many of the problems they cause are, indeed, common to all states
and peoples. But Western governments need to make at least as much effort as
they did during the Cold War to develop a coherent media policy. Every action
they take must be judged by its impact around the world and particularly, on the
Umma. The funds wasted on building up Western conventional forces and
invading Iraq would have been incomparably more effective if they had been
directed to winning hearts and minds. This is the "great struggle" ahead which
will last throughout our lifetime and which we need to address with the same
sort of intellectual focus and determination which was employed on the analysis
of nuclear deterrence and arms control during the Cold War years.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rules relating to the use of force are among the traditional concerns of
international law. "Although nowadays provisions of the United Nations
Charter mark the starting point in debates about the legality of the use of force
* Doctoral candidate, Columbia University Law School, specializing in international and
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under international law," until 1945 theologians and international law theorists
worked to define limits on permissible use of force.1
The horrifying consequences of World Ward II promoted a trend to restrict
all means of the use of force, imposing legal restraints on the legitimacy of
states to go to war, as well as on the means used in time of war. The victors of
World War II re-cast the rules of the use of force, especially through the
establishment of the UN Charter in 1945 and the Geneva Conventions in 1949.
Ultimately, this trend was represented by the manifest desire of the
international community to limit the use of force only to "international legal
personalities," namely states,2 and thus impose clear limits on the conditions by
which states may invoke the permissible use of force; and to create a distinction
between combatants and noncombatants; a distinction that alludes to what I
view as a distinction between war among states and war among nations.
Holding this aspiration, the international community provided an explicit
limit to the use of force, permissible only for performing an act of self-defense,
as articulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.3 In time, the language of Article
51 proved not to be without ambiguities.4 Among these ambiguities is the
discussion on the precise meaning of the term "if an armed attack occurs."5
This has been the subject of many articles and other discussions. However, in
my view, this discussion ought to be led by a wide perspective of the
international right to self-defense. Wide perspective requires not a mere inquiry
of the historical cases in which the right to self-defense was invoked, or a
limited discussion on the context for which Article 51 was established. Instead,
wide perspective requires a deep interaction between, what I view as, vertical
and horizontal analysis.
From the vertical point of view, it is remarkable that the international right
to self-defense is a genuine product of the interplay between the law of war and
international law. The development of the doctrine ofjus ad bellum (the right
to go to war) was reinstated by the international community following World
War II, but this time with new restricted borders. The international community
deemed it of much importance to prohibit all means of the use of force under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and thus promoted a new era of peace and
1. MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 504
(West Group 2001) (1997).
2. See generally Charter of the UnitedNations (providing that "[aill members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state...."); see also Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law, in JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN
R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
APPROACH 6 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter: DRW].
3. Charter of the United Nations, art. 51 (providing a general prohibition on the use of force).
4. See id.
5. Id.
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security.' Nevertheless, considering the right to self-defense as an inherent
right of every sovereign state,7 the international community has acknowledged
the right to self-defense as "permissible use of force." This was the
"Exception" and not the rule. Therefore, it is the notion of limiting states'
power to go to war, limited only to actions of self-defense. Yet the question is:
limited to what extent? This is a question for the horizontal analysis to answer.
Horizontal analysis invites to the discussion a parallel phenomenon; it is
the domestic theory of self-defense-the original grounds of the concept of self-
defense. It is true: one may plausibly argue against the application of a
domestic theory over the international sphere, mainly because the actor is a
human being in the former case, and a state in the latter. Nonetheless, it has
never been denied that the legal philosophy behind both of them is alike.
Moreover, the domestic theory can elaborate on the international theory by
showing the need to restrict self-defense to an "armed attack," which of course
does not include all kinds of "threats." Thus, a sensitive interplay between the
two theories may provide the international legal community with a plain and
defined notion of self-defense, and thus help to avoid misuse of the vagueness
of the contemporary interpretation granted to the international right to self-
defense.
Therefore, in the first section, I present the romantic notion of the law of
war, by which I mean the traditional concept of the law of war, which is best
illustrated by the almost unlimited power to use force both against military
targets and civilian targets, and accordingly the horrific implications of such an
understanding of the concept. In the second section, I address the post-World
War II transition toward what I view as "the golden age of the law of war,"
namely the post-Charter era, focusing on the outstanding limits imposed by the
international community on the use of force. That is, deeming the law of war
as war between states, rather than nations, as well as drafting a general
prohibition on the use of force, except in self-defense. Focusing on the
exception for the general prohibition of the use of force, in the third section I
challenge the traditional reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter. I provide
three possible defense arguments under Article 51: 1) reactive; 2)
anticipatory/preemptive; and 3) preventive. The reactive approach is a very
restrictive form of the right to self-defense, for which an act of self-defense is
permissible only in response to an armed attack that had already occurred or to
an imminent threat of an armed attack. The anticipatory/preemptive approach
is a broader form of self-defense. It includes a potential, but not visible, threat
that has not reached a level of "imminent threat." Finally, the preventive
6. Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
7. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (4th ed. Aspen Publishers
2003) (1988).
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approach is the broadest and almost the unlimited form of self-defense. It
includes threats that have not yet emerged at all. They are not even potential
threats. They are solely threats that might emerge one day. Inquiring these
three defense arguments, I assert that the international right to self-defense
should be limited solely to reactive self-defense, by which I mean in response
to an armed attack or to an imminent threat of an armed attack. This position
is best advocated by the general and consistent trend of the international
community to restrict all means of the use of force, and ultimately by
understanding the essential features of the domestic theory of self-defense. In
my view, adopting any defense argument other than the restrictive one would
miss the goal that Article 51 was hoped to achieve. Finally, I conclude by
criticizing the rise of the preventive approach as a legitimate ground for
permissible use of force, argued to be the necessary approach in the
contemporary "Age of Terrorism" as well as in the age of the non-conventional
and nuclear arming.
II. ROMANTICS AT WAR: 8 NATIONS AND THE "UNLIMITED" Jus AD BELLUM
Medieval writers distinguished betweenjus ad bellum, the justice of war,
andjus in bello, the justice in war.' Jus ad bellum requires making judgments
about aggression and self-defense. Jus in bello is "about the observance or
violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement."'" The distinction
between war among nations and war among states is of significant importance
under the theory ofjus in bello. " One of the important questions, therefore, is
who takes part in the war.
Nationhood refers to people--ordinary people-who may or may not have
a state. Something stronger than a state bounds the people together. That is the
Shakespearean narrative of brotherhood (family-hood), 2 which encompasses
a national identity for the people. The nation bears the factors that constitute
8. In his book, Professor George Fletcher provides a novel analysis of the law of war from a
romantic perspective. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTiCs AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF
TERRORISM (2002). On the theory ofRomanticism, see ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM (Henry
Hardy ed., Princeton University Press 2001) (1999). In the context of the law of war, I provide the
romanticism theory as binoculars by which I can view traditional views throughout modem ones.
9. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 1, at 505.
10. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT wITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (3d ed. 2000).
11. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 47, 58 ("This body of rules that legitimates conduct otherwise
subject to punishment.").
12. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE OF HENRY V ACT 4, SC. 3 ("[W]e band of brothers; For he
today that sheds his blood with me [s]hall be my brother .. "). The Notion of the brotherhood was raised
again in the context of the American war on Iraq and on Afghanistan, namely a "war for honor and glory."
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each individual-the language, the history, the culture, the bond between
geography and self. " The "nation" is what people feel "part of," rather than
merely "belong to." It is one large entity, which has its own existence; it is a
"self." "Nation" is personal; people have loyalty to it, e.g. they can betray the
nation whether it is embodied in a state or not. The nation acts in history,
achieving greatness and committing crimes, and for its glory as well as its
shame. The nation must receive a share of both the credit and the blame. "
Literally, the concept of nation is derived etymologically from the Latin none
natio (birth). That is, the nation includes all those born and unborn. 5 Unlike
a nation, a state is a political entity. It has no "self' existence. It is derived
from the "will of the people" and for the "will of the people." State is what
people "belong to," but not necessarily what they feel "part of." If the people are
part of the nation, it follows that the nation comes first, and thus legitimizes the
establishment of the state. Unlike "nation," state is timeless; it does not exist in
time. State is not about death and birth, but about organization of power.
Reading the general context of the Lieber Code, 6 deemed as the first
original and official codified rules on the law of war, 7 it is more likely that
Francis Lieber viewed the war as among nations. For Lieber, not only
combatants take part in the warfare but also noncombatants, as best illustrated
by Article 20, which provides: "[P]ublic war is a state of armed hostility
between sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and requisite.., called
states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and
retrograde together, in peace and in war."8 However, Lieber was not off track
in his time. Six months after the Lieber Code came into existence Abraham
Lincoln delivered his famous Gettysburg address, invoking precisely the
establishment of"a new nation."' 9 This was, therefore, a notion of warfare in
the shadow of nationhood: "A war energetically carried on cannot be entirely
13. The sense of nationhood has played a great role in American history. See FLETCHER, supra note
8, at Xiii.
14. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 139.
15. Id. at 140. When Lincoln cast his regard back "four score and seven years," he thought not of
the American people but of the American nation as the concept embracing generations over time.
16. U.S. War Department, General Orders No. 100 (1863), reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER&
JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988) (1973).
17. It is "the first" in the sense that it had a large impact not only on the United States but also on
other comparative jurisprudences. If I had to describe its importance in two words, I would say "Universal
Code."
18. U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT, supra note 16, at art. 20 (emphasis added). See also id at art. 21
("[T]he citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state
or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.").
19. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, GETTYSBURG ADDRESS (Nov. 19,1863). Note: this isan outmoded notion
of the 19th century, which replaced the notion of warfare as among religions.
2006] Wattad 209
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
confined to acts against the enemy under arms and his means of defense, but it
will tend also to cause the destruction of his materials and moral resources. No
consideration can be given to the dictates of humanity, such as consideration for
persons and property, unless they are in accordance with the nature and object
of the war." 20
Ultimately, the Lieber Code represents the romantic notion of the law of
war-a common perception until the end of the 19th century-namely war
between nations. The romantic war at its best is the escape of the quotidian and
the pursuit of glory.2' Every citizen, every woman, every child, and every
soldier are all alike. They are all-combatants in the field, they all have the glory
of the victory and the shame of the defeat, and thus they all have the right to kill
and the risk to be killed. This is the romantic thinking; the nation acts as a
character in the drama of war and reconciliation. It is an entity of the people;
each is a major component of this united fabric. This is a war of all people,
namely the nation is the actor in the battlefield. The "nation" is the soldier.22
That is, once there is a war, all are part of it, and therefore individuals do not
exist anymore; they disappear merely as being part of the nation. They become
a legitimate target, exactly as they are legitimized for targeting others.23 This
I view as a notion of "heavy war," where no limits on warfare, and where no
protected person exists. It is a war with one ultimate goal: "winning the war."24
However, the romantic perspective of the law of war affected not only the
jus in bello, but also thejus ad bellum doctrine, which concerns itself with the
justice of war. Akin to the ultimate unlimited notion ofjus in bello, the 19th
century imposed fewer restraints, if any, on the right to go to war. It is true: the
international community recognized the legitimacy to self-defense long before
the United Nations ever existed. Nonetheless, the right to self-defense was
20. See PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR, AN AMERICAN STORY 71 (2000) (quoting German
General Staffs Manual of Land Warfare (Kriegsge brauchim Landkriege)).
21. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 17.
22. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH "THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON
REvISITED," (1999) (Rawls uses the word "people" synonymously with "nation").
23. On the "equal right to kill," see WALZER, supra note 10, at 41. See also FLETCHER, supra note
8, at 92.
24. This notion of "heavy war" is a flawed approach, as it exposes innocent people, who are not
willing to take part in the warfare, to the harsh conditions of the war, merely because they are part of the
nation. See also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862) (J. Nelson, dissenting). On the issue ofcollective guilt,
see FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 37.
25. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PARADIGM 72 (1993); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5 (1963). See also Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in
Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 128
(1999) (discussing the justification of military action in response to the threat that Iraq poses).
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recognized as a vague concept, 26 it was deemed to be more a right to self-
preservation, 27 namely an absolute right, laying at the foundation of all of the
other rights of states.28 This was the case until World War II ended.
III. THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE LAW OF WAR: LIMITING STATES' POWER
World War II exposed an inevitable need for re-casting the international
rules on the use of force. This was an urgent requisite to minimize, to the
greatest extent possible, the exceptions for the use of force. The international
community, therefore, promoted the emergence of the UN Charter in 1945 and
the Geneva Conventions in 1949. Both documents came into the world with a
new terminology on the law of war. The UN Charter limited the international
legal personality to states, and provided a general prohibition on the use of
force, subject to exceptions.29 In the same vein, the Geneva Conventions
enhanced the international community with the concept of protected persons, °
as distinguished from states, more precisely, from the combatant forces (the
military). In sum, the UN Charter provided a new meaning for the jus ad
bellum,31 and the Geneva Conventions superseded the romantic meaning of the
jus in bello. It is in my view a clear transition from the concept of nationhood
to the idea of statehood.
Accordingly, the modern law of war has restricted the reciprocal
relationship to combatants. Only combatants are subject to being killed, and
therefore only combatants enjoy the collective right to use force.32 The 1949
Geneva Convention changed the romantic meaning of war: sick people,
civilians, and prisoners "cannot be touched., 33 It is a new concept of what I
view as "light war," namely, the ultimate goal of the war is not simply winning
26. Louis HENKIN, RIGHT V. MIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37 (2d ed.
1991).
27. As once argued byjurist William Hall: "[International law has] no alternative but to accept war,
independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set up. See WILLIAM E.
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 200 1).
28. JANIS, supra note 7, at 189.
29. Charter of the United States, supra note 2.
30. Sick people, civilians, and prisoners.
31. W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 279, 281 (1985) (providing criteria for the justification of the lawful use of force in international
law).
32. See FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 54.
33. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973. See SHAKESPEARE, supra
note 122; (Henry V orders his troops neither to humiliate the French language nor to touch the church, women
and children. These are innocent persons, unlike the prisoners whom he orders to kill). See also Department
of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2 5(G) (2003).
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the war, but rather keeping noncombatants away from the atrocities of war. In
the same vein, the UN Charter limited the right to self-defense, both individual
and collective, to states.34 States are the ultimate subject of the Charter; hence
it is only for the military forces (the "lawful combatants") to use force.
Unfortunately, whereas the need to restrict the gross means used in the
battlefield has been in large consensus among the international community, the
meaning and the essence of a state's right to self-defense is still in dispute.35
That is, what are the borders of the right to self-defense? Under what
circumstances may a state invoke it? Is it derived from the same rationales as
the domestic right to self-defense? What difference does it make, if any? Is
there any interplay between the rules of the UN Charter and the unwritten rules
of international law of the pre-Charter era, what modem international lawyers
call Customary International Law?
IV. STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
On June 5, 1967, the turmoil between Israel and its neighboring Arab
states escalated into a military confrontation, as Israel commenced a series of
air strikes on the Egyptian air forces. Apparently, the crisis had its origin in
reports circulated by Soviet officials in mid-May, to the United Arab Republic
(UAR),36 that Israel was amassing its forces on the Syrian border.37 Upon
learning that, Egypt amassed its troops on Israel's border, closed the Straits of
Tiran to Israeli shipping, and secured command control over the armies of
Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. In addition, Egypt had engaged in hostile propaganda
against Israel, and President Nasser of Egypt had repeatedly made bellicose
threats, including the total destruction of Israel.38 The scope and intensity of
Egypt's buildup, together with the mobilization of virtually every Arab army,
was observed with near-panic in Israel. For Israel, the Egyptian attack was only
hours away, and, therefore, Israel launched the first strike on June 5, 1967.
34. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 3. This is unlike the right to self-defense under the
Rome Statute of 1998, which grants individuals the right to self-defense. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37
I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Cf Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 31 (July 9).
35. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 659 (2d ed. 1987).
36. A country that existed as a union between Egypt and Syria, established on February 1, 1958.
37. WALZER, supra note 10, at 82-83.
38. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL
20-21 (1988); MICHAEL B. OREN, Six DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE
EAST 75, 97, 108-09 (2002).
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Whereas Israelis believed that Israel's use of force was justified by the
dramatic threatening events of the previous weeks, Arab states argued that in
the absence of an armed attack, Israel was not allowed to use any means of
force under the UN Charter.39 That is, unless an armed attack had occurred,
Israel was not allowed to invoke a right to self-defense. Nevertheless, the
United Nations Security Council took no position, as to whether Israel acted
under self-defense or not. The Israeli attacks were neither proscribed nor
praised.4° The question, therefore, is whether Israel could have argued any
defensible position under international law?
Under the UN Charter, which introduces the notion of a general
prohibition on the unilateral use of force by states,4 war is inherently unjust.
The only "justified war"4 would be a war against an aggressor,43 namely in
self-defense by a victim state." Under the terms of Article 5 1: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
",45defense if an armed attack occurs ....
Reading the simple words of Article 51, it becomes obvious that the
international community recognizes, ultimately, a limited right of permissible
use of force. However, the international right to self-defense was recognized,
though in other versions, long before the international community drafted or
ratified the UN Charter. The pre-Charter right to self-defense, known
nowadays as the inherent right to self-defense, is considered as not limited to
an armed attack. Nevertheless, given the vagueness of the right to self-defense
in the pre-Charter climate, known as customary international law, and the
narrowness of this right under the post-Charter, the question becomes, did this
customary international law survive the establishment of the UN Charter? If
yes, in which context, and to what extent?
39. AREND & BECK, supra note 25, at 76-77.
40. Matthew L. Sandgren, War Redefined in the Wake ofSeptember 11: Were the Attacks against
Iraq Justified?, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1, 15-16 (2003) (discussing the legitimacy of attacking Iraq).
41. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 2, at art. 2, para. 4.
42. In the fifth century, St. Augustine and other church fathers distinguished just from unjust wars,
arguing that:
[J]ust wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the nation or city
against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish wrongs
committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it. Further
that kind of war is undoubtedly just which God Himself ordains.
JANIS, supra note 7, at 171.
43. Compare G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 3, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., with U.N.
Doc AIRES/3314 (1974).
44. JANIS & NOYES, supra note 1, at 514.
45. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 2.
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE:
A RESTRICTED APPROACH
In time, the language of Article 51 proved not to be without ambiguities.
However, it has been accepted that the right to self-defense is subject to
limitations of "necessity" and "proportionality."'46 It has also been accepted that
self-defense includes both a right to repel an armed attack and to take the war
to the aggressor state,47 in order to terminate the attack and prevent a
recurrence. The ambiguity upon Article 51, therefore, is limited to the arguable
meaning of the term "if an armed attack occurs., 48  The question, therefore,
what is "permissible use of force" under Article 51 of the UN Charter?
A. Reactive Self-Defense
The reactive self-defense approach is derived from the precise meaning of
the term "if an armed attack occurs." That is, self-defense to an aggression that
is already done or in progress. The classic case49 is the war on Afghanistan,
which is regarded as a response to the September 11 attacks. Nonetheless, the
1967 Israeli-Egyptian case is more controversial, and thus raises the question
as to whether the term "if an armed attack occurs" includes "imminent threat"
as a legal ground for invoking the right to self-defense.50 Perhaps the mere
presence of the Egyptian army in Sinai was not grounds for launching a
"preemptive attack."'"
46. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 1, at 518.
47. I may note that the notion of taking the war to the aggressor state raises, in my view, several
interesting legal questions. The classic rationale behind the right to self-defense is to repel the aggression or
the threat of the aggression, but not to go after the aggressor to his "house" and continue the aggression. That
would be a clear case of excessive self-defense which is impermissible use of force. Whereas this rationale
plainly corresponds to the domestic right to self-defense, it might need to be addressed from a different angle
in the context of the international law. However, I leave this issue for a separate inquiry.
48. Charter of the United Nations, supra note 2. Note that in the lack of the word "unlawful,"
besides the term "armed attack," one may plausibly argue that once there is an armed attack, the other side
can respond as means of self-defense, but also the one that waged the first attack can respond to the attack
waged as means of self-defense, also as means of self-defense. Remember: unlike "aggression," "armed
attack" does not include in itself the unlawful feature of aggression. However, since I believe that the drafters
did not pay much attention to this term, the right to self-defense should be interpreted as limited to "unlawful
armed attack." Otherwise, it will be contrary to the rationale behind treating self-defense as permissible use
of force rather than aggression, namely as a defense of justification rather than an excuse.
49. It is arguable though if the right to self-defense might be invoked against non-state actor, e.g.,
Al-Qaeda or PLO. For instance, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 31 (July 9).
50. FLETCHER, supra note 38, at 21; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From
Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 222, 254 (2004).
51. As Eskol, the Israeli Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, at that time, argued. See
But, why would we include "imminent threat" if it is not mentioned
explicitly in Article 51? Is it necessarily built into the "inherent right to self-
defense?" I argue: "It is." To illustrate my argument, allow me to make an
analogy to domestic law, and address Goetz,52 an American homicide case, as
a case whose issue parallels the Israeli-Egyptian case. Goetz had been asked
for five dollars by four black guys in the subway of New York City.53 The
presence context of the request for five dollars was critical, as it could be
understood as intimidation or a simple request that could be declined,
depending on the tone and the circumstances. If the request was an act of threat
of coercion, the circumstances are much closer to an imminent attack, and
therefore the response of Goetz, shooting the four black youths,54 should be
considered as a legal act of self-defense. The idea is that once a person is
attacked, repelling the aggression is the right thing to do. A person does not
have to wait until the aggressor achieves his goal. Once there is "sufficient
evidence" for an imminent threat to be attacked, the victim is not required to
wait. Our focus therefore is on the coercion leading up to an arguable attack.
Once it is obvious, the victim may act. "The requirement of imminence means
that the time for the use of force will brook no delay."55 The defender cannot
wait any longer.56
What would be considered "an imminent threat" under this analysis?
When A' raises his arm toward B' in order to assault him, A' is not required to
wait. It is his right to repel this assault before reaching him. This is right as to
individuals, but how does that apply under international law, i.e. to states?
Allow me to take an advantage, again, of the 1967 Six Days of War.57 There
is no doubt that Egypt was attempting to intimidate Israel by behaving as
thought it was about to attack. All evidence indicated that Nasser would soon
stage a provocation,58 and thus "every delay was a gamble with the Israel's
survival."59 Therefore, though Israel could have waited to be actually attacked,
OREN, supra note 38, at 134. Note that it is possible that Egypt had already breached international law by
closing the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
52. See generally New York v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986).
53. Id. at 100.
54. Id.
55. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAw 133 (1998).
56. See also The Model Penal Code, § 3.04, and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 L.L.M. 999.
57. See OREN, supra note 38.
58. As General Yariv informed Eshkol. See id. at 97.
59. As Netanyahu, a platoon commander in the paratroopers wrote to his girlfriend back home. Id.
at 98.
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the requirement of imminence does not mean that bombs must be in the air.
The actions of the Arab states were irrevocable steps toward war, were rightly
seen as such, and constituted a prior armed attack to which the intended victim
could legitimately respond.6' And if anything short of letting the missiles fly
constitutes an imminent attack, then this requirement was fulfilled when Israel
launched its first strike. 61 To say, states, unlike individuals, do not have arms
to raise, but rather they have troops, air forces, and missiles. Once a state
launches its missiles or amasses its troops on the borders, under circumstances
of intimidation, the intended state is not required to wait anymore, and it can
legitimately perform an act of self-defense seeking to avert the intended attack.
However, if amassing troops on the border is not sufficient to illustrate the
"imminent threat" argument, how about the Soviet Union building medium-
ranged ballistic missile sites in Cuba and transporting weapons to the island, all
in 1962. Could have President John Kennedy let the offensive military prepara-
tion continue? "Yes." Should have he done so? "No." The threat was
imminent. Although the United Nations Security Council did not pass a resolu-
tion, the Council of the Organization of American States supported America's
plan and recommended that its member "take all measures.., including the use
of armed force which they may deem necessary., 62 The Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962-63 illustrates the extent to which states deemed a threat as imminent,
and that actions against it shall be taken, including the use of force.
B. Anticipatory/Preemptive Self-Defense
Having said all that, I am aware that this is not how international law
scholars view Article 51. Invoking the so-called anticipatory/preemptive self-
defense, scholars rely on the Caroline precedent of 1837,63 where Webster, the
60. CHRISTINEGRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAWANDTHEUSEOFFORCE 112-13 (2ded. 2000); YORAM
DINsTEN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 173 (Cambridge University Press 2001) (1988) (Dinstein
uses the term "interceptive self-defense," which takes place where after the aggressor state takes irrevocable
steps to make an armed attack but before the aggressor is able to actually fire the first shot); W. Michael
Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Law of War, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 82, 87-88 (2003) (Reisman argues
that the relation that prevailed between Egypt and Israel at the time may have already been one of belligerency
so that the air attack could have been seen as reactive self-defense under Article 51of the UN Charter).
61. FLETCHER, supra note 38, at 21.
62. See Resolution on the Adoption of Necessary Measures to Prevent Cuba from Threatening the
Peace and Security of the Continent, Annex A, OEA/Ser.G/V/C-d-1024 Rev. 2 (Oct. 23, 1962).
63. The facts of Caroline arose in the context of an insurrection in Canada in 1837, where
insurgents moved supplies and gained recruits from the United States. The Caroline was a steamer employed
by an insurgent group. On December 29, 1837, while the steamer was docked on the American side of the
Niagara River, Canadian soldiers crossed to the American side of the river, destroyed the ship, and caused
casualties among American citizens defending the vessel. British Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston claimed
a right of self-defense.
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Secretary of State, wrote that to make a showing of self-defense, a state must
show "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation." It was a case with which only
potential threat existed, and therefore some international law scholars view the
reference to "inherent right" as incorporating a right to anticipatory/preemptive
self-defense, derived from long-standing international practice, so-called by
modem international lawyers Customary International Law.'
With this view I cannot agree. This is nothing but a misuse of the
Caroline precedent. It is right that the Caroline circumstances were those of
which there was no imminent threat, but rather a potential one, and thus force
was used as means of preemptive power. Nevertheless, in his letter, Webster
did not address the conditions by which states are entitled to use preemptive
force. He did not even invoke the term "preemption/anticipation." Rather,
Webster addressed precisely the notion of "imminent threat," as equivalent to
the clear case of aggression that is already done. In my view, there has been a
large and deep misunderstanding of the Caroline precedent. If at all, it is a
strong precedent for acknowledging "imminent threat" as a legal ground for
permissible use of force.
The trouble is that scholars do not distinguish between cases of "imminent
threat" and others of "anticipation/preemption." This cannot be correct: an
anticipatory/preemptive strike is grounded on a prediction of how the feared
enemy is likely to behave in the future. Though it could be a rational assump-
tion, it is not based on a visible aggression, and thus it is illegal.65 Whereas in
cases of anticipatory/preemptive self-defense there is neither a visible
aggression nor a visible threat in vista, "imminent threat" cases deal not only
with visible aggression in vista, but in particular with aggression visible just
beyond the threshold. It is an aggression that a state can see and not just feel.
One does not need binoculars to see it. The classic case for illustrating
anticipatory threat, but not imminent, is the Israeli strike against the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in 1981. Not only was the Israeli attack clearly grounded on
potential fear, but also, Israel was unable to show a shred of evidence either to
support its claim that the Iraq's plutonium purchases had more to do with the
creation of weapons than with nonviolent means, or for the assertion that a
nuclear attack was imminent or at least visible. Therefore, in 1981, the United
Nations Security Council adopted a resolution, inter alia, condemning the
Israeli attack.66
64. E.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use ofMilitary Force, 26:2
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 89, 92 (Spring 2003).
65. FLETCHER, supra note 38, at 20.
66. See S.C. Res. 487, at 10, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
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To those who insist on relying on Caroline, argued to be Customary
International Law, it is notable that Customary International Law is not only
about the practice of states but also about Jus Cogens (Compelling and Higher
Law). Not only that in the period between Caroline and the establishment of
the UN Charter, states considered it acceptable to engage in military action
where a state's neighbor state had massed forces along the border between the
two; but also I doubt if any Jus Cogens was ever developed to support an attack
of anticipation/preemption.67 If that is not enough to overturn Caroline, as
arguably understood, and if the UN Charter's language is also not sufficient, it
is thus the conflict between Nicaragua and the United States that demonstrates
how narrowly Article 5 1, and its threshold of an armed attack, is defined by the
United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, and the International
Court of Justice.6"
C. "Preventive" Self-Defense
Preventive self-defense is nothing but the romantic extension of the right
to self-defense. Accordingly, there is no dispute among international law
scholars that this form of the romantic concept of self-defense is illegal under
the UN Charter. If so, how does it fit in this context of our discussion?
The modem resurrection of preventive self-defense argument has emerged
in the post September 11 "War against Terror," which included the invasion of
Iraq. Invoking a right to preemptive self-defense, the Bush Administration
articulated this right as an adaptation of the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. The Administration theory
was that it was no longer fair to require a state to wait until a threat is imminent,
67. In addition, the acceptability of a first strike was also gauged against the level of threat of
invasion from the invaded state. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in
Combating Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the Principles ofAnticipatory
Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87, 107-08 (2004). See also JOHN CHILDS, ARMIES AND
WARFARE IN EUROPE 1648-1789 (1982).
68. United States used force to support the government ofEl Salvador against rebels being sustained
by Nicaragua. Nicaragua complained to the United Nations Security Council in March of 1982. However,
the Security Council found Nicaragua's complaints to be groundless. One year later, Nicaragua convened the
Security Council to investigate a new aggressive escalation of acts by the American Administration, in the
form ofmassive infiltration of military units and task forces ofcounter-revolutionaries. The Security Council
unanimously reaffirmed the right of Nicaragua and all other countries in the area to live in peace and security,
free from outside interference. Despite the Security Council's position on this matter, Nicaragua continued
to complain of attacks and, therefore, requested yet another Council meeting to review the situation on
September 12, 1983. In March 1984, Nicaragua confirmed that the United States had mined its harbors. By
this time, the United State's support in the United Nations was deteriorating quickly. See SANDGREN, supra
note 40, at 12. It is remarkable though that in Nicaragua, only one of the dissenting judges expressed his
support for a right of anticipatory/preemptive self-defense under Article 51.
[Vol. 1 3:1
and it argued that "with weapons of mass destruction, any enemy must be
stopped upon or prior to passion of these weapons. '"69
To my view, even though the Bush Administration used the expression
"preemptive self-defense," the facts of the invasion of Iraq do not support the
case for preemption, as there was neither visible nor potential threat, if any.
Therefore, the war on Iraq seems, at best, to qualify as an instance of preventive
war, to say a war of deterrence. Preventive war is not an acceptable exception,
however, to the Charter system's prohibition on the use of force.7"
D. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the UN Charter is the ultimate legal source for
permissible use of force. The permissible use of force is limited to acts of state
self-defense, which can be performed only in response to an armed attack,
including an imminent threat to amount to an armed attack. This is the only
possible reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter, paying primarily attention to
the establishment of the United Nations, holding the desire of the international
community to maintain peace and security in the world. This is correct in
general, but also in particular in reference to the devastation of World War H1,
which was the primary incentive for the establishment of the United Nations,
deemed to be the ultimate police power of the worldwide security. These
restricted premises are the only legitimate form of self-defense under Article
51.
VI. EPILOGUE: RESURRECTING ROMANTICS AT WAR-
ALL THE WAY BACK TO "HELL
' 71
If it was World War H that promoted the constitution of the UN Charter,
here is the aftermath of the September 11 attacks resurrected, in the hands of
the Bush Administration, the romantic notion of the law of war, which was
bypassed by the UN Charter. Whereas the western world deems 9/11 as an act
of terror or an unlawful attack (aggression) against the United States of
America, fanatic Islamic organizations, on top of them Al-Qaeda, deem it as a
war against the "Western Nation." That is, no protected western person exists
anymore for the purposes of this war. Persons are a means of an ultimate end:
winning the war. Akin is the war on Afghanistan, which is led by the desire or
69. White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15 (Sept. 17,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
70. Richard A. Falk, Agora: Future Implication on the Iraq Conflict: What Future for the UN
Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 598 (2003). WALZER, supra note 10, at 76
(Walzer argues that a preventive war is a war fought to maintain the balance; a key to peace among states).
71. WALZER, supra note 10, at 22.
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the need to bring back the lost honor of the American nation, and thus to
achieve a glory for the American People. The September 11 attacks were
deemed by the American People as a sense of national shame.
This becomes manifest by waging the war on Iraq. The invasion of Iraq
by the United States created a new precedent for preventive self-defense, which
is clearly prohibited by almost all views of international law. I feel that the
international law, and in particular the United Nations and the International
Court of Justice, will be required to break their silence and take a position
within the coming three years, assuming that the Bush Administration will
continue to apply the same policy of preventive self-defense articulated with
terms of preemptive self-defense.
Unlike municipal law, international law is not a packet of rules. Rather,
it is a packet of rulers. The United States is one of the five permanent members
in the Security Council, and in addition to the veto power, it enjoys the most
meaningful military power worldwide. Moreover, international law is not
conclusive to what states achieve by concluding consensual treaties. It includes
also customary international law, which is usually not pre-defined, and is
constructed of various practices, among them the resolutions of the Security
Council. Given this picture, the application of the preventive self-defense
approach, with the mere silence of the international community, may evolve one
day to become part of the legal international law, namely customary
international law-whether by explicit consent or by acquiescence. If that
happens, and I believe it has already begun to emerge, that would be the certain
sway toward the resurrection of "Romantics at War,"72 leading the scholars of
the future by what would be remembered as the Invasion of Iraq precedent.
To end with, in my view self-defense either exists or not. There is no
category in between. Once there is "imminent threat," always the right to self-
defense can be invoked. It is only a question of evidence. However, I have to
admit that giving the rapid expansion of technology a threat may not always be
visible. Nevertheless, it is our duty as scholars to draw the theory regardless the
event, but never articulate a theory in light of the event. But, as Winston
Churchill once argued: "This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the
end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
73
72. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 8.
73. See Winston Churchill, This is Not the End, Speech given at the Lord Mayor's Luncheon in
Mansion House, London (Nov. 10, 1942), available at http://www.winstonchurchiU.orgi4a/pages/index.cfr?
pageid=388#beaches (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times ran an article revealing that
the Bush Administration had, in the months immediately following the attacks
of September 11, secretly authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to
monitor the international telephone and email communications of "hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants in an
effort to track possible 'dirty numbers' linked to al Qaeda."' The resulting
firestorm from the disclosure was extremely fierce as civil liberties activists,
scholars and pundits from all political perspectives weighed in on the legality
and constitutionality of the surveillance program. President Bush and members
of his administration, including United States Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales, quickly offered arguments supporting the operation.
The main thrust of the administration's defense-and the argument
considered herein-of the NSA surveillance program is that "the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) [passed by the United States Congress
on September 18, 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks] places the
President at the zenith of his powers in authorizing the NSA activities."2 In
essence, the administration is arguing that by authorizing the President to use
force against those who were involved in any way in the 9/11 attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress declared war against al Qaeda
and other terrorist organizations, and by doing so gave the President power to
* Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Government, The University of Puget Sound,
1500 N. Warner, Tacoma, WA 98416.
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, BushLets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2005, at AI.
2. Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described By The
President (Jan. 19, 2006), U.S. Department of Justice, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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"intercept international communications into and out of the United States of
persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. '
The argument that the United States is currently at war with al Qaeda and
other international terrorist groups and that, therefore, the AUMF passed on
September 18, 2001 gave the President sufficient legal authority to conduct the
NSA program has been repeated multiple times by members of the Bush
Administration. According to this logic, since the United States is involved in
a war, the President's constitutionally-designated role as Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces provides the necessary constitutional authority. In the
words of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales:
The President's authority to take military action-including the use
ofcommunications intelligence targeted at the enemy-does not come
merely from his inherent constitutional powers. It comes directly
from Congress as well. First, [Congress] expressly recognized the
President's authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and
prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States.
Second, it supplemented that authority by authorizing the President
to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons her determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted or aided the terrorist attacks" in order to prevent further attacks
on the United States. The Resolution means that the President's
authority to use military force against those terrorist groups is at its
maximum because he is acting with the express authorization of
Congress.4
President Bush has echoed this logic, arguing that "Congress gave the
President additional authority to use the traditional tools-or 'fundamental
incidents'-of war in the fight against terror when Congress passed the
authorization for the use of military force in 2001."' This part of the
administration's defense ofthe NSA domestic surveillance program rests, there-
fore, on the argument that the country is at war in the formal and legal sense
and that that war was declared by Congress, in accordance with congressional
constitutional authority and responsibility, in the AUMF of September 18,
2001.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Prepared Remarks for Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Georgetown University Law
Center (Jan. 24, 2006), U.S. Department of Justice, available at
www.USDoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag.speech_0601241 .html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
5. Remarks by the President of the United States at the National Security Agency (Jan. 25, 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060125-l.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2006).
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The NSA operation has come under attack from many different
approaches. In a letter written to various members of Congress a group of legal
scholars attacked the legality and constitutionality of the surveillance program
on several grounds, arguing that even if it could be reasonably concluded that
Congress, by passing the AUMF, had "silently authorized" the NSA program,
the explicit prohibition of domestic wiretapping in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) would override such a tacit understanding of the
AUMF, especially when combined with the Fourth Amendment's restriction on
unwarranted searches.6 The Congressional Research Service, in a memo
entitled PresidentialAuthority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, concluded that it is difficult to
conclude that the passage of FISA did not imply specific and explicit congres-
sional intention to limit and control domestic surveillance operations.
Furthermore, because Congress wrote into FISA a fifteen-day exception
following a declaration of war in which the President could conduct warrantless
domestic surveillance, "Congress seems clearly to have contemplated that FISA
would continue to operate during war. '
However, all of these critiques, while certainly trenchant and possibly
correct, fail to engage the more fundamental constitutional questions of war
powers that are posed by the dispute. What are the powers contained within a
formal "declaration of war" and how do those powers fit into the balance
between congressional and executive war powers? How does the authority and
scope of Presidential power depend on whether a formal declaration has been
made? Is the AUMF passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11 th
attacks tantamount to a declaration of war? These are some of the questions
that will be considered herein.
Specifically, this paper will first examine the essential nature of a formally
declared "war," and will argue that the difference between "war" and "not war"
is the degree to which the executive branch is given power by Congress to
control the domestic arena with acts of an essentially legislative nature as a
means of prosecuting a conflict. Thus, the President has wide latitude in the
deployment of troops and the use of force, but, lacking explicit Congressional
approval, is heavily restricted in the ability to mobilize or transform the home
front, as when President Truman's seizure of steel mills during the Korean War
was rejected by the Supreme Court. Second, this paper will consider whether
6. Why the NSA Surveillance Program is Unlawful (Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/01/whythe nsa sur.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
7. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 43 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m0I0506.pdf (last
visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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Senate Joint Resolution 23 (the AUMF of September 18,2001) is a declaration
of war, arguing that it is not and consequently the power of the President to
affect the domestic sphere is limited. Therefore, authorizing the NSA domestic
surveillance program, as well as attempts to replace civilian courts with military
tribunals or indefinitely detain suspected terrorists without allowing for writs
of habeas corpus, is beyond the scope of executive power in peacetime.
Finally, this paper will conclude that in an undefined war with little prospects
of ever being "won" in a traditional sense, extreme caution should be exercised
when handing the legislative reins to the executive branch in pursuit of
"victory."
H. THE MEANING OF "WAR" AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS
The first question to be considered is whether the AUMF passed by
Congress, on which the President is basing much of his authorization for the
NSA program, is the legal and constitutional equivalent of a declaration of war,
and what difference the distinction of whether the country is "at war" makes,
especially in the powers of the President. This is an offshoot of the more
fundamental question of Presidential war powers which is broached in the
Constitution itself. So, before considering what is meant by the constitutional
authority to declare war, we shall first examine how the war powers are
delegated.
The Constitution is actually quite specific in spelling out which branch has
which power, though it fails to define exactly what certain powers entail.
Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to declare war, but does not
describe what a state of war is, nor whether there can be hostilities without a
formal declaration of war.' Congress is also given the power to raise and
support armies with appropriations for no longer than two years, to provide and
maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces. 9 The Presidential war powers are summed up in Article
H, Section 2, in the line, "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States," a power also left undefined.10 Thus, the
delineation, at least at a very basic level, seems to be that Congress has the
power to provide the President with military force that is to be commanded at
the discretion of the executive. Declaring war is clearly and solely within
congressional purview, but what is meant by declaring war is unexplained.
One logical place to examine the intentions of the Founding Fathers is the
Federalist Papers. The first paper concerning war powers is Federalist Paper
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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24, which assures that the fear of an unchecked executive figure, able to
command an army at his will, is assuaged by the division of the war powers."
This is a clear response to the colonial fear of a standing army being controlled
by a king, or other ruler, without popular control. By vesting solely in Congress
the power to raise an army, and by limiting all appropriations to no more than
a two year period, it is ensured that "no military establishment without evident
necessity" can be maintained. 2 It is the decision of Congress, and Congress
alone, whether an army should be raised and funded, and thereby exists at all.
Thus, the President's control over the command of the forces is checked by the
congressional power to cut off monies.
Federalist Paper 26 further confirms the opinion that the primary
congressional war power is the power of the purse.13 Alexander Hamilton does
recognize that Americans have a fear, and a well-justified one, of standing,
peace-time armies, but responds that under the Constitution only the legislature,
or in other words, the representatives of the people, will have the authority to
raise an army, removing the threat of an imperial President using the troops to
violate citizens' liberties. 4 Furthermore, the obligation to reconsider the need
for the army and vote on its funding every two years will prevent the armed
forces from being abused. These two provisions guarantee that American
liberty can not be subverted by the executive branch's command of the army.
The clearest indication of the constitutional intent for executive war
powers can be found in Federalist 69, where Hamilton argues that the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief:
[w]ould be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain,
but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of
the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and
regulating of fleets and armies.... .
Nowhere is it, or could it be, stated more plainly or directly that the President
is to have ultimate and unchallenged ability to command and employ United
States Armed Forces, with the checks and balances being his inability to raise,
fund or regulate them.'6 Federalist Paper 74 reinforces this claim, asserting that
l1. THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. Id.
13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
16. Id.
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it is essential in the conduct of hostilities for the command of the troops to be
in one, single hand. 7
Not only do the Federalist Papers assert that the President has sole power
to order and command American soldiers, and that the congressional war
powers are centered around appropriation powers, but case law supports this
view as well. Ex Parte Milligan states that Congress has not only the power to
raise and support armies, but also to declare war, a power that "extends to all
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except
such as interfere with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns.
That power and duty belong to the President as Commander-in-Chief."'' Along
these same lines, Swaim v. United States declares that while Congress may
increase or reduce the military, or even abolish it altogether, "so long as we
have a military force Congress can not take away from the President the
supreme command."' 9 As neither of these cases have ever been overturned, the
principle still holds.that the President has ultimate control over the order and
employment of American armed forces, and Congress may neither command
troops nor conduct their campaigns.
As to the constitutional emphasis on congressional appropriations power,
Holtzman v. Schlesinger sets forth the principle that continued congressional
appropriations, undoubtedly being used to prosecute hostilities (the Vietnam
War, in the case in question), do constitute an implied authorization for the use
of force.20 Therefore, if Congress is opposed to the continuation of hostilities
being conducted by the President, it would have the constitutional right to cut
off funding to the troops, or to earmark that those funds could not be used in the
specified conflict (a tactic which was ultimately used by Congress to end the
United States military involvement in Vietnam).2' Elaborating on this point,
Spaulding v. Douglass Aircraft gives Congress broad authority to control the
manner in which funds appropriated in a budget may be used.22 Specifically,
it allows Congress to not only designate the purpose of any given appropriation,
but also to set terms and conditions under which the money may be spent.23
Thus, it was within congressional authority to declare, for example, that funds
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
18. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
19. Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. CI. 173 (1893).
20. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F.Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
21. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS
DEPLOYMENTS (Jan. 10, 200 1), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS20775.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2006).
22. Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 60 F.Supp. 985 (S.D.C. 1945).
23. Id. at 988.
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delegated to the army in 1973 could not be used to conduct hostilities in
Vietnam, or when, in 1984, Congress forbade the President from using monies
to pursue conflicts in Latin America.24 These restrictions do not interfere with
the role of the Commander-in-Chief to command the troops in the field, but
rather are a direct outgrowth of the power to raise and support an army. The
power of the purse is recognized to be wholly in the hands of Congress, and is
a broad means for the legislative branch to exercise checks and balances on the
executive branch, by making it impossible to use appropriated funds in a
particular manner.
However, Holtzman v. Schlesinger only addressed the issue of hostilities
in progress at the time of the appropriation, and does not tell whether the
President may use an already-funded army to initiate military operations
without the express permission of Congress. In fact, the decision states that
"appropriations bills do not necessarily indicate an open-ended approval of all
military operations which may be conducted."' 5 The implication is that some
other form of Congressional authorization may be required for the President to
commit American soldiers into hostilities.
Mitchell v. Lairdfirmly established that it is constitutionally acceptable for
Congress to use other means than a formal declaration of war to authorize
approval for the conduct of hostilities.26 In the unanimous decision, the court
stated that "any attempt to require a declaration of war as the only permissible
form of assent might involve unforeseeable domestic and international
consequences .... 27 The decision also says that the manner in which
Congress may or may not give its assent is largely a political one, and is to be
determined by the other two branches.28 Nevertheless, we have a firm decision
that there are other acceptable means of congressional assent to the deployment
of military force than a formal declaration of war.29
Returning to Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft, it is possible to determine one
such means of "alternative" authorization. If it is within congressional rights
to place rules and conditions on their appropriations packages, then what is the
message when no such stipulations are made? Since Congress is aware, or
should be aware, of its ability to place conditions on funds, if it does not choose
to do so, then the money is free to be spent. Knowing full-well that the
President often uses military force, Congress could place a restriction on the
defense budget, by stating that appropriated funds do not give authorization to
24. Id. at 985.
25. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F.Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
26. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (1973).
27. Id. at 615.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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conduct operations in a particular area, if they desire to restrain the President
from engaging in such activities. It is within congressional authority to control
how the United States military is funded and what it is funded for, but once it
is funded, Congress has no control over how the troops are used. By placing
no conditions on the funds, Congress tacitly assents to an "alternative"
authorization of hostilities, permitted by Mitchell v. Laird.3°
Critics will argue this point, saying that specific Congressional
authorization for the action in question is needed, and that such an indirect
authorization is not valid or constitutional. 3' However, neither precedent nor
case history support this view, with both establishing that specific congressional
assent to military actions may not be needed. Durand v. Hollins states that as
the only legitimate organ of foreign policy, it is the President's job to protect the
lives and interests of American citizens both at home and abroad.32 When the
President is acting in this role, he is not required to obtain prior Congressional
authorization to commit troops into hostilities.
Furthermore, since the inception of the United States Army, only five
states of war have been declared by Congress, while there have been well over
215 instances in which United States military forces have been sent into
conflict, or potential conflict, to protect United States citizens or promote
American interests.33 Commenting on this very point in the debate over the
United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Senator Arthur Vandenberg noted that:
[i]f we were to require the consent of Congress to every use of our
armed forces, it would not only violate the spirit of the Charter, but
it would violate the spirit of the Constitution of the United States,
because under the Constitution the President has certain rights to use
our armed forces in the national defense without consulting Congress.
[I]t is just as much a part of the Constitution as is the congressional
right to declare war.34
If Congress had thoroughly and completely objected to any of these instances
of Presidentially-initiated hostilities, it could have passed a resolution against
the action, cut off funding for the military, or even in the words of Swaim v.
30. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (1973).
31. Karl Schonberg, Global Security and Legal Restraint: Reconsidering War Powers After
September 11, 119 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 115 (2004).
32. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F.Cas. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1860).
33. For a list of all uses of force by the United States, see RICHARD F. GRIMMETr, INSTANCES OF
USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2004, available at
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/forces.htm (last visited November 18, 2006).
34. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1945).
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United States, "abolish it altogether., 35 However, the normal congressional
response has been silence. The existence and continued funding of a permanent
standing military force, in light of a clear precedent of Presidential usage of the
force, constitutes tacit congressional authorization of the Presidential utilization
of that force.
Congress has never even tried to restrain a Presidential deployment of
force using the War Powers Resolution, which was passed in 1973 as a
response to the deployment of United States forces in Vietnam pursuant to the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in lieu of a declaration of war. However:
[e]very President from President Nixon forward has taken the position
that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement
on the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to utilize
the Armed Forces of the United States to defend what he determines
are the vital national security interests of the United States.36
By taking no action in over 200 cases, Congress has essentially resolved
the political question and created a gloss on the Constitution, which, in the
words of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the "Steel Seizure" case,
constitutes:
a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on 'executive power ....37
By assenting time and time again to unilateral commencements and conduct of
hostilities by the President, Congress has agreed that such actions are a
recognized part of the executive power, which answers the political question
raised in Mitchell v. Laird.3" Congress, by continually appropriating the
military budget with no restrictions or conditions, and by refusing to challenge
the Presidential authority to unilaterally commence hostilities, Congress has
granted the President the power to send American troops into combat without
specific legislative authorization.
But, congressional silence on an unconstitutional Presidential action does
not make it legal. Is it within his delegated powers for the President to send
35. Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173 (1893).
36. RICHARD F. GRIMMET-r, supra note 21, at 3.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (1973).
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troops into hostilities without seeking either a declaration of war or other
specific congressional approval? Bas v. Tingy established the principle that
there are levels of hostility below a declared war, referred to as "imperfect
wars" by Justice Washington.39 These low-intensity conflicts are restrained by
domestic law, and the President has no special emergency powers, the granting
of which can only come from a Congressional declaration of war. The
imperfect war, according to Justice Washington, is one in which an army has
been raised and funded by Congress, and is limited in its nature.4 ° Since
Congress has raised and funded the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marines, uses of the United States military power conducted without a formal
declaration of war fits the category of imperfect war.
Almost all uses of U.S. military force meet the criteria of imperfect, rather
than perfect, wars.4 Bas v. Tingy makes it clear that the President does have
the right to use force without a declaration of war from Congress, but that in
such conflicts, Presidential power to conduct those hostilities must be
restrained.42 When combined with the "alternative authorizations" described
above, a picture of executive war powers emerges; one in which the President
has wide latitude to deploy U.S. military force without explicit authorization
from Congress, let alone a formal declaration of war.
What good then is the congressional power to declare war? If the
President can send troops into battle whenever and wherever he deems
necessary, why would the President ever seek a declaration of war in the formal
sense, and why is the power to declare war one of the war powers, along with
power of the purse, explicitly given to Congress in the Constitution? The
answer is in the distinction between perfect and imperfect wars as described in
Bas v. Tingy, or in the difference between "war" and "not war."
Bas v. Tingy describes an imperfect war as a "limited, partial, war" in
which "those who are authorized to commit hostilities, act under special
authority, and can go no further than to the extent of their commission." '43 A
perfect war is defined as one in which "one whole nation is at war with another
whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war, are authorized
to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and
39. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dali.) 37 (1800).
40. Id. at 40.
41. It has not yet been discussed whether the Authorization to Use Military Force, upon which
President Bush is basing his authority for the NSA domestic surveillance program, is tantamount to a formal
declaration of war, which would make the War on Terror a "perfect" war. This question will be considered
below.
42. Bas, 4 U.S. at 41.
43. Id. at 43.
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under every circumstance." These definitions are critical in understanding the
importance of both the congressional power to declare war and the
consequences of the distinction between "war" and "not war."
The vast majority of instances of the use of U.S. military might fall well
short of a conventional understanding of war, or that given in Bas v. Tingy. A
war, in the formal sense, is one in which the entire effort of the country is given
to the prosecution of the conflict.45 This definition is supported by the
description of the legal consequences of a declaration of war given by Justice
Nelson in his dissent in The Prize Cases.46 Nelson's description included: The
citizens of the warring nations become enemies, the suspension of all legal
contracts, a right of interdiction of trade and commerce into the enemy nation,
the ability to capture and confiscate the property of the enemy, and the right to
blockade ports.4 7 Furthermore, Nelson wrote that "no power short of [a
congressional declaration of war] can change the legal status of the Government
or the relations of its citizens from that of peace to a state of war .... The war
power of the Government must be exercised before this changed condition of
the Government and people... can be admitted.,
48
The difference between war and not war, therefore, is about the ability of
the President to act in a legislative manner in the domestic sphere (as well as
in the international sphere), and is not primarily concerned with the use of
force. A war in the formal sense, or a perfect war in the language of Bas v.
Tingy, involves a level of hostilities that are much higher than in an imperfect
war and requires the effort and focus of the entire country. A state of war, thus,
affects both domestic and international law, and changes conditions and
circumstances, as well as the scope of Presidential power, to allow for a more
effective and complete national effort in prosecuting a war. Such conditions
and circumstances involve acts of an inherently legislative nature that would
normally require an act of Congress to authorize. For example, actions taken
by Presidents during wartime include the suspension of habeas corpus, the
rationing of food or material stocks, and the internment of American citizens
of Japanese descent.
44. Id. at 40.
45. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 365 (1863).
46. Id.; Justice Nelson's dissent was not related to the definition of war, but rather whether
President Lincoln needed a declaration of war to blockade Confederate ports in the absence of such a
declaration; the majority agreed that Lincoln did not need a declaration of war to do so.
47. Id.
48. The majority decision in The Prize Cases found that previous congressional legislation,
including the Acts of Congress of February 28, 1795 and March 3, 1807, served as a declaration of war by
expressly giving the President the power to use the U.S. military in case of invasion or insurrection. Thus,
the logic of Justice Nelson in the cited quote is not contradicted.
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When the country is not in a state of war by virtue of a declaration of war,
the ability of the President to take such actions is restricted. The logic of this
distinction is supported in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, commonly
referred to as the "Steel Seizure" case.49 During the Korean War-which
despite being called a war was not fought with a congressional declaration of
war but rather a U.N. resolution-President Truman attempted to seize
domestic steel mills in an effort to force striking steel workers back to their
jobs, arguing that the steel mills produced material that was vital to the war
effort." The action was struck down as it was, according to Justice Black's
opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has
expressly confided to Congress and not to the President .. . ." In the
framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."52 Furthermore:
the order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the
President's military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. Even though the 'theater ofwar' is an expanding concept, we
cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as
such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's
lawmakers, not for its military authorities.53
When the President wants to take, pursuant to his powers as Commander-
in-Chief, an action that is inherently legislative in nature, he must have explicit
permission from Congress to do so---"from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."54 Since the Constitution does not give this kind of power
to the President, it can only come from an act of Congress. A formal
declaration of war meets such a definition.55 This is the reason for the
declaration itself, as well as the strength and relevance of congressional
constitutional war powers.
49. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. 579.
55. The argument that Congress, when it passes a declaration of war, knowingly and deliberately
gives the President power to take actions of a legislative nature will be presented in the following section.
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M. THE AUMF AND THE MEANING OF A DECLARATION OF WAR
With regards to the NSA domestic surveillance program, the President's
claim is that the AUMF passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11
attacks was, in fact, a declaration of war.5 6 Thus, the argument follows that
Congress authorized the President to take domestic actions of a legislative
nature, in this case approving the wiretapping of U.S. citizens. If Congress did
declare war in a legal sense, then the President's claim is, on these narrow
grounds, valid.57 So, the question becomes: is the AUMF the functional
equivalent of a declaration of war and did Congress intend to give legislative
authority to the President?
Not every use of American military force has been conducted under the
aegis of a declaration of war. Far from it. Out of the more than 200 uses of
force, war has only been declared by the U.S. Congress five times: the War of
1812; the Mexican-American War; the Spanish-American War; World War I;
and World War 1V8 However, while no conflict involving U.S. soldiers has
involved casualties like those in World War I or 11 (126,000 dead and 234,300
wounded, and 407,289 dead and 671,846 wounded, respectively), several have
approached, if not surpassed, the world wars in terms of length (the Korean and
Vietnam Wars, lasting three and nine [counting from the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution until the withdrawal of U.S. troops] years, respectively).59
Furthermore, while many of the more than 200 uses of force are fairly small-
scale instances in terms of relevant measures such as intensity, scope, troops
involved, and casualties, ranging from the use of U.S. air assets to strike at
Libyan leader Moammar Qadaffi to the invasions of Panama and Grenada,
several others have involved large troop deployments that strike most observers
as "wars," such as the first and second Persian Gulf wars. And yet, none of
these conflicts was a war in the legal sense.6°
The key to understanding the necessity of a declaration of war is the scale
and scope of the conflict. Under the framework developed in the previous
section, the difference between a state of "war" and "not war" is the degree to
which the President has been given power by Congress to act in a legislative
manner in the domestic arena. Only in conflicts in which such powers would
56. See generally Remarks by the President of the United States at the National Security Agency,
supra note 5.
57. There are many other arguments for and against the legality and constitutionality of the NSA
program. Here we are only considering whether it is part of the President's war powers.
58. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2004, NAVY DEP'T LIBRARY (2004), available at
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/forces.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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be necessary for the prosecution of the fight would a declaration of war be
needed. Since the turn of the 20th century, only the two world wars have risen
to such a level.
This level is known as "total war," a concept first developed by Prussian
military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. "Total war" referred to war in the
manner discussed in the previous section in which one entire state is in a state
of war with another state, a war in which conflict was not just limited to the
troops in the field, but also the industrial base and infrastructure as well as the
political leadership of the combatants.6 Such conflicts are not limited in any
sense of the word; the entire nation is at risk and therefore contributes to the
war effort. This mirrors the logic expressed in Bas v. Tingy, with the distinction
between perfect and imperfect wars, the latter of which demands that the
President's power be constrained. It is inconceivable that the United States
could have successfully prosecuted either World War I or II without massive
contributions from the home front. Furthermore, the domestic populace of the
United States has made few, if any, sacrifices in pursuit of other military
conflicts, such as in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, Panama, Grenada, or Iraq.62
Accordingly, World War I and II were both fought under declarations of
war, allowing the Presidents at the time to act in the domestic arena by
establishing rationing laws, seizing industry, and taking other actions as deemed
necessary. But, can it be said that ceding such power was specifically intended
by Congress?
The declarations of war for World Wars I and II both contain particular
language that provides clear indication that Congress did intend to cede
legislative power to the President in recognition of the unlimited scope and
scale of the conflicts. The language is found at the end of the declarations of
war against Germany in both world wars and against Japan in World War II:
"the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and
military forces of the [United States] and the resources of the Government to
carry on war against the [specified country]; and to bring the conflict to a
successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged
by the Congress of the United States."63 Furthermore, the declarations all
61. See generally CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans.,
1976). See also PHILIP BOBBIrrT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, ANDTHE COURSE OF HISTORY 196
(2003); B.H. LIDDELL HART, STRATEGY 338-44 (1991).
62. This is not to minimize the loss of life incurred in any of these conflicts. However, as a nation,
the United States contributed or sacrificed little during any of these wars in comparison to World War I or
II.
63. Declarations of War, available at
www.firstworldwar.com/source/usofficialawardeclaration.htm; www.law.ou.edu/hist/germwar.htmt;
www.law.ou.edu/hist/japwar.html (note that the phrase "and the resources of the Government" is absent in
the declaration against Germany in World War I) (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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specify that "a state of war" between the United States and the enemy is
"formally declared."' This language makes it clear that Congress understands
the implication of "war" as opposed to "not war" and that Congress recognizes
in "war" the President will need more tools at his disposal than when using
force in a less comprehensive manner.65
"All the resources of the country" means exactly that: when the country
is in a state of war with an enemy, the President must be able to call upon the
domestic arena with powers of a fundamentally legislative nature. Without a
declaration of war, a President may not seize a domestic industry deemed
crucial to the war effort, as President Truman tried to do; with such a
declaration, a President can intern more than a hundred thousand American
citizens, establish rationing, or divert industrial or transportation assets to the
military cause.66 The President can only call upon such powers when they are
expressly and explicitly given to the President by Congress. So, did Congress
intend to give such powers to President Bush with the passage of the AUMF on
September 18, 2001?
The AUMF contains none of the critical language that is found in the
official declarations of war. It does not mention the establishment of a state of
war to create a "perfect" or "total" war. It does not commit "all the resources
of country" to the President to prosecute the conflict. Rather, the AUMF
merely states that "the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations, or persons."67 This language cannot be interpreted
to meet the criteria establishing a perfect war outlined in Bas v. Tingy, to create
64. Id.
65. FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S WORLD
ROLE (1998) (since these three wars were not fought in the same way as the wars of the 20th century, the
absence of the "resources of the country" language does not undo the argument); While the declarations of
war for the War of 1812 and the Mexican- and Spanish-American Wars do formally declare the existence of
a state of war, they do not contain the language about ceding all the resources of the country to the President.
But this should not be surprising. The concept of "total" war did not really come into existence until the
beginning of the 20th century, and World War I represents the first real "total" war. Furthermore, during the
19th century, the U.S. did not yet possess the domestic infrastructure or capability to mobilize much power
from the home front.
66. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 151 (2005).
67. S.J. RES. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted), available at
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/septl l/sjres23_eb.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
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a state of war as described in the dissent from the Prize Cases, or to function
as a declaration of war.
In the absence of a declaration of war, the logic of Youngstown holds sway
over Presidential power, restricting the ability of the President to act in a
legislative nature in the domestic arena. Authorizing the NSA to conduct
domestic wiretapping of U.S. citizens is such an action which would require
congressional approval. If the President would not be allowed to seize property
for the purposes of aiding the war effort in the absence of a declaration of war,
it is hard to imagine that eavesdropping on U.S. citizens in violation of existing
U.S. laws would be permitted in a similar circumstance.
Furthermore, in Youngstown, Justice Jackson established, in his
concurrence, three categories of "practical situations" that can be used to assess
the legality of a Presidential action.68 The first is when the "President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress. ' '69 In such a
situation, "his authority is at its maximum, for it implies all that he possesses
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."7 ° In instances when "the
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,"
there exists "a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, on in which its distribution is uncertain," meaning that "any actual
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law."7 1 Finally, the third
situation occurs when "the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress."72 In such cases, Presidential power is
at "its lowest ebb" and "Presidential claim to a power. . . must be scrutinized
with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system. 73
Neither the AUMF nor any other act of Congress expressly gave the
President the authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens.
And, since the AUMF is not a declaration of war it cannot be read as giving
implied authorization either. Thus, the NSA surveillance program does not fall
into Justice Jackson's first category, where the legality of the program would
"be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon
68. Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. 634-56.
69. Id. at 635.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 637.
72. Id.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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any who might attack it."74 But does the NSA program then fall into the second
or third category?
As has already been mentioned earlier, Congressional Research Service
(CRS) published a study of the NSA surveillance program, in which it
concluded that the passage of FISA by Congress firmly places the NSA
program in the third category. CRS wrote that:
[w]here Congress has passed a declaration of war, 50 U.S.C. § 1811
authorizes the Attorney General to conduct electronic surveillance
without a court order for fifteen calendar days following a declaration
of war by Congress. This provision does not appear to apply to the
AUMF, as that does not constitute a congressional declaration of war.
Indeed, even if the authorization were regarded as a declaration of
war, the authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance under
50 U.S.C. § 1811 would only extend to a maximum of fifteen days
following its passage.75
Furthermore, "the history of Congress's active involvement in regulating
electronic surveillance within the United States leaves little room for arguing
that Congress has accepted by acquiescence the NSA operations here at
issue."76
If, as argued here, the NSA program falls into the third category of Justice
Jackson's analysis, and if the AUMF did not constitute a declaration of war,
then President Bush did not have the authority to authorize the National
Security Agency to eavesdrop on U.S. citizens, regardless of its utility in
pursuing and fighting terrorists. In the analysis herein, the President does have
wide latitude to use military force in the absence of an explicit declaration of
war; however that latitude does not extend to actions like authorizing a U.S.
intelligence agency to spy on American citizens.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: WAR POWERS IN A NEVER-ENDING WAR
In his concurrence to Youngstown, Justice Jackson wrote that "the
tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies-such as wages
or stabilization-and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced
structure of our Republic."77 Indeed, much of the administration's defense has
rested on the argument that the NSA program is an effective and necessary
component of the War on Terror. In the Department of Justice memo, Legal
74. Id. at 637.
75. BAZAN & ELSEA, supra note 7, at 26.
76. Id. at 43.
77. Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 634.
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Authorities Supporting the Activities ofthe National Security Agency Described
by the President, the argument is made that:
[t]he Government's interest in engaging in the NSA activities is the
most compelling interest possible-securing the Nation from foreign
attack .... The Government's overwhelming interest in detecting
and thwarting further al Qaeda attacks is easily sufficient to make
reasonable the intrusion into privacy involved in [the NSA
surveillance program]. 7
Even if the threat from al Qaeda is in fact, as President Bush has often
asserted, an existential threat to the United States, it does not necessarily follow
that the President should be freed from congressional restraints to pursue
whatever policies the executive may deem necessary to fight that threat. In a
"normal" war like either of the two world wars, an end can be envisioned,
metrics exist for assessing progress towards that end, and extraordinary
legislative powers ceded to the President by Congress can one day be given up.
However, the "War on Terror" is not such a war. The enemy is unclear, as are
the desired goals. Is the aim of the "War on Terror" defeating all terrorism,
reducing terrorism to a nuisance, or simply lowering the likelihood of another
large-scale attack? How can it be known if the U.S. is winning the war? Does
an absence of attacks mean that the war is successful, or that the terrorists
haven't tried? At what point would victory, if victory is even possible, be
declared, and any extraordinary legislative powers be given back to Congress
by the President?
In such a situation, the burden of caution must recommend against a broad
interpretation of executive powers. In the absence of a clear and specific
congressional authorization, the President must not claim powers that exceed
his normal authority. In the words of Justice Jackson:
[n]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem more
sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign
affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.79
However, in light of the comprehensive war powers argument developed
herein, the claim by the executive branch for the legitimacy of the NSA
program is damaging in a previously unforeseen way. For years, Presidents
78. Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described By The
President, supra note 2, at 40.
79. Id. at 33.
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have been making the case that they have the constitutional right to deploy
force without a specific congressional authorization, and have refused to
recognize congressional attempts to assert legislative authority, as with the War
Powers Resolution. The argument here supports that position. But by claiming
that the AUMF is the functional and intentional equivalent to a formal
declaration of war, the administration has unwittingly undermined the executive
branch's case for wide latitude and deference in force deployment. If such an
argument rests on a narrow interpretation of the congressional power to
"declare war"--that that power refers to the creation of a "state" of war and not
the deployment of troops-the argument that any congressional authorization
of force meets the constitutional mandate must necessarily broaden
congressional war powers. The President's rush to find authorization in the
AUMF suggests that other similar congressional legislation might also be
tantamount to a declaration of war. Such an interpretation would therefore
expand congressional power over the deployment of military force. In the wake
of the NSA surveillance program, Congress may very well attempt to reassert
itself. Fearing additional encroachments by the President, Congress may claim
that, in line with the very arguments made by the President, any and all
congressional authorizations for the use of military force should be seen as part
of a declaration of war and thus subject to congressional authority.
The decision by President Bush to task the National Security Agency to
eavesdrop on the conversations of American citizens is an extremely con-
tentious one, but one that was no doubt made in good faith. The President very
likely believes, perhaps even accurately, that such a program is a vital tool in
protecting the nation from another terror attack and a critical assert in fighting
the war on terror. However, noble goals and successful policies are not the
arbiters of a policy's legality and constitutionality. The power to act in a
legislative manner rests with Congress, and does so in order to preserve the
delicate balance of powers and authority that defines American government.
In the absence of a clear and pressing threat to the country that is identified by
Congress as needing a state of war to be properly contested, the President must
not and cannot claim broad domestic powers. The NSA domestic surveillance
program is illegal and unconstitutional. In a war that will likely have no end in
the immediate future and has no real metrics for victory, policy must flow from
process. Extreme caution must be taken before handing this-or any President
-unmonitored domestic powers.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Acastus and the State of Rubria have agreed to submit the
present controversy for final resolution by the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") by Special Agreement pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 1 of the Statute
of this Court.' In accordance with Article 36,2 the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases that the parties refer to it.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This dispute arises out of the responsibilities over alleged human rights
violations committed in the Elysian Fields. The Elysium, inhabited by a
community of approximately 5,000 indigenous Elysians, is a territory that runs
through the border between the Republic of Acastus (Applicant) and the State
of Rubria (Respondent). The residential villages of the Elysians are located
north of the border in Acastus. The Elysians depend completely upon the fertile
agricultural lands located south of Rubria for food. The Elysium has retained
its unique prehistoric cultural heritage, with its own language and religion. Its
economy is wholly agricultural. Their agricultural lands are stewarded by the
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 40.
2. Id. at art. 36.
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National Park Authority, an agency of the Rubrian government. An under-
ground spring, situated fifty kilometers south of the Elysium, irrigates the entire
agricultural land.
Up until this dispute, relations between Acastus and Rubria were friendly
since their independence from the former Republic of Nessus which was
dissolved in 2000. For several decades predating their independence, there was
disagreement between the political factions in the north and south. With
Nessus dissolved, the North then became Acastus and the South Rubria. The
600-kilometer border between Acastus and Rubria runs exactly along the 36th
parallel.
The capital of Nessus, sitting in the North, is now the capital of Acastus.
Acastus has continued the trade and industrial activities that distinguishably
characterized the North before independence. Acastus granted the Elysians all
rights of citizenship, and a seat in the Acastus Parliament reserved for the
Elysians has been occupied by Mrs. Doris Galatea since 2002.
Notwithstanding Rubria's application for United Nations ("UN")
membership in April 2001, Acastus sent a note to the UN Secretary-General at
the same time, submitting Acastus's continuation of Nessus's membership in
the UN, of all the UN organs including the ICJ, and all other treaties for which
the UN serves as depository. Nessus was an original member of the UN and a
party to several other treaties. Following the Under-Secretary-General for
Legal Affairs' memorandum interpreting Resolution 2386 at the request of the
Secretary-General, Acastus was allowed to temporarily continue the member-
ship of Nessus in the UN. Acastus maintained the entire diplomatic core at the
UN and its organs, including sitting behind nameplates reading "Acastus" and
flying the flag of Acastus in place of the flag of Nessus. Furthermore, Acastus
has assumed obligations under Nessus's multi-year plan to repay its 1999 dues.
Aiming to enhance foreign investment opportunities, the Acastus
Parliament passed the "Multinational Corporate Responsibility Act" ("MCRA")
in December 2002. The Act aims to ensure Acastus's business entities hold
themselves to the same standards in both domestic and overseas affairs and
thereby to encourage other states to enter into bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") with Acastus. There have been several BITs entered between Acastus
and other states before Rubria and Acastus signed the Rubria-Acastus Binding
Bilateral Investment Treaty ("RABBIT") in February 2003. The RABBIT not
only contained provisions on investment, but also procedures for dispute
resolution including reference to the ICJ. Acastus joined the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") on January 1, 2003.
Following the discovery of rich oil deposits on the Rubrian side of the
Elysium by geologists of Trans-National Corporation ("TNC"), a privately-
owned limited liability company incorporated in Acastus, TNC entered into an
agreement with the government of Rubria to form Corporation for Oil & Gas
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("COG"), a joint-venture corporation incorporated in Rubria in May 2003.
COG's aim is to develop and export petroleum resources discovered in the
Elysium. TNC and the government of Rubria remain the two sole shareholders
of COG. COG was granted exclusive operational rights in the region by the
President of Rubria, Mr. Leon Fides.
In June 2004, despite reviewing alternative plans to extract and export the
deposits for ten months, COG accepted a proposal that would lead to the
destruction of over half of the Elysians' agricultural lands and would block the
spring which the Elysians depend. The detrimental repercussions envisaged by
the proposed construction of the pipeline were later confirmed by the Institute
of Local Studies and Appraisals ("ILSA"), an internationally respected non-
governmental organization ("NGO"). The ILSA observed that the Elysians
were left with virtually no choice as it was unthinkably difficult for them to
adapt to the lifestyles in the cities of Acastus and Rubria. After the proposal
was made public, the Rubrian government did not raise any criticisms and
thereby permitted the construction.
Fully aware of the harm posed, COG authorized and financed the creation
of Protection & Retention Operations Force ("PROF") to guard their personnel,
anticipating possible hostility from the Elysians. COG is the only client of
PROF, paying a fee that covered almost all of the expenses incurred by PROF.
COG further provided PROF with all necessary equipment to carry out their
duties. PROF mainly consisted of former members and recently retired
commanders of the Rubrian armed forces. The ILSA expert team found that
PROF had inter alia seized young Elysian men to work for COG by waving
weapons at them and forcing them to work under inhumane working conditions
and perform dangerous work without compensation.
On September 30, 2004, Mr. Davide Borius, one of the men seized,
brought an action against COG, PROF, Rubria, and TNC in an Acastus civil
court, with the help of Mrs. Galatea and several NGOs. The plaintiffs
submitted that the court had jurisdiction over the case against COG, PROF, and
Rubria in accordance with the Acastian International Rights Enforcement
Statute ("AIRES").
On November 8, 2004, the court dismissed the claim against TNC on the
ground that it was not directly involved in the alleged violations and COG's
corporate veil could not be pierced. PROF was also dismissed as a defendant
because it did not conduct business nor have assets in Acastus and thus was not
"present" there under the terms of AIRES.
Unlike TNC, Rubria is a direct alleged violator and the situs of the alleged
violations. Further, Rubria was not immune from suit under Acastus's foreign
sovereign immunity statute because of the commercial nature of Rubria's
activities. The court retained Rubria as a defendant on November 10, 2004.
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Although COG did not appear at any stage of the proceedings, the nature
of its business was such as to come within the meaning of "present" under the
AIRES. On January 15, 2005, the court found the two remaining defendants
jointly liable to the plaintiffs, with compensatory damages amounting to 200
million Euros.
The Elysians have exhausted all local remedies available in Rubria to
rectify the problems stipulated in the Compromis.
Noting Rubria's disagreement over the judgment, Acastus notified the
Ministry of Justice of Rubria that Acastus intended to institute proceedings
before the ICJ. Further noting Rubria's preliminary objection to the admissi-
bility of the case, Acastus withdrew its application and started negotiations with
Rubria. Thereafter, the construction was suspended while Acastus refrains
from enforcing the Borius judgment against Rubria and COG.
On September 15, 2005, Acastus and Rubria jointly submitted the
Compromis, agreeing to the stipulated facts of the dispute notwithstanding a
disagreement on the Court's adhocjurisdiction. The Court has decided to hear
arguments relating to jurisdiction and the merits of the case concurrently.
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Acastus requests that the Court adjudge and declare that:
A) the Court has jurisdiction over all claims in this case, since
Acastus has succeeded to Nessus's status as a party to the
Statute of the Court;
B) by permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed,
Rubria would violate the rights of Acastus's citizens of Elysian
heritage;
C) the activities of PROF in the Elysium, including the forced labor
of civilians, are attributable to Rubria and are violations of
international law; and
D) the outcome of the Borius litigation does not place Acastus in
breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over all claims in this case, since Acastus has
succeeded to Nessus's status as a party to the Statute of the Court. Acastus's
succession of Nessus is evident from the presence of both "objective" and
"subjective" factors. "Objective" factors include Acastus retaining Nessus's
capital city as its capital city; sustaining Nessus's former economic relations;
maintaining Nessus's diplomatic relations, within or outside the UN structure;
and assuming Nessus's multi-year plan to repay outstanding dues. "Subjective"
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factors are usually regarded as more important. Recognition of Acastus as the
successor of Nessus by third states and Acastus's consistent self-conception of
its succession have convincingly shown Acastus's succession to Nessus's
status. Acastus's succession to Nessus's membership in the UN is also consis-
tent with the general trend and practice of state succession laid down by former
key state dissolutions, most notably in the case of British India, USSR, and
SFRY.
The construction of the pipeline as planned will render it impossible for
the Elysians to continue their traditional way of life. This state of affairs will
see them deprived of their rights under Article 27 of the ICCPR.3 By failing to
provide adequate legal protection for these rights, the State of Rubria is in
breach of its obligations under Article 2(2) of the Covenant.4 The restriction
on the Elysians' rights was neither necessary nor prescribed by law, and so
cannot constitute a lawful restriction under the ICCPR. As a matter of
customary international law, the Elysian people, as indigenous occupiers, have
special ownership/usage rights in the Elysian Fields and the natural resources
pertaining thereto. These rights qualify the sovereign rights of Rubria over the
land and its resources. This qualification prevents Rubria from maintaining the
defense that its acts were the lawful exercise of its sovereign rights.
The activities of PROF violated the Elysian labourers' right to liberty and
security, the right to fair and just remuneration for work, and the right to their
own means of subsistence. PROF was also in violation of international treaties
and custom which prohibit any form of forced labor.
COG is liable for PROF's illegal conduct since PROF is COG's
empowered agent. Rubria is directly responsible for PROF's conduct due to its
interest in and control of COG. Despite its status as the minority shareholder,
Rubria had effective control over COG by way of its economic, legal and
political connection with the corporation. Furthermore or alternatively, Rubria
has an implied duty under the ICCPR, the ICSECR, ILO Conventions, and
international custom to regulate the conduct of multi-national corporations
within its jurisdiction to ensure the non-violation of human rights and other
international commitments. Rubria has failed to discharge its duty to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the Elysians' rights.
The AIRES is concerned with claims under international law. As the
primary rules of international law are addressed to states and state officials,
TNC, as a non-state actor, is not a subject of international law. Currently, there
is no binding agreement that directly imposes international obligations or duties
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, G.A. Resolution 2200A (XXi),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
4. Id. at art. 2(2).
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on corporations. TNC is also not bound by any "soft law" which seeks to
impose international obligations directly on corporations.
Furthermore, TNC is not a proper party defendant within the meaning of
the MCRA since it had no direct involvement in the activities of PROF in the
Elysium. Despite the express incorporation of the OECD Guidelines, the
MCRA does not repeal the principle of limited liability and hence TNC is
protected by its separate legal status from that of COG. The approach of the
Acastian court is in concert with decisions of other national courts.
V. PLEADINGS
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over All Claims in This Case, Since Acastus
Has Succeeded to Nessus's Status as a Party to the Statute of the Court.
1. Nessus's Status
Nessus was a founding member of the UN and was a party to the Statute
of the ICJ. Nessus accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in all cases. In
2000, Nessus was dissolved and its territory was divided into Acastus and
Rubria. Article 93(1) of the UN Charter provides that membership of the UN
gives rise ipsofacto to the presumption that it is a party to the Statute.5 Acastus
submits that the ICJ maintains its compulsoryjurisdiction in all claims by virtue
of having succeeded Nessus's membership in the UN and party status to the
Statute.
2. Acastus Has Succeeded Nessus.
Scholars have noted that the law of state succession remains uncertain, and
consistent state practice to establish an international custom is lacking.6 In the
absence of settled legal rules, this Court will want to consider all the relevant
circumstances as a whole in this case when determining the status of Acastus.
The circumstances to be considered may be grouped into "objective" and
"subjective" factors. "Objective" factors are the variants of the basic criteria
for statehood, such as retention of a certain amount of the former state's popula-
tion, armed forces or seat of government,7 while "subjective" factors include the
state's claim to continuity and its self-conception and, "most importantly, the
international recognition of, or acquiescence in, this claim by third states."8
5. U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1.
6. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 650 (5th ed. 1998).
7. KONRAD G. BUHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
18(2001).
8. Rein Mullerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR
and Yugoslavia, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 473, 476 (1993).
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The classification provides not only clarity, but also possibly a "formula" or
doctrine that could be applied in future cases. The subjective factors are
"particularly important in doubtful or marginal cases."9
a. "Objective" Factors Are Present.
i. The General Rule is That "Objective," Factors Alone are Not Conclusive of
Whether a New State Has Succeeded the Former State's Status.
The International Law Association has summarized in the 1996 Helsinki
Conference that, inter alia, the name of the state and its capital; (minor)
territorial change; changes of the population; changes of governmental or state
power and constitutional change; and (temporary) occupation bellica do not
affect the identity and continuity of a state."
ii. Acastus's Capital City was the Former Capital City of Nessus. Acastus
Has Sustained Nessus's Former Economic Relations and Industries.
The circumstances are consistent with the theory of "core or nucleus" of
territory coined famously by Hall who wrote: "identity of a state therefore is
considered to subsist so long as a part of the territory which can be recognised
as the essential portion through the preservation of the capital or of the original
territorial nucleus ......
iii. Acastus Has Satisfied the Essential Requirements for Membership in the
UN as Laid Down in Article 4 of the UN Charter.
Article 4 of the UN Charter states that UN membership is open to all
"peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained."' 2 Acastus is a
peace-loving state as evident by instituting the present proceedings before the
ICJ and refraining from enforcing the Borius judgment. Acastus has willingly
accepted the obligations as a UN member by inter alia, assuming annual
obligations under Nessus's multi-year plan to repay its 1999 dues and
continuing to participate in the UN and its agencies since Nessus's dissolution
in 2000. Acastus's bonafide involvement in the UN is being recognized by the
UN community evidenced by Acastus's delegation sitting behind "Acastus"
nameplates in the UN and its agencies since 2000 and the flag of Acastus flown
in place of the flag of Nessus.
9. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 402 (1979).
10. BUHLER, supra note 7, at 14 (citing Report of the Sixty Seventh Conference held at Helsinki,
Finland, (1996) Int'l Law Ass'n).
11. WILLIAM HALL & A. PEARCE HIGGINS, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1917).
12. U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 4.
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b. "Subjective" Factors Are Present.
i. Acastus is Recognized as the Successor of Nessus.
"Where there are substantial changes in the entity concerned, continuity
may depend upon recognition (as in the case of India after 1947)."'" There
were no major objections to the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs'
memorandum interpreting Resolution 2386. Acastus can distinguish itself from
the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("SFRY") where UN members held different views resulting in different
resolutions being adopted.' 4 In addition, several third-party states that had
bilateral treaties with Nessus have considered those treaties as continuing as
between them and Acastus."5
ii. Acastus's Self Conception on its Succession of Nessus Has Been
Consistent. The "Behaviour of the State Itself' is Important in Determining
its Status.'
6
c. There is a Presumption of Continuance of the State.
There is a "presumption [of continuity]-in practice a strong one-[lies]
in favour of the continuance, and against the extinction of an established
State."' 7 The international legal order is generally favorable to stability in
international relations and the preservation of the status quo. The strong
presumption of continuance of state should favour Acastus's continuance of
Nessus's membership in the UN and Nessus's status as party to the Statute.
d. Acastus's Succession to Nessus's Membership is Consistent with the
General Trend and Practice of State Succession Laid Down by Former Key
State Dissolutions.
i. Example from India's Succession to British India's
Membership of the UN.
The partition of British India into Dominions of India and Pakistan in
1947, occurring simultaneously with the former's attainment of independence,
13. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 406.
14. Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United
Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 55-63 (1995).
15. Compromis, 8.
16. Rein Mullerson, New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L.
199, 303 (1993).
17. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 417.
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was the first instance in which the UN was faced with the problems of
succession to membership.'" As contended by Professor Crawford, recognition
of India's continuity by third states seems to have been of decisive signifi-
cance.' 9 Likewise, Acastus has been recognized by the majority of the UN
member states. In considering the legal question of succession, the Sixth
(Legal) Committee adopted several guidelines as general guidance for future
cases.20 They are, inter alia, (1) constitutional or territorial changes are pre-
sumed not to affect UN membership unless the extinction of a state as a legal
personality recognised in the international order is shown; and (2) each case
must be considered according to its merits and its particular circumstances.2'
Acastus has sustained Nessus's legal personality by evidence of continuance of
Nessus's conventional obligations and diplomatic relations with third states.
The merits of this case, as highlighted by both "objective" and "subjective"
factors listed above, call for a strong inclination towards the conclusion that
Acastus's succession has properly succeeded Nessus.
ii. Example from the Russian Federation's Succession to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic's ("USSR") Membership of the UN.
With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russian President Yeltsin sent
a letter to the UN Secretary-General, declaring Russia would "continue" the
membership of the USSR in the UN and requested that the UN replace the name
"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" with the name "Russian Federa-
tion. 22 Shortly after, Russia took over the seat of the USSR in all UN organs,
including its permanent seat in the Security Council. 23 Russia had not been
subjected to any formal admission procedures.24 In this context, Acastus's
declaration of its succession of Nessus's status and the subsequent positive
reactions from the international community towards Acastus's succession
should be accepted as clear and sufficient evidence that Acastus has succeeded
Nessus's status as a party to the Statute.
18. Scharf, supra note 14, at 34; see Oscar Schachter, The Development of International Law
Through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat, 1948 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 101.
19. CRAWFORD, supra note 9, at 402.
20. Scharf, supra note 14, at 35; see U.N. GAOR, 1 st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582-83, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 1/212 (1947) (letter from Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the Chairman of the First Committee).
21. Scharf, supra note 14, at35-36;seeU.N. GAOR, lstComm., Annex 14g, at 582-83, U.N. Doc.
A/C. 1/212 (1947) (letter from Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the Chairman of the First Committee).
22. Scharf, supra note 14, at 46; see Letter from Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Soviet
Socialist Republic, to Javier Peres de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Dec. 24, 1991), U.N.
Doc. 1991/RUSSIA (1991) [hereinafter Yeltsin U.N. Letter] (on file with author).
23. Scharf, supra note 14, at 47.
24. Id.
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iii. Example from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's ("FRY")
Succession to the SFRY's Membership of the UN.
FRY's succession to the SFRY's membership of the UN has been by far
the most complicated precedent because both the "objective" and "subjective"
factors present in the FRY case had not been compelling enough to denote a
clear conclusion as to whether FRY was a successor of the SFRY" With
respect to the "objective" factors, even though FRY retained the former capital
Belgrade and the whole governmental machinery, it comprises only about forty
percent of the territory and forty-five percent of the population of the former
SFRY;26 whereas for the "subjective" factors, FRY's claim to "continue the
state, international legal and political personality of the [SFRY] '' 27 was
vigorously debated and many third states had expressed doubts as to whether
FRY was entitled to take over the SFRY's membership in the UN. It was
evident from FRY's later suspension to participate in the work of the General
Assembly that the disagreement existed.28 Nonetheless, FRY was regarded as
the continuation of the SFRY by this Court.29 The international reaction
experienced by Acastus was much more positive and as such, the acts of the
international community are persuasive and clearly determinative of Acastus's
succession of Nessus's status.
In the Bosnia case,jurisdiction rationepersonae was established following
the FRY's declaration regarding the continuation of the SFRY's membership.3"
Jurisdiction was established upon the intention expressed by the FRY to remain
bound by the international treaties to which the SFRY was party.31 Acastus's
note to the UN Secretary-General in April 2001, declaring continuation of
Nessus's membership should be given the same effect as the FRY's declaration.
Following the legal confusion caused by GA Resolution 47/1 regarding
FRY's status, the Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the UN had
25. YehudaZ. Blum, Membership ofthe "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 830, 833 (1992).
26. Id. at 833.
27. The Ambassador, Letter Dated2 7April 1992from the ChargeD 'Affaires A.L of the Permanent
Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, delivered
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23877 (May 5, 1992).
28. Application for Revision of Judgment of 11 July 1996 in Application of Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 122
31 (July 11) [hereinafter No. 122].
29. Application ofConvention on Prevention and Punishment ofCrime ofGenocide (Bosn. & Herz.
v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11) [hereinafter No. 91].
30. No. 91, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11).
31. Id.
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provided a legal explanatory statement at the request of Permanent Representa-
tives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia on 29 September 1992.32 It
explained that "the resolution [47/1] neither terminates nor suspends
Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization. 3 3 In the present case, the
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs' memorandum interpreting Resolu-
tion 2386 had noted that "Nessus has ceased to exist ... the resolution [2386]
does not prevent Acastus from temporarily continuing the membership of
Nessus in the United Nations. '"" However, it did not determine whether
Nessus's membership was terminated or suspended and did not provide a time
frame as to when Acastus's continuation of Nessus's status would lapse.
Therefore, the argument that Acastus has succeeded Nessus's status has always
been valid.
3. This Court Should Not Penalize a Defect in a Procedural Act which the
Applicant Could Easily Remedy.35
"The ICJ, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to
matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in
municipal law."36 Procedural defects such as premature application are not
adequate reasons for the dismissal of the applicant's suit.37 Even if Acastus
were to formally apply for UN membership and waited a year, giving effect to
Rubria's reservation of requiring the opposing party to be a party to the Statute
for more than a year, Acastus's "new" application filed in the ICJ would still
be almost identical to the present one as the current conflict would remain
unsettled. It defies common sense to require Acastus to institute fresh
proceedings upon the compliance with formal UN membership application
procedure.3 8 This Court should maintain its compulsory jurisdiction over all
claims in this case.
32. No. 122, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 122.
33. Id.
34. Compromis, 10.
35. No. 91, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11).
36. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15,28 (Dec. 2) (citing The Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), 1924 P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, 34 (Aug. 30); see also Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 24-25 [hereinafter
Nicaragua].
37. No. 91, 1996 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (July 11).
38. Northern Cameroons, 1963 I.C.J. 15, 28.
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4. This Court Should Rule In Light of The Purpose and
Object of the Statute.
In Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"),
a treaty should be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose.39 The nature
of the treaty is significant to its interpretation.4' The ICJ was established to
encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes, one of the UN's fundamental
goals evidenced by Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.4' As with many treaties,
it was the intention to involve as many states as possible. This intention is
made clearer if seen in light of the different possible means by which
jurisdiction can be conferred upon the ICJ. Therefore, the Statute aims to
encourage peaceful settlement of disputes between more states. The Elysians
had already exhausted all domestic remedies to rectify the problems and
Acastus respectfully asks this Court to maintain its compulsoryjurisdiction over
all claims in this case so as to provide a peaceful resolution to this potentially
destructive situation involving the lives and livelihood of an ancient people.
B. By Permitting The Construction of the Pipeline as Proposed, Rubria
Would Violate the Rights ofAcastian Citizens of Elysian Heritage.
1. The Construction of the Pipeline as Proposed Violates Rubria's
Obligations under Article 27 of the ICCPR.
Rubria is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"). Article 27 of the ICCPR states that: "In those states in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language. 42
The jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
("UNHRC") on Article 27 has been developed largely through cases brought
to it under the Optional Protocol.43 These cases demonstrate that Article 27 can
form the basis at international law for compelling states to recognize and take
active steps to preserve the "special relationship of indigenous peoples with
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf#search=%22article%2031 %20vienna%20conv
ention%22 (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
40. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
41. U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at arts. 1-2.
42. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 27.
43. Look in footnote 43 when ILL comes in
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their land."" As the treaty body has been specifically authorized by sovereign
state parties to administer the treaty, the UNHRC's opinion is of great
persuasive value. In its General Comments, the UNHRC has stated that:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms,
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources,
specially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such
traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves
protected by law .... .
In Ldnsman v. Finland, the UNHRC affirmed the principle that Article 27
protects traditional practices of indigenous groups and their right to do so on
traditional lands.46 This case concerned the alleged disturbance of reindeer
breeding-which formed part of the Saami custom-by government authorized
quarrying of the Etela-Riutusvaara Mountain.47 While the UNHRC concluded
that, on the facts, the scale of quarrying was not sufficient to illicit the impact
on alleged reindeer breeding, it was noted that a significant expansion of the
quarrying would put Finland in breach of Article 27.' 8 The Committee also
gave significant weight to the fact that the Saami were consulted over the
licensing process. 4
In Ominayak v. Canada, the UNHRC found Canada in breach of its Article
27 obligations as against the indigenous Lubicon Lake Band.5" The facts,
closely analogous to the instant case, were thus: the Band had, since time
immemorial, occupied an area of approximately 10,000 square kilometers of
lake territory in Alberta, Canada.51 They continued to practice their traditional
means of subsistence, namely: hunting, fishing, and trapping. 52 The Provincial
Government of Alberta granted forestry leases, as well as oil and gas
exploration licenses over almost all of the 10,000 square kilometers to various
private corporations." The UNHRC placed considerable emphasis on the fact
44. SARAH PRITCHARD, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 196
(1998).
45. General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities, U.N. CCPR Human Rights Committee,
50th Sess., 1314th Mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.5 (1994).
46. Commc'n No. 511/1992: Finland, Aug. 11, 1994, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992.
47. Id. 19.6.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ominayak v. Canada, [1990] Commc'n No. 167/1984, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., A/45/40, vol.
H1, annex IX.A [hereinafter Ominayak].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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that the leasing process was carried out without consultation with or
representation of the Band or its interests." The environmental impact of the
forestry and exploration activities was such that it would prevent the Band from
engaging in its traditional way of life altogether." The UNHRC found that the
Canadian Government's failure to legally protect the Band's traditional way of
life constituted a breach of its Article 27 obligations. 6
Acastus submits that the environmental damage attendant on the
construction of the pipeline would result in the loss of rights of Acastian
citizens of Elysian heritage, which rights are guaranteed under Article 27."
Over half the Elysians' agricultural lands would be directly destroyed by the
construction process.58 The agricultural capacity of the other half would be
destroyed by the blocking of water supplies.59 It will be recalled that "[t]he
Elysians depend completely on the rich agricultural lands located in Rubria for
food."6 According to the ILSA report of September 2004, it will no longer be
possible for the Elysians to subsist on the Elysian Fields, or to practice their
traditional way of life.6  The report concludes: "If the pipeline is built
according to plan, each and every Elysian will have a very simple choice: leave
their ancestral homeland for the inhospitable cities of Acastus and Rubria, or
starve."62 Acastus submits that the ILSA report is evidence of the highest
quality, and should be accepted by this Court. It is further submitted that the
sudden rural-urban migration of the Elysians would do irreparable harm to
customs, language, and religion of the people.63
It is submitted that the deprivation of the Article 27 rights of the Elysians
creates positive obligations against Rubria to enact positive legal measures to
protect their rights. The UNHRC held that this requirement arises pursuant to
Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, which obligates state parties to the Covenant to,
inter alia, "adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."'  These rights arise
irrespective of the fact that the victims are not citizens of Rubria, since Article
54. 1d.
55. Ominayak, [1990] Commc'n No. 167/1984, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., A/45/40, vol. II, annex
IX.A.
56. Id.
57. Compromis, 37.
58. Id. 21.
59. Id
60. Id. 5.
61. Id. 24.
62. Compromis, 24.
63. PRITCHARD, supra note 44.
64. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 2(2).
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2(1) of the ICCPR states that "[T]he rights enunciated in the present Covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to... national or social
origin... ."65 On the facts, Rubria has passed no laws nor instituted any legal
proceedings to protect the Article 27 rights of Acastian citizens of Elysian
heritage. It is therefore submitted that Rubria has violated the rights of these
people.
2. Rubria's Actions Do Not Constitute a Legitimate
Restriction of Elysians' Rights.
Acastus concedes that the rights under ICCPR Article 27 are of such
character that they may properly be subject to restrictions. However, it is
submitted that, in conformity with international human rights practices, such
restrictions must meet two criteria: they must be prescribed by law, and no
greater than are necessary.66
With regard to the first requirement, the European Court of Human Rights
held in Hashman andHarrup v. United Kingdom that the phrase "prescribed by
law" in the context of the restriction on human rights must be taken to mean
"through legislative process."67 Rubria has not enacted any legislative, legal,
or quasi-legal measures purporting to restrict the Elysians' rights under Article
27.
The second requirement is that restriction on rights must be "necessary."68
In the plain sense, the term "necessary" connotes that there must exist some
concern or reason for the restriction that is objectively commensurate to-or
greater than-the importance to the upholding of the right. The UNHRC case
of Kitok v. Sweden laid down a stricter necessity test for the restriction of the
Article 27 rights.69 It is summarized here by the Australian Human Rights and
Equal Opportunities Commission: "[T]o be valid and not breach Article 27, a
restriction upon the right of an individual member of a minority must be shown
to have a reasonable and objective justification and to be necessary for the
continued viability and welfare of the minority as a whole."7
65. Id. at art. 2(1).
66. International Covenant on Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights art. 4, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3(enteredintoforce
Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; ICCPR, supra note 3, arts. 18, 21, 22.
67. Hashman v. U.K., 25594/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. 133 (1999).
68. ICESCR, supra note 66, at art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 3, arts. 18, 21, 22.
69. Kitok v. Swed. Commc'n No. 197/1985, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/33/D/197/85.
70. Id. 9.2; see also The fight against racism: Principles of non-discrimination and equality,
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socialjustice/ntissues/fight.html#21 (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
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The reason for the restriction of the Elysians' rights in this case is strictly
financial; other routings for the pipeline could have been pursued by COG but
were dismissed on grounds of cost alone.7 Acastus submits that the monetary
gain by project stakeholders cannot render a restriction of the livelihood rights
and cultural rights as "necessary" in the objective sense. The strict Kitok
necessity demands that the restriction be necessary specifically for the
protection of the right bearers themselves.7" It has not been argued by
Rubria-and such an argument could not stand on the facts-that the restriction
of the Elysians' rights would promote the long-term viability of the Elysians
themselves. It is submitted, therefore, that the restrictions do not meet the
necessity requirement under any formulation.
Based on these submissions, namely that any restriction that has taken
place on the rights of Acastian citizens of Elysian heritage arising from Article
27 of the ICCPR was neither prescribed by law nor necessary, Acastus submits
that any such restrictions cannot be viewed as legitimate in light of Rubria's
international obligations under international law.
3. The Sovereignty Rights of Rubria Do Not Absolve It of Liability for the
Alleged Breaches as Rubria's Sovereignty Rights Are Qualified by the
Elysians' Right of Self-Determination.
Acastus submits that the Elysians have a right to self-determination at
international law. This includes the right to continue to subsist on their
traditional lands, and the right to participate in the management of natural
resources pertaining to those lands as well as a share in any profits derived from
exploitation of those resources.
Nessus acquired its sovereignty over the Elysian Fields through the method
of occupation, as the absence of any war or succession treaty between the
Elysians and Nessus rules out other methods of acquisition. In order to lawfully
acquire territory by occupation, the territory in question must have been, at the
time of occupation, terra nullius-or "territory belonging to no one"-at
international law.73 Until the 20th century, many smaller indigenous societies
that occupied territory were considered too "backwards" and lacking in
sufficient socio-political complexity to be considered occupiers at international
law.
74
71. Compromis, 21.
72. Kitok, Communication No. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988), 4.3.
73. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 11 (Oct. 16).
74. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from
Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 263, 263 (1997).
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Acastus submits that where territory is acquired by a state in this fashion,
customary international law confers special rights on those indigenous people.
These special rights qualify the sovereignty rights of the state. These rights,
characterized broadly as "self-determination rights," include, inter alia, special
property interests in land and natural resources. This right need not be the
absolute form of property rights observable in many municipal law regimes."
This right could, in the instant case, be discharged in a number of ways ranging
from consultation and profit sharing to a rerouting of the pipeline.
This practice by states is evidenced in many international treaties. Article
15 of the ILO Convention No. 169, to which it is likely that Rubria is a party,
requires that: "The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources
pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the
right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation
of these resources." (Emphasis added).76 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR (which is
identical to Article 1 of the ICESCR) states that: "All peoples have the right
of self-determination."77 This statement is further elaborated upon in Article
1(2): "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth."78 Article 7 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples states that: "Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual
right not to... prevention of and redress for: ... (b) any action which has the
aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources."79
This right is further developed in Articles 26-28 of the Draft Declaration.8"
Acastus submits that a sense of obligation amongst state actors that they
are bound by customary norm to safeguard these rights is evident amongst those
states in which indigenous people reside or subsist. The following are
examples of such opinio juris: the High Court of Australia in Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 2] overturned the long-held presumption at common law that
Australia had been terra nullius at the time of its occupation due to the
"backwards" nature of its aboriginal inhabitants.81 The High Court of Australia
granted "native title" to the applicant, an indigenous Aboriginal, and in doing
75. See generally Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., 2 A.C. 883 (2002).
76. The International Labor Organization Convention (No. 169) Concerning the Protection of
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, at art. 15 (entered
into force Sept. 5, 1991).
77. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 1(1).
78. Id. at art. 1(2).
79. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-
Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add I (Apr. 20, 1994).
80. Id. at arts. 26-28.
81. Mabo v. Queensland H, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
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so recognized that indigenous heritage gives rise to certain property rights at
law, including the right to access the land and practice traditional agriculture
thereon, as well as the right to exclude other uses of the land such as mining or
urban development.8 2 In the Awas Tingni case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights injuncted the government of Nicaragua from licensing a Korean
corporation to log communal lands of the Mayagna people. 3 In a decision
followed by that tribunal in several subsequent cases, the Inter-American Court
recognized Indigenous property rights as arising from Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights and pledged to protect them. 4 The
Canadian Government has also recognized these rights "through the Indian Act
of 1970 and Treaty 8 of 21 June 1899 (concerning aboriginal land rights in
northern Alberta)." 5  This treaty is now enshrined in the Canadian
Constitution. 6 New Zealand has protected similar land rights through the
Maori Land Act of 1993 and the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975.87 Chapter 12
of South Africa's Constitution protects the rights of indigenous inhabitants,
including the customary law of indigenous peoples as it applies to land. 8
Acastus submits that the effect of this customary norm in the instant case
is that it restricts the right of Rubria to dispose of the land constituting Elysian
Fields and the natural resources thereupon. Without considering full extent of
this restriction, it is submitted that Rubria's right to grant licenses of an
exclusive character over the entire lands of the Elysian Fields to COG without
consulting or seeking approval from the Elysians must fall within such a
restriction, as it gives no account at all to the self-determination rights of the
Elysians. It is submitted, therefore, that national sovereignty rights cannot form
the basis of a defense at international law for Rubria's inactions.
82. Id.
83. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Court H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 79 (Judgment on merits and reparations of Aug. 31, 2001), in 19 ARmz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395 (2002)
(pub. abridged ver.) [hereinafter Awas Tingni case].
84. See S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y
237, 239 (2005); Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, doc. 5 rev. I at
860(2002); Maya Indigenous Communities ofthe Toledo District, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 40/04, 61 (2004).
85. Ominayak, Commc'n No. 167/1984, CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990), 2.3; see also
Delgamuukwv. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010, 206 (1997); see generally R. v. Marshall, 3 S.C.R. 456
(1999) (citing R. v. Badger, I S.C.R. 771, 79 (1996)).
86. Canada Constitution.
87. Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975; Maori Land Act, 1993.
88. South Africa Constitution, ch. 12.
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C. The Activities of Prof in the Elysium, Including the Forced Labor of
Civilians, are Violations of International Law and are Attributable to
Rubria.
1. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium, Including Forced Labor, Are
Violations of International Law.
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR states, inter alia, that "everyone has the right to
liberty and security of person.89 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention." By kidnapping and detaining the Elysian laborers, PROF violated
the Elysians' right to liberty and security of the person.
Article 8(3) of ICCPR provides that no one shall be required to perform
forced or compulsory labor.9" ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work requires member states to eliminate all forms of forced and
compulsory labor.91 By forcing the Elysian labourers to work on the pipeline
project against their will, the conduct of PROF fell afoul of the interests
protected by ICCPR Article 8(3) and the ILO Declaration.
PROF is also in breach of international custom which similarly prohibits
forced labor. The existence of such a custom is evidenced in Article 23(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,92 Article 4 of the European
Convention on Human Rights,9 3 Article 6(2) of the American Convention on
Human Rights, 94 Article 1 of the ILO Forced Labor Convention,95 Article 1 of
the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention,96 and various resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly.97
Furthermore, the Elysian laborers were forced to work all day on the
pipeline project and they were only given a small bag of sorghum as payment
89. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 9(1).
90. Id. at art. 8(3)(a).
91. International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
1998, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATION WEB.ABOUTDECLARATIONHOME
?var-language=EN (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
92. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
93. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec.
20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
94. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S., 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic3.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2006).
95. Forced Labour Convention, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55.
96. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
97. G.A. Res. 52/140, 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/140 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 53/162, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/53/162 (Feb. 25, 1999); G.A. Res. 56/231, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/231 (Feb. 28, 2002).
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for their labor. Their rights are violated under Article 7 of ICSECR, which
protects a person's right to fair and just remuneration for work.98
The Elysian economy is insular and wholly agricultural. According to
Elysian tradition, children, pregnant women, and the physically and mentally
handicapped do not labor in their fields. As the Elysian men were forced to
work on the pipeline during the daytime and only allowed to return to their
fields in the evening, the Elysians were deprived of their own means of
subsistence, contrary to Article 1 of the ICSECR.99
2. COG is Liable for PROF's Activities.
Pursuant to a contract concluded in July 2004, PROF was engaged by
COG to carry out various operations in the Elysium in return for a fee which
covered operating costs and profits.'00 Although PROF has a separate corporate
identity from COG, it was created and financed by COG solely for the purpose
of carrying out the COG contract. PROF was empowered by COG to determine
and purchase the weapons and ammunitions necessary for its operations.10
More importantly, PROF was authorized by COG to practice forced labor, as
evidenced by the fact that the Elysians were deposited at sites to work under the
instructions of COG managers. Therefore, PROF is an empowered agent of
COG.
It is submitted that private security companies are capable of violating
human rights if armed violence is used to kill, detain, kidnap or otherwise
coerce.10 2  Companies that use such private security firms are clearly
responsible for the conduct of their agents.' 3 It is not disputed that PROF used
force or threatened to use force in kidnapping and coercing the Elysians to work
on the pipeline project. COG is therefore responsible for the conduct of PROF.
98. ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 7.
99. Id. at art. 1.
100. Compromis, 23.
101. Id.
102. Compromis, 30.
103. Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria,
Commc'n No. 155/96 (2001); Fifteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, 2001-2002, 50, 58, 62; Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War;
Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Order, 34 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 75, 152-53 (1998).
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3. The Activities of PROF in the Elysium Are Attributable to Rubria.
Conduct attributable to the state can consist of actions or omissions.
104
The activities of PROF are attributable to Rubria due to its interest in and
control of COG and/or its omission to take appropriate measures to secure the
rights of the Elysians.
a. Rubria is Directly Responsible for PROF's Conduct Due to its
Interest in and Control of COG.
In the case of corporate entities, international law recognizes the
separateness of corporate entities at the national level, except in those cases
where the "corporate veil" is a mere device or a vehicle for fraud or evasion.'0 5
The conduct of corporate entities in carrying out their activities is prima facie
not attributable to the state.0 6 However, where there is evidence that the state
is using its interest in or control of a corporation in order to achieve a particular
result, the conduct in question can be attributed to the state.
0 7
In the Foremost Tehran v. Iran case, a decision not to pay dividends to the
company's shareholders, including the claimant American company, was
attributable to the Iranian State."' The Iran-US Claims Tribunal based its
decision on the fact that the State of Iran was represented on the company's
board of directors and these representatives had influenced the board of
directors' meeting at which the decision was taken for the purpose of
expropriating shareholders.0 9
A state is also responsible for the acts of non-state entities if the private
conduct is directed or controlled by the state." 0 The non-state entities are not
state organs and the conduct does not have to involve "governmental
authority.""'.
104. International Law Commission, Commentaries to the DraftArticles on Responsibility ofStates
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 70 U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess. (2001) [hereinafter Commentaries to Draft
Articles].
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 108.
108. Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 228 (1986).
109. Ademola Abass, Consent Precluding State Responsibility: A Critical Analysis, 55 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 211 (2004).
110. International Law Commission, Draft Articles of the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, UN GAOR, 56th Session, Supp. No. 10, Article 8, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter
Draft Articles].
11. JAGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 140
(2002).
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In the Case concerning Military andParamilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, this Court accepted that a state can be liable for humanitarian
violations committed by non-state actors outside its territory.' 2 It was held that
for the conduct of non-state actors to give rise to legal responsibility of the
state, it would have to be proved that the state had effective control of the non-
state actor's operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed." 3
The issue in the present case is whether Rubria used its interest and control
of COG for a particular purpose and whether such control was effective. The
Rubrian government and TNC incorporated COG expressly and solely for the
purpose of developing and exporting the petroleum resources in the south of the
Elysium." 4 This is in concert with Rubria's post-independence policy to
encourage investment by multinational companies, especially those involved in
extracting mineral and oil resources. Clearly, Rubria would like to use its
interest in COG as a vehicle to advance its local economy, despite its
knowledge that the operation of COG would jeopardize the livelihood and
rights of the Elysians.
Rubria may contend that its government is only the minority shareholder
of COG and hence it did not have effective control of the latter's decision.
However, it is submitted that a majority shareholding is not a prerequisite to
effective control over a corporate entity. In the case of private corporations,
effective control can flow from the economic, legal and political connection
between the corporation and the state." 5 In this case, it can be established that
Rubria had effective control over the activities of COG and PROF by way of
the following facts:
A) Rubria is responsible for almost half (forty-nine percent) of the
funding for COG;" 6
B) COG was incorporated under the laws of Rubria;" 7
C) The agricultural lands to be exploited for oil are under the
stewardship of the National Parks Authority ("NPA"), an
agency of the Rubrian government;"' and
112. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 63, 111.
113. Id. 1112.
114. Compromis, 19.
115. 115. JAGERS, supra note I 11, at 171; Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, I II YALE L.J. 443, 525 (2001).
116. Compromis, 19.
117. Id.
118. Id. 5.
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D) The Rubrian government granted COG the exclusive rights to
operate within the region to COG." 9
Hence, Rubria had effective control over COG and is directly responsible
for the human rights violations by PFOF, which acted as COG's agent.
b. Rubria has Failed to Take Reasonable and Appropriate Measures to
Secure the Elysians' Rights.
i. States have an Implied Duty to Regulate Activities of Private Entities to
Avoid Human Rights Violations.
Rubria is a party to the ICCPR, ICSECR, and the ILO. 20 These conven-
tions impose an obligation on the party states' governments to regulate the
conduct of multi-national corporations within their jurisdiction in order to
uphold the principles contained within them.1 2'
This general obligation can also be found in international human rights law
and it has appeared in the case-law of international human rights bodies. For
example, the Inter-American Court in the Velasquez-Rodriguez case decided
that Honduras was responsible, even if the alleged human rights violations had
not been carried out by agents acting under the cover of public authority. 22
This was because the state failed to prevent these violations or to punish those
responsible. 12
In the Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, this Court concluded that the
responsibility of Iran was entailed by the "inaction" of its authorities which
"failed to take appropriate steps," in circumstances where such steps were
evidently called for. 124
Similarly, in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria, the African Commission of Human and People's
Rights held that Nigeria failed to discharge its duty to protect citizens from
damaging acts done by private parties by failing to enact appropriate legislation
and institute effective enforcement measures against breaches, contrary to the
119. Id. 20.
120. Id. 36.
121. Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53, 66 (2004); Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights paras. 6, 7 & 18 (Jan. 22-26, 1997), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines-.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
122. . Velasquez-Rodriguez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 182 (1988).
123. Id. 178.
124. United Nations Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31-32
(May 24).
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minimum conduct expected of governments and therefore, it acted contrary to
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.'25
In the present case, Rubria failed to discharge its duty to prevent the illegal
activities of PROF, including forced labor, which took place within Rubrian
territory. When entering into the bilateral agreement with Acastus, RABBIT,
Rubria specifically insisted on having the corporate responsibility provision of
the MCRA incorporated to ensure that human rights would be observed by
Acastian corporations. 2 6 Rubria, however, failed to satisfy the minimum
requirement of enacting similar legislation on its part.'27
ii. Actual Knowledge of the Violations is not
Required to Constitute Breach.
It has been argued that the simple fact of harm by a corporation, where a
government does not have adequate prior or concurrent knowledge of that harm,
cannot trigger state responsibility.12 Thus, Rubria may contend that it was not
aware of PROF's conduct, including forced labor, at the time the conduct was
occurring.
However, the findings of the ILSA report, including the incidents of forced
labor committed by PROF, were published in September 2004 .29 It is
submitted that Rubria had at least constructive knowledge of PROF's conduct.
Furthermore, the agricultural lands cultivated by the Elysians are under the
stewardship of the NPA, an agency of the Rubrian government. 30 Additionally,
Rubria had appointed four directors of COG, to whom the chief executive
officer of COG reported.'3 ' Even if the Rubrian government did not have actual
knowledge of PROF's conduct, its knowledge can be imputed through the NPA
and its interest and control of COG.
In the Corfu Channel case, this Court found Albania liable for a failure to
act when it knew or should have known of the illegal conduct taking place
within its territory.132
125. 15th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, supra
note 103.
126. Compromis, 15.
127. Aguirre, supra note 121, at para. 150).
128. Craig Scott, Multinational Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudence on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 563-96 (A. Eide, C.
Krause & A. Rosas eds., 2d ed. 2001).
129. Compromis, 24.
130. Id. 5.
131. See generally Id.
132. Corfu Channel case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,4, 23.
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Rubria was the situs of PROF's activities which violated the Elysians'
human rights.'3 3 Rubria ought to have known of the illegal conduct and its
failure to prevent or penalize such activities gave rise to a breach of its
obligations under ICCPR, ICSECR, ILO, and customary international law.
iii. Serious Harm has Been Caused to the Elysians.
In the Ldnsman cases, the UNHRC required a threshold of seriousness of
harm before a state's duties to prevent the harm were triggered, and, even then,
a state may discharge such duties by fulfilling its obligation to consult with the
potentially affected groups.'34 This duty to consult and negotiate in good faith
was confirmed by this Court in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project.' The UNHRC decided that Finland had not violated its legal
obligations, noting that the amount of quarrying that had already taken place
had not caused significant harm.'36 It also noted that the authors of the
complaint had been consulted before the quarrying permit was issued. "
The present case can be distinguished from the Ldnsman cases in that the
Elysians were never consulted on the building of the oil pipeline. Hence,
Rubria is in breach of its duty of good faith. Serious harm has been caused to
the Elysians due to the forced labor, the lack of adequate compensation, and the
deprivation of opportunities to cultivate their agricultural lands during daytime.
D. The Outcome of the Borius Litigation Does Not Place Acastus in Breach
of Article 52 of the RABBIT.
It is submitted that the Acastian court acted lawfully in dismissing TNC
as a defendant in the claims under AIRES and the MCRA, and hence Acastus
is not in breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT. 3 8
1. TNC Is Not Liable for the Conduct of PROF under AIRES Since It Is Not
a Subject of International Law.
a. The Nature of Claims under AIRES.
Under AIRES, Acastian courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases
in which it is claimed that international law, including but not limited to the
133. Compromis, 30.
134. Commc'n No. 511/1992, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, 8.4.
135. Case Concerning the Gabcik ovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 3, 7.
136. Commc'n No. 511/1992, CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, M 9.6, 10.
137. Id. 9.6.
138. Compromis, 15.
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international law of human rights, has been violated outside the national
territory, so long as the defendant is present or may be found in Acastus. '39
.As found by the domestic court of Acastus, TNC, as a private company,
is not a "subject" of international law, which governs the rights of statesand
other international legal persons, and therefore is not a proper party defendant
in a case under AIRES.
140
b. TNC is Not a Subject of International Law.
To determine the obligations of corporations for human rights violations
under international law, the status of corporations under international law must
be first addressed.1 4' Under present international law, entities only owe
responsibilities to the international community when they are considered to be
subjects of international law. 142
A subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing international rights
and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing
international claims. 43 The question then turns onto whether a corporation has
i) rights, ii) duties, and iii) whether it is able to enforce its rights in international
law.
In terms of international rights, it has been accepted that business
enterprises have rights under international law, whether the economic right
under investment treaties to receive nondiscriminatory treatment, or political
rights such as freedom of speech.'" As for the ability of a corporation to
enforce its rights, there is also evidence that corporations have been provided
with the possibility of enforcing their rights through arbitration. Other
examples include the United Nations Compensation Commission, through
which corporations can bring claims for compensation against Iraq,'45 and the
Seabed Disputes Chamber, 146 which has jurisdiction relating to disputes
between parties to a contract.
However, in terms of duties, the classic position is that the primary rules
of international law are addressed to states and state officials, not non-state
139. Id. 27.
140. Id. 28.
141. JAGERS, supra note I11,at 19.
142. Jdgers, Multinational Corporation underinternational Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARD AND
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORP., THE HAGUE 259, 261 (1999).
143. Reparation for Injuries in the Service of the UN case, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179.
144. Addo, The Corporation as a Victim ofHuman Rights Violations, in HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARD
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORP., THE HAGUE 187, 191 (1999).
145. SC Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991).
146. Annex V1 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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actors.'47 The most commonly cited example of international legal norms
imposing obligations on corporations is the European concept of Drittwirkung,
under which certain provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights
are understood to contemplate "horizontal effect," meaning that they apply as
between private parties.'48 However, it is submitted that such a concept does
not conflict with the classic position, as European authorities have demon-
strated that it is the state that has the obligation to ensure that private parties
behave in certain ways towards other private parties.'
Similarly, in Velasquez-Rodriguez, although the Inter-American Court
recognized that the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights had a
horizontal effect similar to that of the European Convention, it affirmed the
responsibility of the state for its failure to prevent or punish private conduct that
infringed human rights, but it did not hold that private individuals who inflict
such injuries are guilty of violating the Convention. 5 0
Therefore, although corporations have rights and are sometimes able to
enforce their rights by bringing international claims, there is no binding
agreement that directly imposes international obligations or duties on
corporations. Therefore, TNC, as a corporation, is not a subject of international
law and is not a proper party defendant in the claim under AIRES.
c. Furthermore, TNC is Not Bound by Any "Soft Law" Which Seeks to
Impose International Obligations Directly on Corporations.
While the U.N. Global Compact,' 5' ILO Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,'52 and the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ("the OECD Guidelines")'53
all urge toward some form of legal personality, they are not clear or precise
enough to establish on their own a customary rule on international legal
147. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 58.
148. Jiigers, supra note 142, at 265.
149. L6pez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277 (1994); Guerra v. Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998);
see also Carlos M. Vk.zquez, Direct vs Indirect Obligations of Corporations under International Law, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 928, 937 (2005).
150. Velasquez-Rodriguez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
151. UN Global Compact, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2006).
152. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/mne.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
153. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Text, Commentary and Clarifications,
DAFFIME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL, available at http//www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/daffe-ime-
wpg(2000)15-final (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
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personality for corporations.'54 They are essentially "soft law," i.e., they are
only voluntary in nature and they do not on their own impose any binding
obligations on corporations.'
Rubria may seek to rely on Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
("Norms"), which aspire to hold businesses accountable for their human rights
abuses. 56 However, although the Norms are not voluntary, they are still in the
form of recommendations and have not attained the status of a treaty which
would create legally binding obligations on private corporations.'57
In any event, the very first principles of the Norms, entitled "General
Obligations," state that the Norms are in no manner intended to reduce the
obligations of governments to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure
respect for, or protect human rights.'58 The Norms would be misused if they
were employed by a government to justify failing to protect human rights fully
or to provide appropriate remedies for human rights violations. This idea is
reinforced in paragraph 19 of the Norms, which provides that nothing in the
Norms should be construed as diminishing states' obligations to protect and
promote human rights or as limiting rules or laws that provide greater
protection of human rights.'59
Hence, even under the Norms, Rubria is still obliged to ensure that human
rights are being protected within its territory and there is no justification for
shifting its liability to TNC or any other corporate entities.
2. TNC Is Not a Proper Party Defendant within the Meaning of the MCRA.
a. TNC had No Direct Involvement in PROF's Activities in the Elysium.
According to section 1 of the MCRA, the purposes of the Act are to, inter
alia, ensure that business entities incorporated in Acastus conduct themselves
abroad by the same standards to which they are held in their domestic affairs. 60
154. llias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309,
314 (2004).
155. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 913
(2003).
156. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR C.H.R., 55th Session, 22nd mtg., UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub/2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Norms].
157. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 155, at 914.
158. Norms, supra note 156.
159. Id. 19.
160. Compromis, Annex A(1).
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This provision limits the jurisdiction of the Acastian civil courts to claims
against business entities which carry out operations outside the territory of
Acastus. In fact, the words "conduct abroad" or "operating abroad" appear five
times in the entire Act. They demonstrate that the Act only applies to
corporations which actively conduct their businesses outside the Acastian
territory. Therefore, using either a purposive or literal interpretation of the Act,
liability under the Act can only be imposed on corporations which are directly
involved in activities that violate customary international law.
In the present case, TNC did not have any direct involvement in the
alleged activities of PROF. Rather, it was COG that operated the pipeline
project in the Elysium and engaged PROF to commit various violations against
the Elysians, including forced labor. As there is also no evidence that TNC was
the alter ego of COG, TNC should not be named as a defendant within the
meaning of the MCRA.
b. The MCRA does not Repeal the Principle of Limited Liability Despite
the Incorporation of the OECD Guidelines.
The MCRA has expressly incorporated the General Policies set out in the
OECD Guidelines for interpreting and implementing the standards of the Act.16 '
Rubria may argue that TNC, as a parent company, is responsible for PROF's
conduct, since under the OECD Guidelines, parent companies are responsible
to ensure that their subsidiaries observe the Guidelines. '62 However, it must be
emphasized that such obligation was mentioned only in the clarifications of the
Concepts and Principles of the Guidelines. Nowhere in the General Policies,
to which the MCRA specifically refers, including the corresponding official
commentary and clarification, is such an obligation stipulated.
In any event, the clarifications under Concepts and Principles confirm that
the Guidelines are not meant to supersede or substitute for national laws
governing corporate liability and they do not imply an unqualified principle of
parent company responsibility.'63 Therefore, the Acastian court, in interpreting
the MCRA, had the discretion to adopt the principle of limited liability and
acknowledge the existence of a corporate veil protecting TNC from being held
liable for the conduct of its subsidiaries. Such discretion has been well
recognized by the European Court of Human Rights under the margin of
appreciation doctrine. The doctrine suggests that insofar as the standard for a
protected right is satisfied, states are allowed a wide discretion when choosing
161. Id. at A(3).
162. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 153, at 9.
163. Id. at 10.
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the means of enforcing international law and assessing its impact on their
citizens."6
c. Examples From Other States Demonstrate a Similar Approach to
Assessing Liability of Parent Companies.
In order to decide whether the Acastian court was correct in adopting the
limited liability approach in the Borius litigation, it would be useful to consider
other national courts' decisions on similar matters. In Australia, a 1998 court
judgment refused to hold an Australian parent company, James Hardie, liable
for asbestosis suffered by an employee at its New Zealand subsidiary, on the
basis that the parent's legal identity prevented the imposition of a duty of care
under the law of negligence.' 65 It also noted that "the law pays scant regard to
the commercial reality that every holding company has the potential [to] and,
more often than not, in fact, does, exercise complete control over the
subsidiary."' 66
Another useful reference can be made to the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA") of the United States. Similar to the MCRA, the ATCA gives U.S.
district courts power to hear civil claims by foreign citizens for injuries caused
by actions "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 67
In Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., ;B218;B218the U.S. court decided that
whether to hold a parent company liable for the acts of its subsidiary is a fact-
based inquiry, and the general rule is to respect the corporate form, unless to do
so would work an injustice upon innocent third parties.'68 The court rejected
the plaintiffs alter-ego theory because there was "no evidence to support a
finding that incorporation was undertaken in bad faith or that observing the
corporate form would achieve an inequitable result.;B219;B219" 6 9
Rubria may seek to rely on another ATCA case, National Coalition
Government ofBurman v. Unocal Inc., in which a U.S. district court held that
a corporation could be held liable for its overseas joint venture's violations of
international human rights. 7 ' However, such a decision has been criticized as
164. ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUR. CT. H.R. 17 (2002).
165. Briggs v. James Hardie & Co. Pty. Ltd. 16 NSWLR 549 (1989).
166. Id. at 577.
167. Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/atcaindx.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
168. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
169. Id. at 1247.
170. Nat'l Coal. Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal Inc., 176 FRD 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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a misapplication of international law and discouraging to foreign investments
in countries with poor human rights records. 7'
d. No Injustice Has Been Caused by Dismissing TNC as a Defendant.
Rubria may contend that if Rubria is liable for COG's business operations
in the Elysium, by the same token TNC should also be liable because of its
controlling interest in COG. Otherwise, TNC would be receiving preferential
treatment.
However, it should be noted that the Acastian court's decision against
Rubria is based on the provisions of AIRES, not the MCRA. More importantly,
the decision is not premised on the fact that it was a shareholder of COG, but
as a violator of the Elysians' internationally-guaranteed human rights. As
suggested by the above-mentioned Australian case Briggs, a controlling interest
does not automatically impose liability on the parent company for the wrongful
acts conducted by the subsidiary.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the court's decision has caused any
injustice upon the plaintiffs or any innocent third parties, nor is there any
indication that COG was created for fraudulent purposes by TNC to evade any
existing or potential liabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons in this Memorial, the Republic of Acastus
respectfully requests that this honourable Court:
i) DECLARE that this Court has jurisdiction over all claims in
this case since Acastus has succeeded to Nessus's status as a
party to the Statute of the Court;
ii) DECLARE that Rubria violated the rights of Acastus's citizens
of Elysian heritage;
iii) DECLARE that the activities of PROF in the Elysium,
including the forced labor of civilians, are attributable to Rubria
and are violations of international law;
iv) DECLARE that the outcome of the Borius litigation does not
place Acastus in breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT.
171. Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 619 (2000); David I. Becker, A Callfor the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183, 206 (1998).
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The differences between the Republic of Acastus and the State of Rubria
concerning the Elysian Fields have been brought before the International Court
of Justice in accordance with Article 40(1) of its statute by notification of the
Compromis for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the
Differences between the Republic of Acastus (Applicant) and the State of
Rubria (Respondent) Concerning the Elysian Fields. This special agreement
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was concluded by the parties in Chicago, Illinois, USA, on September 1, 2005
and was notified to the Court on September 15, 2005. The Compromis
constitutes a statement of agreed facts but not an agreement to the Court's ad
hoc jurisdiction. Rubria has no objection to the admissibility of the matters
concerning the RABBIT. However, with respect to all other matters, including
Rubria's direct responsibility for alleged human rights violations, admissibility
is contested.
The Court is respectfully requested to decide the case on the basis of the
rules and principles of general international law, as well as any applicable
treaties.
The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including
the rights and obligations of the parties, arising from its judgment on the
questions presented in the case.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The State of Rubria respectfully asks this Court to decide:
I. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than those
under the RABBIT, since Acastus is not in continuation of Nessus
and has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in its
own right;
II. Whether Rubria exercises rights attendant to its sovereignty over
territory and natural resources and does not violate international law
by permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed;
III. Whether the actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under
international law, or in the alternative, did not violate any inter-
national legal obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus;
IV. Whether Acastus is in breach of Article 52 of the RABBIT by virtue
of the Acastian civil court's decision.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2000 the Republic of Nessus dissolved to form two new democratic
States: the Republic of Acastus (Applicant in this case), incorporating the rich
coastal plains north of the thirty-sixth parallel, and the State of Rubria
(Respondent in this case), incorporating the mountainous and largely
undeveloped southern half of Nessus's territory.
Rubria became a member of the United Nations [hereinafter UN] in 2001
and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
[hereinafter ICJ], making one reservation that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
any case in which the opposing state has not been a party to the Statute of the
Court [hereinafter ICJ Statute] for at least twelve months at the time of the
application to the Court. Rubria is, and Nessus was, a party to the Vienna
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Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT], the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR], and
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties [herein-
after VCST]. Acastus has not signed any of these treaties in its own capacity.
Rubria is also a member of the International Labour Organization [hereinafter
ILO] and Acastus is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development [hereinafter OECD]. Although Acastus claims to continue
the international legal personality ofNessus in both, membership in the UN and
in all treaties, the Security Council [hereinafter SC] states in its Resolution
2386 that Nessus has ceased to exist and that Acastus shall also apply for
membership. This resolution was subsequently interpreted by the Under-
Secretary-General for Legal Affairs in a memorandum to conclude that Acastus
can temporarily continue the membership of Nessus in the UN until it has been
admitted as a new member state. Several third states including Rubria have
protested against this interpretation because no devolution agreement has been
signed, Acastus does not encompass a majority of the land mass or population
of the former Nessus, and Nessus's armed forces were divided evenly between
Acastus and Nessus. Irrespective of these facts, Acastus has not applied for
membership.
Nonetheless, relations between Acastus and Rubria have largely been
friendly. In February 2002, both countries signed the Rubria-Acastus-Binding-
Bilateral-Investment-Treaty [hereinafter RABBIT], which inter alia guarantees
that Acastus will enforce all aspects of its domestic law in carrying out its
obligations under the treaty, including the Multinational Corporations Respon-
sibility Act [hereinafter MCRA], and that any disputes regarding the RABBIT
shall be referred to this honorable Court. The MCRA guarantees that in the
case of a violation of international law by an Acastian company in its conduct
abroad compensation will be provided to those harmed.
In May 2003, the Trans-National Corporation [hereinafter TNC], a limited
liability company incorporated in Acastus, and the government of Rubria
announced the formation of the Corporation for Oil & Gas [hereinafter COG]
in Rubria for the purpose of developing and exporting petroleum resources
discovered in northern Rubria. Exclusive rights to operate within the region
were promptly granted. TNC holds fifty-one per cent and Rubria forty-nine per
cent of shares in COG. Under the corporate charter of COG, all shareholder
decisions are made by simple majority vote, on a one-share, one-vote basis.
For the extraction and exportation of the oil, experts have recommended
the construction of a pipeline running through a territory used by the Elysians
for agriculture. The Elysians are an indigenous group with Acastian citizen-
ship, resident in Acastus and present only temporarily for the purpose of
agricultural activities. Although the construction through the Elysium would
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destroy half of the agricultural lands used by the Elysians and would reduce the
yields of the remainder, this is the only financially feasible route.
As the Elysians were likely to be hostile to this construction, COG
authorized and financed the creation of the Protection & Retention Operations
Force [hereinafter PROF] for the sole purpose of accompanying and guarding
their personnel.
A study ordered by the Acastian government and performed by the
Institute of Local Studies and Appraisals [hereinafter ILSA] delivered a report,
stating that the construction would make it impossible for the Elysians to
continue their way of life and accusing PROF of seizing young men from
among the Elysians and forcing them to work on the COG project.
On September 30,2004 a number of local NGOs concerned with minority
rights, Mr. Borius and an unincorporated group calling itself "Elysians for
Justice" brought an action for damages in an Acastian civil court against COG,
Rubria, PROF, and TNC. The action alleged that Elysians were forced to per-
form dangerous work without compensation. Jurisdiction over the case against
Rubria, COG, and PROF was based on the Acastian International Rights
Enforcement Statute [hereinafter AIRES], which grants Acastian courts j uris-
diction in cases where international law has been violated outside of Acastus,
as long as the defendant is present in Acastus. In the case against TNCjurisdic-
tion was based on the MCRA and alternatively on AIRES.
Whereas TNC and PROF were dismissed as defendants, Rubria and COG
were found jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for compensatory
damages in an amount equivalent to 200 million Euros. TNC was dismissed on
the grounds that the MCRA only imposes legal obligations on corporations
which directly operate abroad, the Act does not repeal the limited liability
principle, and that AIRES is not applicable because corporations cannot be
subjects of international law. PROF did not fulfil the requirement of presence
in Acastus. Rubria has vigorously protested against this illegal and extraterri-
torial judgement and does not accept it.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Claim I: This honorable Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than
those under the RABBIT, since Acastus is not the continuation of Nessus and
has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in its own right.
I. The Court lacks jurisdiction because the Court shall only be open to
State Parties according to Article 35 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Acastus is not the continuation of
Nessus because it does not meet the necessary criteria under
international law to legal identity. Therefore, Acastus cannot claim
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Nessus's status as party to the statute and therefore does not have
access to the Court.
II. Furthermore, the Court lacks jurisdiction because Acastus does not
continue Nessus's membership or its inherent rights sui generis and
thereby neither enjoys access to the Court, nor falls under its
jurisdiction. First, access to the Court cannot be granted on the basis
of sui generis status because no such right sui generis exists and
second, Acastus did not declare submission to the ICJ as required
under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statue.
Claim II: By permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed,
Rubria exercises rights attendant to its sovereignty over territory and natural
resources and does not violate international law.
I. Rubria has not violated international treaty law. Acastus cannot
claim rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights because Acastus has not automatically succeeded Nessus as
party to the ICCPR. In the alternative, Rubria has not violated the
ICCPR because first, the Elysians are not "peoples" in the sense of
ICCPR Article 1. Second, the Elysians are not Rubrian nationals and
have not demonstrated the required element of stability on Rubrian
territory. Third, Rubria has not violated Article 27 because agricul-
tural activities are not included in its scope of protection. Fourth, in
the alternative, Rubria's fundamental right to economic development
supersedes Elysian claims.
II. By permitting the construction of the pipeline, Rubria has not
violated customary international law.
Claim III: The actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under
international law, or in the alternative, did not violate any international legal
obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus.
I. The actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under international
law because first, PROF acted as a private legal entity and not as a
state organ of Rubria, and second, no de facto relationship exists
between PROF and Rubria which entails state responsibility under
international law. Neither did PROF exercise elements of Rubrian
governmental authority, act under Rubrian instruction or under the
direction or control of Rubria, nor can the alleged conduct be
attributed to Rubria due to a "failure to control." Third, Rubria bears
no responsibility due to so-called "supporting and harboring."
II. In the alternative PROF's actions did not violate any international
obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus, because they do not constitute
internationally wrongful acts. In the alternative, Acastus is estopped
from holding Rubria legally responsible for conduct that it already
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guaranteed to Rubria in the RABBIT would not be committed by
Acastian companies.
Claim IV: Acastus has violated RABBIT Article 52 by failing to enforce
all aspects of its domestic law.
I. TNC's influence and control over COG and PROF constitutes
"conduct abroad," requiring the attribution of the alleged human
rights violation under RABBIT Article 52. First, the term "conduct
abroad" under MCRA Section Four must be interpreted according to
international law due to its incorporation into the RABBIT and the
accompanying declaration by the Acastian prime minister, and
second, TNC is liable for human rights violation committed by COG
and PROF under international customary law.
II. Acastus violated the RABBIT Article 52(2) by failing to enforce
AIRES provisions, leadings
I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CLAIMS OTHER
THAN THOSE UNDER THE RABBIT
The court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than those under the
RABBIT because Acastus is not in continuation of Nessus and therefore does
not have access to the court, and has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court in its own right.
A. Acastus is not in continuation of Nessus and therefore does not have
access to the Court.
According to Article 35 of the Statute of the ICJ,1 the Court shall be open
to States Parties. Article 93(1) of the UN Charter2 stipulates that only UN
members can become parties to the Statute. Acastus is neither member of the
UN nor party to the Statute because UN membership was not automatically
transferred to Acastus as successor to Nessus, and furthermore, Acastus does
not continue Nessus's membership or its inherent rights suigeneris and thereby
neither enjoys access to the Court, nor falls under its jurisdiction.
1. Acastus is not a UN member because Nessus's membership cannot
automatically be transferred to its successor and Acastus does not fulfill the
requirements of state identity.
Under customary international law continuation of membership in
international organizations can only be established when the emergent and
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 35.
2. U. N. Charter art. 93.
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former states are identical.' A mere successor state does not assume the rights
and obligations of the predecessor.4 Legal identity is required,5 which must be
derived from certain objective and subjective criteria according to the merits
and circumstances of each case.6 Acastus has fulfilled neither the objective nor
the subjective criteria for state identity which have emerged in customary
international law:
a) Acastus has not assumed the majority of Nessus's territory;
b) Acastus has not incorporated the dominant share of Nessus's
population and military infrastructure;
c) Third States have not accepted Acastus's claim;
d) A devolution agreement has not been signed by Rubria and
Acastus.
a. Acastus has not assumed the majority of Nessus 's former territory.
Under customary international law a clear majority of the former state's
territory is necessary to establish state identity.7 Continuation claims involving
the incorporation of seventy-five per cent of the former territory have been
accepted (e.g. India and Russia),' while claims of states incorporating forty per
cent have been denied (e.g. Pakistan).' Furthermore, both the Czech Republic
3. U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 1st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947); The
Succession of States in relation to Membership in the UnitedNations, U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/14 (1962), reprinted
in [1962]2 Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N 101, [hereinafter Succession of States Memorandum]; Legality of Use of
Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Can.), 2004 I.C.J. 1, 10-11 (Dec. 15) (separate opinion of Judge Kreea) [hereinafter
Opinion of Judge Kreca]. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 80(6th ed. 2003).
4. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 598 (Sept.
11); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 620-21.
5. See KONRAD G. BOHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2001); Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership
in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 41 (1995).
6. See U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 42nd mtg., Annex 6b, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/162 (1947).
7. See OLIVER DORR, DIE INKORPORATION ALS TATBESTAND DER STAATENSUKZESSION 131-40
(1995); See also RALF WITTKOWSKI, DIE STAATENSUKZESSION IN VOLKERRECHTLICHE VERTRAGE UNTER
BESONDERERBEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER HERSTELLUNG DER STAATLICHEN EINHEIT DEUTSCHLANDS 58 (1992);
ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN, STAATENNACHFOLGE IN VOLKERRECHTLICHE VERTRAGE 70 (2000).
8. Kashi Parasod Mirsa, Succession of States: Pakistan's membership in the United Nations, 3
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 283 (1965); Yehuda Z. Blum, UN. Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia:
Continuity or Break, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 830, 832 (1992); See Indian Independence Order, U.N. GAOR, 2d
Sess., 6th Comm., Annex 6c, at 3b U.N. Doc. A/C.6/161 (1947); Scharf, supra note 5, at 50, 59.
9. G.A. Res. 108 (I1), at 1451, U.N. Doe. A/399 (Sept. 30, 1947); Succession of States
Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8.
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and the Slovak Republic, incorporating sixty per cent and forty per cent
respectively,' were obliged to apply for new membership in the UN."
After the dissolution of the Former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter SFRY), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter FRY)
contained only forty per cent of the territory;" therefore the UN rejected its
claim of continuation.' 3 Therefore, because Acastus and Rubria both assumed
fifty per cent of Nessus's former territory, Acastus has no clear majority and is
not identical with Nessus.
b. Acastus has not incorporated the majority of Nessus 's population or the
dominant share of its military infrastructure.
Only when a new state incorporates the majority of the former state's
population and the dominant share of its military infrastructure the state can be
considered identical to the former state.' 4 India's claim was accepted because
it incorporated eighty per cent of British India's population, 5 while Russia's
claim was accepted because it incorporated more than half of the Soviet
Union's population 6 and assumed the dominant share of its enormous military
infrastructure. 7 In contrast the FRY contained less than half of the SFRY's
population and was not accepted as identical to the SFRY.' 8 As Acastus
incorporated only fifty per cent of Nessus's population and military apparatus
it cannot claim to be identical to Nessus.
c. Acastus cannot claim to be identical because third states have not
accepted this claim.
Third states' acceptance or non-acceptance of continuation claims is an
important subjective element.'9 Although the FRY claimed to continue the
10. See Mary Battiata, Czechs, Slovaks Set "Velvet Divorce ", WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 28, 1992,
at A25.
11. G.A. Res. 47/221, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/221 (Jan. 19, 1993); G.A. Res. 47/222, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/222 (Jan. 19, 1993).
12. Blum, supra note 8, at 833.
13. G.A. Res. 47/1, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992); S.C. Res. 777, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992).
14. See DORR, supra note 7, at 131,140; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 7, at 70, 71.
15. Scharf, supra note 5, at 50.
16. Blum, supra note 8.
17. Scharf, supra note 5, at 51.
18. G.A. Res. 47/1, supra note 13; S.C. Res. 777, supra note 13; Marc Weller, The International
Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
19. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 639; DORR, supra note 7, at 142; ZIMMERMANN, supra note
7, at 77.
20061
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
SFRY's UN seat,2" the claim was not accepted by the USA, Canada, Japan,
Australia, and members of the European Community.2 Rubria and several
other states have vigorously and consistently protested against Acastus's claim
to continue Nessus's membership, thereby demonstrating that Acastus's claim
must also be rejected.
d Nessus's dissolution was not concluded with a devolution agreement.
A major subjective requirement for continuation is the existence of a
devolution agreement.22 Even though Russia fulfilled all objective criteria
illustrated above, the UN nonetheless made clear that it was only possible for
Russia to continue the USSR's membership in the UN because of the Alma Ata
devolution agreement between the USSR, Belarus, the Ukraine, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States. 23 India was also able to continue
British India's membership in the UN because of the existence of a devolution
agreement.24 Until today, the two successor states of Nessus have failed to sign
a devolution agreement, indicating that the consent of the states immediately
concerned and necessary for the continuation of the former state to be accepted,
has not been established.
2. Acastus does not enjoy Nessus's membership or membership rights,
including access to the Court sui generis.
Until Acastus has applied for new membership in the UN, it would be
incompatible with international law to temporarily continue Nessus's member-
ship or certain membership rights sui generis because the Charter does not
provide for rights derived from a sui generis position, and the 2004 judgments
of this Court in Legality of Use of Force25 make clear that sui generis status
does not grant access to the Court.
20. Scharf, supra note 5, at 59.
21. See G.A. Res. 47/201, U.N. Doe. A/RES/47/201 (Dec. 22, 1992).
22. Paul R. Williams, State Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political
Criteria v. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations, 43 INT'L & COmP. L. Q. 776, 783 (1994); See
BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 623.
23. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 I.L.M.
151 (1991); See Scharf, supra note 5, at 68.
24. See Indian Independence Order, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 6th Comm., Annex 6c, at 308-10, U.N.
Do. A/C.6/161 (1947).
25. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Can.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 15) (Preliminary
Objections) [hereinafter Legality of Use of Force].
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a. The Charter does not provide for rights derived
from a sui generis position.
The provisions of the Charter, as far as the relationship of the UN vis-6-vis
states is concerned, have been formulated in exclusive terms of a member
state/non-member state dichotomy.26 Because Acastus is not a member to the
UN, it therefore does not enjoy any rights attendant upon UN membership
b. Sui generis status does not grant access to the Court.
The position taken by the UN by accepting the FRY as a new member state
in 2000 and this Court's judgments in the Legality of Use of Force document
the legal irrelevance of a state's sui generis position. Although the FRY's
continuation claim was rejected by the UN, the FRY was defacto allowed to
participate in particular work of the UN. In Application for Revision27 this
Court examined the issue of a sui generis position for the FRY and stated that
it was unable to deny locus standi to the FRY in the Genocide Case"8 due to the
unclear and unprecedented situation before it and therefore developed the
ambiguous term ofsui generis status.29 In its 2004 judgments in Legality of Use
of Force however, this Court clarified that a sui generis position is generally
not legally relevant and ruled that "sui generis, "is not a prescriptive term from
which certain defined legal consequences "accrue" and "no final and definitive
conclusion was drawn... from this descriptive term on the amorphous status
of the [FRI] vis-6-vis or within the United Nations. 30 It further stated that "the
sui generis position of the Applicant could not have amounted to its
membership in the Organization 3 ' and came to the conclusion that the FRY
was not a member of the UN, and in that capacity a state party to the statute of
the ICJ. 32 As emphasized in Judge Kreca's dissenting opinion in Genocide
Case (Application for Revision), the FRY's so-called sui generis position was
considered insufficient for establishing access to the Court.33 In light of the
final clarifications in the above cases, the fact that Acastus enjoys certain de
26. Opinion of Judge Kreca, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 20.
27. Application for Revision of the Judgment of I 1 July 1996 in the Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Yugo. v. Bosn. & Herz.),
2003 I.C.J. 7 (Feb. 3) (Preliminary Objections) [hereinafter Genocide Case (Application for Revision)].
28. See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11) (Preliminary Objections) [hereinafter
Genocide Case].
29. See Genocide Case (Application for Revision), 2003 I.C.J. 7, at 70.
30. Legality of Use of Force, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at T 73.
31. Id. at 77.
32. Id.; Opinion of Judge Kreca, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 20.
33. See Genocide Case (Application for Revision), 2003 I.C.J. 7, at 30 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Kreca); Legality of Use of Force, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 89.
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facto participation rights despite its unresolved identity does not create legal
circumstances amounting to access to this Court.
B. Alternatively, Acastus's sui generis position does not imply that it
automatically continues Nessus's declaration of submission to the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction.
The submission of a former state generally does not have binding effect on
successor states.34 The judgment in the Genocide Case (Application for
Revision) supports this position, as the Court stated that it explicitly based its
jurisdiction on ICJ Statute Article 35(2)"5 in connection with Article 9 of the
Genocide Convention 36 and not on the FRY's sui generis status.37 Acastus did
not declare its submission to the ICJ as required under Article 36(2) of the ICJ
statute. 38  Acastus did not apply for membership, evidently seeking to
circumvent Rubria's reservation to the statute, under which it only accepts the
compulsory jurisdiction of this Court when the opposing state has been a party
to the ICJ statute for at least twelve months. If Acastus had applied for
membership as requested, jurisdiction could not be granted in the present case
due to the Rubrian reservation. For these reasons, the Court does not enjoy
jurisdiction in this case.
II. BY PERMITTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PIPELINE AS PROPOSED,
RUBRIA EXERCISES RIGHTS ATTENDANT TO ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER
TERRITORY AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND DOES NOT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Rubria does not violate the ICCPR or customary international law.
A. Rubria has not violated international treaty law.
Acastus cannot claim rights under the ICCPR39 and alternatively, Rubria
has not violated the ICCPR.
34. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 7, at 672.
35. . Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 35.
36. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
37. See Genocide Case, 1996 I.C.J. 595, at 41; Legality ofUse ofForce, 2004 I.C.J. 1, at 87.
38. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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1. Acastus cannot claim rights under the ICCPR because Acastus's claim of
automatic succession to the Convention must be denied.
According to the rules of customary international law codified in Articles
34 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties4", a treaty generally
only creates rights and obligations for the contracting parties. 41 Acastus never
became party to the ICCPR in its own capacity and can therefore not invoke
articles thereof, as it neither signed nor ratified this treaty as required in ICCPR
Articles 48(1) and (2).42 According to the clean slate principle, Acastus does
not enjoy rights under the ICCPR because it is not in continuation of Nessus;
successor States do not automatically succeed in party status because VCST
Article 3443 does not represent customary international law. 44 Israel explicitly
stated in its 1948 Declaration of Independence that it was not bound by any
treaties "on the basis of generally recognized principles of international law;' ' 5
additional state practice confirms this principle.46 E.g. Israel emphasized that
a singular declaration of succession cannot have constitutive effect.47 Just as
UN membership is strictly personal in character,48 party status to human rights
treaties is directly connected to the legal personality of the state. Acastus is
therefore not a party to the ICCPR and thus not entitled to invoke articles
thereof.
2. Alternatively, Rubria has not violated the ICCPR.
Alternatively, Rubria has not violated the ICCPR because the Elysians, as
an indigenous group, are not "peoples" in the sense of ICCPR Article 1, and do
not constitute a minority entitled to protection under ICCPR Article 2741 in
Rubria.
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 34, 36, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
41. Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 127 (May 26) (Preliminary
Objections); See generally Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 7, at 29 (May 25).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 48, Mar. 23, 1976,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
43. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 34, Aug. 22, 1978, 17
I.L.M. 1488 (1978).
44. Genocide Case, 1996 I.C.J. 595, at 109-11 l(dissenting opinion judge Kreca); Shigejiro
Tabata, Interim Report by the Committee on State Succession, in 9 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 173 (1965); See Anthony A. Lester, State Succession and Localized Treaties, 4
HARV. INT'L L. CLUB J. 145, 153 (1962); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1992).
45. Lester, supra note 44, at 145, 153; See YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW
STATES OF AFRICA 158 (1983).
46. Tabata, supra note 44; See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44.
47. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 7, at 562; MAKONNEN, supra note 45.
48. U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 1st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947); Scharf,
supra note 5.
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 27.
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a. The Elysians are not 'peoples " in the sense of ICCPR Article 1.
The ICCPR must be interpreted according to the rules of the VCLT.5
According to VCLT Articles 31 and 32, a treaty's terms must be interpreted
according to their ordinary meaning; if terms remain ambiguous, the travaux
prdparatoires may be consulted.5 Diverse opinions can be found on the
interpretation of the term "peoples" in Article 152, because the wording leaves
the meaning obscure.53 The travaux prparatoires document that minorities
were not included in the term "peoples" nor accorded the right of self-
determination at the time of drafting.54 In multinational states, such groups
must be of comparable size to other groups and be constitutionally recognized
as a people.55 The term "peoples" implies all people-the demos-and not
separate ethnoses or religious groups.56 Even if the Elysians partially possess
these characteristics, they are not constitutionally recognized as a people by
Acastus or Rubria and are not comparable in size to other groups, as they
consist of only approximately 5,000 people. The Elysians have instead
demonstrated that they are part of the Acastian people by accepting Acastian
citizenship and actively participating in the Acastian government. The ILO's
1957 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention categorized indigenous
populations solely as members of the national population.5 7 When the ILO
50. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS CPPR COMMENTARY
952-53, 994 (2d ed. 2005).
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31,32, May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331; See
Lighthouses Case (Fr. v. Greece), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.62, at 4, 13; Conditions of Admission of a State
to Membership in the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), 1948 I.C.J. 57, at 63 (May 28); Competence of the
General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3). See generally
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 1 I (May 16) (Advisory Opinion).
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 1.
53. KNuT IPSEN & EBERHARD MENZEL, VOLKERRECHT 407 (5th ed. 2004); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 230-31 (5th ed. 2003).
54. U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., at14-15, U.N. Doc. A/2929, (July 1, 1955); Sub-Comm. on Prevention
of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Study: The Right to Self-Determination, Implementation of the
UnitedNations Resolutions, at 9, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. I (Mar. 1981) (prepared by Hector Gros
Espiell); Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Study: The right to Self-
Determination, Historical and Current Development on the Basis of UnitedNations Instruments, at 41, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.A/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1 (198 1) (prepared by Aureliu Cristescu); Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination
of People, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 96
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); IPSEN, supra note 53, at 413.
55. CASSESE, supra note 54, at 92, 94-96; IPSEN, supra note 53, at 409.
56. ANNA MEUKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF MINORITIES
AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (2001); See generally U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 18,
82, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (July 19, 1993).
57. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, CONVENTION ON INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL
POPULATIONS, ILO No. 107, art. 1 (June 2, 1959), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/convdispl.htm (last visited Sep. 28, 2006) [hereinafter ILO 107].
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recognized indigenous groups as peoples in ILO Convention 169, it clarified in
Article 1(3) that no legal consequences can be derived from this term. 58 States
have not supported documents like the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, which attempted to grant indigenous groups inter alia the
right to self-determination. 9 For these reasons, the Elysians do not enjoy the
right of self-determination as an indigenous group, and Rubria, therefore, did
not violate ICCPR Article 1.
b. Rubria has not violated ICCPR Article 27 because the Elysians are not a
protected minority on Rubrian territory.
Rubria has not violated ICCPR Article 27 because the Elysians are not
Rubrian citizens and have not demonstrated the required element of stability on
Rubrian territory, and Article 27 does not include agricultural activities in its
scope of protection. Even if the Elysians and their farming practices are pro-
tected under Article 27, Rubria's fundamental right to economic development
and other vital State interests supersedes Elysian claims.
i. The Elysians are not Rubrian nationals and have not demonstrated the
required element of stability on Rubrian territory.
Article 27 is not applicable to aliens because the drafting process confirms
that the term minority only implies groups of nationals.6" Being nationals of
Acastus and not of Rubria, the Elysians do not fall under the protection of
Article 27 in Rubria. Alternatively, a minority must additionally fulfill the
requirement of "existence" in the relevant state to be protected under Article 27.
As can be derived from the travauxpr~paratoires, stability was emphasized in
the definition of minorities in order to prevent recognition of immigrants,
migrant workers and other forms of "new minorities."'" During the drafting, the
GA emphasized the necessity of distinguishing between long-established, well-
defined minorities, and temporary visitors, who, on account of their transient
58. Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169, June 27,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989).
59. See Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/! 992/28
(June 23, 1992); See also IPSEN,supra note 53, at 412; See generally 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res.
60/I, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/l (Oct. 24, 2005).
60. PARTICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 171 (1991); See
generally Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. ofMinorities, Study of the Rights Belonging
to Ethnic, Religious andLinguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 (1977) (prepared by Francesco
Capotorti).
61. The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, U.N. GAOR, 1 0th Sess., at 63 186,
U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955); MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 495 (1987); NOwAK, supra note 50, at 646.
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relationship to the host state, should not be entitled to enjoy the same rights.62
In order to fulfill these criteria, an ethnic group must have inhabited a tradi-
tional settlement area within the state for a significant period of time.63 The
Elysians are not a long-established group with a settlement inside Rubria
because they enter and leave Rubria daily for work. Therefore they fail to
satisfy the element of stability required for the attribution of minority status in
Rubria.
ii. Rubria has not violated Article 2 7 because agricultural activities are not
included in its scope ofprotection.
Article 27 prohibits State parties to "deny to minorities the right to enjoy
their own culture, profess their own religions, or use their own language."' If
the enjoyment of culture includes protection of a particular way of life
associated with the use of land, this solely addresses a relationship with the land
that would give rise to a distinct culture.65 The Human Rights Committee
accepted the 1976 expropriation of the one hundred and twenty-five year old
Rehbooth community in Namibia because cattle raising cannot create such a
relationship to the land "that would have given rise to distinctive culture."66
Because it cannot be assumed that Elysian agricultural practices create a
relevant cultural link to the occupied territory, Rubria has not violated Article
27 by allowing the construction of the pipeline.
iii. Alternatively, even if the Elysians and their agricultural practices are
protected, Rubria's fundamental right to economic development supersedes
Elysian claims.
Even if states are required to uphold minority rights under the ICCPR,
these rights are not absolute.67 The Human Rights Committee stated in
Lovelace that state parties may restrict minority rights to residential areas of the
minority when such measures "have both a reasonable and objective
62. See The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., at 181,
184, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955); NOWAK, supra note 50, at 646; CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, Protection of
Minorities under Article 27 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in VOLKERRECHT ALS
RECHTSORDNUNG-INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKErr-MENSCHENRECHTE: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HERMANN
MOSLER 949, 961 (1983).
63. Fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 1993: Ger. 22/02/96, at 244, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/84/Add.5 (Feb. 22, 1996).
64. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 27.
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 10-28, 2000, J.G.A. Diergaardt v.
Namibia, 10.6, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., H.R.C., Communication No.760/1997,
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (Sept. 6, 2000).
66. Id.
67. NOwAK, supra note 50, at 658.
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justification."68 Others claim that Article 27 rights are limited by other rights
guaranteed under the ICCPR or general limitation clauses such as ICCPR
Article 18(3).69 Under Article 18(3), States may limit ICCPR rights in order to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms under their own legal systems.7" The
Rubrian people enjoy the right to self-determination under ICCPR Article 1,
including the right to development and the right to exploit their natural
resources. Development is recognized as an inherent right,7' inseparable from
self-determination and fundamental to human rights. 72  Even assumed that
agricultural activities in Rubria establish similar ties as habitation, e.g. Article
1 1 of ILO Convention No. 107 explicitly allows for the removal of indigenous
people for reasons of national economic development. 73 As Rubria's economic
development depends on the exploitation of oil resources and the construction
of the pipeline through the Elysium, Rubria's right to development provides a
reasonable and objective justification for the restriction of any Elysian rights
connected to the Elysium and must prevail over rights protected in ICCPR
Article 27.
B. Rubria has not violated rights of the Elysians under customary
international law.
Under customary international law, minority protection is limited to the
general rights of equality and non-discrimination.74 Several governments,
including France, consistently interpret Article 27 as applying only to countries
which have adopted the ICCPR without reservation.75 In the alternative, even
if the scope were expanded to include the rights contained in Article 27,
attempts to grant additional rights to indigenous peoples have failed due to lack
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, IM 15-16,
U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., H.R.C. Communication No. 24/1977, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/I (July 30,1981); See
NOWAK, supra note 50, at 655 and accompanying text.
69. NOWAK, supra note 50, at 667; See Tomuschat, supra note 62, at 976 and accompanying text;
See also Louis B. Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF
PEACE 38 (1968).
70. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, at art. 18(3); NOWAK, supra
note 50, at 430.
71. Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41 st Sess., Supp. No.
53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986); IPSEN, supra note 53, at 440.
72. See generally U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 261, U.N. Doc. A/48/141 (1993).
73. 1LO 107, supra note 57, at art. 11.
74. Individual opinion of Rosalyn Higgins, T.K. v. France, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.40,
H.R.C. Communication No. 220/1987, in Report of the Human Rights Committee, Volume 1I, Appendix H1,
at 125, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (Oct. 4, 1990).
75. Id.; See also NOWAK, supra note 50, at 641.
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of acceptance on the international plane.76 Because customary international law
does not exceed the protection standards for minorities established in the
ICCPR, the construction of the pipeline would not violate rights enjoyed by the
Elysians.
III. THE ACTIONS OF PROF ARE NOT IMPUTABLE TO RuBRIA UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR ALTERNATIVELY, DID NOT VIOLATE ANY
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION OWED BY RUBRIA TO ACASTUS.
As this honorable Court stated in Elettronica Sicula, an allegation of state
responsibility should not be made lightly.77 Hence, the criteria for invoking
state responsibility must clearly be satisfied before raising an allegation.
A. PROF's actions cannot be imputed to Rubria.
1) PROF acted as a private legal entity and not as a state organ of Rubria,
2) no defacto relationship exists between PROF and Rubria which entails state
responsibility under international law, and 3) Rubria bears no responsibility due
to so-called "supporting and harboring" PROF.
1. PROF did not act as a State organ of Rubria.
The status of an organ must be determined by the state's internal law."
Because PROF does not have this status under Rubrian domestic law, it did not
act as an organ of Rubria. Although it is argued that the status of organ should
additionally be examined under international law in exceptional cases,79 this
position has not gained international acceptance, as evidenced by objections
raised in the drafting process of the ILC Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility."0 Also, while it is claimed that "all officers and men in authority"
represent the state and act on its behalf,8 retired and former military personnel
are nowhere classified as organs of state. Therefore, PROF clearly did not act
as an organ of Rubria.
76. Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, supra note 59; IPSEN, supra note 53, at
412; See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 59.
77. See Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
78. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in United Nations
International Law Commission Report on the work of its fifty-third session, U.N.GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at43, U.N.Doc.A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafterILC Draft]; See THE INTERNATIONAL LAWCOMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 91 (James Crawford ed.,
2002) [hereinafter Crawford].
79. Crawford, supra note 78, at 98, Art.4 11.
80. International Law Commission, State responsibility: Comments and observations received from
Governments (Poland), U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515/Add.2 (May 1, 2001).
81. Crawford, supra note 78, at 94, Art.4 3 and accompanying text.
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2. No de facto relationship exists between PROF and Rubria which entails
State responsibility under international law.
As a general principle of international law, "the conduct of private persons
or entities is not attributable to the State., 82 As held by this honorable Court in
Nicaragua, only the actions of private persons or entities acting as de facto
organs or agents under the instruction, direction or effective control of a state
can be imputed under customary international law.83 This was confirmed in the
ILC Draft. 84 PROF has not acted a) as a defacto organ of Rubria, b) on instruc-
tions given by Rubria, or c) under its direction or control. Furthermore, d) the
actions of PROF cannot be imputed to Rubria due to a "failure to control."
a. PROF did not act as a defacto organ of Rubria exercising
elements of governmental authority.
"The fact that a state initially establishes a corporate entity, whether by
special law or otherwise, is not a sufficient basis for attribution to the state of
the subsequent conduct of that entity." 85 According to ILC Article 5, solely the
conduct of entities empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of
governmental authority shall be considered an act of state.86 The internal law
in question must specifically authorize the conduct as involving the exercise of
public authority.87 It is not sufficient that internal law permits activities as part
of the general regulation of the affairs of the community.88 Proposals to delete
the phrase empowered "by the law of that State" in the ILC Draft, referring only
to the vague term "elements of governmental authority" without further clarifi-
cation" are incompatible with customary international law and are therefore not
82. Crawford, supra note 78, at 110, Art.8 9 1; See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24); BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 437 and accompanying text.
83. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
at In 109, 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 9 301 (Dec. 19, 2005) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icojudgments/icojudgment_20051219.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2006)
[hereinafter Armed Activities].
84. Crawford, supra note 78, at 110-11, Art.8 4.
85. Crawford, supra note 78, at 112-13, Art.8 16; See Schering Corp. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 361 (1984); Otis Elevator Co. v. Iran, Iran Award 304-284-2, 1987 WL 503815 (1987); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
86. Crawford, supra note 78, at 112-13, Art.8 16.
87. See Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 72 (1985); Crawford, supra note 78, at
113, Art.897.
88. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 7.
89. International Law Commission, State responsibility: Comments and observations received from
Governments (Japan), U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., at 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 (Mar. 19, 2001).
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reflected in the final version.90 No Rubrian law authorized PROF or COG to
engage in any specific conduct, in particular the exercise of any governmental
authority. The Rubrian Ministry of Natural Resources approved COG's
contract with PROF as a shareholder and not on the basis of an internal law.
PROF therefore did not act as a defacto organ of Rubria.
b. PROF did not act under Rubrian instruction.
PROF did not act under Rubrian instruction in perpetrating the alleged
actions because Rubria did not exercise the necessary decisive influence over
COG to qualify its approval of the contract between COG and PROF as giving
instructions. Alternatively, the alleged actions of PROF were not committed
under specific instructions from Rubria and can therefore not be imputed.
i. The Rubrian Ministry of Natural Resources did not issue instructions to
PROF when it approved the contract between COG and PROF.
The conduct of private entities has only been attributed to the state in
exceptional cases where evidence showed that "the State was using its owner-
ship interest in or control of a corporation specifically to achieve a particular
result."'" In Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases, even the actions of a fully state-
owned oil company were not attributed to the state as there was no proof that
the state used its ownership interest as a vehicle for directing a company to
seize property.92 As documented in these cases and specifically addressed in
European Competition law concerning shareholder responsibility, shareholders
must have decisive influence over a corporation's actions in order for these
actions to be attributed to the shareholder.93 Necessary decisive influence can
only be established when the shareholder fully owns the subsidiary or possesses
more than fifty per cent of the subsidiary's shares, enabling it to effectively
90. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 7.
91. Crawford, supra note 78, at 112-13, Art.8 6 and accompanying text; See Foremost Tehran,
Inc. v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228 (1986); American Bell Int'l Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib.
Rep. 170 (1986).
92. See Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 23 (1987); Int'l Technical
Products Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 206 (1985); Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. v. Iran, 12 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 335 (1986).
93. See Case C-286/98, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 1-09925, 61;
Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd. v. Comn'n, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 692 (Advocate General Mayras);
Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Comm'n, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 14-16;
Joined Cases 6/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm'n, 1974
E.C.R. 223, 26-31; See also Peter Jan Kuyper, European Community Law and Extraterritoriality: Some
Trends and New Developments, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1013, 1016-21 (1984).
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control the company's activities.94 COG enacted simple majority voting
procedures for shareholder decisions in its corporate charter. Rubria, holding
forty-nine per cent of shares, was not able to overrule TNC or otherwise control
COG's policies. Therefore, Rubria, as its minority shareholder, did not have
the decisive influence over COG necessary for it to be in a position to issue
instructions to PROF.
ii. Alternatively, the alleged Human Rights violations by PROF were not
committed according to specific instructions by Rubria.
"A State, in giving lawful instructions to persons who are not its organs,
does not assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in an
internationally wrongful manner."95 Human rights violations committed by the
Nicaraguan Contras were not imputable to the U.S. because they were not
carried out under specific instructions of the CIA.96 In the present case, Rubria
did not issue specific instructions to PROF. Rubria merely approved a contract
between COG and PROF, authorizing PROF to guard COG personnel. This
contract did not authorize or instruct PROF to force Elysians to perform
dangerous work without compensation. Rubria therefore clearly did not
specifically instruct PROF to commit the alleged actions.
c. PROF did not act under the direction or control of Rubria.
Rubria did not i) exercise effective control over the actions of PROF, ii)
Overall control would not be sufficient to impute actions of private individuals
or entities to a state, and iii) even if overall control were sufficient to entail
responsibility, Rubria did not exercise this level of control over PROF.
i. Rubria did not exercise effective control over the actions of PROF.
This Court previously examined the degree of control necessary for
attribution of private actions to a state in Nicaragua, where it established that
responsibility is based on effective control-actual participation and
direction-by a state.97 "A general situation of dependence and support would
be insufficient to justify attribution of the conduct to the state."9" As shown
above, Rubria did not give specific instructions or directions to PROF.
94. Id.; See Olivier De Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationalsfor Human Rights Violations
in European Law, in NON STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 276 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter De Schutter].
95. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 8.
96. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at I 109, 115.
97. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 62, 64-65, 86, 109, 115.
98. Crawford, supra note 78, at 110-11, Art.8 4; Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. 14, at 109-115.
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Furthermore, Rubrian officials did not participate in the actions at issue.
Therefore, Rubria did not exercise effective control over PROF.
ii. Overall control is not sufficient to impute actions ofprivate individuals
or entities to a State.
No argument to the contrary can be drawn from Prosecutor v. Tadic
(Appeal); Tadic did not examine the issue of state responsibility, " but solely
determined the existence of an international conflict and the application of
international humanitarian law on the basis that the FRY exercised overall
control' over the Bosnian Serb Army. Additionally, the inapplicability of the
overall control doctrine does not conflict with Tadic because, as rightfully held
by ICTY Judge Shahabuddeen, a violation of international human rights or
humanitarian law requires a higher degree of control than an illegal use of
force.'' In contrast, it would contravene rules of customary international law
referenced in Nicaragua and confirmed in the ILC Draft if the broader Tadic
criteria were applied in the present case of state responsibility.' 2 Overall
control is therefore not sufficient to impute the actions of PROF to Rubria.
iii. Even if overall control is sufficient for invoking responsibility, Rubria
did not exercise this degree of control over PROF.
As held in Tadic, overall control is established when the state not only
finances and equips forces, but also plans, participates in and supervises
military activities. 0 3 In Tadic, "forces were almost completely dependent on
the supplies [of the state] to carry out offensive operations."" 4 In this case,
Rubria did not equip PROF, because PROF independently determined its
equipment needs and procured those items on the open market. Rubria did not
participate in the planning and supervision of the alleged activities, as it had no
decisive influence or control over COG or PROF. As held in Jorgic and cited
in Tadic,'°5 State organs or officials must actively participate in the conduct
beyond financing and providing technical equipment in order to establish
99. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. lT-94-1-I, Appeals Chamber, Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen,
114, 18, 38 I.L.M. 1518, 1611 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic]; Crawford, supra note 78, at 111-12,
Art.8 5.
100. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at 141.
101. Id.
102. Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 301, (Separate Opinion of Judge Simma),
at 29, (Separate Opinion Kooijmans), at 25; Crawford, supra note 78, at 111-12, Art.8 5.
103. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at IN 145, 160.
104. Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at 155.
105. See Tadic, 38 I.L.M. at 130 and accompanying text.
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overall control, specifically using the term "Verpflechtung."'' 0 6 In the present
case, only PROF personnel participated in the alleged actions. As former
members of the Rubrian armed forces were completely discharged from service
before joining PROF, PROF personnel cannot be considered State organs or
officials of Rubria. Therefore, Rubrian organs and officials clearly did not
participate in PROF's activities. Attribution of ultra vires acts beyond acts of
state organs as stated in ILC Draft Article 9, is not compatible with customary
international law as enshrined in Nicaragua.0 7 In any case, this claim is only
brought forward concerning acts committed under a state's effective control,'0 8
which, as demonstrated above, Rubria did not exercise over PROF at any time.
Alternatively, PROF's activities clearly went beyond instructions. As PROF
was mandated by COG only to guard COG personnel, the conduct in question
was clearly incidental. Therefore, PROF's actions do not give rise to ultra vires
attribution to Rubria under international law.
d. The alleged conduct cannot be attributed to Rubria
due to a 'failure to control."
As this Court held in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the
"mere failure to control the activities of armed ... bands in itself cannot be
attributed to the territorial State as an unlawful act."'0 9 Therefore, Rubria
cannot be held responsible for the alleged acts because it was merely the situs.
According to Article 9 ILC Draft, conduct may be attributed to a state "in the
absence or default of the official authorities" when the conduct effectively
relates to the exercise of governmental authority and occurred in situations
where a state has lost control or collapsed."0 The conduct here cannot be
attributed to Rubria for "failure to control" because PROF did not exercise
elements of governmental authority nor had Rubria lost control over its
territory, including the Elysian Fields.
3. PROF's actions are not imputable to Rubria due to
"supporting and harboring."
Attempts to legally justify military action in Afghanistan and Iraq
following September I Ith have not changed the general rules of state
responsibility for the attribution of private acts to the state relevant in this case.
106. Id.
107. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 7 109, 115; Cf Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116,
at 301.
108. Crawford, supra note 78, at 113, Art.8 18.
109. Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 301, (Separate Opinion of Koojimans), at
24.
110. Crawford, supra note 78, at 114-15, Art.9 IM 3, 5.
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Some scholars claim that the principle of "supporting and harboring" contains
a special standard of imputability between terrorist groups and host states,"'
while others claim that Article 51 also applies to armed attacks of non-state
origin."'2 As the factual and legal situation surrounding September 11 th is not
comparable to the present case and PROF's actions cannot be considered
terrorist acts, they would certainly not be imputed to Rubria under such
standards.
B. Alternatively, PROF's actions did not violate any international
obligation owed by Rubria to Acastus.
The alleged actions did not violate an international obligation owed by
Rubria to Acastus because Acastus is not party to the ICCPR and the actions
did not violate customary international law. They do not amount to prohibited
forced labor because the Elysians were adequately compensated for their
efforts. Alternatively, Acastus cannot make such a complaint venire contra
factum proprium as the actions are attributable to the Acastian domestic
corporation TNC and furthermore imputable to Acastus itself. Acastus is
estopped from holding Rubria legally responsible for conduct which it
guaranteed to Rubria in the RABBIT would not be committed by Acastian
companies.
IV. ACASTUS HAS VIOLATED RABBIT ARTICLE 52 BY FAILING TO ENFORCE
ALL ASPECTS OF ITS DOMESTIC LAW.
If COG and PROF have in fact violated the human rights of the Elysians,
Acastus has violated obligations toward Rubria contained in RABBIT Article
52 by dismissing TNC as a defendant in the Borius litigation on the basis of a
too narrow interpretation of "conduct abroad," because TNC's influence and
control over COG constitutes "conduct abroad" under MCRA Section Four,
therefore requiring the attribution of COG's and PROF's conduct to TNC, or
alternatively, Acastus failed to enforce provisions contained in AIRES,
constituting a violation of Article 52 RABBIT.
111. Albrecht Randelzhofer, The Charter of the UnitedNations, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECURITY VS. LIBERTY? 34 (Christian Walker et al. eds., 2004); See
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
112. Armed Activities, I.C.J. General List No. 116, at 301, (Separate Opinion of Simma), at 13,
(Separate Opinion of Kooijmans), at 23; Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory
Opinion - An Ipse Dixit from the IC]?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005); See generally Markus Krajewski,
Selbstverteidigung gegen bewaffnete Angriffe nicht-staatlicher Organisationen, 40 ARCHIV DES
VOLKERRECHTS 183 (2002).
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A. TNC's influence and control over COG and PROF constitutes "conduct
abroad" requiring the attribution of the alleged human rights violations to
TNC under RABBIT Article 52.
RABBIT Article 52 in connection with MCRA Section Four obliges
Acastus to grant jurisdiction in all cases where a violation of Section Four by
an Acastian domestic company is alleged. Acastus violated this obligation by
dismissing TNC from the Borius litigation because the term "conduct abroad"
must be interpreted according to international law and thus, human rights
violations of COG and PROF must be attributed to TNC because TNC
exercised sufficient influence and control over COG and PROF to cause a duty
of care to arise under international law.
1. The term "conduct abroad" in MCRA Section Four must be interpreted
according to international law.
Although the MCRA was originally passed as domestic law, its
incorporation into the RABBIT and the December 15, 2002 declaration by the
Acastian prime minister evidence that MCRA provisions have taken effect
between Rubria and Acastus and must be interpreted according to international
law. Due to the incorporation by reference, the MCRA becomes a rule of
international law in effect between Rubria and Acastus. Because investment
treaties are instruments of international law, arbitrators "should have recourse
to the rules of general international law to supplement those of the treaty.""' 3
ICSID Convention Article 42(1) reflects the generally accepted principle of
customary international law that the domestic law of the host state and the
applicable rules of international law govern the interpretation of investment
treaty provisions if no explicit choice of law is made. 14 The RABBIT does not
provide for an explicit choice of law for the interpretation of its treaty
provisions. Therefore, the application of the principle of limited liability as
under Acastian domestic law by the Acastian civil court is incorrect. Instead,
the interpretation must be governed by Rubrian law as law of the host state and
the rules of customary international law.
113. Antonio Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated Under Investment
Treaties, 16 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 21 (2001); Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R.
Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration, at
10 (2.2.2), (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment int-human-rights-bits.pdf
(last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
114. Convention on the Settlements of Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States, Art.
42, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
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2. TNC is liable for human rights violations committed by COG and PROF
under international law.
TNC is liable for human rights violations committed by COG and PROF
under international law because customary international law establishes parent
company liability for human rights violations, and TNC exercised sufficient
influence and control over COG and PROF to establish liability for their human
rights violations.
a. The customary international law principle ofparent company
liability applies in cases of human rights violations, particularly in
cases offorced labor.
According to ICJ Statute Article 38(1), ageneralpractice acceptedas law
is required for customary international law to emerge.115  State practice
encompasses all legally relevant acts, including those within international
organizations and between states. 1 6 State practice and opiniojuris affirm that
the parent company of a multi-national corporation owes a legal duty of care to
those affected by its subsidiary operations, provided there is sufficient
involvement in and control over the subsidiary operations by the parent. 117
This notion, i) reflected in the decisions of supra- and international courts, is
derived from State practice of ii) national courts inter alia in the European
Union, USA, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Australia, and iii) manifested
in the recently created guidelines and declarations of major international
organizations.
i. Supranational and international Courts' decisions confirm the legal
responsibility ofparent companies.
This Court already confirmed in Barcelona Traction that the principle of
limited liability has no unrestricted validity under international law when it
stated that "lifting the corporate veil" or "disregarding the legal entity" can be
115. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1); North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G.
v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20).
116. IPSEN, supra note 53, at 215; OTTO KIMMINICH & STEPHAN HOBE, EENFTHRUNG IN DAS
VOLKERRECHT 184 (8th ed., 2004).
117. See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter UN
Norms on the Responsibility ofTransnational Corporations]; Cf Steven R. Ratner, Corporations andHuman
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); Daniel Aguirre, Multinational
Corporations andthe Realisation ofEconomic, Social and CulturalRights, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53 (2004);
See also David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003); De Schutter,
supra note 92, at 227.
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justified at the international level under certain circumstances or for certain
purposes. 8
In its prevailing case law, the European Court of Justice applies rules
accepted by Member States when it emphasizes that the fact that a subsidiary
has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of
imputing its conduct to the parent company ... in particular where the subsi-
diary, although having separate legal personality, does not decide independently
upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the
instructions given to it by the parent company. 119
In European Competition law, the so-called "single economic unity
approach" E° demands that piercing the corporate veil may be possible in some
cases, for instance where the parent corporation fully owns the subsidiary or
possesses more than 50% of the shares of the subsidiary company, so that it is
in a position to control effectively its activities, or where the boards of directors
of both companies are composed essentially or fully of the same individuals. 2 '
ii. State practice evidences the legal responsibility of controlling companies
in cases of human rights violations, in particular where forced labor
occurred.
Recent U.S. court decisions based on the Alien Tort Claims Act122 have
ruled that a fictitious legal separation of activities to insulate the parent
company from liability for subsidiaries' activities is not (generally) permitted
under U.S. or international law. 123 Court decisions in the United Kingdom,1
24
Australia,125 and the Netherlands 26 have upheld the principle of parent company
responsibility in a similar manner.
118. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 l.C.J. 3, at 56
(Feb. 5).
119. Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd., 1972 E.C.R. 619, at 132-33; Case 107/82, AEG-Telefunken
AG v. Comm'n of the European Cmty's, 1983 E.C.R. 315 1, at 49; Europemballage and Continental Can,
1972 E.C.R. 215, at 15; De Schutter, supra note 94, at 279.
120. De Schutter, supra note 94, at 279.
121. De Schutter, supra note 94, at 276; AEG-Telefunken, 1983 E.C.R. 3151, at 50.
122. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).
123. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (Cal. App. 2002); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969
F. Supp. 362, 370-71 (D. La. 1997); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
124. Lubbe v. Cape Pic., [2001] 1 W.L.R 1545 (A.C.).
125. Dagi v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. & Anor (1997) 1 V.R. 428.
126. Gerrit Betlem, Transnational Litigation Against Multinational Corporations in Dutch Courts,
in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 283 (Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi
eds., 2000).
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iii. Recently created guidelines and declarations confirm parent company
responsibility for human rights violations committed by subsidiaries and
significantly influenced companies.
States' commitment to create a legal framework for multinationals is
reflected in the OECD's Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises-directly
referenced in the MCRA-according to which "to the extent that parent
companies actually exercise control over the activities of their subsidiaries, they
have a responsibility for observance of the Guidelines by those subsidiaries."' "
The most recent reflection of state practice is the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities ofTransnational Corporations approved by the United Nations
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which
define a transnational corporation as an enterprise, whether of public, private
or mixed ownership, comprising companies of two or more countries,
regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which
operates under a system of decision-making centers, in which the entities are
so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them exercise a
significant influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share
knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others. 128
A paramount concern in drafting the norms for exclusive application to
transnational corporations was that an inadequate definition "would allow
businesses to use financial and other devices to conceal the transnational
nature" of their operations, and thus avoid responsibility.'29 As the leading
expert in the drafting committee stated, the "Norms constitute a succinct, but
comprehensive restatement of the international legal principles" derived from
treaties and customary international law. 130 Forced labor is included as
prohibited conduct in both the OECD and the UN guidelines, and furthermore
in the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy'3' which are all generally accepted by the inter-
national community.
127. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Text, Commentary and Clarifications, at 9,
(Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/
4f7adc214b91a685c12569fa005d0ee7/dIbadale7Oca5d9Ocl256af6005ddad5/$FILE/JTO0 115758.PDF (last
visited Oct. 4, 2006).
128. UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, supra note 117, at 1(a).
129. Weissbrodt et al., supra note 117, at 909.
130. Weissbrodt et al., supra note 117, at 913 and accompanying text.
131. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 1.L.M. 422, para. 6 (Nov. 16, 1977).
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b. TNC exercised sufficient influence and control over COG and PROF to
establish liability for their human rights violations.
Although COG maintains a separate legal personality from TNC, TNC
nonetheless exercises significant influence over COG because it effectively
controls its activities, including those of its subcontractor PROF. In 2003
TNC's Chief Executive Officer Silvia Euterpe announced at a shareholders'
meeting that TNC was actively exploring commercially viable strategies for
exploiting the oil resources discovered in the southern Elysium. TNC then
founded COG in 2004 solely for the purposes of developing and exporting these
resources. TNC has not only exercised significant influence over COG since
its creation, it also continues to exercise exclusive control over COG because
it holds fifty-one per cent of COG's shares and appoints the majority of its
board of directors following simple majority voting procedures. COG therefore
cannot independently pursue its own policies and must instead carry out the
instructions of its majority shareholder. Although the Elysians supposedly
labored under PROF's supervision, TNC, as COG's majority shareholder, had
the authority to direct and control PROF's activities. For these reasons, the
conduct in question must be attributed to TNC.
B. Acastus violated RABBIT Article 52(2) by failing to enforce AIRES
provisions.
Because TNC is situated in Acastus, it is clearly present in Acastus for the
purposes of AIRES. The Rubrian claim cannot be rejected on the grounds that
TNC lacked subjectivity under international law. First, subjectivity is conferred
on Acastus under RABBIT Article 52 in connection with MCRA Section Four.
It binds Acastus to grant jurisdictions in all cases where a violation of those
rules is alleged, thus conferring legal personality on Acastian domestic corpora-
tions in regard to their compliance with all governing norms of international
law. Secondly, it is grossly inconsistent to claim that TNC, a private company,
cannot be subject to international law provisions on human rights, as the
Acastian courts must have assumed subjectivity under international law for the
private company COG when it was sentenced to compensation under the
AIRES in the same lawsuit. Thirdly, corporations must be held individually
liable for violations of international law committed in complicity with state
actors.' 32 Furthermore, because the plaintiffs in the Acastian civil court's case
incorrectly claimed that the human rights violations were committed by Rubrian
132. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1996); Eastman Kodak Co., 978 F.
Supp. at 1091-92; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 (1966); Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 6 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 494-507 (2001).
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officials, a state action requirement for subjectivity of TNC would have been
met. At minimum transnational companies must be subjects of international
law in cases of grave human rights violations such as forced labor.
13
Therefore, even if this honorable Court decides to interpret the term "conduct
abroad" in MCRA Section Four according to Acastian domestic law, Rubria has
violated its obligation vis-2i-vis Acastus under RABBIT Article 52 in
connection with the provisions of AIRES on the basis that TNC is responsible
for the alleged conduct of COG and PROF under international law.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUBMISSIONS
The State of Rubria respectfully requests this honorable Court to adjudge
and declare that:
I. The Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims other than those
under the RABBIT;
II. By permitting the construction of the pipeline as proposed,
Rubria exercises rights attendant to its sovereignty over territory
and natural resources and does not violate international law;
III. The actions of PROF are not imputable to Rubria under
international law, or alternatively did not violate any
international legal obligation owned by Rubria to Acastus;
IV. Acastus has violated RABBIT Article 52 by failing to enforce
all aspects of its domestic law.
Respectfully submitted,
Agents of the Respondent
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